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Abstract
Many of the issues and problems concerning the role of our frameworks
and structures of reasoning in the guidance of the process of social and
technological development are encapsulated in the debate about nuclear
energy. This thesis takes that debate as a context for analysing the
rationality of scientific knowledge of society and the role and influence
of such knowledge in debate and decision-making about appropriate forms of
social and technological development.
After an introductory review of the historical, political and economic
context of the issues and of the development of UK energy policy over the
last 25 years, the body of the thesis is structured into two parts.
In the first part, a critical examination of orthodox conceptions of
scientific objectivity is followed by an attempt to elaborate an
alternative conception of the nature of the rationality of social
scientific knowledge founded upon the notions of 'value-contingency'
and 'ideology'. This conception is developed through discussions of the
role of social problem-solving in providing a basis for the process of
knowledge development and of the role of the state in structuring the
problem-solving process and the development of social knowledge to
provide a complex 'technical' legitimatory framework. The concept of a
dominant 'technocratic ideology' is then elaborated and an attempt made
to identify and outline the major cognitive and normative components of
this ideology. In particular it is conceived of as presenting interrelated
ideological accounts of the appropriate form of knowledge development,
of the content of the social world and of the appropriate form of
knowledge utilisation, which are underpinned by 'materialistic',
'liberalist' and 'rationalist' normative traditions.
The second part of the thesis analyses certain aspects of the debate about
nuclear energy in order to attempt to identify the role and influence of
the 'technocratic ideology' and its normative commitments as elaborated
in the first part, with a view to assessing the validity and implications
of such a conception. After a review of the major issues of controversy
in the debate, covering the economic, safety, environmental, social and
political implications of nuclear energy, an attempt is made to clarify
and categorise the main dimensions of the dispute in terms of the
perception and valuation of economic benefits and 'social costs'.
Arguments in support of nuclear power are then examined, themes of
'technocratic rationality' identified and the implications for the conduct
of the debate discussed.
Two particular aspects of the debate are then examined in detail to
identify the influence of normative, ideological themes. Firstly,
pro-nuclear perceptions and interpretations of the energy problem are
analysed and liberalist and materialist themes identified; in particular
tendencies towards the establishment of 'materialist ethical imperatives'
are highlighted. Secondly, aspects of the process of consideration of
alternative means to the 'solution' of the energy problem are examined
including illustrations of the value-contingent nature of the relevant
social knowledge, an analysis of the treatment of the issue of demand-side
solutions in pro-nuclear arguments, and a brief disucssion of the implications
of technocratic rationality for the evaluation of the costs and benefits
of nuclear power. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the evidence for
the influence of technocratic rationality and the normative themes
identified, on the political implications of such dominant ideological
themes and on limitations of the analysis and further research directions.
iPreface
"Unless either philosophers become Kings in their countries
or those who are now called Kings and rulers come to be
sufficiently inspired with a genuine desire for wisdom;
unless, that is to say, political power and philosophy meet
together, there can be no rest from the troubles for
states, nor yet, as I believe, for all mankind ..."
Thus Socrates outlined for Adeimantus, in Plato's 'Republic', the
nature of the ideal State in which 'Philosopher-Kings' were to rule
on the basis of real knowledge. Since Plato's time there has been
a continuing concern amongst political philosophers, and, more
recently, political scientists, with the relationship between human
reason and social action to create desirable forms of social and
political organisation.Many theoretical positions, with complex
interrelated systems of descriptive and normative commitments,
have been propounded yet we might look at our contemporary world and
wonder about the nature of the benefits of more than two thousand
years of human intellectual effort. Economic and technological
development, interacting to define a conventional conception of
'progress', has nevertheless presented new and ever more complex dil-
emmas to test the human capacity for problem-solving. While such
development simultaneously enhances, in material and 'quantitative'
terms, our capacity for addressing the problems it creates, there
remain those doubts concerning the 'quality' of human reason and
action which came to underpin Plato's pessimism about the inevitable
progression to tyranny.
Of all the challenges facing humankind in today's world, that pre-
sen ted by the question of the development of nuclear energy may not
be the most fundamental but it is nevertheless a deep concern of many
people. Moreover, it can be seen as encapsulating many of the issues
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that are at stake in the guidance of the process of social and techno-
logical development. It provides, therefore, a context for the attempt
to examine the broader problem of the role of our frameworks and
structures of reasoning in the processes of developing appropriate
actions to guide such development. The aim of this thesis is modest
in relation to the enormity of the wider task: essentially it attempts
to shed some light on the nature of the present relationship in our
society between the 'scientific' knowledge of society on the one
hand and social action on the other, and to elaborate the impli-
cations of the analysis with reference to the debate about nuclear
power development.*
The structure of the thesis can be briefly outlined. In chapter one
the background to the study is described covering the general historical,
political and economic context, followed by a review of the develop-
ment of UK energy policy over the last 25 years. The body of the
thesis is then structured into two parts. Part one, entitled 'Social
Knowledge and Ideology', incorporates chapters 2-6 and is concerned
with examining the nature and rationality of social scientific know-
ledge and developing a conception of its role in informing social
action in our society. In chapter two the major controversies in the
philosophy of science are reviewed, while chapter three extends the
review to social scientific knowledge, and develops a critique of the
orthodox view of rationality with reference to the field of economic
knowledge. Chapter four attempts to move towards an alternative
conception of the nature of the rationality of social knowledge founded
upon notions of 'value-contingency' and 'ideology'. In chapter five
this conception is elaborated with reference to notions of 'social
problem-solving' and the theory of the role of the State. Finally in
*Some of the arguments developed in this thesis were published in a
preliminary and outline form in Sanderson (1980).
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Part One, chapter six attempts to identify the content of a
'dominant technocratic ideology' and, in particular, the nature of
its normative underpinnings.
Part Two of the thesis is entitled 'Ideology and the Nuclear Power
Debate' and includes chapters 7-9. It is concerned to analyse certain
aspects of the debate about nuclear energy in order to attempt to
identify the role and influence of the technocratic ideology as
elaborated in the first part. Chapters 7and 8 present a review of
the major controversies in the debate, the former being concerned
with the economic issues while the latter covers argumenmrelating
to environmental, social and political implications. In chapter
nine certain themes in the debate are analysed at some length.
Firstly, an attempt is made to clarify the main dimensions of the
dispute and provide a categorisation of the debate and this is fol-
lowed by an analysis of the extent to which arguments for nuclear power
tend to illustrate the themes of the dominant technocratic ideology.
The analysis is then further elaborated with reference to two parti-
cular aspects: firstly, the perception and interpretation of the
'energy problem'; and, secondly, the process of consideration of
alternative means to its solution. The latter aspect includes a
detailed look at the nature of the knowledge brought to bear upon the
process, an examination of the treatment of demand-side alternatives,
and a consideration of certain issues surrounding the evaluation of
costs and benefits. Chapter nine concludes with an examination of
some possible political implications of ideological themes. Finally,
chapter ten outlines some general implications of the analysis and
critically examines what has been achieved.
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1PART ONE SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE AND IDEOLOGY
"It is the absolutist assumptions of .•. positivism which have
led most sociologists to see objectivity as the necessary
outcome of the mechanical application of their rules of veri-
fication."
"The complexity of social problems in a technological and
urbanized world makes the effective application of sociological
knowledge to our social problems the crucial determinant of
our society's future."
Jack Douglas (The Relevance of Sociology)
"The ganglion of post-industrial society is knowledge
Every society now lives by innovation and growth; and it is
thl!oretical knowledge that has become the matrix of innovation."
Daniel Bell (The Coming of Post-Industrial Society)
"Only an intellectual barbarian is likely to maintain that reality
is only that which can be grasped by scientific methods."
"As the physicists are busy engineering the world's annihilation,
the social scientists can be entrusted with the smaller mission
of engineering the world's consent."
Peter Berger (Invitation to Sociology)
2Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Rationality and Social Problems
Philosophers have long agonized over the 'raison d'etre' of human
existence and no doubt will continue to do so as long as the human
species survives. But this may not be for very long. For, whatever
this 'raison d'etre' might be, we have contrived, through the
conscious development of scientific and technological means, to bring
ourselves to the brink of self-destruction. It may represent a
despairing cynicism to rationalize the whole of human history in terms
of such a possible end but, nevertheless, a growing pessimism about
the future of humankind is understandable in the present context. As
Alvin Gouldner has argued:
"Optimism wanes as the promise of technological expansion
is seen to have approaching ecological limits and when
scientific achievements threaten a military peril of
planetary proportions. Now, once-rosy optimism has greyed
and gives way to a growing sense of being lost in history.
There is no longer a sense of riding an upward drift and
the dimming prospect reopens once-closed Malthusian issues."
(Gouldner 1976 p. 16)
Of course, it is possible to argue in response that it could have
been different and that we shall survive in the future to a more noble
end. The former argument must remain in the realms of metaphysical
speculation, but the latter provides the fundamental focus for all the
remaining forces of optimism about the human condition. Whether we
shall survive long if present trends continue is open to question but
we surely can shape for ourselves a future which bypasses the threats
of the present and develops new potentialities for long-term
realization.
3The shaping of such a future represents a considerable challenge to
those who have the vision. It may indeed involve fundamental changes
in our institutions and in our ways of thinking about social develop-
ment. And many of those who have the vision of such a future are not
in a position to effect change or even present arguments which will be
acknowledged as valid and reasonable. Such problems are a recipe for
disillusionment, discontent and protest, for increasing alienation of
those who become labelled as 'radicals', for increasing recourse to
political activity bypassing the 'legitimate' channels which fail to
accommodate such 'radical' arguments.
Moreover, there is a multitude of problems facing our society, less
fundamental than that of human survival, which greatly compounds the
challenge. Much has been written about the demise of the Western
advanced capitalist economies which are experiencing severe problems
of stagnation, inflation and unemployment with attendant social
consequences. The destruction of our natural environment has
increasingly become a focus of concern for many, some of whom regard
this, indeed, as one of the major threats to our survival. The plight
of our cities has received considerable attention especially in respect
of housing, transport and environmental problems. During the past
decade, the energy problem facing the advanced industrial nations has
achieved some pre-eminence. An important dimension of such problems
concerns the distribution of wealth and resources. As material wealth
is continually expanded through the development of scientific and
technological means, the persistence of poverty amidst affluence
becomes increaSingly problematical. This is the case not only within
the advanced capitalist nations but also on a global scale between
advanced industrial nations and less developed nations and such
distributional issues represent major sources of tension and challenge
to public policy making systems.
The ability of policy making systems to respond to such challenges has
become, especially in recent years, the focus for a considerable
research effort. Research concerned to analyse the nature and
'adequacy' of the response of such systems and, indeed, their rationale
in relation to various social needs, interests and objectives is now
firmly established within the field of political science. The work
reported in Lindberg (1977) provides an example of such research in
relation to the energy policy systems of advanced industrial nations.
Now, the process of public policy formulation can be conceived of as
involving both the exercise of political power and the application of
knowledge in order to reach decisions and take actions to attempt to
solve, or at least alleviate, perceived problems in a system of
interest. Consequently, there are two possible foci for analysis of
policy-making systems: firstly, the ways in which political power is
exercised in the process; and, secondly, the nature and influence of
knowledge and ideas which are brought to bear upon the solution of
problems.
The relative importance of these two sets of influences on policy
formulation is extremely difficult to assess and, indeed, is likely
to vary according to the nature of the problem and the circumstances
of the attempt to solve or alleviate it. My major concern in this
study is to analyse the nature and influence of knowledge and ideas
as applied to the consideration of public policy issues in order,
firstly, to provide some indication of the degree of importance of
such influence and, secondly, to assess the implications for the
5nature of policy outputs. It will, hopefully, then be possible to
develop some insights into the potential for the achievement of
alternative futures for our society through the application of reason
- the attribute of human existence which provides the primary basis
for whatever claim to 'civilization' we can make.
The motivation for this study arose primarily from my experience in
local authority planning where it became apparent to me that widely
accepted models of the planning process, and particularly of the role
of social scientific knowledge in that process, had little basis in
actual practice. In particular, the degree of controversy which
develops over public policy issues is difficult to reconcile with
conception of objective social knowledge which one usually finds
underlying discussions of rational planning processes; attempts to
rationalize such disputes with reference to right/wrong, rational/
irrational, logical/emotional dichotomies then appear to be totally
unsuccessful, indeed misconceived. Moreover, it appeared to me, at
least on the face of it, that there is a significant degree of
'pre-formulation' of policy solutions, something of an 'inevitability'
about the outcomes of policy-making processes, which underlies the
veneer of the rational consideration and full evaluation of all
possible options.
Although formulated largely in an urban planning context, these ideas
appeared to have a much broader relevance and, in pursuit of a
developing interest in energy policy issues, I began, in late 1978,
an attempt to assess their validity in relation to such issues. It is
really only during the last decade that energy has come to be
perceived as a distinct problematic, emerging as such, with the oil
6price shocks of the early 1970s, from the more general concern with
the problem of resource shortages which had been developing during the
late 1960s and which was manifested in the so-called 'doomsday
literature'. The prospect of net energy self-sufficiency due to
North Sea hydrocarbons tended to dull the perceived urgency of the
energy problem in the UK throughout the 1970s, especially compared to
countries such as France and West Germany where the anticipation of
continued heavy reliance on imported oil resulted in rather greater
strains on the policy-making machinery. Nevertheless, energy policy
issues have received considerable attention in this country,
particularly the question of the future role of nuclear power which
provides an excellent example of a very deep and passionate controversy
in relation to problems of social and technological development. In
view of the importance of this issue, and, indeed, of energy issues
in general to our social and economic future, I feel that it is
important to attempt to gain some insights into the problem of the
'rationality' of arguments about such issues.
1.2 Historical and Political Context: The Emergence of 'Crisis'
In order to develop further the basic problematic of the study it is
useful to refer in more detail to the appropriate historical and
political context. The steady economic growth and continuity of
social development of the late 1950s and early 1960s engendered a
mood of considerable optimism about social, economic and technological
futures. This mood is often characterized by Harold Wilson's 'white-
hot technological revolution' and his designation of the 1960s as the
'New Age' of prosperity and social harmony. Economic instability was
seen as a thing of the past since Keynesian economic science provided
7the means to manage and 'fine tune' the economy. Harmony,
participation and integration were seen as characterizing the modern
polity heralding the ideal of the pluralistic society with a
multiplicity of interests, dispersion of economic and political power
and guarantees of individual freedoms (cf. Lindberg 1976).
Technological advance was seen as an inevitable process providing, in
conjunction with scientific research, the potential for the solution of
all remaining social problems. This optimistic view of technological
development has achieved a rather deep-seated influence in our society;
as Fran90is Hetman has argued:
" technological change is widely accepted as an essential
element of economic development. Economic growth is based
on gains in productivity which can be realised only through
the infusion of new knowledge and technology. As on the
productive side, technology has enormously increased the
range of opportunities open to consumers. In all sectors of
human life, advances in communication technology have led to
rapid information, advances in transport technology to
greater mobility and easy access to any place on the planet,
advances in medicine and health technology have led to
substantially greater life expectancy and relief from
suffering. "
(Hetman 1977 p. 4)
The so cal.le d 'Post-war consensus' is frequently invoked to characterize
this situation but there have always been dissenting voices. During
the first two post-war decades, however, opposition to and denial of
'materialist' values and concern for the adverse consequences of
economic and technological growth was confined to relatively small
groups with little political influence. As long as the economic system
continued to 'produce the goods', and in the post-war atmosphere of cold
war politics, little credence was given to the prophets of doom and
revolution.
8However, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, fissures began to
appear in the optimistic fayade essentially generated from two major
sources. Firstly, there was an increase in the strength of the
critique of the adverse consequences of economic and technological
progress reflected in growing disillusionment and protest particularly
amongst young people. Secondly, this trend was reinforced by the
development of severe contradictions and destabilizing forces in the
advanced Western economies which brought into question their ability
to fulfil the materialist expectations which they had promoted. It is
appropriate to consider these developments in rather more detail.
Although criticisms of technological progress had little impact before
the late 1960s, they were in fact achieving high levels of
sophistication and elaboration more than a decade earlier. As early
as 1958, Hannah Arendt was writing about the de-humanizing effect of
modern technological society:
"The question therefore is not so much whether we are the
masters or slaves of our machines, but whether machines still
serve the world and its things, or if, on the contrary, they
and the automatic motion of their processes have begun to
rule and even destroy world and things."
(quoted in Williams 1971 p. 32)
Also during the 1950s, Jacques Ellul's 'The Technological Society' was
published in France presenting a devastating critique of technical
progress as producing the domination of humans by 'technique', turning
society into an 'affair to be managed', the state into 'nothing but a
huge machine', and democracy into 'mere appearance' (Williams op. cit.
p. 33). A new totalitarianism is founded upon technical necessity
with state propaganda facilitating mass manipulation:
"Technique must reduce man (sic!) to a technical animal,
the king of the slaves of technique. Human caprice crumbles
before this necessity; there can be no human autonomy in
the face of technical autonomy."
(Ellul quoted in Roszak 1970 p. 6)
Ellul's pessimistic theme was developed during the 1960s by Herbert
Marcuse and Theodore Roszak. Marcuse (1964) argued that technical
progress in advanced industrial society expands the potential for
satisfying wants but simultaneously erodes human rights and freedoms
producing a totalitarian productive apparatus, a 'non-terroristic
economic-technical coordination' which manipulates needs and generates
a 'pattern of one-dimensional thought and behaviour' justifying the
oppressive nature of the system and insulating society from the
possibility of liberating change. In Marcuse's view, therefore:
" technology has become the great vehicle of
reification - reification in its most mature and
effective form. The social position of the individual
and his (sic!) relation to others appears not only to
be determined by objective qualities and laws, but
these qualities and laws seem to lose their mysterious
and uncontrollable character; they appear as calculable
manifestations of (scientific) rationality .•.•. The
web of domination has become the web of Reason itself,
and this society is fatally entangled in it. And the
transcending modes of thought seem to transcend Reason
itself."
(Op, cit. p. 168-9)
Roszak (1970) further articulated the critique (first published in
1968) defining the 'technocracy' as the 'mature product of technolo-
gical progress and the scientific ethos', in which all aspects of
social life (politics, education, leisure, entertainment, culture as
a whole) become the subjects of purely technical manipulation by
specially trained experts. In other words, technocracy is:
la
.. that society in which those who govern justify
themselves by appeal to technical experts who, in turn,
justify themselves by appeal to scientific forms of
knowledge. And beyond the authority of science, there
is no appeal."
(op , cit. p.8)
This critique of technical progress and technological society was,
naturally enough, not well received by those who supported the view
that liberal democratic and pluralist political institutions were still
alive and well and who subscribed to the optimistic view of technolo-
gical progress as a benign and liberating force (cf. Douglas 1974).
However, there were also criticisms from many of a Marxist persuasion
who found it difficult to accept the crushing pessimism of, in
particular, the work of Ellul and Marcuse. The major point of
controversy concerned the idea that technical progress had become an
independent force determining goals, methods and their application and
therefore replacing the political process based on interests arising
from social relations in a capitalist economic system. For example,
Jlirgen Babermas in 'Toward a Rational Society' (1971), while supporting
Marcuse's view of the political implications of instrumental technical
reason, nevertheless argued that:
"The direction of technical progress is still largely
determined today by social interests that arise autochthon-
ously out of the compulsion of the reproduction of social
life without being reflected upon and confronted with the
declared political self-understanding of social groups."
(Op, cit. p . 60)
Consequently, Habermas saw technological progress as still under the
control of politics and determined by value systems - by historically
determined interpretations of need - however much values are reduced
to technical imperatives through the ideology of 'technocratic
11
consciousness'. What is required, Habermas argued, is political change
to abolish technological rationality and bring relations between
technical progress and the 'social life-world' under the control of
rational public discussion based on action and transaction structured
in ordinary language:
"It is .•. a question of setting into motion a politically
effective discussion that rationally brings the social
potential constituted by technical knowledge and ability
into a defined and controlled relation to our practical
knowledge and will."
(ibid. p. 61)
Habermas' critique of the technological society, somewhat less
pessimistic than those of Ellul and Marcuse, indicating the immanent
and vital potential for political change, is perhaps the most forceful
to date (cf. Cotgrove 1975). The central theme of this 'technocratic
critique' - the political implications of a technical reason under-
pinned by the rationality of modern empirical science - was echoed, to
an extent, in the growing concern in the late 1960s and early 1970s
with the environmental and ecological consequences of rapid industrial
and economic growth as manifested in the surge of 'doomsday literature'
expressing a profound pessimism about global resource and environmental
problems. The Ecologist's 'Blueprint for Survival', the Club of Rome's
'Limits to Growth', and writers such as Ehrlich (1970) and Daly (1971)
all emphasized the finiteness of the world and the imminence of severe
resource scarcity due to the expansionist and materialist 'growth
ethic' of advanced industrial society.
The influential analysis presented by Ward and Cubos (1972) provides
an example of this concern. They argued that humankind has been
brought to the brink of a global crisis by three primary factors.
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Firstly, the development of reductionist Western science, with its
orientation to usefulness derived from reliability based on measurement
and controlled experimentation, has increased our knowledge and power
of manipulation and change but, with its specialized and atomistic
tendencies, has simultaneously eroded the influence of natural
ecological 'checks and balances' (op. cit. p. 48-53). Secondly, the
economic logic of the market place has increasingly dominated as the
'human wisdom' that guides the development of human societies producing
enormous social and environmental costs and " •.. intolerable strains
on what had appeared to be the planet's limitless resources." (ibid.
p. 62). Thirdly, the emergence of the nation-state provided the basis
for industrialization, imperial commercial expansion and international
conflict and war, all essential ingredients in the global crisis
(ibid. p. 62-6).
That these critiques of advanced industrial/technological/capitalist
societies had considerable socio-political significance is indicated
by the rapid growth, particularly from the early 1970s, of the
'environmentalist movement' from a previously limited social base to
include a wide spectrum of social groups with differing interests,
values and interpretations of the 'environmental problem' (Cotgrove
1976; Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Sandbach 1980). Now, although an
important part of the environmentalist movement is composed of
"•.• preservationist and conservationist groups whose policies
constitute no kind of challenge to the dominant value system, and are
in this sense basically conservative ... " (Cotgrove 1976 p. 24), there
is nevertheless a significant 'utopian' element which seeks to use
environmental problems as a lever to promote fundamental social change
(ibid. p. 25). It is this 'utopian environmentalism' which is
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essentially the product of the pessimistic thought of the 1960s and
early 1970s, based upon both the doomsday literature and the radical
critiques of technological progress in advanced industrial society and
images of the counter-culture. (cf Cotgrove 1982 chapter 1).
Consequently, the environmentalist movement has increasingly brought
into the political process a radical protest against the dominant values
of 'industrialism'. In this sense, it cuts across traditional political
categories providing a different orientation to the Marxist-based
critique of 'capitalism'. Its focus on scientific rationality, on modes
of consciousness, on resource and environmental consequences of industrial
and technological development contrasts with the traditional Marxist
concern with the capitalist mode of production and the structure of
social relations generated from it as the basic determinant of the
'contingent' environmentalist problematic. utopian environmentalism can
therefore be seen as lying more easily with the analytical foci of
Ellul, Marcuse and Roszak than with the 'new-Marxism' of Habermas. Its
radical nature derives, then, primarily from 'romanticist' themes: the
critique of reductionist, atomistic, manipulative science and an
argument for more subjectivist, holistic approaches to the relations
between nature and society; the rejection of the process of moderniza-
tion, industrialization, technical progress and the extension of
instrumental rationality which banishes discussions of values and ends
to the realm of 'irrationality' (Cotgrove 1978B;1976 p. 26-30 1982;
Sandbach op. cit. p. 25-7).
The force of such growing critical thought and protest was strengthened
by the emergence in the late 1960s and early 1970s of severe contra-
dictions and de-stabilizing trends in the advanced Western economies
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which provided little comfort for the optimists. The situation in
Britain was not untypical of the general problem. By the late 1960s
inflationary pressures were becoming quite severe as increasing wage
costs in a near 'full employment' situation were transferred to
prices (Currie 1980). As the economy began to stagnate efforts by
government to stimulate domestic demand via public spending resulted
in significant increases in the quantity of imported goods and this
caused a deterioration in the balance of payments problem. From 1970
prices of raw materials in world markets began to increase sharply,
especially in the 'case of oil after the formation of the OPEC cartel,
and this aggravated the dual problems of stagnation and inflation.
Then in 1973/74 the massive increases in the price of oil following
the Yom Kippur War exacerbated an already difficult economic situation
and, indeed, triggered off the worst slump since the Second World
War (ibid.).
Throughout the 1970s, then, Western governments were basically
preoccupied with attempts to overcome this economic crisis. But the
persistence of such problems began to cast severe doubts on the
ability of the state in advanced capitalist societies to manage the
economy and maintain growth and investment. More specifically, the
Keynesian approach to macro-economic management, which only a few years
earlier had seemed to be a panacea, was now increasingly questioned in
a situation where economic recession, growing unemployment and high
rates of inflation occurred simultaneously. Indeed, such questioning
was extended to the whole concept of state 'intervention' in economic
and social life resulting in a growing predilection for a return to
'laissez faire' doctrines as expressed in Friedmanite Monetarism
(Gamble 1979; Jacques 1979). Moreover, this apparent failure of the
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state in respect of economic management was aggravated by growing
challenges to its authority. Two sources of such challenges can be
seen as of particular importance. Firstly, the militancy of
organized sections of the working classes increased in the face of
attempts by the state to control public expenditure and inflation
(ibid.). Secondly, the level of protest and opposition from the
environmentalist movement increased in response to government attempts
to promote economic growth through investment in industrial and
technological developments. The resulting situation can be seen as
involving something of a 'crisis of government' - a dilemma of the
state - involving, on the one hand, severe problems for the machinery
of public policy formulation and, on the other, simultaneous trends
which considerably increased uncertainties thus eroding the capacity
for response of that machinery and its ability to successfully tackle
such problems.
1.3 The 'Rational Planning' Response
These latter trends are of fundamental importance to the issues
addressed in this study and therefore will bear somewhat closer
examination. Given such a dilemma it would become important for the
state to attempt to reduce the uncertainties which hinder its ability,
in particular, to handle problems of economic instability. This
implies two major lines of action firstly, to increase information
concerning the nature of the problems which are perceived as requiring
a policy response and, secondly, to reduce the obstacles to effective
political action by increasing the degree of loyalty to and support of
the state from all (or at least most) social classes and groups - in
other words to increase the legitimacy of the state. Indeed, from
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the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s there was an increasing
emphasis placed on the 'relevance' of social scientific research where
'relevance' can be interpreted in relation to the requirements of the
state for better information in order to increase the policy-making
effectiveness (see, for example, Lindblom and Cohen 1979). In
particular, one can point to the rapid growth in econometric modelling
during the 1970s as the epitome of 'relevant' social scientific
knowledge.
As regards the second line of action, the attempt to maintain a
widespread basis of political support has taken several forms. For
example, considerable amounts of public expenditure have gone into the
maintenance of the Welfare State to support those disadvantaged in the
process of economic growth and maintain their support for dominant
values and goals. However, such a strategy is double-edged in that the
high levels of public expenditure required when economic problems are
severe and the need to maintain popular support is consequently greatest,
cause an exacerbation of the 'fiscal crisis' and, therefore, of the
original economic difficulties (Caldwell and Woolley 1976). This
aspect of the dilemma has indeed been in evidence in recent years in
Britain and many other advanced capitalist democracies.
A further strategy which has been adopted by the state to reduce the
obstacles to effective political action involves the control and
management of dissent and opposition. For example, throughout the
1970s governments in Britain attempted to impose various means of
controlling the power of opposition of the trades unions to their
strategies of economic management; such attempts ranged from informal
agreements to 'industrial relations' legislation (Jacques 1979). Also
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during the 1970s the 'Public Inquiry' became the official means of
harnessing and controlling the opposition of the environmentalist
movement to industrial and technological developments, bestowing upon
dissenting groups the feeling that their views are receiving the
proper attention within the democratic political process (cf. Pearce et
al. 1979).
An important further component in such a strategy, moreover, involves
the 'management of consent, belief, trust and attention' (Forester
1982) so as to increase support for governmental approaches to problem-
solving and to devalue the impact of opposition and dissent. Much of
this is achieved through 'natural' processes of socialization which
are supported by the state (Sherman and Wood 1979 ch.9). For example,
our education system is concerned to propagate certain fundamental
beliefs, a primary theme being respect for legitimate authority as
embodied in our basic institutions - the family, state, church etc.
(ibid. p. 209-17; Cotgrove 1978A p. 96-103; Miliband 1973 p. 213-26).
The elected government in representative democracy is conventionally
portrayed as acting in the best interests of all groups in society
and, therefore, as legitimately commanding the respect and support of
all responsible members of society (ibid. p. 4-6). However, in recent
years, there would appear to have been something of a decline in
support for traditional institutions and sources of authority (cf.
Cotgrove 1978A p. 163-4; Habermas 1976B; Offe 1976). This decline has
been particularly marked amongst younger people and can be related to
the increasing support, discussed earlier, for critics of technological
society; it can be seen as contributing in no small measure to the
dilemma of the state. Consequently, it can be argued that there has
arisen a need for 'new' sources of authority and trust in advanced
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industrial societies, sources which, ideally, could be referred to
'above' the emergent disillusioning uncertainties of politics and
morality.
The growing call for 'relevance' in social scientific research during
the 1970s, in order to increase its usefulness in government policy-
making activities, was referred to above in relation to the first
possible path out of the dilemma of the state. But the increasing
tendency for the justification of public policies with reference to
'the findings of science' and the 'informed opinions of experts'
indicates a role for scientific knowledge and expertise as a new
source of authority and trust employed by the state to obtain support
for, and acquiescence in, its approaches to the solution of perceived
problems. This sugge9ts a dual role for social scientific knowledge
in public policy making - as a source of effectiveness and as a
source of authority. But the value of social science in this role is
contingent upon its being conceived as embodying a special, indeed
unique, cognitive power; upon its being conceived (as indicated above)
as 'above' the realms of politics and morality. In other words, to be
of value to the state in overcoming its dilemma, social scientific
knowledge must be presented as objective, untainted by value
considerations, and embodying the truth about the social world.
The value of such a conception of social knowledge to the state can
be considerable. To the extent that such knowledge is indeed
reliable then greater confidence is justified in the ability of
policy makers to solve problems; and if knowledge is objective then
policies based on the application of such knowledge will have greater
legitimacy. Moreover, those in possession of such knowledge can
command respect as 'experts'. Finally, the institutions of the state
can then argue that those who oppose their policies and strategies
must be ignoring the 'findings of science' and the 'truth' and basing
their arguments on falsehoods or on 'subjective' and 'irrational'
factors. The legitimacy of such opponents can therefore easily be
undermined.
The dominant tradition of theory about the role of social scientific
knowledge in public policy making is founded upon just such a notion
of 'objective knowledge'. Most commentators on the theory of planning
tend to subscribe to a form of definition of that activity as
illustrated in the influential work of John Friedmann who conceives
of planning in terms of the linkage between knowledge and action to
achieve societal guidance (Friedmann 1973A, 1973B, 1978; Friedmann
and Hudson 1974). For example, the following definitions of planning
appear in Friedmann's work:
" an activity centrally concerned with the linkage
between knowledge and organized action ... therefore
located precisely at the interface between knowledge
and action."
(op, cit. 1974 p. 2)
"••. guidance of change within a social system ...
reason acting on a network of ongoing activities through
the intervention of certain decision structures and
processes •••"
(op, cit. 1973A p. 346-7)
"Planning refers to the application of a scientific
and technical intelligence to organized actions."
(op, cit. 1973B p. 19)
Such a conception of planning has been supported by Faludi (1973) and
by Rose (1974) the latter, for example, defining planning as:
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" an activity
to gain mastery
future by power
(ibid. p , 23)
by which man (sic~) in society endeavours
over himself and to shape his collective
of his reason."
This view of planning displays an essentially rationalistic basis and,
indeed, planning has tended to be reduced, in mainstream thinking, to
a problem of rational decision-making with the focus on the intellectual
dimension (how to make 'intelligent decisions') at the expense of a
wider political perspective (how to take 'appropriate action' to
achieve social change). For example, in his earlier work, Friedmann
is concerned with the 'use of technical intelligence' and the
'intervention of certain decision structures'; moreover his conception
of appropriate intelligence is revealed in a reference to the
"••. verifiable knowledge which alone is capable of serving as a sound
foundation for a theory of planning." (Friedmann 1973A p. 346-7). In
his influential 'Planning Theory', Faludi (1973) argues that 'planning
has always meant taking intelligent, rational action' and places the
emphasis on 'deciding on a course of action' (ibid. p. 35-8). More-
over, the quality of such decisions is improved to the extent that they
follow from the application of knowledge derived from the 'scientific
method' (ibid. p. 39). Therefore, Faludi sees the aim of planning as
concerned to remove the barriers to, and promote, 'human growth' via
the development of 'societal self-awareness' through the development
of knowledge by the scientific method (ibid. p. 41-5; 49-51).
The dominance of the rationalistic conception of planning is reflected
in the well-established 'rational-comprehensive' model of the planning
process setting out the familiar logical sequence of goals -
alternatives - prediction - evaluation - implementation - monitoring
(Friedmann and Hudson 1974 p. 8; Grabow and Heskin 1973 p. 106-8).
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Following Friedmann (1973B) this model can be seen as comprising four
distinctive characteristics. Firstly, the model is comprehensive in
its attempt to balance all explicitly-stated objectives, to harmonize
competing claims on resources and to forecast all relevant external
conditions. Secondly, the model is founded upon the criterion of
optimal choice which requires a conception of equilibrium balance
amongst the variable components of the planning system. Thirdly, the
conditions of comprehensiveness and equilibrium produce a requirement
for synthetic, quantitative models of the relevant systems resulting
in a descriptive emphasis. Finally, the model embodies a functional
rationality in presenting planning as a 'rational', 'objective'
activity concerned with establishment of optimum means for the
achievement of ends which are determined externally through the
political process from which planners are independent (ibid. p. 53-9).
The rational-comprehensive model of policy-making is, therefore,
firmly based in the context of 'objective consciousness' (Grabow and
Heskin op. cit.), founded upon a conception of 'scientifically-
schooled intelligence" which is free from the distortion of subjective
value considerations and which therefore permits reliable advance
knowledge of the outcomes of any course of social action. Various
modifications to the model have been made to accommodate what are
perceived as 'political realities' and 'limits to human rationality'
resulting in such concepts as 'bounded rationality', 'satisficing' and
disjointed incrementalism' but such developments have not fundamentally
questioned the underlying assumptions concerning the nature of
appropriate knowledge for policy making.
This model of planning and its relationship to social scientific
knowledge can be seen as an important element in the efforts of the
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state to maintain an imput of loyalty and support as a basis for its
attempts to solve perceived social and economic problems. The model
can be seen as promoting confidence and acquiescence in the activities
of the state by generating an impression of thoroughness, competence
and accuracy based on reliable knowledge and expertise. However, its
success in this respect has been far from complete. Although it
remains the dominant rationalization by planners and policy makers of
their own activities it has not silenced the critics of rationalism in
advanced industrialist/capitalist society; indeed, it has provided a
wider basis for their challenge. Certain more recent trends have
therefore added some force to the critiques of the social, political
and environmental consequences of scientific and technological progress.
Firstly, there has been an increasing awareness of the limitations to
the ability of 'mainstream' social scientific knowledge to provide a
firm foundation for policy formulation in the face of increasing
complexity of social and economic problems, of technological systems
and of the ways in which such systems interact with society (Dickson
1981 p. 62-3). This is particularly so in the case of the quantitative
models which are regarded as the ideal form of knowledge within the
rationalist conception but which are necessarily based upon the
abstraction of a limited number of variables and relationships and
upon a restricted conceptualization of the processes of social change
(cf. Friedmann 1973B p. 101-2; Friedmann and Hudson op. cit. p. 8).
For example, recent economic trends in advanced capitalist societies
have presented a severe challenge to the orthodox theories and models
of neoclassical economics and have produced a state of some uncertainty
in the discipline. The fields of economic, sociological and political
theory are all presently attempting to approach the problem of
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explaining the relationships between technological development and
social change but there is considerable controversy over the ability
of existing theoretical frameworks to provide 'acceptable' explanations.
A particular problem in this area can be seen as the continued pursuit
of enquiries within the confines of traditional disciplines when an
understanding of complex social systems really requires a broad multi-
disciplinary approach. The ability of knowledge produced in one
discipline, or of experts trained in that discipline, to comprehend
the situation in all its complexity may therefore be highly circum-
scribed.
Moreover, as the critique of industrialism and technological growth
has developed, and as the environmentalist movement in particular has
gained in support, the controversy over issues of economic and
technological development has emerged increasingly into the public
gaze. Over the past decade there has been a substantial increase in
such issue-directed political action aimed especially at challenging
government policy decisions and in the resulting public controversies
scientific knowledge and expertise has been widely employed by all
disputants in order to support and legitimize their arguments. But
claims of a 'scientific basis' for opposing arguments on a particular
issue necessarily result in some questioning of the 'neutrality' and
'objectivity' of scientific knowledge and experts and increasing doubts
about their legitimatory role (Nelkin 1979A, 1979B). In recent years
the public inquiries over, for example, the energy-related developments
at Windscale and the Vale of Belvoir would certainly seem to have
encouraged such doubts about the role of social scientific knowledge
in providing a rational basis for public policy formulation.
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Throughout the past decade there has also been a growing recognition of
the gulf that exists between rationalist-intellectualist conceptions of
the relationship between social scientific research and policy making
on the one hand, and 'political reality' on the other. Thus, the
rationalist model has been criticized for its focus on intelligent
decision-making, abstracting from the essentially political nature of
the policy-making process and neglecting, for example, constraints on
practical action (cf. Friedmann and Hudson Ope cit.). Further, it has
been argued that the intellectualist approach totally neglects the
particular requirements of politicians and the nature of their task.
Problems arise, then, from the contrast between the rather ambiguous
nature of political action and the precise, technical nature of
academic research; from the different conceptual frameworks and
languages of politicians and academics which create difficulties of
communication; and from the fact that the political process often
demands rapid, 'rough and ready' and immediately relevant information
whereas academic research requires a relatively lengthy time-scale for
more thorough investigation (cf. Higgins 1980).
Such developments have produced a growing current of criticism of the
dominant rationalist and intellectualist models of public policy making
which has added weight to emergent themes of anti-rationalism and anti-
industrialism. The trend is manifested, for example, in the increasing
recognition that disputes and controversies over issues of social and
technological development are not simply resolvable with reference to
the 'facts of the matter' (i.e. with reference to objective scientific
knowledge) but involve complex questions relating to disputes over
values and social goals which influence perceptions of the issues and
which cannot be settled on a factual basis. In other words, there is
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growing acceptance of the view that public policy issues cannot be
adequately considered in abstracted isolation from their wider political
context, that arguments over values and ends on the political level
cannot be dismissed as 'irrational', and that there are limits to the
degree to which 'scientific analysis' of the issues can produce progress
towards 'rational policy making'. This latter relationship is,
therefore, increasingly regarded as ~roblematic and, consequently, has
itself become the subject of growing dispute.
1.4 The Development of UK Energy Policy
The emergence of such a critical viewpoint can be illustrated with
reference to the development of controversies over energy policy issues
in this country. In order to place such developments in context it will
be useful to review briefly the evolution of UK energy policy during
recent years. In the following outline references are omitted to avoid
repetition but are indicated in Annex 1 together with the relevant
diagrams.
The United Kingdom is the second largest consumer of primary energy in
Western Europe, behind West Germany, with a total consumption in 1982
of about 187 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe). Thanks to North
Sea hydrocarbons, Britain is now virtually self-sufficient in energy
with imports accounting for less than 6% of gross inland consumption
of primary fuels. The UK energy situation is conventionally
characterised in terms of the 'four fuel economy' with primary energy
consumption being supplied mainly by coal and oil (c. 36% each),
natural gas (c. 23%) and nuclear power (c. 5%). Hydro electricity
provides the remainder.
This situation is very different from that pertaining in the immediate
post-war years when coal provided over 90% of all primary energy. Oil
began to make significant inroads in the post-Suez period as prices fell
with the expansion of production in the Middle East and Africa and by
1960 a 'two-fuel economy' had emerged with oil providing a quarter of
primary energy and coal most of the remaining three quarters (Annex 1,
Fig.l.l) . During the 1960s the contribution of oil continued to
increase rapidly as it replaced coal in domestic heating, rail transport
and industry, and as private car ownership and road building advanced.
Attempts were made to protect the coal industry during the early 1960s
but oil was providing 35% of consumption by 1965, expanding to 45% by
1970. Coal production therefore declined from over 200 million tonnes
in 1960 to 132 million tonnes by 1973, with a steadily increasing
proportion being used in electricity generation. Natural gas began to
make a contribution only after the discovery of the Ekofisk field in
the North Sea in 1969 and provided 12% of primary energy by 1973.
After the success with natural gas substantial oil discoveries were
made in the North Sea and between 1971 and 1973 starts were made on
the commercial development of 15 oil fields; however, in 1973 nearly
all oil needs had still to be imported.
During the 1960s the consumption of electricity almost doubled and
provided 12% of total delivered energy by 1973. A significant
proportion of increased production over this period was provided by
oil-fired capacity but there was also an increasing contribution from
nuclear power (Fig.1.3). The first civil nuclear programme for the UK
was started in the late 1950s and involved the construction of 4.5 GWE
of nuclear plant based on the Magnox gas-cooled reactor through to
the late 1960s. It was anticipated in the mid 1950s that nuclear plant
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would provide a quarter of all electricity production by 1970; the
achievement was, in fact, only 7%. However, the second nuclear
programme was decided upon in 1965 after much controversy based on the
advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) although only 6GWE were eventually
ordered.
Therefore, by the early 1970s the UK had achieved the 'four fuel
economy' comprising coal, oil, natural gas and nuclear electricity.
However, it is notable that the overall rate of growth in primary
energy consumption over the previous 20 years was relatively low in
comparison with many other advanced industrial nations. Thus, total
consumption increased by 54% between 1950 and 1973 and by 25% between
1960-1973; the increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the latter
period was, by comparison, about 47%. This was due primarily to the
sUbstitution of oil and gas, which have a higher conversion efficiency
from primary to useful energy, for coal in final consumption. For
example, a particularly significant trend involved the replacement of
coal burned in open fires by oil, gas and electric space heating in
the domestic sector whereby a given amount of useful heat could be
obtained with less delivered and primary energy input. It is apparent,
therefore, from Figure 1.2, that delivered energy consumption in the
domestic sector increased only marginally (3.5%) between 1960 and 1973;
in industry such substitution was slower and more difficult so
delivered energy registered a 20% increase over the same period.
Despite the substitution of coal by oil and electricity in rail
transport, the transport sector is dominated by the significant
increase in private car ownership and use which, of course, relied
totally on oil; consequently, this sector registered the highest
increase over the period (47%}. The largest increase in electricity
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consumption in the decade up to 1973 took place in the domestic and
tertiary sector largely due, again, to the replacement of coal fires by
electric heating at a higher overall efficiency, and to the rising
consumption of durable goods (Fig.1.4).
For much of this period such changes occurred within a political context
which was, by and large, perceived as unproblematical. Immediately
after the Second World War there were fuel shortages which prompted the
establishment of the Fuel and Power Advisory Council and later the
Committee on National Fuel Policy. The former, under the chairmanship
of Sir Ernest Simon, reported in March 1946 and was primarily concerned
with the efficiency of domestic heating in view of the new Labour
Government's massive house-building programme. Efficiency of fuel
use to ease energy shortages was also a prime concern of the Committee
on National Fuel Policy which reported, under Viscount Ridley, in 1952.
This report established the major objective of fuel policy as securing
adequate supplies of fuel to meet the demands of the community and
during the following two decades this concern eclipsed considerations
of efficiency of use as the switch to cheap oil, in particular,
progressed.
As there were, from this perspective, few perceived problems in the
energy field, little progress was made towards a coordinated national
policy until the mid-1960s when two issues arose which required some
rationalization. Firstly, the discovery of natural gas under the
North Sea produced the need for decisions to be made on questions of
premium uses and pricing. Secondly, at the time of the announcement
of the second nuclear power programme, electricity demand forecasts
had to De reduced because of a slowdown in economic growth and this
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necessitated decisions on future investment in different types of
electricity generating capacity. After a review of fuel policy in
1965, the Labour Government produced the Fuel Policy White Paper in
1967 to reassess the balance of supplies in the emerging 'four fuel
economy' with a view to securing adequate supplies of cheap energy to
promote economic development. The White Paper was optimistic about
oil supplies and price and about the potential of nuclear power and
therefore confirmed the run-down of the coal industry. priority was
to be given to natural gas, particularly for use in the domestic
sector, and to nuclear power; it was assumed that oil would be readily
available as a balancing fuel.
This perspective was, however, overtaken by events in the early 1970s
after the creation of the OPEC cartel. The trends initiated by the
1971 Tehran and Tripoli Agreements were catalyzed by the Yom Kippur
War and the subsequent massive increase in oil prices created severe
economic problems. In 1974 the cost of oil imports accounted for two
thirds of Britain's visible trade deficit of £5.3 billion. The
'energy problem' became a matter of serious concern to government
primarily because of its severe economic implications at a time when
the performance of the advanced Western economies was already
deteriorating. The major preoccupation of the Labour Government
elected in March 1974 was, as in most other western European countries,
one of reducing dependence upon imported oil through the promotion of
indigenous production and energy conservation. However, an important
factor in this country was the prospect of achieving self-sufficiency
in oil within a decade or so through production from North Sea
fields, a prospect which few other major consuming countries could
look forward to. No new comprehensive statement of energy policy was
produced during the years immediately following the 1973/74 crisis
despite the creation of the Department of Energy in December 1973.
However, the Labour Government did implement a number of measures which
were considered necessary to adapt UK energy policy to the new situation.
These measures related to the conservation of energy and to the
development of 'indigenous' energy production in the form of coal, oil
and nuclear electricity.
The initial energy conservation policy introduced in 1974 relied
primarily on voluntary measures, information and pricing although prior
to 1975 the nationalised industries were prevented from passing on full
cost increases to consumers in order to control inflation and
consequently sustained large deficits. However, after 1975, prices
were raised in line with costs in the interests of achieving
conservation, and policies for energy saving were strengthened at the
end of 1977 with the announcement of a ten-year conservation programme
designed to save around 11 mtoe each year. public expenditure of
£450 million was sanctioned for the period up to 1981 to finance
insulation and energy management in public buildings, grants for
investment in energy saving equipment in industry and for insulation
of private houses, and to finance information services and demonstra-
tion projects. The 'Save It' public information campaign was also
extended and a new Energy Conservation Division was established within
the Department of Energy. In 1979 new mandatory thermal insulation
standards for non-domestic buildings were introduced. However, energy
conservation policy remained relatively weak in many areas, particular-
ly in the transport and industrial sectors, and was criticized as
inadequate by the International Energy Agency in their reviews of
member states' policies. Although UK energy consumption did decline
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after 1973 this was largely due to economic recession, and with the
temporary recovery in 1976 consumption began to grow once more at
pre-1973 rates. Thus, between 1975 and 1979 consumption increased by
10% overall and by nearly 14% in transport and households and commerce.
The supply-side response to the 1973/74 crisis was considerably
stronger and more comprehensive reflecting the orientation of energy
policy objectives inherited from the 1960s. Soon after its election
in 1974 the Labour Government set up a Tripartite Group involving the
National Coal Board (NCB), the Unions and the Government to review
the prospects for the coal industry. The 'Plan for Coal' produced
by the NCB in 1973 was endorsed setting a production target of
135 million tonnes by 1985 and involving considerable investment both
in new capacity and in the improvement of existing capacity. Early
in 1977 the Tripartite Group published 'Coal for the Future' which
set a planning objective for the industry of 170 million tonnes by
the year 2000, of which 150 million tonnes would be deep mined,
requiring 60 million tonnes of new capacity and an investment
programme of £400 million per annum at 1976 prices. However, progress
in new mine development soon fell behind schedule and forecast
production levels have been reduced to about 125 million tonnes in
1985 and 137 - 155 million tonnes in 2000. Coal production actually
declined to 122 million tonnes in 1979 and demand has been maintained
by schemes covering purchases by the Central Electricity Generating
Board who take over 70% of domestic output.
Substantial measures were also taken in 1975-76 to ensure greater
public control over the development of offshore oil resources through
state regulation and participation and through fiscal policy. In
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1975 the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act was passed enabling
the Secretary of State for Energy to exercise additional control over
exploration, development and production, and therefore to determine,
within certain constraints, an appropriate depletion policy. The Act
also established the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) as the
principal agent of State majority participation in the North Sea oil
fields. Again in 1975, the Oil Taxation Act introduced a Petroleum
Revenue Tax (PRT) designed to ensure that a substantial proportion of
net revenues from offshore production remained within the UK and were
therefore available for the attainment of wider economic objectives.
The rate of PRT was increased from 45% to 60% in the 1979 Finance Bill
and by the middle of 1979 the Government had received around £1.2
billion in taxation and royalties from the North Sea.
Production of oil from the North Sea commenced in 1975 in the Argyll
field and 1976 production amounted to 12 million tonnes expanding
rapidly thereafter to the current level of about 80 million tonnes per
year. This gives the UK net self-sufficiency at a lower level of
output than previously anticipated due to reductions in consumption
since 1979. Forecasts of production for 1990 have been reduced to
around 90 million tonnes and thereafter a decline is expected to
about 60 million tonnes by the end of century. Estimates of resources
remaining in existing discoveries have been reduced to 2.3 billion
tonnes.
Since 1973 sales of natural gas have doubled and its contribution to
total primary energy consumption has increased from 12% to 21%; it
now supplies 30% of final energy consumption and plays a particularly
important role in the domestic sector, its major premium market. In
33
1973 the Area Gas Boards were abolished and the British Gas
Corporation (BGC) established with a virtual monopoly over the purchase
and supply of offshore gas. Most of the gas produced during the 1970s
has come from the Southern Basin of the North Sea but newer discoveries
in the Northern Basin have alleviated concern about rapid depletion.
Indigenous production increased between 1973 and 1979 by 36% to
39 billion cubic metres while imports, mainly from the Norwegian
sector of the Frigg field, increased to about 10 billion cubic metres.
The policy of low gas pricing to promote sales (and control inflation)
was changed in 1975 and gas prices to industrial consumers have risen
significantly since then although they continued to fall in real
terms in the domestic market until the middle of 1980.
The final supply-side component in the Government's response to the
'energy crisis' concerned the fourth element of the 'four fuel
economy' - nuclear power. The first two nuclear power programmes
produced orders of about 10 GWE of capacity based on the Magnox and
AGR reactors. Most of the first Magnox programme had progressed
reasonably well to schedule although the final (and largest) reactor
at Wylfa was delayed and did not commence operation until 1971. The
second programme of AGR reactors soon ran into serious difficulties
and severe construction delays were experienced especially, for
example, at Dungeness B which is now coming on stream 11 years late
and at a real cost 110% above the original estimate. In 1973 the
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) sought the approval of
the Government for a programme of 36 nuclear power stations based on
the American pressurised water reactor (PWR). However, after criticism
of this proposal by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and
Technology early in 1974, the newly elected Labour Government rejected
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it in favour of a much smaller third programme of 4 GWe based on the
steam generating heavy water reactor (SGHWR), the prototype of which
had been developed at Winfrith by the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA).
However, slow progress with the SGHWR led to a review of this option
in 1976 in relation to the alternative AGR and PWR technologies. In
January 1978 the Government finally decided to abandon the SGHWR
option, to order two further AGRs as soon as possible (at Heysham
and Torness), and to develop further the option of adopting the PWR
system in the early 1980s in order to avoid exclusive dependence on
anyone reactor system.
Between 1973 and 1974 electricity consumption actually declined
because of lower demand from the industrial sector and the rate of
growth since then has been depressed by the economic recession,
rising fuel costs and competition from natural gas, particularly in
the domestic sector. Coal has increasingly been used to substitute
for oil and natural gas in electricity production, as the delays in
the AGR programme have prevented new nuclear capacity from coming on
stream, and because of the failure of even the commissioned AGRs to
operate to design capacity. However, optimism about the future
growth in electricity demand and about the economic and technical
performance of nuclear power stations continued throughout the 1970s
leading to official expectations of a doubling of capacity between
1979 and 1990 and a further trebling between 1990 and the end of the
century. Work continued throughout the 1970s with the AEA on the
Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) programme. In 1974 a start was made on
the commissioning of the 250 MW Prototype Fast Reactor at Dounreay
and it achieved full power output in 1977.
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During the period after 1974 increasing attention was also given to
the examination of the potential contribution of renewable energy
sources in the UK but the effort was confined to a rather limited
research and development budget. In 1976 work commenced, through the
Advisory Council on Research and Development (ACORD), on the
formulation of a comprehensive national strategy for energy research
and development, and renewable energy sources were identified as a
priority area for R&D funding. Programmes were established in the
areas of wave, solar, wind and geothermal energy between 1976 and
1977 and work continued on the assessment of the potential for a tidal
barrage in the Severn Estuary. Total public sector R&D funding for
energy between 1976 and 1979 reached a level of about £240 million per
year and although the funding for renewable sources increased towards
the end of the decade, it did not achieve more than 3% of the total
(compared with 70% for nuclear technologies).
Consequently, during the mid-1970s there was a considerable amount of
government action in the energy field much of it within the context
of concern with broader problems of economic management and oriented
primarily to the question of securing supplies of energy to ensure
economic growth. The resulting focus on issues of 'indigenous'
energy production created increasing concern at the environmental
costs of the developments implied in official thinking. For example,
the proposals for new mining capacity contained in the 'Plan for
Coal' and 'Coal for the Future' produced concern about local environ-
mental damage. There was some protest, particularly in Scotland,
against the environmental implications of oil and gas-related
development in coastal areas. However, it was the nuclear power issue
which constituted the focus for the major 'environmentalist' opposition
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and two events of the mid-1970s can be seen having considerable
significance for those who were challenging not only official policy
but also dominant approaches to thinking about questions of social and
technological development.
The first event was the publication, in September 1976, of the Sixth
Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution on 'Nuclear
Power and the Environment'. Under the chairmanship of Sir Brian
Flowers the Commission produced a report which did much to establish
the 'respectability' of arguments opposing the development of nuclear
power by voicing substantial and well-reasoned doubts about many
aspects of such development. The Commission argued that there were
severe risks associated with the plutonium econom~ for example,
dangers of terrorist action and of erosion of civil liberties due to
measures which might be necessary to reduce such dangers. They
pointed out that" ... it would be irresponsible and morally wrong
to commit future generations to the consequences of fission power on
a massive scale unless it had been demonstrated beyond reasonable
doubt that at least one method exists for the safe isolation of .•.
wastes for the indefinite future." Serious doubts were also expressed
about the official view of a substantial reliance on nuclear-generated
electricity by the end of the century on the grounds of wastefulness
in energy terms and environmental implications. The Commission
argued, therefore, that a major commitment to nuclear power should be
postponed as long as possible in the hope that it may be avoided
altogether. Finally, and quite significantly, the Commission saw the
issues raised by nuclear power as 'political and ethical' as well as
technical and felt that decisions on major questions of nuclear
development should be made by 'explicit political process'.
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Therefore, as well as providing a 'legitimate' basis for
opposition to many aspects of nuclear power development, the Royal
Commission report can also be seen as adding force to the challenge
to the 'instrumental rationality' approach to thinking about social
and technological policy issues, by arguing that political and
ethical value considerations necessarily underlie the controversy.
This argument subsequently gained further impetus through a second
significant event viz. the establishment of a Public Inquiry into
the application by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) to build a
major new thermal oxide fuel reprocessing plant (THORP) at
Windscale in Cumbria. The Inquiry took place between June and
November 1977 and resulted in the granting of a special development
order for BNFL to proceed with the construction of the proposed
reprocessing facility. Although the opponents of BNFL's development
in particular, and of nuclear power in general, felt that the Inquiry
Inspector, Mr. Justice Parker, failed to pay due regard to their
arguments, the Inquiry can nevertheless be seen as having resulted
in a wider appreciation of the argument that the debate about nuclear
power is, at base, a debate about values and ends. Wide-ranging and
detailed arguments both for and against the development of nuclear
power were subjected to close examination and public scrutiny
and it became clear from the proceedings that disputes could not be
settled on a purely 'technical' basis (cf. wynne 1978; Kemp 1980).
Moreover, somewhat paradoxically, it may be that the apparent failure
of Mr. Justice Parker to appreciate the positions presented by
opposition groups has led to a more widespread recognition of the
evaluative basis upon which his assessment was made.
Nevertheless, such a recognition would still appear to be
largely confined to academic commentators and to certain sections
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of the anti-nuclear movement. The argument developed throughout the
late 1970s by, for example, Professors David Pearce and Steven
Cotgrove, and by Dorothy Nelkin, Peter Taylor and Brian Wynne (see
refs. ) to the effect that 'the nuclear debate is about
values' has not had much impact at Whitehall or Westminster judging
by recent official policy developments. The major statement of
official energy policy during the period since 1973/74 was produced
in the 1978 Green Paper 'Energy Policy: A Consultative Document'
based on the Working Document on Energy Policy produced by the Cepart-
ment of Energy for the first meeting of the Energy Commission in
November 1977. The Green Paper took into account the arguments of
the Royal Commission in respect of social, environmental and security
problems of nuclear fission but presented an optimistic 'technical'
response - the appropriate safeguards, institutional changes and
technological advances would be forthcoming. There was little
recognition of the Commission's point about the fundamental importance
of political and ethical dimensions of the issues.
Moreover, the underlying approach to, and philosophy of, policy
formulation embodied in the Green Paper was highly rationalistic
being based upon a complex, quantitative forecasting methodology which
was regarded as investing policy outputs with a high degree of
rationality and legitimacy. Traditional objectives for energy policy
were restated in broad terms as the achievement of adequate and
secure energy supplies to enable the attainment of economic growth
targets, the efficient and rational use of such supplies, and the
minimisation, as far as practicable, of the resource costs of energy
supply and use. Tony Benn, then Minister of Energy, did suggest an
alternative formulation of objectives reflecting greater concern for
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consumer and environmental interests but there has been little
evidence of any significant influence of alternative values and
interests on official policy formulation.
To briefly outline the strategy set out in the Green Paper, the rate
of economic growth was considered likely to continue to be the main
influence on energy demand and two alternative assumptions about
future growth formed the basis for 'High' and 'Low' scenarios. The
first assumed the continuation of past long-term trends on the basis
of a boost to the economy from North Sea oil, producing a growth rate
of 3% per annum to the year 2000; the second assumed that growth would
fall to an annual rate of less than 2% by the end of the century.
Energy demand forecasts were produced from trend projections, reduced
by a 'conservation allowance' deriving from price increases and energy
saving efforts; this reduction amounted to 20% of primary energy
demand in the year 2000. Primary energy consumption was therefore
forecast to increase between 1975 and 2000 by 32% to 270 mtoe in the
High case. On the supply side the stated aim was to achieve a
flexible response within the four fuel context but the strategy
outlined included what were seen as 'upper limit' contributions from
coal and nuclear power, implying large investment programmes in each
of these areas. In the case of nuclear power the strategy involved
an installed capacity in 2000 of about 40 TWe implying the cornmision-
ing of some 28 new reactors over a period of 21 years. Large
contributions were also assumed from North Sea oil (90 million tonnes)
and natural gas (35 - 63 billion cubic metres), with imported oil
providing the additional supplies needed in the High case. The
contribution from renewable sources of energy was assumed to be, at
the most, 6 mtoe, that is 2.2% CLow) and 1.8% (High) of total primary
energy.
These forecasts were revised in 1979 with the publication by the
Department of Energy of 'Energy Projections 1979'. Again, two
economic growth assumptions were made but the revisions affected only
the composition of GDP and not the rates of growth which remained the
same as in the 1978 Green Paper in spite of the poor economic
performance actually recorded between 1975 and 1979, the first few
years of the forecasting period. The principle adjustment made was to
the demand for electricity which was revised substantially downwards
in the light of the reduced importance of manufacturing industry in the
new GDP forecasts. The new primary energy demand forecasts, again
assuming 20% conservation, were 266 mtoe (Low) and 306 (High) for the
year 2000. Forecasts were also made for 1990 of 246 mtoe (Low) and
261 mtoe (High). On the supply side the contributions in 2000 of
indigenous coal and oil were reduced but that of nuclear power remained
at the level of about 55 mtoe, an increase of a factor of seven from
the situation in 1979/80. The reason given for the maintenance of this
high level of nuclear contribution was the relative cheapness of
nuclear electricity compared with that generated from coal-fired
plant, and the growth of alternative markets for coal (e.g. liquefaction).
These revised forecasts made no explicit provision for a contribution
for renewable energy but an allowance was made for 1.5 mtoe of
combined heat and power by 2000 based on power station heat.
In 1978/79 there were further substantial increases in the price of
oil and the economic recession began to worsen once again. During
1979 a new Conservative Government took office committed to monetarist
economic policies and during 1980-82 there was a severe contraction in
industrial activity and a consequent sharp fall in energy consumption.
Between 1979 and 1982 energy consumption declined by 12% overall and
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by no less than 25% in the industrial sector. Initially, the
Conservative Administration made no fundamental changes in policy
direction, endorsing the 1979 Energy Projections and the need to pursue
a 'flexible strategy' to maintain all options with a longer term
emphasis on three major components: conservation, coal and nuclear
power. Traditional energy policy objectives have been restated: to
ensure adequate and secure supplies of energy and its efficient use at
the lowest practicable cost to the nation. However, more recent
statements of energy policy indicate a shift of focus, within the
context of the wider approach taken to economic policy, towards a
laissez-faire perspective with the emphasis on creating the conditions
in which energy markets can operate as nearly as possible as free
markets. Consequently, the major appropriate instruments of policy
are now seen as the stimulus of competitiveness and efficiency in the
supply industries and the pricing of energy to reflect market pressures
or long-run costs; efficiency can then be achieved in relation to
rational decisions by consumers left to respond to market signals.
Official projections of future energy demand and supply possibilities,
providing a framework for policy considerations, were updated in 1982
to take account of major changes since 1979 in economic growth
prospects, the world oil market and the structure of the British
economy. The considerable uncertainty engendered by these changes
promoted the development of a wide range of future scenarios developed
from combinations of assumptions relating to economic growth, fossil
fuel prices and industrial structure. Covering the period 1980-2000
the GDP growth assumptions ranged from 2~% p.a. (High) through 1~%
p.a. (Medium) to ~% p.a. (Low) and these were combined with high and
low fossil fuel price assumptions and hiqh and low growth rates for
major energy-using industries. The resulting primary energy
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demand forecasts for the year 2000 ranged from a highest value of 277
mtoe to a lowest of 197 mtoe, respectively 9% and 26% down from the
High and Low projections of 1979.
On the supply side, coal and oil each supply about one-third of energy
consumption in 2000 in most scenarios, natural gas around 18%, nuclear
11 - 16% and renewable sources about 1%. The contribution of nuclear
power is therefore reduced from the 1979 Projections, with a maximum
of 44 mtoe in 2000 (compared with 57 mtoe), involving a commissioning
rate between 1991 and 2000 of 2.1 GW per year. Notwithstanding a
slow-down in the rate of growth in electricity demand (0.5 - 3.1% p.a.
between 1990 and 2000) the government regards nuclear power as having
the potential to produce electricity more cheaply than fossil fuels
and therefore sees its energy objectives as best promoted by a
substantial commissioning of nuclear plant. The projections include
a possible CHP scheme of 200 MW capacity by 1990 building up to a
maximum 2 GW by 2010. Renewable energy sources are projected to
contribution a maximum of 3% to power station fuelling by 2010; the
Severn Barrage is excluded from the projections but is seen as
potentially saving up to 4% of power station fuelling and 1 GW in the
need for generating capacity.
Within this framework, then, recent government energy policy has
consisted mainly in measures such as the Energy Act 1983 (HMSO 19B3)
to increase competition in the energy sector, to increase efficiency
in public sector energy industries and to promote 'economic' pricing
of fuels. Conservation policy relies primarily on pricing to ensure
that appropriate economic signals are sent to energy consumers
although this is supplemented by a programme of information and
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advice and grant aid for insulation. The approach to public sector
supply industries is illustrated by, for example, the Coal Industry
Act of 1980 which was passed with the intention of making the coal
industry profitable by 1983-84; operating grants were to be phased out
so that coal production would be increasingly concentrated on newer,
more productive mines, and uneconomic pits would be closed. The Act
also provided continued support for the NCB's ten-year investment
programme and an extension of borrowing limits. As regards the gas
industry, measures are being introduced to sell off certain assets to
the private sector while the 1983 Energy Act (ibid.) facilitates
private generation in the electricity sector.
Government policy in respect of nuclear power has attracted consider-
able attention over the past few years. After taking office, the
Conservative Administration soon set out a framework for the long-
term development of nuclear power. In a Commons statement in
December 1979 the Energy Secretary stated that over the decade from
1982 a programme of the order of 15 GWe of new nuclear capacity
should be considered as 'a reasonable prospect against which the
nuclear and power plant industries could plan'. This was in addition
to the two AGRs at Torness and Heysham agreed to by the previous
Government in 1978. Such a programme would bring the total installed
capacity in 2000 to about 22 GWe (assuming the decommissioning of all
the existing Magnox stations) compared with the 40 GWe implied in the
1979 Energy Projections.
Moreover, the Government proposed that the next nuclear order should
be for a pressurized water reactor in order to establish an alterna-
tive reactor to the AGR and that construction should commence in 1982
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subject to the findings of a public inquiry. In January 1981 the CEGB
applied to the Secretary of State for consent to construct a 1200 MW
PWR at Sizewell but the public inquiry into the CEGB's proposals was
delayed until January 1983 and is likely to continue well into 1984
thus frustrating the nuclear industry's hopes of an early start to a
programme of PWR construction. As indicated earlier, the Government's
latest energy projections, presented at the Sizewell Inquiry, present
a range of assumptions about new nuclear capacity between 1991 - 2000
from a low value of 5 GW to a highest of 21 GW. Compared with a total
nuclear capacity in 1990 of 11 GW (contributing between 25% - 31% of
power station fuelling) the projected capacity in 2000 ranges from
13 GW (32% of power station fuelling) to 29 GW (providing 40% of
power station fuelling). It is notable that the 'medium case'
projections imply a rate of commissioning between 1991 and 2000
(1.5 GW p.a.) and a total nuclear capacity in 2000 (c. 22 GW) which
are compatible with the 'framework' adopted in 1979.
The Government's position on nuclear power has come in for considerable
criticism in recent years. The House of Commons Select Committee on
Energy presented a report in 1981 which was critical of several
aspects of the case put forward by the Government and the CEGB for
investment of £15 billion in new nuclear capacity. Pointing to the
substantial over-capacity in the CEGB and SSEB systems the Committee
questioned assumptions about economic growth, fuel and capital costs
and criticised the Department of Energy's approach to energy
conservation, arguing that investment in new nuclear generating
capacity should be evaluated against a comparable investment in
conservation. In its reply to the Select Committee, published in a
White Paper in July 1981, the Government rejected the criticism that
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the level of ordering of nuclear plant envisaged in the 1979 statement
is excessive although it emphasised that each new station would be
evaluated on its merits" •.• taking into account the need for full
diversity, the economic assessment of the generation costs of
different fuels, the development of electricity demand, the performance
of the industry, and the extent to which extensions to plant life can
be regarded as feasible and economic".
More recently, Government policy has been subjected to criticism by
several bodies appearing as objectors at the Sizewell Public Inquiry,
the terms of reference of which have permitted a very wide-ranging
scrutiny of energy policy. Organisations such as the Council for the
Protection of Rural England, the Town and Country Planning Association
and the Friends of the Earth are presenting cases against the proposal
and cross-examining Department of Energy and CEGB witnesses in an
inquiry which certainly represents the most significant event in the
nuclear power debate to date. However, the extent to which the
criticisms will influence government policy must be open to question
in view of the Energy Secretary's reported reference to objectors as
'conspiracy theorists and special pleaders' who ignore the merits of
the Government's position and his presentation of the case for
nuclear power as 'unassailable' (Guardian 12/5/83).
Finally on official energy policy, optimism about the future role of
nuclear power contrasts with a view of the potential contribution of
renewable energy sources which is even more pessimistic than that of
the previous Labour Government. In the 1982 Energy Projections
biofuels and renewables contribute only 1% of primary energy demand
(for energy uses) in 2000, a maximum of about 3 mtoe. By 2010 the
maximum contribution increases to 12 mtoe representing 4% of primary
energy demand. However, some progress has been made in recent years
in R&D programmes, particularly with wind energy. For example, in
January 1981 the Government announced plans for building a full-scale
aerogenerator of 3 MW capacity in the Orkneys by the Department of
Energy and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board to assess
reliability and economics under severe weather conditions; this is
now under construction. The CEGB has constructed a 200 kw wind
turbine at Carmarthen Bay as a forerunner of a larger 5 MW machine
which the Board plans to build and test at Ramsgate in Kent. In the
longer term the CEGB plans to develop a 'farm' of about ten
aerogenerators by about 1990 to assess both operational performance
and environmental acceptability. A Government Committee (the Bondi
Committee) reported in 1981 on the potential for a tidal barrage on
the Severn Estuary producing about 13 TWh p.a., arguing that such a
barrier would be technically feasible and an economic investment in
many scenarios, and recommending further studies on environmental and
industrial impacts, economic factors and preliminary design. The
Government is considering this report.
Geothermal energy experiments are under way at Marchwood near
Southampton and at the Cambourne School of Mines in Cornwall, the
latter with funding from the Department of Energy and the EEC.
Government spending on R&D in the area of alternative energy sources
has been increased to a level of about £14 million p.a. but the
Advisory Council on Research and Development (ACORD) recently
recommended to the Government that new expenditure on research and
development into renewable energy should be severely restricted
(Department of Energy 1982B). Apart from some research into
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geothermal energy and passive solar building design, ACORD argued that
further work beyond existing programmes should not proceed; therefore,
the programme of research into wave energy, for example, has been
severely curtailed. However, studies are progressing on CHP/DH. In
1980 the Government reacted to the Marshall Report by appointing
consultants to undertake an analysis of potential candidates for
'lead cities' and a detailed study of nine such candidates has been
completed indicating that CHPjDH is feasible in all cases although the
economic case is best for larger urban areas (e.g. London, Manchester
and Tyneside). The 1983 Energy Act made it incumbent upon Electricity
Boards to adopt and support CHP schemes and to make use of by-product
heat from electriCity generation (House of Commons 1983 Section 19).
It is apparent, then, that the concern to proceed with a substantial
programme of development of nuclear power is an important element in
official energy policy at the present time. In such a context little
sympathy is being given in government and nuclear industry circles to
arguments about the political and ethical dimensions of the issues
involved, and the importance of analysing the value-stances which
underlie the controversy. Nevertheless, the Sizewell Public Inquiry
has served to provide an impetus to such arguments as did the Winds-
cale Inquiry in 1977. The issues involved in the debate about nuclear
power are clearly of considerable moment in the context of discussions
about social and technological futures and so it is important to
attempt to obtain a better understanding of the role played by
evaluative considerations in the debate.
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1.5 'Values' and the Nuclear Power Debate
As indicated earlier, various academic commentators have been arguing
in recent years that the debate about nuclear power is more about what
the technology 'stands for' in wider social terms than about its
'technical aspects. The arguments to this effect presented by
Professor David Pearce have been influential. His analysis, with
others, of the Windscale Inquiry (Pearce et al. 1979) first elaborated
an argument which he subsequently developed elsewhere:
"(The nuclear debate) is about the public image of the
nuclear industry. It is about the fear that 'experts' are
imposing a technology on an unwary public, who increasingly
find the pace of technological change beyond their control,
beyond the means that ordinary citizens and pressure groups
have for calling a halt while the matter is aired in the open.
It is about the issue of 'need': whether the demand for
electricity justifies more and expensive nuclear power stations.
It is about bigness and centralisation of control. It is, in
short, a debate about life-style and the direction in which
we, as a society, want to go."
(Pearce 1981 p. 23)
Again, Bickerstaffe and Pearce (1980) argue, in greater detail, that
the concept of nuclear power as a symbol of centralized and large-scale
bureaucracies, distant from consumer control, is common to much
opposition to technological change. Argument centres not on the costs
and benefits of nuclear power per se but on the value systems relevant
to the image of society typified by significant nuclear programmes.
This image is of materialist, 'post-industrial' society; yet many
people desire a 'post-materialist, post-industrial' society (ibid.
p. 312-3):
"Where value systems differ, however, argument about the features
of nuclear technology, its safety, its economic record, and so
on, become essentially irrelevant. There can be no reasoned
convergence of value systems."
(ibid p , 313).
This position has also been developed by Professor Stephen Cotgrove
within the context of his study of 'environmentalism' (Cotgrove 1981,
1982; Cotgrove and Duff 1980). He argues that:
" the debate between environmentalists and their opponents
over, for example, nuclear power, is more than simply an
49
argument about the effects of low-level radiation, or
the probabilities of accidents. It is also a debate
about the values which can justify nuclear risks."
(op. cit. 1981 p. 124)
More specifically:
" the opposition of nuclear protestors goes beyond
technical questions of risk and safety and economic
benefits. It is the wider questions of social, political
and psychological risk to which they attach importance.
The significance and meaning of nuclear power for the
social and moral order of the opponents is the promise of
remote impersonal centralised bureaucracies, increased
reliance on experts, loss of control over decisions which
affect their lives, threats to personal liberty from the
security requirements of the plutonium economy, as well
as the risks of nuclear proliferation. To the supporters,
it is the economic benefits which are of overriding
importance. Their social and moral order is threatened
by the failure to develop nuclear power. If the environ-
ment takes a knock or two or if society takes some
calculated risks, then this is the price to be paid for
the pursuit of the greater good."
(ibid. p. 133).
This argument implies, therefore, that progress towards the resolution
of conflict over such issues as nuclear power, towards the achievement
of greater consensus, towards the defusing of frustrated, potentially
violent opposition - such progress is contingent upon a recognition
of the political dimensions of the controversy and the establishment
of procedures for public discussion and decision-making which can
incorporate the consideration of opposing 'social paradigms' (cf.
Cotgrove and Duff Ope cit.; Pearce 1978). Bickerstaffe and Pearce
(op. cit. p. 333) argue that to the extent that consensus depends
upon a unity of values then there is little prospect that it can be
achieved in view of deep disagreements over social goals which
underlie the nuclear debate. However, they suggest that progress
towards greater consensus can be achieved through efforts to
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.. give 'fair hearing' to all parties in the debate, and to
separate out issues of political choice in defining goals from those
of technological means, giving each explicit recognition (ibid.
p , 336).
other recent work which has emphasised the evaluative dimension of
the nuclear debate can be briefly referred to. Del Sesto (1980)
analyses the nuclear debate, as manifested in the US Congressional
hearings on reactor safety in 1973/74, in relation to ...
, ... ideological cleavages and differences in the world view of the
partisans involved." (ibid. p. 40). He is concerned to show, then,
that the debate goes beyond technical issues into sociopolitical,
moral and ethical dimensions in which ideological conflicts are of
fundamental importance. Stott (1981) also emphasises the ideological
bases of the debate, arguing that the faith of so many western
governments in nuclear power must be interpreted in relation to
" ..• the ideological bases common to advanced industrial nations and
the assumptions underlying them" (ibid. p. 106). Conversely, he
argues that opposition to nuclear power goes beyond technical issues
of safety and economy and arises" ... because it represents the
development of certain directions in society, technocratic non-
participating, centralist." (ibid.).
These approaches to the analysis of the nuclear power debate, then,
have presented a serious challenge to the traditional technical or
'engineering' conception of the issues (cf. Lovins 1975 p. 12-14).
However, they also generate a conceptual problem concerning the
relationship between the 'technical' and 'ideological' realms in
public policy disputes. There has been little explicit consideration
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of this relationship and, indeed, a tendency to implicitly assume the
separability of these two realms, implying that the recognition of
the importance of ideological factors in the debate does not necessarily
prejudice the discussion of scientific facts in the 'technical' realm.
For example, the position represented by Pearce, discussed above,
tends to retain the dichotomous distinction between means and ends,
between the 'technical' and the 'political', between facts and values.
While this position acknowledges the importance of dispute over
political and social ends and values and the inability of discussions
of technical means and the 'facts' to settle the dispute, it is
nevertheless maintained that if we carefully identify and separate out
evaluative issues and considerations then the rationality of decision-
making processes can be increased with respect to technical
discussions of the costs and benefits of means based on the findings
of science (cf. Bickerstaffe and Pearce op. cit.). Dorothy Nelkin
also argues that ••.
.. increased knowledge may eventually depoliticize
an issue by helping to separate facts from values or
by clarifying the technical constraints that limit
policy choices."
(Nelkin 1979A p. 19)
From such a perspective, then, the problem essentially arises from the
process of evaluating costs and benefits of nuclear power in relation
to broader social, political and ethical aims, values and aspirations
since different groups will weight different costs and benefits in
different ways and, indeed, while agreeing on the existence of a
particular impact, may disagree about whether it constitutes a 'cost'
or a 'benefit'. The resulting implication for the policy-making
process is that such dispute about social ends and values should be
recognised as legitimate and important and institutional reforms should
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be implemented to permit its accommodation and resolution according
to democratic principles (cf. Pearce 1978; Pearce et al. 1979).
However, it can be argued that such a perspective places excessive
confidence on the degree to which social scientists can produce
knowledge about the costs and benefits of nuclear power which can be
considered value-free and 'cognitively reliable'. Recent work in the
fields of the philosophy, sociology and history of science has
indicated that scientific knowledge of social phenomena is
conditioned by social interests and values to an extent and in such
a way as to prejudice all conceptions relying on the separability of
facts and values irrespective of whether or not considerations
relating to the latter are seen as 'relevant', 'important' and
'rational'. Against this background my basic concern in this thesis
is to provide an analysis of the nature of scientific knowledge of
social phenomena in our society and its role and influence in debate
about issues of social and technological development using the
debate about nuclear power as an example. The broad perspective
adopted involves an emphasis upon the relationship between scientific
activity and wider social and political processes.
Brian Wynne (1982) has recently published an analysis of the role of
scientific rationality in decision-making processes, based on the
Windscale Inquiry in particular, which adopts a similar perspective.
In this important, seminal work, Wynne is basically concerned with
the role of cognitive structures in providing institutionalised
authority to legitimise technological commitments. He criticises the
models of rationality in decision-making which rely on conceptions of
value-free science and supports a conception of scientific knowledge
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as evolving within 'intellectual-emotional complexes' or 'cosmologies'
and developed in interpretive fashion in relation to the social interests
and experiences of different groups. Scientific knowledge, he argues,
plays an important role in achieving authority and political control
and is reinforced (or, indeed, supplanted) in this role by a 'judicial
ideology' which attempts to reduce debates about technological develop-
ment to 'concrete technical facts' of unambiguous meaning, thus
concealing the social relations of decision-making. He applies this
conceptual framework in an analysis of the Windscale Inquiry concluding
that knowledge plays a complex moral and political role which is
neglected, indeed concealed, in traditional conceptions.
The analyses in this thesis, then, are concerned with similar issues
to those examined by Wynne although the detailed approach and focus is
rather different*. In the first part of the thesis (chapters 2 - 6)
my aim is to develop a conception of the nature of social scientific
knowledge as it is constituted in our society and of its role in
relation to the 'societal guidance' activities of the modern State.
In the second part (chapters 7 - 9) I review the major controversies
in the debate about nuclear power development and examine certain
aspects of this debate in order to elaborate upon some of the
implications of this conceptual framework.
* The analyses reported here were complete and the thesis substantially
written before I read Wynne's work and consequently it is not
referenced in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 2: Rationality in Scientific Knowledge
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review the arguments which have been
developed by philosophers of science concerning the possibility of
achieving rational scientific knowledge of any kind. After setting
the broad context in a brief review of the historical development
of conceptions of science and its role in society, I discuss current
controversies over the rationality of science. In this discussion I
outline what I perceive to be an 'orthodox' conception of science and
then consider criticisms of this conception which arise from different
positions within the philosophy of science. The critiques considered
are those of the realist and conventionalist positions, that which
arises from the view of science as an essentially problem-solving
activity, and, finally, that of the so-called critical theorists
who see science as an ideology underlain by the purpose of technical
control over nature and society.
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2.2. Historical Perspective
The idea that the possession of knowledge is essential to the
advancement of civilization, dates back to the writings of the Greek
philosophers who were concerned with the problem of achieving and
maintaining political order through the selection of knowledgeable
rulers and the establishment of virtuous conduct amongst the citizens
(Rich 1979 p 6-7; McCarthy 1978 p 2).Thus, Plato's emphasis was on
salvation through government by a knowledgeable ruler; political action
could justly only be decided by the 'philosopher King' because only
such adequately educated persons were in possession of true knowledge
of 'Forms'. Such knowledge was obtained by going beyond perception in
the world of appearances via reasoning from premises to conclusions, to
'seeing' connections between real things so as to grasp the 'Form' of
things, where such 'Forms' are metaphysical entities (eg Truth) (Kerr
1981 p 485-6; Rich op.cit.). Therefore, from Plato we obtain the
notion that only theoretical knowledge of true propositions can
intelligently direct practical action and that the main problem of
government was to join power and knowledge and develop a science of
politics grounded in theoretical knowledge but designed for the
transformation and control of society (Gunnell 1976 p 32).
A fundamental characteristic of the Platonic conception of knowledge is
its recognition of the distinction between surface, contingent
appearances and an underlying reality and its equation of Truth with
knowledge of the latter. Also in this unified conception of knowledge
there was no radical distinction between science and political values
(cf. Marcuse 1964 Ch.5). However, Plato's pupil Aristotle, in his
system of logic, saw theoretical knowledge as concerned with the
development of general laws in relation to an object of knowledge which
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was given by experience and expressed in symbolic form. Consequently,
science became radically separated from ethics and values which were
seen as the subject of an irrational metaphysics. And the focus of
science became the given, experienced world; the Platonic conception of
the real intelligible world was lost (ibid. Ch. 5-6; McCarthy op.cit) •
In Aristotelian logic, therefore, lies the origins of modern idealist
philosophy with its emphasis on the formal treatment of an artefactual
object of knowledge, seen as the product of human cognition rather than
as an objective substance with a real existence independent of the mind.
This tradition was developed in Thomas Aquinas' conception of
knowledged based on sensations and experiences and developed via
generalization and reasoning from those experiences (Kerr op.cit. p 487) •
Later this tradition provided the basis for the intellectual revolution
of the seventeenth century in which science carne to be seen as a
distinctive category of inquiry and, as such, as a means to challenge
and overcome traditional beliefs and modes of thinking. Specifically,
science, as conceived by Francis Bacon in particular, was presented as
involving a new emphasis on rigorous method and critical thought in
pursuit of truth, as a means of overcoming arbitrary bias and human
error, as a branch of knowledge totally separate from religion and
ethics, and as a means to challenge the accepted synonymity of
knowledge and religious faith which was seen as supporting a dogmatic
system of metaphysics implying a rational order of things, buttressed
by powerful institutions (Rich op.cit. p 7-9).
The subsequent development of science in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was characterised by two primary orieoLations. Firstly, the
idealist conception of knowledge was consolidated, for example in
Hume's work. Thus, Hume saw scientific knowledge as involving the
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development of causal ('conjoining') statements on the basis of
observation of events in time and space. He therefore emphasized
the view that the use of 'a priori' reasoning to arrive at claims about
matters of fact or existence creates nonsense or meaningless talk; the
Platonic 'grasping' of the connections between 'real' entities to
produce a knowledge of 'Forms' was considered as meaningless, beyond
the realm of human understanding. Science, firmly based in observation
and experience, was radically distinguished from metaphysics (Kerr
Ope cit. p. 489).
The second orientation derived from Bacon's emphasis, reminiscent of
Plato, on scientific knowledge as the basis of power. Although by no
means a unanimous preoccupation amongst scientific philosophers and
social theorists, there has been an important tendency since the
philosophical upheaval in the seventeenth century which has emphasized
the usefulness of science to the state and to society in general
(Dreitzel 1972 p. 166; Rich op.cit. p. 9-10). The Baconian motivation -
'Scientia Ex Potentia Humanum In Idem Coincident' - was subsequently
developed by Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte, all of whom saw science,
on the one hand, as the only source of true knowledge, opposed to
superstition and dogma, and, on the other, as essential to 'progress'
and the advancement of civilization (ibid.)
These two orientations - observability and applicability - were
essentially interelated in that the latter, the usefulness of science
in directing human progress, was dependent upon the ability of science
to reveal the truth about the world (seen as its distinctive
characteristic) and this ability was seen to rest upon the development
of scientific laws on the basis of observable phenomena. Moreover, the
idealist conception of the object of knowledge as the creation of the
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human mind can be seen as fostering an orientation towards the control
and modification of that object. Thus, McCarthy argues:
"Although the pursuit of science for its own sake
(that is, in order to comprehend the true order of
nature) was historically at least as important as
the Baconian motivation, 'scientia propter potentiam',
a potential for predictive and technological
application is intrinsic to theoretical knowledge of
this sort. Given a description of the relevant
initial conditions, scientific laws can be used
(within certain limits) to predict future states of a
system. Providing that the relevant factors are
manipulable, these laws can also be used to produce a
desired state of affairs." (McCarthy op.cit. p. 3).
More recent developments in science can be seen as having consolidated
and extended these historical tendencies. Thus, the positivist
tendencies deriving from Comte were developed and systematized in
'Logical positivism' (or 'analytical philosophy') which was developed
in the 'Vienna Circle' and in Reichenbach's Berlin School in the 1920s
with the aim of establishing definitive frontiers between science and
metaphysics and of elevating the empiricist tradition of European
philosophy into a scientific philosophy which would, once and for all,
fix the principles and methods of science in a system of norms (Suppe
1974 p. 7-11; Wellmar 1974 p. 16; Los 1977 p. 10). This was made
possible by developments in mathematical logic culminating in Whitehead
and Russell's 'Principia Mathematica'; thus 'empiricism' and 'logicism'
were conjoined so that mathematical statements of scientific laws and
definitions of theoretical terms could be produced in terms of
mathematical logic with the aim "••• to reach the unification of
scientific knowledge and to find a method common to all science, which
can provide guarantees against the accumulation of meaningless concepts
or pseudo-problems." (Los op.cit. p. 11).
Another important trend has been the increasing interrelationship
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between science and technology and the increasing role of government
in this relationship. This shift in emphasis between pure and applied
science reflects the developing concern with the application of science
to human advancement and progress in a context where such 'progress'
is defined primarily in relation to the economic and industrial system.
And the view, strengthened by World War II, of applied science and
technology as basic means of production in the modern industrial system,
promoted the increasing role of government in influencing the kind of
research carried out, its application to technolgical developments and
in directly supporting such developments. Such is the strength of the
institutionalized connection between science and technology that "•.•
today technological considerations play a dominant role in determining
the direction of progress in many areas of pure science." (McCarthy
Ope cit. p. 3). In view, therefore, of the extent to which science has
become intimately connected to the practical spheres of social and
technological development it can be argued that there is a consequent
requirement for a philosophical justification of this role which
simultaneously emphasizes the practical power of scientific knowledge
while grounding this power in the 'objective' nature of that knowledge.
Positivist philosophy provides this justification in a view of knowledge
guaranteed freedom from the tainting intrusion of normative considerations
by a unitary methodology which permits progress towards Truth, and
thereby provides the warrant for the use of such knowledge to guide
human affairs.
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2.3.
2.3.1
Controversies over the Rationality of Scientific Knowledge
An Orthodox Position
In view of the essentially controversial nature of the philosophy of
science it is difficult to define an 'orthodox' position. However,
as indicated in the previous section, the development of Western
Science has been underlain by the conviction that its rationality
resides primarily in a guarantee of true, progressive or, at least,
highly confirmed knowledge. Despite the fact that this conviction has
been shaken in recent times by sceptical challenges based, for example,
on historical studies of actual scientific activity, the predominant
response to such challenges has been to refine traditional approaches
and to reassert the cognitive well-foundedness of science as its
rational basis (Laudan 1977 p. 1-4). Within this general tradition it
is possible to suggest that there exists a broadly orthodox view of
science as involving the explanation of the world through the development
of universal laws of nature whose degree of truthfulness can be
established with reference to empirical observations.
Now, classical Humean empiricism holds that the objects of knowledge are
atomistic events which constitute given facts and that such facts provide
a secure basis for scientific knowledge; empirical regularities or
constant conjunctions of events developed on this basis are both
necessary and sufficient for scientific knowledge (Bhaskar 1975 p. 24,
127). Post-Humean idealist philosophy has, however, developed the
conception of the objects of knowledge as artificial constructs which
are the product of human cognition viz. subjective experiences of an
observational character. Such experiential constructs are still
nevertheless asserted to provide a secure basis for scientific knowledge
but now the constant conjunction of events is an insufficient though
still necessary condition for science (ibid p. 25; Popper 1979 p. 35-6).
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Consequently, the orthodox model of scientific rationality is founded
upon the Humean view of causality which defines laws in terms of
regular successions of events or states of affairs, repeatedly
observed: viz. an event A is caused by another event B when B is
temporally prior to A; and whenever an event of type B occurs it is
always followed by one of type A (Bhaskar op. cit. p. 127-9; Keat and
Urry 1975 p. 12, 28-9; Lessnoff 1974 p. 23-4). The primary aim of
science is therefore seen as the development of 'satisfactory
explanations' of events by the discovery and statement of laws of nature
with the status of universal empirical statements of temporal correlation
under which those events can be subsumed (Popper op.cit. p. 191-2;
Bhaskar op.cit. p. 129-30; Lessnoff op. cit. p. 11; Ryan 1970 p. 46).
The dominant model of scientific explanation, following the work of
Hemple, Nagel, Oppenheim and Popper, is the 'deductive-nomological'
structure:
"By an 'explanation' (or a causal explanation) is meant
a set of statements by which one describes the state of
affairs to be explained (the 'explicandum') while the
others, the explanatory statements form the 'explanation'
in the narrower sense of the word (the 'explicans' of the
'explicandum')". (Popper op.cit. p. 191).
More precisely, deductive explanation requires a logical argument
comprising three parts (Keat and Urry op. cit. p. 10; Ryan op. cit.
p. 49; Rudner 1966 p. 60):
i A statement describing the event to be explained
(ie the 'exp1icandum' or 'explanandum');
ii A set of statements describing the relevant
circumstances that are antecedent to, or otherwise
causally related to, the explicandum (ie 'initial
conditions' or 'causal antecedents');
~-
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iii A set of lawlike statements to the effect that
the initial conditions, when present, will cause
the explicandum to occur.
The latter two parts of the argument comprise the 'explicans' (or
'explanans'), and to be satisfactory they must fulfill certain conditions
(Popper op.cit. p. 192-3; Bhaskar op.cit. p. 130).
a. The 'explicans' must logically entail the 'explicandum'
ie the latter should be deducible from the former;
b. The 'explicans' ought to be true, or at least well-
corroborated or not known to be false after critical
examination;
c. If not known to be true the 'explicans' must be
independently testable (ie the 'explicandum' must
not provide the only evidence for the 'explicans');
d. The 'explicans' must contain at least one universal
law.
According to this model the statements of universal laws together with
their initial conditions provide a basis for either explanation or
prediction of events and an argument enabling prediction also permits
explanation. The difference lies merely in the fact that the
'explicandum' of an explanation lies in the past while that of a
prediction lies in the future (Bhaskar op.cit.; Keat and Urry op.cit.
p.ll-l2) .
6:3
One of the central problems of the philosophy of science has concerned
the above conditions for satisfactory 'explicans', in particular the
question of corroboration of the universal laws. The fundamental
principle of the orthodox view is that laws, with the status of
universal empirical hypotheses, are tested in relation to their instances
which constitute the objects of actual or possible observable
experiences (Bhaskar op.cit. p. 131). The traditional justificationalist
answer to the problem involved the view that such hypotheses should be
confirmed or proven as true, or at least highly probable, on a self-
justifying foundation either of 'infallible reason' or 'intuition'
(the intellectualist or rationalist response) or, more commonly, of
experience (the empiricist response) (Lakatos 1970 p. 93-4; Briskman
1977 p. 511-2). The empiricist justificationalist argument rests on
two fundamental assumptions:
a. The positivist assumption that all cognitively meaningful
statements are of just two exclusive kinds. Analytic statements
are statements of language, whose truth arises from the meanings
of their terms, and which make no empirical assertions about the
world (ie have no factual content). Synthetic statements are
statements of fact and therefore contain all knowledge about the
world; their truth must be established by induction and they can
therefore be corroborated, unlike analytic statements (Hollis
and Nell 1975 p. 5-7; Hindess 1977 p. 17-18). The positivist
view considers the latter synthetic observation statements to be
'ontologically privileged', in that only such statements can
make genuine reference to items in the real world. Moreover,
they are also considered to be 'epistemologically privileged'
in two senses: firstly, in that the truth value of statements
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containing only observational terms can be known with
greater certainty than those (ie analytic statements)
containing only theoretical terms; and, secondly, in that the
truth value of observation statements can be established
without reference to that of analytic theoretical statements
ie empirical knowledge is theory-neutral (Keat and Urry
op.cit. p. 18-20; Hesse 1976 p. 4). Consequently, the
empiricist justificationalist must assume the existence and
availability of true, theory-neutral observation statements.
b. The second necessary assumption is that it is possible to
reason by induction to establish the truth of empirical
hypotheses on the basis of 'given' observation statements.
(popper op.cit. Lakatos op.cit.).
The untenability of these assumptions is now widely accepted and
consequently justificationalism has been underminded. Firstly, the
possibility of an a-theoretical observation language cannot be
demonstrated. Thus, in order to test an observation language in
relation to reality we must 'stand outside' that language; but this
requires reference to another observation language with respect to
which the same problem must arise. Since we cannot, by definition,
'stand outside' all possible observation language an infinite regress
opens up. Therefore, positivism cannot demonstrate the possibility of
an a-theoretical observation language; it merely asserts this assumption
and this constitutes dogma in its own terms (Hindess op.cit. p.139-40).
More generally any justificationalist foundation is open to demands for
justification and therefore the problem of infinite regress (Briskman
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op.cit. p. 512). In fact it is now widely believed that observations
cannot be made independently of theory-based expectations; to quote
Popper, •.•
"•••there is nothing direct or immediate in our
experience: we have to learn •••It is all decoding,
or interpretation." (op.cit. p.35-6).
"•••there is no observation which is not related to
a set of typical situations-regularities-between which
it tries to find a decision ..•there is no sense organ in
which anticipatory theories are not genetically
incorporated". (ibid. p , 72).
The general problem, then, is that if observation cannot be independent
of theory, how can the test of a tht~y with respect to such observation
be decisive ?
Secondly, a problem which has preoccupied philosophers of science for
centuries is that no matter how many repeatedly similar and constant
observations we may make of some phenomenon, these observations can
never prove the truth of a theory developed from them; there is always
the possibility that the next observation will contradict the theory.
This result is independent of the truth of observation statements;
thus, in Popper's formulation of the logical problem no number of true
test statements would justify the claim that an explanatory universal
theory is true (Popper op.cit. p. 7).
With the collapse of justificationalism the banner of rationality in
science has passed to popper's falsificationism which represents a
considerable liberalization of positivism, while still remaining
committed to truth as a regulative concept (ibid p. 29) and to the
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demarcation of science from 'pseudo-science' (ie rather than metaphysics
cf. Popper 1976). Popper's proposed solution to the problems of
justificationalism remains tied to the principle that theories are
tested in relation to empirical evidence, but in order to overcome the
problem of induction he argues that the rational method of science
consists in a constant effort to falsify empirical hypotheses by the
construction of severe crucial tests.
Firstly, in relation to psychological aspects of his theory, Popper,
as indicated above, rejects the view that we begin with pure empirical
observations and then derive a theory to explain them; rather he insists
that we necessarily make observations in the light of prior theory
or expectations - "•••conjecture or hypothesis must come before
observation or perception •••" (ibid p. 52). The two consequences of
this thesis are, firstly, that since we arrive at theories more by
reason than by observation, we must subject those theories to severe
tests; and, secondly, that there can be no theory-neutral, basic
observation statements against which to test theories.
The problem of testing such theories is, then, the concern of popper's
'logic of knowledge'. Although, Popper argues, it is logically
impossible to confirm the truth of a universal statement (hypothesis or
theory) on the basis of any number of singular statements (observational
experiences), the latter can be used to logically prove the falsity of
a universal statement. He therefore reformulates the problem of
induction in terms of the logical asymmetry between universal and
singular statements.
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" there is no induction, because universal theories
are not deducible from singular statements. But they
may be refuted by singular statements, since they may
clash with descriptions of observable facts." (ibid
p. 86).
Consequently, Popper's proposed theory of the method of science involves
two imperatives: firstly, it is necessary to explicitly state
preconceived assumptions, hypotheses and theories as empirically
testable propositions; and, secondly, we should then submit such
propositions to rigorous tests by confronting them with empirical
evidence in an attempt to expose their deficiencies:
"The method of science is the method of bold conjectures
and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them".
(popper 1979 p. 81).
A simple criterion for the demarcation of science from non-science or
pseudo-science is therefore provided by Popper's theory. Science
proposes empirically testable hypotheses which are open to falsification
with respect to empirical evidence and then proceeds to rigorously
attempt to falsify them; scientists must be prepared and able to state
in advance the evidence which they would accept as falsifying their
hypotheses. on the other hand, pseudo-science (Popper sio<]les out
Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis) does not advance falsifiable
hypotheses.
The critical method of science, then, involves the elimination of
hypotheses which are refuted in crucial tests and the retention of those
which survive as scientific theories. However, Popper argues that such
theories cannot be seen to be proven as true, only as unfalsified, and
therefore to be preferred and provisionally accepted as a basis for
action and further continued attempts at falsification (ibid.Ch. 1).
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We cannot therefore speak of the 'truth' or 'certainty' of scientific
knowledge but by rigorously pursuing the critical method of conjecture
and refutation we can have good reason to believe that our accepted
scientific theories correspond more closely to the truth than any known
alternatives i.e. have higher 'truth content':
".•.while we cannot ever have sufficiently good arguments
in the empirical sciences for claiming that we have actually
reached the truth, we can have strong and reasonably good
arguments for claiming that we may have made progress
towards the truthR• (ibid p. 57-8).
Notwithstanding the argument that objective scientific knowledge is
necessarily conjectural, science, for Popper, is the epitome of
rationality by virtue of the critical method. A commitment to the
continuous, rigorous elimination of errors through criticism and testing
can ensure that the 'science of the day' constitutes a better
approximation to the truth than any alternatives so far proposed and,
further, constitutes the most rational available basis for action:
"•••a pragmatic belief in the results of science is not
irrational, because there is nothing more 'rational' than the
method of critical discussion, which is the method of science.
And although it would be irrational to accept any of its results
as certain, there is nothing better when it comes to practical
action: there is no alternative method which might be said to be
more rational ". (ibid p. 2~).
Now popper's theory has been widely criticised on the grounds that it does
not overcome the problem of theory-dependency of observation. To
re-state the problem: if, as Popper himself argues, observations are
made in the light of theory-based expectations, and if observational
propositions cannot be proven as true (and, therefore, must be taken
as fallible) how can contradictions between such propositions and
hypotheses or theories result in the conclusive falsification of the
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latter? This proposal has some considerable significance to the extent
that failure to resolve it presents the danger of the collapse of the
attempt to ground the rationality of science in the regulative concept
of truth.
Moreover, in practice the situation is even more problematic. Popper's
demarcation criterion requires that the scientist be prepared to state
the empirical conditions which would constitute grounds for falsifica-
tion; but most theories will forbid any observable state of affairs
only if the influence of other factors is excluded (Lakatos, 1970
p.100-2). Consequently, in a test situation any contradiction which
arises will be between a (fallible) observation statement, a theory and
a 'ceteris paribus' clause; even if the observation statement were true
the contradiction could be blamed on unsatisfied 'ceteris paribus'
conditions (ibid; Hollis and Nell, 1975, p.33-8). And there are
further complications: for example, it is always possible to 'immunize'
a theory against falsification by the introduction of auxiliary
hypotheses which make the theory consistent with the evidence in
question; a theory may fail a test because of the unsatisfactory
performance of test procedures, (Keat and Urry, 1975, p.46-8).
Popper, in fact, recognizes these criticisms and has broadened his
position from strict falsificationism to critical rationalism,
incorporating falsification as an important special case (cf. Popper,
1976). Imre Lakatos (op.cit.) has argued that in so doing Popper has
developed a conventionalist approach. In testing a particular theory
the scientist can provisionally decide to accept an observation
statement as having 'truth-value'; such decisions are made according
to prevailing techniques within the scientific community and are
recognized as fallible, being based on background theoretical knowledge
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which is accepted as unproblematic within the community as a basis for
testing the theory (ibid P.I06-8; Hindess, 1977, p.173-4). Moreover,
in the event of a contradiction the scientist must again decide what
to do in respect of 'acceptance' of 'ceteris paribus' clauses,
introduction of auxiliary hypotheses and rejection of the theory under
test (Lakatos, op.cit. p.108-10). In effect, such decisions and
methodological rules embody a normative conception of what constitutes
'scientific behaviour'; the demarcation criterion between science and
'pseudo-science' essentially refers to a behavioural imperative rather
than to the nature of hypotheses and theories (Hindess, op.cit. p.174-5).
Falsification has developed into its most sophisticated form in response
to the prospect of a necessary abandonment of the attempt to defend the
rationality of science with respect to method, a prospect which appears
to loom ahead on the conventionalist path. In this form, tests involve
comparisons between alternative series of theories and any such series
is falsified only if a new series is proposed which has excess
empirical content (some of which is corroborated) and explains the
successes of the old series (Lakatos, op.cit. p.116-8). Consequently,
falsification involves more than the confrontation between a theory and
an empirical basis; rather, it occurs only in the context of
competition between theories and must be based upon the emergence of a
better theory (or series of theories) (ibid p.1l9-20). However, even
in this form conventionalist decisions are still required, demarcation
is essentially a matter of 'intellectual honesty' (cf. the cri tical
attitude), and falsification still relies on corroboration of the
empirical content of theories; as Popper (1976, p.104) states:
"•••there is no better idea of rationality than that of a
readiness to accept criticism; that is, criticism which
discusses the merits of competing theories from the point
of view of the regulative idea of truth."
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Lakatos' development of Popper's position, then, presents the conception
of the 'scientific research programme' (SRP), containing a series of
theories, as the basic unit of appraisal, (Lakatos op.cit.). The SRP
is seen as structured into a 'hard core' and 'protective belt' and as
containing rules, standards and conventions in the form of 'negative'
and 'positive heuristics'. The 'hard core' comprises basic explanatory
laws and metaphysical commitments accepted as irrefutable by the
methodological decision of the community of scientists, and protected
by the 'negative heuristic' which diverts research (attempts at
falsification) towards the 'protective belt'. The latter comprises
auxiliary (observational) hypotheses which 'soak up' anomalies, and is
constructed in the light of the 'positive heuristic' which provides a
plan for the definition of problems, the treatment of anomalies and the
further development of the research programme (ibid P.132-6).
Now scientific progress is achieved through the comparative appraisal
of research programmes with respect to empirical content and the
corroboration of that content with reference to observable states of
affairs. Those SRPs displaying 'progressive problem shifts' are to be
preferred, i.e. those predicting novel facts backed up 'occasionally'
by corroboration. But the decision to abandon a 'degenerating'
research programme in favour of a competing 'progressive' programme
cannot be clear-cut; Lakatos argues that whereas we may rationally
decide not to allow 'refutations' to transmit falsity to the 'hard
core' as long as the corroborated empirical content of the 'protective
belt' of auxiliary hypotheses increases, we must nevertheless allow for
the abandonment of the 'hard core' if the programme ceases to anticipate
novel facts (ibid. p.l34). Clearly, this is a matter of decision in
relation to the standards of the academic community and, like Popper,
Lakatos emphasises the critical attitude as the measure of 'intellectual
honesty' and, with the idea of empirical corroboration, as the basis
for rationality in science.
The theories propounded by Popper and Lakatos can be seen, then, as
representing the most sophisticated attempt to defend the rationality
of science in the traditional sense as providing the cognitively best-
founded knowledge that we can possibly attain. As argued above, these
theories rest upon two fundamental concepts: firstly, that of
universal laws based on empirical regularities; and secondly, that of
falsification in relation to an empirical basis. A further important
feature of these theories is their ontological basis. Thus, underlying
the popperian position is a pluralistic conception of the world:
"In this pluralistic philosophy the world consists of at
least three ontologically distinct sub-worlds: or, as I
shall say, there are three worlds: the first is the
physical world or the world of physical states; the
second is the mental world or the world of mental states;
and the third is the world of intelligibles, or ideas in
the objective sense: or it is the world of possible
objects of thought: the world of theories in themselves,
and their logical relations; of arguments in themselves;
and of problem situations in themselves." (Popper, 1979,
p.lS4) •
This ontology, then, is the basis for Popper's conception of objective
knowledge - 'knowledge without a knowing subject', i.e. existing
independently of the subjective states of mind of any individuals.
Scientific knowledge is therefore seen as developing in 'World 3'
as a product of human activity but as existing in 'World 3' as an
objective structure independent from the human mind (ibid. p.lS8-9).
The development of this ontological scheme represents an attempt to
reconcile the acknowledgment of the subjectivist components in the
process of knowledge formation (cf. the psychology of knowledge) with
the requirement to ground the defence of the rationality of science
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in a conception of 'reliable' knowledge. That this attempt fails is
the argument of various critiques; indeed, the defence of the
rationality of science presented by the Popper-Lakatos theories has
been subjected to criticism from several sources. I shall briefly
consider three such positions from the point of view of their
criticisms and their alternative conceptions of science.
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2.3.2 The Realist Critique
Firstly, 'received philosophy of science' is criticized by Bhaskar
(1975) from a realist perspective. From such a position the commitment
to universal empirical generalizations and empirical testing cannot
guarantee rationality; yet the idea of rationality is retained in an
alternative conception of science as causal explanation of phenomena
in terms of the mechanisms which produce them. Bhaskar's critique
centres on the argument that the development of universal law-like
statements and the notion that a theory can be tested in relation to
its deduced empirical consequences rely on the concept of a closed
system in which constant conjunctures of events can be empirically
identified (ibid. Chap. 2). However, system closure is only possible
under controlled experimental conditions where the system can be
assumed to be isolated from external influences or where such
influences can be assumed to be constant (viz. 'ceteris paribus').
The restriction of the application of universal laws to such closed
systems leaves unanswered the fundamental question of what governs
phenomena in the open systems which characterise the real world; but
such a restriction is necessary if the universal character and empirical
status of the laws is to be retained. Consequently, to the extent that
science involves the explanation and identification of causes of
phenomena that occur in open systems, it cannot be coherently rational-
ized in terms of the development of universal empirical laws (ibid.).
Moreover, the restriction of the application of universal laws to
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closed systems (i.e. subject to the satisfaction of a 'ceteris paribus'
clause) produces the fundamental problem for falsificationism referred
to above (p.69 ) viz. that a failure of prediction can always be
blamed on unsatisfied 'ceteris paribus' conditions and therefore cannot
conclusively refute the law (ibid. p.92-6). Consequently, the idea
that a theory can be judged by its deduced empirical consequences and
the specification of ex ante criteria for the refutation of a theory
only make sense when the system of interest can be closed. Such
criteria do not make sense for a science which is concerned to develop
causal explanations of phenomena in open system where the subjects,
conditions and forms of action are characterised by diversity and
constant change, and where consequent events may have a multiplicity of
causes and may not be invariably realized. Bhaskar (op.cit. p.104)
summarizes as follows:
"Now once we have grasped the ubiquity of open systems in
nature we will be in a better position to understand the
embarrassment with which textbooks in the philosophy of
science gloss over their failure to produce a single law
or explanation which satisfy the criteria they so
laboriously develop and defend; a fact which bears
eloquent witness to the non-availability of universal
closures of any epistemic significance. We will also be
in a better position to understand not just this failure,
but their absurdity, when they seek to apply these same
criteria to fields such as history and the human sciences,
where the conditions for even a restricted closure (of a
non-trivial kind) are not naturally and cannot be
experimentally satisfied, and where the concept of action
implied by these criteria is patently inapplicable."
Bhaskar, therefore, proposes an alternative 'realist' conception of
science which he sees as providing a rational foundation. He argues
that scientific explanation should not be analysed as consisting of a
form of logical argument enabling prediction of observable events;
rather, explanation must penetrate 'behind' constant conjunctures of
events to answer the questions how and why those events did or will
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occur. To do this it must refer to the mechanisms or structures which
generate or produce the phenomena we are trying to explain; we must
show how processes of change operate in the world by describing the
'nature' or 'essence' of phenomena.
Consequently, the discovery of empirical regularities is seen as
neither a sufficient nor, indeed, a necessary condition of explanation.
However, it can constitute a first stage in a dialectic involving the
identification of a regularity, the conjecture of a plausible explana-
tion, and the checking of the real entities and processes postulated
in the explanation in terms of a description of the generative mechanisms
which are actually at work (ibid. Chap. 3). An observed pattern of
events might provide a clue to the tendencies of such generative
processes but due to the complexity and multiplicity of causation in
the world (i.e. in an open-systemic context) such tendencies need not,
and often will not, be reflected in an invariant pattern or regularly
occurring sequence of events:
"Science must be conceived as an ongoing social activity;
and knowledge as a social product which individuals must
reproduce or transform, and which individuals must draw
upon to use in their own critical explorations of nature.
Science is a process in motion, continually on the move
from manifest behaviour to essential nature, from the
description of things identified at anyone level of
reality to the construction and testing of possible
explanations and thus the discovery of the mechanisms
responsible for them. This process necessitates the
construction of both new concepts and new tools (or the
resurrection or refinement of old ones). The aim of
science is the discovery of the mechanisms of the
production of phenomena in nature; and it proceeds by
way of a dialectic of taxanomic (or descriptive) and
explanatory knowledge, in which the conflicting principles
of empiricism and rationalism can be reconciled, a dialectic
which has no foreseeable end." (ibid. p.248).
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2.3.3 Conventionalist Critiques - Kuhn and Feyerabend
A second source of criticism for the orthodox conception of scientific
rationality centres on the contradiction between the recognition, on the
one hand, observation or description is crucially dependent upon theory
and training, and the insistence, on the other hand, that rationality
resides in the confrontation between theories and observed facts and that
theories strive to approximate an adequate conception of an independent
reality. Basically, this position argues that if the implications of the
theory-dependency of observation are confronted then it is impossible to
lay down universal standards for the rationality of science. Rather,
science is seen as carried out from within a 'conceptual perspective' or
'world-view' which largely determines which questions are worth
investigating and what kinds of answers are acceptable; that is the
perspective provides a way of thinking about a class of phenomena which
defines the class of legitimate problems and delimits the standards for
their acceptable solution." (Suppe 1974 p.l26).
The view that the subject of knowledge is constituted by the community
of investigators is indicated in Popper's conception of the 'horizon
of expectations' which constitutes what are accepted as facts, but
Popper does not pursue the consequences of this view (cf. McCarthy,
1978, p.47-S0). The two philosophers perhaps most closely associated
with the development of the implications of this line of reasoning
are Kuhn and Feyerabend and I will briefly consider their arguments
here.
Kuhn's ideas represented a significant challenge to the positivist
philosophy of science by questioning the idea of the simple unilinear
and cumulative development of scientific knowledge. Significant
scientific discoveries, he argued, are not simple 'events' in which
a new fact or law is fitted into an evolving edifice of science, but
rather arise from complex historical processes and themselves alter
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the structure of knowledge through which they are produced (Schuster,
1979, p.303). In his major work (1970) Kuhn conceived of science in
terms of two types of period - 'normal' periods which dominate and
characterise the scientific endeavour, and 'revolutionary' periods
which occasionally produce fundamental upheavals and significant
discoveries. In periods of 'normal science' the scientific community
works within a 'paradigm'which, as a consellation of beliefs, values,
techniques and indeed 'concrete puzzle-solutions' generally held by
members of the community, generates a steady supply of 'puzzles' and
also the rules for their solution. The paradigm, therefore, constitutes
a 'world-view' which determines which facts are significant and .••
"Normal science consists in ••• extending the knowledge
of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly
revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between
those facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by further
articulation of the paradigm itself." (Kuhn, 1970, p.24).
Normal science is, therefore, not concerned with the production of
major conceptual or phenomenal novelties; rather, it is characterised
by extended periods of convergent research, bound by tradition, in which
scientists pursue a ".•• complex and consuming mopping-up operation
that consolidates the ground made available by the most recent
theoretical breakthrough." (Kuhn, 1977, p.xvii). However, during the
course of such consensual activity, anomalies arise - "••• an occurrence
or set of occurrences that does not fit existing ways of ordering
phenomena." (ibid.) - and severe and prolonged discrepancies can
produce 'crisis' and a subsequent 'scientific revolution' when the
scientific community shifts its allegiances 'en masse' to a new paradigm
or world-view which promises to provide the conditions of a new
normality, i.e. promises to solve the anomalies which led to the crisis,
and to provide a long period of normality (Kuhn, 1970, p.82-92).
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Of central importance to Kuhn's account is his notion of the 'paradigm'.
Requiring a specification of what the consensus of normal science con-
sists and failing to find the shared explicit definitions of concepts
and correspondence rules of orthodox philosophy of science, he conceived
of the notion of the paradigm as shared exemplary problem solutions
which teach by example the meaning and function of concepts and which
serve as models for further 'mopping-up' researches (Schuster, op.cit.
p.305-6) • The paradigm rules for problem solution were seen as
conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological commitments
which remain essentially tacit and implicit, not amenable to explicit
identification, (Kuhn, 1970, p.43-6). Under pressure of criticism of
his original formulation, Kuhn was led to clarify the use of the
concept (ibid. p.175-209i Kuhn, 1974, p.463-7l). He argues that the
term is used in two different senses:
"On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members
of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of
element in that consellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions
which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit
rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles
of normal science." (Kuhn, 1970, p.175).
In this elaborated version, then, the paradigm comprises two basic
components (Kuhn, 1974, op.cit.):
1. The 'disciplinary matrix' comprising three main elements:
(a) Symbolic generalisations: expressions readily cast in
logical formi
(b) Models: provide the community with preferred analogies,
heuristic at one extreme and objects of metaphysical
commitment at the otheri
(c) Exemplars.
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2. 'Exemplars' which are concrete problem-solutions accepted by the
community as paradigmatic from the study of which, and from
attempts to solve problems, the scientist develops 'similarity'
or 'resemblance relations' which are used to model the application
of symbolic generalizations to new experimental situations.
The disciplinary matrix, therefore, supplies a conceptual framework or
'world-view' and partially determines, or imposes constraints on, what
questions may legitimately be asked, what techniques may be employed in
seeking solutions, etc., since it provides a language, with meanings
specific to the community, for interpreting symbolic generalizations
which restricts questions and the way descriptions can be applied to
reality. Exemplars are accepted applications of symbolic generalizations
to actual problems which replace the correspondence rules of the
positivist account (Suppe, 1974, p.483-95).
An important implication of Kuhn's argument is the idea of
incommensurability. Each paradigm contains its own interpretation of
what constitutes relevant 'facts', problems, standards and methods:
" the differences between successive paradigms are both necessary
and irreconcilable." (Kuhn, 1970, p.103). When a scientific
revolution produces a change of world-view, interpretations of reality
are radically affected: the result is " an incommensurability of
viewpoints, and a partial breakdown of communication between the
proponents of different theories." (Kuhn, 1977, p.xii). On this
basis Kuhn's argument suggests that rationality can only be defined
internally within a paradigm, that universal standards for rationality
are impossible and that, consequently, it is not possible to speak of
scientific 'progress' in terms of an increasing degree of cognitive
well-foundedness. However, Kuhn has, latterly, placed greater emphasis
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upon the rational components in his conception. He argues that theory
change is rational to the extent that it is guided by certain shared
values which have long been emphasised in traditional philosophy of
science as objective criteria of internal rationality, viz. accuracy,
consistency, congruence with other theories, scope, simplicity and
fruitfulness (ibid. p.321-2). And he has rather toned down his views
on incommensurability to allow for a certain amount of communication
between adherents of different paradigms by a process of translation
between the different 'languages' involved (Kuhn, 1970, p.200-2).
However, despite these concessions to traditional views of scientific
rationality, and claims of the closeness of his views to Popper's in
terms of commitment to predictive and puzzle-solving capability, Kuhn's
view nevertheless retains its primary distinctive feature, viz. the
necessary reference of scientific practice to its historical and
social context. Scientific values are not given and universal rules
which determine theory choice but vary between communities, change over
time and influence choice in complex ways depending on the selective
and interpretive actions of scientists operating in variable and
changing social, cultural and historical contexts (Kuhn, 1977, p.324-34).
And Kuhn insists that such problems for scientific rationality cannot
be dismissed or accommodated by the traditional account in terms of a
distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification or, in
Popperian terms, between the psychology and logic of knowledge. It is
not possible, Kuhn argues, to relegate subjective factors to the
context of discovery and to insist on their irrelevance to the question
of scientific objectivity~ theory choice must be influenced by such
personal, social and historical factors (ibid. p.326-9). The position
is well summarized by Schuster (op.cit. p.307):
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"These contentions ••• amount to a radical claim for the
thorough going historicity of scientific practice: scientists
cannot avoid making judgements which depend upon the skilled
interpretation of the current state of play in the light of
values, the number, nature and weighting of which are themselves
historically evolved, socially maintained and yet in principle
always re-negotiable. Scientific knowledge is inextricable
from this tissue of judgements and interpretations; in fact
they may be identified with it .••• But neither does all this
render somehow subjective or irrational. One would indeed say
that it makes scientific rationality a typically human form of
rationality, that is, a species of value-conditioned practical
judgement."
This Kuhnian position, then, presents certain fundamental criticisms
of the falsificationist conception of scientific rationality; two
such criticisms will be briefly outlined (Kuhn, 1977, p.269-88).
Firstly, the argument that scientists proceed by testing theories, or
systems of theories, against experience by observation and experiment
is considered by Kuhn to miss the fundamental distinguishing feature
of science. Normal science is concerned with testing hypotheses with
current theory premised as the rules of the game - the theory itself
cannot be tested. Only in 'extraordinary' research in revolutionary
episodes is theory subjected to critical examination and to represent
the rationality of science in terms of its occasional revolutionary
periods is to distort the actual practice of science; on the contrary
normal scientific activity is characterised by the abandonment of
critical discourse (ibid. p.269-73).
Secondly, Kuhn adds to the criticism, outlined previously, of the
argument that falsification in relation to actual observation and
experiment can provide a coherent and rational logic of knowledge. He
argues, then, that Popper cannot admit that no conclusive disproof of
a theory can ever be produced (due to the possibilities of questioning
the experimental results, introducing ad hoc hypotheses, blaming
unsatisfied 'ceteris paribus' clause, etc.) and yet still rely on
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logical falsification (ibid. p.280-2). Moreover, he suggests that it
is not possible to satisfy the necessary requirement of logical
falsificationism to classify, firstly, each conceivable event as either
a confirming or falsifying instance or as irrelevant to the theory,
and, secondly, all logical consequences of the theory into true and
false (ibid. p.284-8). Consequently, Kuhn suggests that Popper does
not, in fact, provide a separate logic of knowledge which produces
objective knowledge in 'world 3'; rather, he provides an ideology - a
set of procedural maxims and values or social-psychological imperatives
(ibid. p.283).
The critique of orthodox philosophy of science provided by the position
developed by Kuhn can be extended by considering the criticisms of
Lakatos' conception which derive from it. Schuster (op.cit. p.309-
13) develops what he calls a 'neo-Kuhnian' critique of Lakatos by
emphasising certain themes in Kuhn's latter work. Firstly, he argues
that the definition of what constitutes the hard core, protective belt
and negative and positive heuristics, and decisions about progressive-
ness or degeneracy may be possible with the benefit of hindsight but in
scientific practice are open to debate and revision by the relevant
community in the course of research. Moreover, the fact that research
in any field proceeds along multiple fronts in a non-unilinear fashion
aggravates the problem of fluidity of definition; perceptions of the
state of the field and decisions about acceptance, rejection, value,
significance, etc., will be different at various points on the research
frontier. Lakatos' rationalisation is, therefore, inappropriate to the
situation in which scientific actors must find themselves - making
choices in relation to socially, culturally and historically-conditioned
values (ibid. p.309-10).
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Schuster develops the critique, then, by arguing that Lakatos'
conception of the rationality of scientific practice fails on two
counts: inadequacy and hermeneutical naivety. Firstly, it is
inadequate because scientists working in a 'normal' scientific context
can be rational by behaving in ways excluded from the Lakatosian model;
this echoes Kuhn's criticism of Popper considered above. For example,
in Kuhnian normal science progress is made by solving anomalies -
narrowing the gap between prediction and observation - in some well-
trodden area, an activity which will not result in the prediction of
novel facts, (ibid. p.3l0-ll). Secondly, it is hermeneutically naive
because it fails to represent the complexity of the factors at work in
scientific decision-making. Lakatos recognises that discretion and
'common sense' are necessary to avoid premature decisions and choices
but the idea of objective judgements about progressiveness or degeneracy
is seen as a "•.• profound mystification", (ibid. p.3l2). As indicated
above, even within a given research programme different groups of
scientists are likely to make different judgements, decisions and
choices because of divergent interest and exemplars. Given problems of
incommensurability, such that competing paradig~s often do not credit
the existence of certain of each other's problems, predictions and
corroborations, the idea of rational comparisons of competing research
programmes has little credence. Therefore, the context of scientific
evaluation and decision is considerably more complex than Lakatos
suggests and must be conceived in terms of social and psychological
factors; rationality cannot be conceived as residing in objective
judgements in a 'sophisticated falsificationist' framework but rather,
necessarily, in situationally-relative value-laden assessments based on
research interests, exemplars and capabilities (ibid.).
Finally, Schuster refers to the ontological basis of the Lakatosian
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conception - the Popperian 'World 3' of objective knowledge. Lakatos,
in fact, criticizes Kuhn's emphasis on the 'psychology of science' as
neglecting the fact that the rationally reconstructed growth of
science takes place in this World 3 of articulated knowledge independent
of the knowing subject (Lakatos, 1970, p.177-80). As Schuster (op.cit.
p.3l3) notes:
"The third world provided Lakatos' ultimate defence of his
conception of what internal and external history of science
should be. The former is to be the objective history of
research programmes, their progressiveness and degeneracy,
and consequent pattern of replacement and supercession.
Actions and decisions in accordance with the objective
relations of research programmes are correct and rational,
and they result from relatively unclouded vision of the third
world and a healthy psychological disposition to follow its
lead. Actions and decisions not in accordance with the
objective relations and scores of research programmes are non-
rational, and are explained by the sociological or psychological
distortion of awareness of the third world."
From the Kuhnian perspective, then, such a 'third world' is dismissed
as a figment of the philosophical imagination which merely underlies
" mystifying rationalizations of whatever we happen to like
(mainly 'the present')", (ibid. p.3l2). The rationality of science
must, therefore, be seen not in universal methodological imperatives
but rather in situationally-relative value judgements. Of course, this
creates the problem of science being reduced to the other extreme of
subjective idiosyncracy but it is clear that Kuhn himself does not
support arguments of extreme relativism, to the effect that any
viewpoint can be defended as 'rational' (or, at least, as not
'irrational'). However, such arguments are developed by Feyerabend
who further develops the relativistic elements of the Kuhnian
problematic.
Feyerabend develops his position on the basis of a critique of the
86
mainstream philosophy of rationality which sees scientific progress as
guaranteed by firm, binding principles and methodological rules
(Feyerabend, 1975, 1978). Firstly, he develops the critique of the
notion that it is 'experience', 'facts' or 'experimental results' which
measure the success of theories and provide the only means of achieving
progress rather than arbitrary change (op.cit., 1975, p.29-37). Having
already outlined elements of this critique as represented in the work
of, for example, Popper and Kuhn, I shall not dwell much on Feyerabend's
arguments in this respect. However, it is interesting to make note of
his conception of an 'observational ideology'. Arguing, conventionally,
that knowledge and description of facts cannot be independent of theory
he sees theories, experimental results, mathematical techniques,
epistemological prejudices, judgements, decisions, choices, etc., as
all indeterminate, ambiguous and inseparable from the historical
background (ibid. p.66). Consequently, empirical evidence is inevitably
'contaminated' by an observational ideology which contains principles
which are implicit and hard to test, and assumptions which structure
observational terms and involve subjective components with no objective
correlates (ibid. p.66-7).
On this basis, Feyerabend criticizes the notion that scientific
rationality derives from the method of empirical testing. He argues
that many facts can be known only in a context where several alternative,
mutually inconsistent theories are available; therefore, the process of
assessment requires a pluralistic methodology involving comparisons of
alternative sets of ideas. In general terms, a commitment to a
particular theory or idea (or epistemology) eliminates certain facts
which would only become available through the consideration of alter-
natives. Such elimination of evidence helps to ensure the 'success' and
survival of the original idea; the process becomes circular with the
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decision to adhere to an idea guaranteeing its survival which, in turn,
justifies continued adherence at the expense of alternatives, (ibid.
p.39-45). He goes on ••.
" how can we possibly test, or improve upon, the truth of a
theory if it is built in such a manner that any conceivable
event can be described, and explained, in terms of its
principles? The only way of investigating such all-embracing
principles would be to compare them with a different set of
equally all-embracing principles - but this procedure has been
excluded from the very beginning." (ibid. p.45).
He therefore criticizes popper's 'critical rationalism' as a standard
of rationality because, he argues, the application of falsificationism
would wipe out science as we know it and, indeed, would never have
permitted it to start (ibid. p.1976). Ths distinction between the
context of discovery (psychology of knowlege) which can be irrational,
and the context of justification (logic of knowledge) which must be
rational cannot be upheld; in fact, he argues, the essence of science
is just that set of social, economic and political influences which are
dismissed as irrational in the othodox view (ibid. p.165-7). Moreover,
he points out that the incoherence of Lakatos' attempt to 'retrieve
Reason' deriving from the need to provide 'breathing space' for
theories and the need for liberal standards which .•.
" make it impossible to specify conditions in which a
research programme must be abandoned or when it becomes
irrational to continue to support it. Any choice of the
scientist is rational, because it is compatible with the
standards. 'Reason' no longer influences the actions of
the scientist." (ibid. p .186) .
Like Kuhn, Feyerabend argues that standards and judgements influencing
choices and decisions are necessarily a function of social, economic
and political factors; such standards •.• "come from the research
process itself, not from abstract views of rationality ••. "; they
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are, like theories, a matter of ingenuity, fact and knowledge of
details (op.cit., 1978, p.99). But whereas Kuhn remains committed to
the idea that science does have its own rationality, Feyerabend insists
that we must consider all traditions, viewpoints and ideologies on an
equal footing. He rejects the validity of those 'internal' standards
which Kuhn, in later work, saw as contributing towards rational
progress; thus, he argues that considerations of simplicity, elegance,
consistency, etc., can only be properly judged after the event, and
since science is never a completed process (i.e. it is always 'before'
the event) such criteria can never be necessary conditions of scientific
practice (op.cit., 1975, p.24). Science, for Feyerabend, is an
historically-conditioned social enterprise and the appeal to Reason is
a political manoeuvre which strengthens the 'totalitarian tendencies'
of society (op.cit., 1978, p.lOO). Only if we adopt the position that
'anything goes'; only if we reject all universal standards and rigid
traditions; only if we allow all groups and individuals a say in a
fully democratic society; only then can we hope to •.•
" gradually erode the narrow and self-serving 'rationalism'
of those who are now using tax money to destroy the traditions
of the tax payers, to ruin their minds, rape their environment
and quite generally to turn living human beings into well-
trained slaves of their own barren vision of life." (ibid. p.IO).
The subjectivist challenge to the orthodox conception of scientific
rationality, therefore, achieves a position of extreme scepticism in
the arguments of Feyerabend. However, many philosophers, although
agreeing with the fundamental elements in the critique of objective
knowledge, are more reluctant to pursue the scepticist path. Instead,
they attempt to reconstruct, and provide an alternative definition of,
what it is that is rational about science. In so doing they reject the
problematic which arises from the identification of the rationality
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{ssue with the question of the extent to which science can provide us
with 'true' knowledge about the world, and replace it with a oroblem-
atic which is basically concerned with the extent to which science
provides a basis for practical action in the world, and the extent
to which it can be seen as 'rational' in relation to this purpose.
We therefore arrive at a third position of criticism of the orthodox
model of scientific rationality and within this position I shall
consider two very different conceptions. The first represents an
attempt to reconstruct the rationality of science in terms of its
success in solving problems; the second perceives the 'rationality'
of science as essentiallv invested in its ability to provide technical
control over the world.
2.3.4 Science as Problem -Solvinq
Various philosophers of science have attempted to provide a reconstruction
of its rationality in terms of the extent to which it provides us with
the knowledge to solve problems; I shall refer here to the work of
Kekes (1976, 1977), Laudan (1977), and Ravetz (1971). The basis of
their work is the argument that the traditional notion of the pursuit
of truth should be at least relegated to a subordinate position if not
dropped altogether; and such concepts as degree of confirmation and
corroboration, falsification, verisimilitude, etc., should be cor-
respondingly relegated as standards of rationality. The main test
of a theory should be the extent to which it provides an adequate
solution to a perceived problem.
Such a conception, then, is developed upon the basis of the criticisms
of the orthodox model of scientific rationality outlined above. Briefly,
there is agreement that observation is necessarily conditioned by
theoretical presuppositions and expectations and that no universal
method of testing theories against experience, such as falsificationism,
can provide guarantees of their cognitive well-foundedness. It is
argued that the attempt to establish standards to provide such
guarantees cannot be rationally justified because such standards are
necessarily contingent upon theoretical presuppositions and assumptions:
"The acceptance of scientific inquiry as a paradigm of
rationality requires a demonstration of the ... (rationality
of) ••• presuppositions upon which scientific inquiry rests.
But such a demonstration cannot come from within science,
since it would already presuppose what requires to be proven,
namely, the presuppositions of science." (Kekes, 1976, p.83).
The answer is seen to lie in the more 'practical' criterion of problem-
solving and, thereby, in a reversal of the orthodox conception of the
relationship between rationality and scientific progress. In place of
the view that scientific progress is contingent upon its rationality,
which in turn consists in accepting those theories and statements
which we have good reason to believe have the greatest truth-content;
in place of this view we should adopt one which sees the rationality
of science as contingent upon its progressiveness, the latter being more
easily identifiable as involving the choice and acceptance of those
theories (or series of theories) with the greatest problem-solving
effectiveness, making no presuppositions concerning veracity or
verisimilitude (Laudan, op.cit., p.5-6; 122-5):
"(If) scientific progress consists in a series of theories
which represent an ever closer approximation to the truth,
then science cannot be shown to be progressive. If, on the
other hand, we accept ••• that science is an inquiry system
for the solution of problems, if we take the view that
scientific progress consists in the solution of an increasing
number of important problems, if we accept the proposal that
rationality consists in making choices which will maximise
the progress of science, then we may be able to show whether,
and if so to what extent, science in general, and the specific
sciences in particular, constitute a rational and progressive
system." (ibid. p.126).
91
Since there are certain important differences between the problem-
solving accounts of science provided by Kekes, Laudan and Ravetz, I
shall briefly outline the main characteristics of these accounts in
turn. Firstly, then, Kekes' concern is to provide an answer to the
'philosophical smugness' of the scepticist challenge to rationality
which has led to a 'flowering of unreason' in the forms of, for
example, existentialism, astrology and 'ideologies of higher
consciousness' :
"If it were true that nothing could be justified by reason,
then all honestly held convictions would have an equal claim
on general acceptance, and argument would, indeed, be replaced
by 'passionate intensity'. This would be a dangerous and
undesirable situation, for the inevitable conflicts could
then be settled only by force. The civilizing restraint of
debate and criticism would disappear. If rationality is
abandoned, then either 'anarchy is loosed upon the world',
or dogmatism supported by brute force would prevail."
(Kekes, 1976, p.l).
Kekes' arguments can, then, be seen as a challenge to the position
developed by Feyerabend which attempts to avoid the dilemmas of the
orthodox response.
Following criticisms of traditional responses to scepticism (pragmatism,
common sense, ordinary language, Popperian science and coherence
theories) and an outline for the reasons for their failure, Kekes
elaborates certain requirements of a theory of rationality (cf. ibid.
chap. 7). He argues that such a theory must provide both internal
criteria for the rationality of theories and, more importantly, an
'external' standard which is rationally defensible without the support
of a further standard (ibid. p.ll2). Further necessary but insufficient
requirements include the justification of presuppositions, conformance
to the rules of formal logic, an account of rationality in relation to
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successful action, a critical outlook and a philosophical (rather than
psychological) approach to rationality (ibid. p.113-5). The internal
standards for the rationality of a theory are fruniliar from traditional
philosophy of science including those of logical consistency,
conceptual coherence, explanatory power and criticizability, the latter
expressed in essentially Popperian terms (ibid. p.133-61). However,
these internal standards are seen as insufficient to guarantee
rationality and, in fact, as becoming relevant only after the proposed
external standard is satisfied, viz. only after a theory is accepted as
a successful problem-solver (ibid. p. 133-4).
In his external account, then, Kekes argues that theories are held
against a cultural background of beliefs, prejudices, expectations,
value judgements, myths, practices and, most importantly, problems
(ibid. p.120: op.cit. 1977, p.353). Problems require solution and
it is the role of theories to provide such solutions: "The problem,
the theory and the solution provided by the theory jointly explain the
point of holding the theory." (ibid.). Theories are seen as providing
an imaginative account of reality and are to be accepted when it is
recognised that if things were as depicted by this account the problem
would be solved (op.cit. 1976, p.121). In spite of difficulties which
arise from the theory-dependency of problem-perception, it is possible,
Kekes argues, to distinguish between 'problems of life', occurring out
of the process of human evolution whose solution is essential to human
survival and well-being, and 'problems of reflection', arising from
the need for prior choices between alternative solutions to 'problems
of life'. While 'problems of reflection' are necessarily theory-
dependent, Kekes suggests that 'problems of life' are prior to theory,
arising out of the human condition: it is, therefore, in providing
solution to such 'problems of life' that theories can be judged to be
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rational (ibid. p.l22-5; op.cit. 1977, p.355-7).
Consequently, Kekes argues that the 'life according to reason' is one
where problems are solves through theories and theories are chosen and
accepted on the basis of their ability to solve problems (ibid. p.165-7).
Rationality is, therefore, conceived as a method which everyone
should adopt:
"The justification of rationality is the justification of
the employment of a method. The method is a device for
problem-solving, and it should be employed because
everybody has problems, because it is in everybody's
interest to solve his (sic) problems, and because
rationality is the most promising way of doing so."
(ibid. p.167)
In this account Kekes retains a commitment to truth as a regulative
idea to the extent that he conceives of 'problems of life' as being
objectively definable, with their solution being dependent upon the
degree to which theories present 'accurate explanations of reality'.
The concept of truth is further subordinated in the second problem-
solving account, provided by Laudan (1977). He argues initially
that:
"Philosophers of science, by and large, have imagined that
they can lay bear (sic) the rationality of science by ignoring,
in their analyses, the fact that scientific theories are
usually attempts to solve specific empirical problems about
the natural world." (ibid. p.ll)
Laudan identifies two types of problems which scientific theories are
designed to solve. Firstly, 'empirical problems' are first-order
problems occurring in the empirical realm and may be classified as
'unsolved', 'solved' or 'anomalous'; the latter are problems unsolved
by a particular theory but solved by competitors and an important
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component of science is the attempt to convert anomalous problems into
solved problems, thereby extending the problem-solving capacity of a
theory at the same time as removing cognitive liabilities (ibid. p.15-3l).
Secondly, 'conceptual problems' concern the characteristics of theories
and the grounds of conceptual structures developed to solve empirical
problems. Laudan argues that such problems lie at the centre of
scientific disputes but are ignored in traditional empiricist
epistemology. They may be 'internal' relating to conceptual
inconsistencies within a theory, or, more importantly, 'external',
relating to tension with other theories, with methodological norms of
the scientific community, or with components of the prevalent world
view (ibid. p.45-63).
Laudan argues, therefore, that the solved problem is the basic unit of
scientific progress and that the aim of science is to maximize the
scope of solved empirical problems while minimizing the scope of
anomalous and conceptual problems; theories which solve more signifi-
cant problems than competitors are to be preferred (ibid. p.66-8). But
he develops the argument with reference to the ideas of Kuhn and
Lakatos to the effect that it is not single theories which lead to
predictions and solve problems but 'theory complexes' or 'research
traditions' (cf. 'paradigms' and 'research programmes'). Such research
traditions contain series of theories together with ontological and
methodological guidelines; they cannot be assessed directly on an
empirical basis but can be evaluated according to their success in
defining and solving empirical and conceptual problems (ibid. p.7l-82).
The fact that success or failure of a research tradition does not
reflect upon individual theories within the tradition is not
problematical because no assignments of truth or falsity are made. The
best available tradition is that which has the greatest problem-solving
ability and this has no necessary connection with truth-value;
95
rationality consists in accepting that tradition, i.e. in making
'progressive' choices (ibid. p.40-3, 122-5).
Consequently, as indicated above, scientific rationality is defined in
terms of progress and this, in turn, is defined in terms of the
selection and acceptance of research traditions on the basis of their
problem-solving capabilities. This is seen by Laudan as providing a
general, 'trans-temporal and trans-cultural' parameter of rationality
but he also recognizes the crucial importance of specific historical
and cultural factors in the definition of scientific rationality
(ibid. p.127-31). Echoing the trend of Kuhnian thought outlined above
he argues that •..
" we need a broadened notion of rationality which will
show how the 'intrusion' of seemingly 'non scientific'
factors into scientific decision making is, or can be, an
entirely rational process. Far from viewing the
introduction of philosophical, religious and moral issues
into science as the triumph of prejudice, superstition and
irrationality, this model claims that the presence of such
elements may be entirely rational; further, that the
suppression of such elements may itself be irrational and
prejudicial." (ibid. p.l32)
This theme is, in fact, developed more emphatically in a third
problem-solving conception of science provided by Ravetz (1971) who
sees science as a social and historical process, as bound by cultural
milieu and world-view and yet, paradoxically, as providing 'objective'
knowledge:
n(A) proper analysis of the social activity of science must
be based on understanding of the very special goals of the
scientist's tasks; and an analysis of achieved scientific
knowledge must comprehend its character as a social possession,
the product of an historical process. An analysis of science
which unites these two aspects will be able to resolve the
apparent paradoxes in its nature: that out of a personal
endeavour which is fallible, subjective, and strictly limited
by the context, there emerges knowledge which is certain,
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objective and universal." (ibid. p.7l)
Ravetz, therefore, proposes a conception of scientific knowledge based
on four theses: that scientific inquiry is a craft; that the objects
of science are intellectual constructs studied through the investiga-
tion of problems; that science is guided and controlled by methods
which are mainly informal and tacit; and that the special character
of achieved scientific knowledge is explained by a complex social
process of selection and transformation of results of research into
accepted 'facts' (ibid. p.7l-2). He argues, then, that the
recognition of the craft character of scientific work is fundamental
to an understanding of how objective knowledge can be produced by a
subjective and personal process. Craft work involves an intimate
knowledge of materials and techniques based on learning and experience;
scientists employ craft procedures and judgements, which are partly
personal and partly social, in, for example, the selection and
interpretation of data, the choice of techniques, tools and models
and the interpretation of experimental results (ibid. p.75-l0l).
Ravetz argues that science is not a process of discovery of true laws
of nature by empirical testing but rather a process of production of
statements (e.g. reports, descriptions, laws, models, theories, etc.)
by craft work on intellectually-constructed classes of things and
events (i.e. theory-dependent constructs). Science proceeds through
the creation and solution of problems which arise from 'problem-
situations', defined as a recognition of a need for the solution of
some problem as yet undefined, this recognition being based upon craft
judgement (ibid. p.109-38). The scientific process is guided and
controlled by methods, or criteria, judgements and standards for the
assessment of the 'adequacy' and 'value' of problem solutions and
97
Revetz argues that such judgements and standards derive from a body of
social principles and precepts which are largely informal and tacit,
not susceptible to explicit testing. Problem solutions can never
be known to be true or certain; they can only be judged to be 'adequate'
and 'of value' by scientists on the basis of craft judgement, experience
and training (ibid p. 146-76).
Finally, Ravetz argues that the statements produced by this scientific
process must be accepted by the scientific community as 'facts';
that is, the products of an essentially subjective process must be
'transformed' into 'objective knowledge' by a social process which
operates within the scientific community. This process involves
anonymous refereeing and journal publication, recognition of 'value' and
'significance' for further work, reproduction and use of the results by
others, and translation into new problem-solving work. Statements
which survive this social process can be accepted as 'facts', as the
closest thing to the truth about the world that we can possible achieve
(ibid p. 182-91). But it is likely to be an ephemeral object ••"•••of
very temporary usefulness and life .." (ibid p. 236). a product of
particular historical, social and cultural milieu (ibid p. 237-8).
Ravetz therefore provides us with a highly complex account of the
rationality of scientific knowledge in terms of problem-solving, one
which, having rejected the notion of rationality through a universal
and objective method, further develops the Kuhnian themes followed up
in Laudan's work discussed above. In arguing for the rationality of
scientific knowledge in terms of personal and social judgements,
decisions and choices made in a particular historical and cultural
context, Ravetz places a heavy burden on the behaviour and training
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of scientists as individuals and as a community when defining rationality.
Indeed, he does argue that such rationality depends heavily on an
effective and enlightened code of ethics in science:
"...unless there is an effective ethic, even more
refined than a 'professional ethic', this very delicate
and sensitive work will not long continue to be well
governed or well performed." (ibid. p. 313).
However, he also recognises that such a scientific ethic or ideology is
based upon wider ideological, cultural and political characteristics of
the society in which scientsts are educated and live, and illwhich science
stands in a particular relationship to economic, political and social
practice. And within the context of advanced industrial society he
perceives little scope for an ethic which will ensure the future
excellence of science (ibid. chap. 11).
2.3.5 Science as Technical Control
Emphasis on the social context of scientific activity brings us naturally
to the consideration of the conception of science as underlain by the
rationale of technical control. This conception has developed primarily
out of the anti-positivist tradition of German historicism based on
developments of the work of Marx. The views of, for example, Lukacs
and the members of the 'Frankfurt School', particularly Marcuse and
Habermas, see modern experimental and empirical science as being invested
with a 'rationality' which must be defined in terms of a technical interest
in control and domination of the world and in terms of the need to justify
such control and domination.
Lukacs (1971) argues, then, that modern rationalism, based on the idealist
conception of rational knowledge as a product of the mind (i.e. as the
product of rational reasoning), contains the ideal of a universal system
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founded upon the principle of systematisation; that is, the creation of
a complete system of knowledge connecting up partial systems of forms
on the basis of necessary connections inherent in the forms themselves
(ibid. p. 111-7). The primary characteristics of the resulting programme
of rationality are, firstly, the elevation of the methods of mathematics
and geometry as essential to the development of formal systems of
objective knowledge and, secondly, the development of a structure of
cognition which attempts to isolate a closed system of necessary natural
laws (ibid. p. 104-30). This programme has certain fundamentally
important consequences. Thus, the more that scientific knowledge develops
as a formally closed system of partial laws in the abstract world of pure
thought, the more it becomes divorced and isolated from the 'real material
base' which it is, in fact, its task to understand (ibid. p. 104, 127).
Moreover, the fundamental goal of modern rationalism becomes clear in the
principle of systematisation:
"This notion of system makes it clear why pure and
applied mathematics have constantly been held up as
the methodological model and guide to modern
philosophy. For the way in which their axioms are
related to the partial systems and results deduced
from them corresponds exactly to the postulate that
systematic rationality sets itself, the postulate,
namely, that every given aspect of the system should
be capable of being deduced from its basic principle,
that it should be exactly predictable and calculable."
(ibid. p. 117).
This ideal of knowledge implies, then, a particular concept of action;
that is, action in accordance with the predictions of objective formal
laws to exploit the resulting effects to the best advantage (ibid. p. 129-30).
Herein, therefore, lies the rationale of control and domination in formal
rationality, in stark contradiction with the 'freedom' and 'progress'
which it is supposed to guarantee (cf. ibid. p. 133-4).
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This contradiction in fact mirrors Marx's view of science as performing
a dual role (Marx 1979 p. 693-700). On the one hand, it transforms
the production process and "...subjugates the forces of nature and
compels them to work in the service of human needs ..." (ibid. p. 700);
that is, from this perspective science is seen as a liberating influence,
playing an essential role in human emancipation. On the other hand,
Marx saw that science in capitalist society becomes a productive force
which exists in objective form in fixed capital or machinery, i.e. is
appropriated by capi tal:-
"The accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the
general productive forces of the social brain, is thus
absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence
appears as an attribute of capital, and more specifically
of fixed capital, in so far as it enters into the
production process as a means of production proper.
Machinery appears, then, as the most adequate form of
fixed capital " (ibid. p. 694).
That is, science becomes a means for the exploitation of labour acting
on the worker through the machine as a 'ruling, alien power'. In the
last analysis, however, Marx sees capitalist social relations as a
transitory phase of human history, and views science as ultimately a
progressive force which can promote the liberation of humanity.
The arguments developed by Lukacs and members of the Frankfurt School,
although based on Marx's analysis are more pessimistic about the
progressiveness of science. As Lukacs indicated, the method and
programme of modern scientific rationality may be inherently exploitative
and this theme is further developed especially by Marcuse and Habermas.
Marcuse (1964) focusses on technology and the system of domination which
has been created by technical progress. Such progress in advanced
industrial society increases the potential for the satisfaction of wants
and needs of individuals but at the same time erodes their rights and
liberties. The technical apparatus of production and distribution tends
1(11
to become totalitarian, determining socially needed occupa t.i ons, skills
and attitudes, individual needs and aspirations:
"Independence of thought, autonomy and the right to
political opposition are being deprived of their
basic critical function in a society which seems
increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the
individuals through the way in which it is organised."
(ibid. p. 1).
However, the repressive nature of technical progress is legitimised by
its ability to constantly increase production and to appear as "...the
very embodiment of reason for the benefit of all social groups and
interests ..." (ibid. p. 9). Thus, technical progress has, Marcuse argues,
produced increased 'rationalisatio~ in two senses: firstly, in the form
of scientific management which has increased productivity and living
standards; and secondly, in the form of a pattern of 'one-dimensional'.
thought and behaviour which justifies the oppressive features of the
system (ibid. p. 11-12, 146).
Marcuse sees these trends as related to developments in the scientific
method, particularly to the post-Aristotelian trend towards abstract
mathematical systems of formal laws. Like Lukacs, he views the trend,
within idealist philosophy, towards 'operationalism', that is, towards
the reduction of scientific knowledge to concepts conceived as artefacts
and characterised by measurement operations, as leading to 'instrumentalism'
in which science is justified in terms of the ability to predict nature,
and therefore provide the basis for control over matter. The apparent
neutrality of science in its manipulation of abstracted matter constitutes
the 'positive' character; it becomes part of technology as a form of
control and domination over nature and society, stripping the world of
its concrete, historical, 'qualitative' character thus denying a rational
basis to criticism and different ways of seeing and thinking (ibid.
p. 146-58).
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Marcuse, then, presents an essentially pessimistic view of the inherently
repressive nature of scientific rationality and emphasises the
difficulties of instituting revolutionary changes in a situation where
relations of production and productive forces are tied in with domination
and where ...
"The web of domination has become the web of reason
itself, and this society is fatally entangled in it.
And the transcending modes of thought seem to transcend
reason itself." (ibid. p. 168-9).
Moreover, Marcuse refers to the work of Husserl in relating the rationality
of science to a kind of rationale of the human existence - a socio-
historical project involving the domination and control of nature:
"The scientific abstraction from concreteness, the
quantification of qualities which yield exactness as
well as universal validity, involve a specific concrete
experience of the Lebenswelt - a specific mode of 'seeing'
the world. And this 'seeing', in spite of its 'pure',
disinterested character, is seeing within a purposive,
practical context. It is anticipating •.••• and
projecting •.•. Galilean science is the science of
methodical, systematic anticipation and projection.
But - and this is decisive - of a specific anticipation
and projection - namely, that which experiences, comprehends
and shapes the world in terms of calculable, predictable
relationships among exactly identifiable units. In this
project, universal quantifiability is a prerequisite for the
domination of nature. Individual, non-quantifiable
qualities stand in the way of an organisation of men and
things in accordance with the measurable power to be
extracted from them. But this is a specific socio-
historical project, and the consciousness which undertakes
this project is the hidden subject of Galilean science;
the latter is the technic, the art of anticipation
extended in infinity ••••••.•• " (ibid. p , 164).
This theme is further developed in the work of Habermas who argues that
the basic orientation of scientific inquiry has resulted from structures
of human existence; from the imperative that the human species
reproduces itself, at least in part, through "purposive-rational'
action tied to a cumulative learning process (Habermas 1972 p.121-34,301-17;
McCarthy 1978 p. 64). Scientific knowledge is formed within a framework
which arises through the relation of the human species to its natural
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environment in the labour process. This process involves a behavioural
system of instrumental, feedback-monitored action which necessarily
binds knowledge of nature to the interest in technical control over
natural processes; knowledge is formed to guide purposive-rational
behaviour (Habermas Ope cit. p. 133-4 McCarthy Ope cit. p. 62-3).
The empirical-analytic sciences, therefore, represent a systematic and
reflected form of this (pre-scientific) learning process which aim to
produce an objective knowledge of the universal laws of nature for the
purpose of gaining reliable technical control over nature (Habermas
Ope cit. p. 122-24; McCarthy op. cit. p. 63-4). Habermas therefore
labels the basic orientation of empirical scientific inquiry a 'technical
cognitive interest' (op. cit. p.308-9).
Habermas argues that this interest is reflected in modern science in
the concern with the establishment of a universal method which will
guarantee a form of knowledge which is objective, free from the intrusion
of subjective intentions and which is therefore technically exploitable
(Habermas 1971 p. 99; 1976A). In advanced industrial society technical
control over nature has been expanded and administration of human beings
continually refined; science produces technical recommendations for a
purposive-rational action which reduces rationality to socio-technical
control rather than 'collective action enlightened by interested reason'
(ibid. p. 331-3). Consequently, instrumentalist scientific rationality
has become a form of domination and exploitation.
In identifying the rationale of modern empirical science with this form
of committed instrumental reason, Habermas points to an inevitable
contradiction in the orthodox conception of scientific rationality
(ibid. p. 334-8). The attempt to invest rationality in a method
which will guarantee objective knowledge is motivated by the concern to
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combat dogmatism, irrationality, 'pseudo-science'; to separate in
principle the scientifically rationalised shaping of reality from value-
laden attempts at enlightening consciousness. But this very concern
represents an attempt to enlighten consciousness so the proclaimed idea
of a value-free methodology fundamentally contradicts the value-laden
commitment which necessarily underlies the pursuit of scientific knowledge.
Therefore, in its definition of dogma and pseudo-science the orthodox
conception of science in fact includes what it must tacitly presupposed
as its own motivation, namely, " the convergence of reason and
commitment •••" (ibid. p. 338).
Like Marcuse, then, Habermas sees science in late capitalist society as
an ideology, having become increasinglyi~rd~pendent with technology as
a leading production force, and contributing, as such, to a 'technocratic
consciousness' which portrays social development as a process of scientific-
technical progress, a matter of 'technical' decision-making which excludes
practical questions and democratic discussion of them. (op. cit. p. 102-15).
But Habermas is rather more optimistic than Marcuse about the potentially
progressive and liberating influence of science, although this would
again involve social and political change to overcome the de-politicising
influence of technocratic consciousness and to create a new form of
scientific rationality based upon 'communicative competence' viz.
meaningful public discussion and re-politicised decision-making processes
(op. cit. 1971; McCarthy Ope cit. p. 13-14).
105
2.4 Conclusion
This survey of the controversies over the question of the rationality
of scientific knowledge indicates the extent and intensity of
disagreement between philosophers of different schools of thought, a
disagreement which is arguably inevitably given the essential nature of
the philosophical task. However, my intention is to establish that
there are reasonable grounds for rejecting the attempt to lay down
universal methodological norms and rules as a guarantee of the cognitive
well-foundedness of science; and it can be concluded that the arguments
against the orthodox conception of scientific rationality are sufficiently
weighty to provide such grounds. On the other hand, this rejection
does not necessarily imply an acceptance of the radical scepticist position
which argues that science is inevitably 'irrational' and no different
from other modes of reasoning in terms of the cognitive validity of its
product. I shall further develop these arguments in the next chapter
but it does seem that the most promising approach to the conceptualisation
of what it is that is rational about scientific knowledge lies in the
attempt to construct this rationality in terms of the social, historical
and institutional context in which knowledge is produced wi th particular
reference to values arising from that context and to the 'problems'
which develop and require solution.
This much said, we can now proceed with a more specific consideration
of problems of rationality in social scientific knowledge, that is,
the major kind of knowledge which is brought to bear upon the debate
about nuclear power development.
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Chapter 3 Rationality in Social Scientific Knowledge
3.1 Introduction
Our major concern, in analysing the cognitive dimension of the nuclear
power debate, is with the problems of achieving scientific knowledge of
social phenomena - with the question of the extent to which it is possible
to derive demonstrably 'objective', or at least 'reliable', knowledge
about the economic, social, and political implications of nuclear power
development. Dispute is not, however, restricted to the realm of social
science; in the controversy over the safety of nuclear power, for example,
an important issue concerns the state of knowledge about the impact of low
level radiation on human organs and body tissue and this, of course, is a
product of biological science. Nevertheless, the central focus here will
be on social scientific knowledge and, in particular, on knowledge relating
to the economic aspects of the nuclear power debate. There are two main
reasons for this emphasis: firstly, the importance of the controversy
over the economic costs and benefits of nuclear power; and, secondly,
the widespread view that economics represent the most 'scientific' of all
the social sciences and therefore produces knowledge which can be
accepted as cognitively well-founded and reliable. It can be expected,
therefore, that any problems in economic argument will be manifested in
the analysis of social and political implications.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to commence an analysis of the
'scientific' nature of our knowledge about social phenomena in general
and, more particularly, about the economic aspects of the debate about
nuclear power. The orientation will be essentially critical. I shall
firstly present a brief outline of the characteristics of the application
of the 'orthodox' approach to science in the context of the development
of social knowledge. Secondly, I shall consider some of the problems
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inherent in such an application and attempt to develop a critique with
reference to knowledge about economic phenomena. This critique will
comprise two parts, the first referring to the general problems of
developing economic theory, and the second considering in rather more
detail the role of econometric model building in the formulation and
testing of economic knowledge. This analysis will provide a basis for
the consideration of a rather different approach to the problem of
establishing the 'rationality' of knowledge about social phenomena.
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3.2 Rational Social Knowledge: An 'Orthodox' View
The controversies over the possibility of a 'scientific' knowledge of
society are even deeper and more extensive than those considered in the
previous chapter. This results from a distinction that is commonly
made between the respective objects of study of the natural and social
sciences. Rex (1973 p. 212) presents the distinction in the following
terms:
"Whereas natural science is an activity in which men (sic)
formulate concepts in order to understand the behaviour
of classes of objects or things, the human studies are
concerned with the study of a particular class of objects
which themselves have the curious characteristic that they
may be thought of as having concepts about each other and
about other objects." (ibid.)
Cohen (1968) conceives of the problem in more general terms. In the
physical world entities have properties deriving from the sum of, and
relations between, their component elements but the characteristics of
these elements themselves exist independently of the entities in which
they participate. On the other hand, while entities in the social world
again obtain their characteristics mainly from the relations between their
component elements, many of the characteristics of these elements
themselves derive from the larger entities of which they are a part.
Moreover, social wholes or entities are partly mental products and
therefore have some characteristics 'above' the structure of relations
between their parts (ibid. p. 11-13).
Now, while such conceptions undoubtedly attribute to the natural sciences
a greater degree of objectivity than is warranted, the social sciences
nevertheless do face more severe problems deriving from the nature of
the object of study. A complex set of philosophical and methodological
positions have developed and a number of important dichotomies have
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arisen. Firstly, there exists the 'naturalist' versus 'anti-naturalist'
dichotomy, the former arguing that conceptions of science developed in
the natural sciences can be transferred, more or less directly, to the
social sciences while the latter disagrees, arguing that no general laws
can be discovered nor accurate predictions made about phenomena dependent
upon human activity (Keat and Urry 1975). The latter position for
example, is characterised by the 'Verstehen' school deriving from the
work of Max Weber who argued that the social sciences are concerned with ...
".•.psychological and intellectuaL .•. phenomena the
empathic understanding of which is naturally a problem
of a specifically different type from those which the
schemes of the exact natural sciences in general can
or seek to solve." Weber (1949 p. 74)
A second dichotomy has arisen in social science methodolgy from the
problem of the relation of individuals to social wholes; the problem of
reconciling observed social phenomena with a possible conception of a
".•..reality exterior to the individual." (Rex 1961 p. 60). One
approach, deriving from Durkheimian sociology, is 'methodological holism'
which is concerned with explaining the relations between social wholes
in terms of the roles and norms associated with those wholes rather than
the characteristics of individuals comprising them. The holistic
approach has tended to stress the analogy between social wholes and
organisms, emphasising 'systematic' properties and leading to functional
explanations. An opposing approach is provided by 'methodological
individualism' which sees social wholes as the sum of the individual
parts and therefore explicable in terms of facts about individuals.
This individualist approach can result in a tendency towards the
'reduction' of sociology to psychology.
Notwithstanding these problems and dichotomies the orthodox approach to
the development of social scientific knowledge essentially involves
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the application of that which holds sway in natural science on the
grounds that a universal method can produce a scientific knowledge of
society which is antithetical to 'ideology'. In spite of advances
made in recent times by proponents of 'anti-naturalist' approaches to
social science, there remains a dominant preoccupation with the problem
of developing explanatory and predictive knowledge in terms of 'universal
laws' or law-like generalisations which are tested by relating their
empirical consequences to the accepted facts of experience (Keat and
Urryop. cit. p. 88; Giddens 1974 p. 4). Again, such laws tend to
be conceived in terms of well-established empirical regularities which
permit prediction of observed states of affairs rather than causal
relationships which permit explanation in the sense of an understanding
of determining factors.
Consequently, the objective scientific method involving the conjecture
of a hypothesis, the deduction of consequents, and the testing of such
consequents in relation to empirical evidence, together with the
constant attempt to criticise and falsify such hypotheses is seen to
provide a logic of knowledge which guarantees knowledge of society
which is free from the intrusion of attributes of the 'knowing subject'.
Such subjective values, attitudes and goals are consequently prevented
from 'contaminating' knowledge; the only values entering into theory
are those implicit in the scientific method itself (e.g. in the selection
of the research problem (ibid.; Oquist 1978 p. 147). Therefore,
social science is seen as having a technical character, producing
'instrumental' (predictive) knowledge, with no implications, in itself,
for practical policy or the pursuit of values and only justifiable in
terms of the rational method used to produce it.
This approach, then, represents a development of the positivist
tradition of social science whose concern has been to overcome the
111
influence of value judgements, prejudices, imagination and metaphysical
speculation by establishing a rigorous science of facts based on
observation. Within this tradition the holistic approach to the study
of society is essentially a product of French sociology. The notion
of a science of society was a later development of the 'Enlightenment'
and was conditioned in France by post-Revolutionary economic and
political conditions (Rex 1973 p. 91-2; Therborn 1976 p. 210-2).
Comte, who is usually acknowledged as the founder of the 'science of
society', believed that institutions, beliefs and morals in a society
are interrelated as a whole so that the explanation of anyone item in
the whole must discover laws prescribing how this item coexists with
all the others. Therefore, French sociology rejected rational
individualism and utilitarianism finding its most sophisticated
expression in Durkheim, in the late nineteenth century, who was
basically concerned with constraints on human conduct deriving from
the wider system of social interaction rather than from individual
psychological factors (Rex 1973 p. 60-2). He believed that in order
to be objective sociology must treat social facts as things independent
of individual consciousness: he saw sociology as concerned with a
'reality exterior to the individual'. However, this created a
problem of bridging the gap between observable phenomena and social
reality and this has subsequently led to the adoption of the analogy
between biological species and societies and of functional explanation.
The explicit doctrine of functionalism was the creation of Malinowski
in the field of anthropology but it was developed and consolidated
by Radcliffe-Brown during studies of pre-literate societies (Cohen
1968 p. 37-45). Such societies tend to be relatively stable with
little historical consciousness and their institutions, beliefs and
symbols tend to be interrelated in an apparently total pattern. In
such a context, functionalism provides a systematising framework within
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the positivist tradition. The problem of social order is approached
through the analysis of institutional arrangements regulating social
relationships; institutions are seen as functioning parts of the
social system which maintain it in a more or less stable equilibrium
condition (Goddard 1972 p. 63-4). Further, Radcliffe-Brown saw
social anthropology as an inductive, non-historical science concerned
with the establishment of universal laws governing the relations
between social phenomena via comparative analysis of social systems
with no reference to psychological factors (e.g. thoughts, feelings
and motives of individuals) (ibid. p. 66-7).
Significant recent contributions to functionalism have been made
by Talcott Parsons. Combining some of Malinowski's ideas with those
of Pareto and Durkheim, he has focussed on the needs of the personality
and analyses items in terms of their functions in relation to these
needs (Cohen op. cit. p. 45-6; Rex 1973 p. 113-4).
Functionalist explanation, then, draws analogies from the biological
sciences which are concerned with living, self-maintaining systems in
which processes have the function of contributing towards the survival
of the species and in this are mutually supporting and dependent
(Lessnoff 1974 p. 109-11). Functionalist social scientists, therefore,
see societies as systems of interrelated, mutually dependent elements
which cooperate to ensure the existence and survival of the social
whole. Due to this interrelationship the character of anyone
element in the system is explicable only by reference to all the
others, and a valid functional explanation consists in showing in
what way an element contributes to the functioning of the system to
which it belongs (ibid. p. 122; Bailey 1975 p. 56-7). In general,
therefore, elements of social systems are explained in terms of
their desirable consequences viz. the survival of the system and its
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maintenance in a condition of equilibrium. An example is provided
by the explanation of prices in neo-classical economic theory in
terms of their function in equilibrating supply and demand.
On the other hand, the 'methodological individualist' approach within
the positivist tradition has been the hallmark of British social
thought since Spencer developed his 'Principles of Sociology' in the
late nineteenth century. A century previously Bentham and Smith
had established the view that the way to the 'good society', with the
maximisation of the welfare of all members, was through the free,
self-seeking individual, and through the operation of market forces
with minimum interference from the state. Spencerwas an 'individualist'
both in the sense that he believed that the free, spontaneous
development of the individual was the prime political and social goal,
and in that he saw social life as explicable in terms of individual
members of that society (Keat and Urry op. cit. p. 79).
Although Spencer was concerned to reconcile the organic analogy and
functional organisation of the social whole with the primacy of the
individual, his sociology was rapidly overtaken by events;
specifically, by the demise of small-scale competitive capitalism and
the advent of the age of monopoly capitalism in the late nineteenth
century in which emphasis came to be placed upon the collection of
information about social conditions with a view to social reform to
alleviate the conditions of the poor (Rex 1973 p. 57-8; Therborn op.
cit. p. 230). Consequently, what Therborn (ibid.) calls
'Administrative Sociology' developed in Britain, somewhat in isolation
from the more theoretical emphasis of European Sociology, concentrating
on the empirical study of the quantitative characteristics of
individuals rather at the expense of the developments of explanatory
theory.
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The combination of this individualist empiricist tradition with the
development of logical positivism resulted in behaviourism attaining
a position of some dominance in social scientific inquiry in this
country. Behaviourists argue t.ha.t, soca ol.phenomena can be explained
only by reference to the observable behaviour of individuals and not
unobservable intentions, motivations or expectations which offend
positivist criteria of 'corroboration' (Hollis and Nell 1975 p. 118).
Therefore, observed regularities in behaviour are seen as constituting
the basis for 'law-like generalisations' which permit prediction of
patterns of behaviour and hence a satisfactory explanation. A
well-known example of behaviourism in the social sciences is the
'revealed preference theory' of neoclassical economics in which
consumers' behaviour as manifested in observable market decisions is
taken as a firm basis for the development of 'economic laws'.
However, this epistemological position is subject to certain criticisms
which can be introduced here in general terms. It was suggested in
Chapter 2 that the applicability of the orthodox conception of
scientific rationality is crucially dependent upon certain preconditions
which cannot be satisfied even in the realm of the natural sciences.
In particular, it presumes the existence of closed systems, in which
the internal system structure and relationships with the external
environment are constant (Bhaskar Ope cit. Chap. 2). In the soc ial
sciences the problems of establishing controlled experimental conditions
to achieve system closure become increasingly intractable because of
the nature of the object of study: and even in cases where some degree
of closure is possible the relevance of the resulting knowledge to the
actual complex and dynamic social world is highly circumscribed. In
other words, the idea that a theory is to be judged by its predictive
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success or failure, and the specification of ex ante criteria for
refutation have limited applicability if analysis must proceed in the
context of open social systems where subjects, conditions and forms of
action are characterised by diversity and constant change and where
consequent events may have a multiplicity of complex causes and are not
invariably realised (ibid. Hutchison 1981 p. 276; Weber 1949 p. 84-5).
The syntactical identity between explanation, prediction and falsification,
such that a correct prediction is seen to explain and an incorrect one
to falsify, is based on the assumption that there can be independent
grounds for the initial conditions of an explanation. But the only
such grounds which are available within the falsificationist conception
are provided by immediate sense-experience and this in turn presupposes
the existence of a theory-neutral observation language which can provide
an unambiguous, 'non-contingent' designation of the elements of experience
(Bhaskar op. cit. p. 134-6). In the social sciences the problem of
the theory-dependency of observation is particularly marked and,
consequently, the validity of a universal method of empirical testing
in such a context must be highly questionable. As Ravetz (1971 p. 374)
states:
"Where the objects of inquiry have but a tenuous relation
to the real things and events they purport to describe,
and are themselves ill-informed and unstable, an isolated
investigation devoted to a supposedly 'empirical' test
of some hypothesis about their relations, is highly
unlikely to yield worthwhile results."
The problems associated with the application of this conception of
rationality to the social sciences can now be considered in some detail
in relation to the field of neo-classical economics, particularly the
activity of economic modelling as a means to the development of
economic knowledge.
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3.3 The Rationality of Economic Knowledge
3.3.1 An Outline Critique: Economic Theory
Within the neoclassical paradigm it is broadly agreed that the development
of theory should proceed by way of the hypothetico-deductive method and
that this method provides guarantees of the rationality of such t.hf'orv(Blauq
1980 p. 127-8). This position is adopted, for example, in many
textbooks which represent the mainstream neoclassical stance (cf.
Samuelson 1973, Chap. 1; Lipsey 1963, Chaps 1-3). In the hypothetico-
deductive system, models play a crucial role in the testing of economic
hypotheses against observation data. A hypothesis is developed on the
basis of pre-existing theory which is accepted within the neoclassical
paradigm. In order to test this hypothesis against economic data it
must be specified in empirical form, ideally, it is argued, as a set
of mathematical equations with quantifiable parameters. The resulting
model represents an abstraction of the real world, the process of
abstraction of 'relevant' elements depending upon judgements, norms and
practices embodied in the neoclassical paradigm, and upon the nature of
available data. The validity of the model is then assessed in terms of
the extent to which it yields predictions in conformance with economic
observations; if it performs badly then it should be treated as falsified
and rejected, whereas if it performs well then the hypothesis can be
provisionally accepted as a basis for proceeding to further analysis.
For this programme to be acceptable, therefore, it is necessary that the
process of testing economic models against observed data should be
capable of providing unambiguous criteria for the rejection of false
hypotheses about the functioning of the economic system. The classical
position in this respect was stated by Milton Friedman in his 1953 essay
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'The Methodology of Positive Economics', arguing that the validity of
economic theory is to be tested not by the descriptive 'realism' of
assumptions and premises, but by the accuracy of the theory's predictions
(Blaug 1962 p. 672; 1980 p. 104). The falsificationist position is
elaborated by Machlup (1978 p. 140-1). Hypotheses are tested by,
firstly, deducing from them, and the factual assumptions with which
they are combined, all the conclusions that can be inferred and, secondly,
confronting these conclusions with data obtained from observation of
the phenomena concerned. Such a procedure may cause the rejection of
hypotheses if irreconcilable contradictions are found between the
deduced consequences (predictions) and observations, but can never
definitely confirm or verify hypotheses. Hypotheses which survive
tests are, therefore, not-yet-refuted but never proven as true. An
import~t element in this position concerns the role of assumptions;
it is argued that the only decisive consideration in the question of
building into theoretical models assumptions which it may not be possible
to subject to direct empirical testing, is their 'usefulness' in making
the models conform with observations (ibid. p. 94-5). Blaug (1962
p. 666) summarises as follows:
"Since the days of Adam Smith, economics has consisted
of the manipulation of a priori assumptions, derived
either from introspection or from causal empirical
generalisations, in the production of theories or
hypotheses yielding predictions about events in the
real world. Even if some of the assumptions involved
non-observable variables, the deductions from these
assumptions were ultimately related to the observable
world: economists wanted to 'explain' economic
phenomena as they actually occur. In short, economists
have always regarded the core of their subject as
'science', in the modern sense of the word: the goal
was to produce accurate and interesting predictions that
were, in principle at least, capable of being empirically
falsified."
Now the process of subjecting economic hypotheses and models to empirical
tests is in practice very complex involving several problematical stages.
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Firstly, it is necessary to derive a set of 'acceptable' statements
concerning the particular empirical conditions of relevance to the test;
this involves, for example, identifying and measuring relevant phenomena
and adjusting 'observed values' of economic variables to 'true values',
net of measurement error and non-economic values. These activities
clearly entail a considerable amount of judgement which is necessarily
made in relation to the theoretical background from which the hypothesis
itself derives. This theory-dependency can introduce a degree of
circularity into the testing process such that 'acceptable' observation
statements are those which do not falsify the hypothesis. This problem
exists in addition to that which arises from the logical impossibility
of decisive falsification in relation to theory-impregnated observation
statements. As an example, one can point to two tendencies which are
apparent in the process of determination of relevant observation
statements within the neoclassical paradigm, which are 'theory-dependent'
in the broad sense, and which contribute to the survival of neoclassical
hypotheses from falsification. The first tendency is that towards the
emphasis on variables which are susceptible to quantification and the
consequent de-emphasis of factors which are difficult or impossible to
quantify; while the second involves the neglect of certain classes of
variables relating, for example, to social and institutional factors
which are defined within the paradigm as irrelevant to 'economic'
problems.
A second set of requirements of the testing process concerns the
specification of criteria of application for theoretical terms, the use
of other supporting theories, hypotheses and assumptions, and some
application of logic and mathematics, all of these again dependent upon
the theoretical framework. Thirdly, 'ceteris paribus' clauses must be
specified to exclude external influences (i.e. 'close' the system)
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and state the conditions under which the test is to count as decisive.
Therefore, within the falsificationist conception, what must be subjected
to test is not a single theory or hypothesis but rather a complex system
of hypotheses assumptions, empirical descriptions and elements of logic
and mathematics; if the system fails a test it is consequently rather
difficult to know which part of it to reject. For example, the only
way in which the economist can determine whether 'ceteris' are, in fact,
'paribus' is to assume the correctness of the hypothesis and measure
the extent to which the observed facts fail to fit it - but, then, how
can the hypothesis be shown to be false? Indeed, failure of prediction
can always be blamed on wrongly adjusted variables and observation
statements, on supporting hypotheses or on unsatisfied 'ceteris paribus'
conditions but cannot conclusively refute the hypothesis (Hollis and
Nell 1975 p. 25-38; Blaug 1980 p. 106).
Moreover, within the conception the economist is warranted in bringing
into the testing situation additional assumptions to save hypotheses
in difficulty:
"In the question of admitting additional assumptions into a
theoretical model, their relative usefulness should be
the only decisive consideration. If an assumption seems
to be in reasonable conformance with observation or reliable
testimony in a large number of instances, and with the
findings of imagined introspection, and if it modifies the
operation of our models in a way as to achieve greater
conformance with observed phenomena of the real world
(and if this degree of conformance cannot be achieved with
gteater or simpler assumptions), such assumptions should be
eligible for admission to our models .••" (Machlup Ope cit.
p. 94-5).
Clearly, the dependence of judgements about what constitutes 'reasonable
conformance with observation or reliable testimony' and 'imagined
introspection' upon theoretical preconceptions, and the allowance for
the introduction of additional assumptions and ad hoc hypotheses, create
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severe difficulties for falsificationism as a universal guarantee of
rationality. Furthermore, in cases where some contradiction remains
between the deduced consequences of a hypothesis and an 'accepted' set
of observations, there arises the problem of deciding just what degree
of contradiction can lead to rejection of the hypothesis or model,
particularly if there is no available alternative theory explaining
the same events which is considered 'simple', 'fruitful', 'appropriate'
etc. Theories are usually overthrown by other theories not simply by
empirical contradictions which are rarely clear-cut and absolute due
to the basic inability to set up controlled experiments (closed systems)
to test economic theories (Blaug 1962 p. 672):
"Since the criteria for accepting or rejecting economic
hypotheses are statistical ones, no refutation or
confirmation can ever be final. Statistical testing
is essentially 'a game against nature': if we would
rather reject true hypotheses than run the danger of
accepting false ones, we raise the level of significance
at which we screen hypotheses; on the other hand, if
we are more worried about rejecting true hypotheses
and less worried about accepting false ones, we lower
the level of significance. Thus, the cut-off point
at which we begin accepting hypotheses is entirely
arbitrary and depends on our eagerness to obtain
significant results, which in turn depends on the number
of alternative hypotheses that are already available in
the same area. In the final analysis, therefore, the
degree of confirmation offered by empirical evidence in
a field like economics is, itself, a matter of judgement
of the balance of probabilities between competing
hypotheses." (ibid. p. 673).
It is apparent, then, that strict adherence to the principle of
methodological falsificationism would rule out much of what is presently
practiced in the name of 'economic science'. Economics in fact contains
many definitions, concepts and theories which are not empirically
falsifiable and tautologies are often presented as substantial
contributions to economic knowledge. For example, the concept of a
negatively inclined demand curve in conjunction with an inclusive
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'ceteris paribus' clause is not falsifiable because if quantity
demanded and price are both observed to decline together while other
prices and incomes remain constant (i.e. in apparent contradiction to
the theory) it is always possible to save the original hypothesis
by contending that tastes have changed (viz. 'ceteris' are not
'paribus') (ibid. 674). The attempt to rescue falsification by
hypothesising that tastes are stable over the relevant period, and
subjecting this hypothesis to empirical tests, must again fail because
such tests themselves require 'ceteris paribus' clauses which can,
once more, be blamed for any contradictions. Despite its unfalsifiable
nature, the concept of the negatively inclined demand curve is generally
accepted within neoclassical economic theory; however, its support can
be seen as deriving not from its survival of attempts at falsification
but rather more from its place within a wider body of theory, within a
paradigm, which holds a hegemonic position in the field of economic
analysis. Thus, the concept derives from that of 'diminishing
marginal utility', but this latter concept is also tautological as
Robinson (1962 p. 48) argues:
"Utility is a metaphysical concept of impregnable
circularity; utility is the quantity in commodities
that makes individuals want to buy them, and the fact
that individuals want to buy commodities shows that
they have utility."
Moreover, the hypothesis that individuals maximise utility and that in
an equilibrium situation the ratio of the marginal utility of each
commodity to the price is everywhere equal - such a hypothesis is
unfalsifiable since observed preferences, from which utility is inferred,
are inevitably a reflection of market prices. Price is the only
possible measure of marginal utility so to say that an individual will
consume a comodity up to the point where marginal utility is equated
with price is tautological; for an observation of an individual's
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consumption at a particular price it can merely be assumed that the
price reflects marginal utility and that the individual is pursuing
maximising behaviour (cf. Sayer 1976 p. 212).
More generally, the assumption of rational maximising behaviour by
neoclassical economic agents is not amenable to empirical test.
Thus, 'Rational Economic Man' (sic!) is a person who conforms to the
neoclassical model so rational behaviour embodies the 'true value'
of behavioural economic variables. But rationality is defined in terms
of what the models predict and failure of prediction can always be
blamed on 'irrational' behaviour; there can be no independent empirical
test of the maximising hypothesis. Attempts to side-step prior
assumptions of rationality have resulted in behaviourism which seeks
explanation on the basis of observed regularities which allow predictions
of patterns of behaviour. But the selection of economically 'relevant'
and reliable patterns which are predictable requires some prior criterion
and this leads quickly back to the postulation of maximising behaviour
as such a criterion thus compounding the contradiction (Hollis and Nell
op. cit. p. 53-62).
Returning to the hypotheses which are employed as a basis for arguments
concerning the economic implications of nuclear power programmes it
can be seen that there is little prospect of conclusive falsification.
Setting aside the problem of future effects and concentrating only on
that of establishing the nature of the present relationship between
nuclear power development and GOP growth, it is not possible to set up
empirical tests which would indubitably establish the rationality of
the beliefs of either proponents or opponents of nuclear power. Rather,
it would appear that such rationality is conferred more by the extent to
which the hypothesis is consistent with the wider theoretical framework
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which is conventionally accepted as 'scientific'. More specifically,
then, the belief that nuclear power development has beneficial
implications for GDP growth is regarded as rational not because it is
falsifiable and has withstood successive rigorous attempts at empirical
refutation but because of its location in (and importance to) a broader
system of beliefs about energy and the economy which hold sway in our
society.
This general point concerning the 'rationality' of particular economic
beliefs was asserted by Keynes, in a wider context, with reference to
the school of thought which maintains that economic systems are
essentially self-adjusting and should not therefore be subjected to
state 'interference' (a school of thought which has enjoyed a recent
revival) :
"The strength of the self adjusting school depends on
its having behind it almost the whole body of economic
thinking and doctrine of the past 100 years. This is
a formidable power. It is the product of acute minds
and has persuaded and convinced the great majority of
the intelligent and disinterested persons who have
studied it. It has vast prestige and a more far-
reaching influence than is obvious. For it lies
behind the education and the habitual modes of thought,
not only of economists, but of bankers and businessmen
and civil servants and politicians of all parties."
(Keynes quoted by Godley (1983».
The argument can be developed in more detail with reference to the
forecasts of energy demand which have been produced by the Department
of Energy as the basis for the formulation of policies in respect of
nuclear power. Such forecasts, and the relationships from which they
are derived, represent important elements in this broad system of
beliefs about energy and the economy and underpin the specific beliefs
concerning nuclear power and GOP. The forecasting system developed
by the Department of Energy is built around an econometric model of
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energy demand which establishes empirical relationships between economic
variables and energy consumption and which is therefore an important
basis of the perceived rationality of the official economic case in
favour of nuclear power. Consequently, it is worth examining such
models to see if their scientific quality can be established with
reference to the falsificationist criterion. Such an examination will
also provide a more specific analysis of the problems of developing
economic science since econometric models represent the vehicles via
which economic theories and hypotheses are subjected to empirical
testing.
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3.3.2 A Detailed Critique: Econometric Modelling
Econometrics, then, is concerned, in general terms, with the estimation
and testing of economic models (Johnston 1972). Such models are
intended to be simplified abstractions of certain features of the system
of interest which will provide insights into the operation of that
system and thus facilitate predictions of future development and the
planning of that development with a view to 'improving economic welfare'
(ibid. p. 2). From a falsificationist standpoint the task of the
econometrician is to develop, and assess the performance of, economic
models in terms of the extent to which they constitute ".•.. a
sufficiently realistic picture of the economy being studied or whether
a somewhat different specification has to be estimated." (ibid. p. 5-6).
The position is summarised by Ramsey (1977 p. 20-1):
"The claim of economics to be a science must be based
on its method. The scientific method is, very
simply, the procedure by which ideas about how the
world functions are continually tested, so that theory
is confronted with reality. The more severe and
challenging the test, the more we learn about our
discipline, whether the idea under test is rejected
or not. The short-run objective of every scientist
is to try to refute the existing, or currently-
entertained ideas; he (sic!) tries to test and if
possible reject the conventional wisdom. If he
succeeds, we know we must find other explanations.
If he fails, our confidence in the prevailing view
is increased.
Consequently, the fundamental role of econometrics
is to specify the procedures required to test
economic ideas."
This process involves several highly problematical stages: the
specification of the appropriate economic hypothesis in the form of
a mathematical model, given that the 'a priori' restrictions deriving
from economic theory are not usually sufficient to yield such a precise
specification; the collection and selection of 'relevant and
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appropriate' data: the estimation of model parameters using this data;
and the testing of the estimated model to assess the 'appropriateness'
and to decide whether or not it should be rejected (Johnston Ope cit.
p. 5-6). These problem areas are usually considered in two main
categories: firstly, problems of model choice and, secondly problems
of model estimation (Brada and King 1979 p. 588); however, these
categories are in fact closely interrelated and interdependent.
Models, then, are representations and abstract~ons of phenomena or
systems which exist in the real world; models are developed by abstracting
from 'reality-as-perceived' those elements which are considered most
relevant to the problem under examination. Models can be chosen to
represent the system of interest to varying degrees of 'reality'; the
problem is usually seen as one of choosing a model which contains a
structure that approximates 'reality' to a degree sufficient for the
purposes of the investigation being pursued (Koopmans 1970 p. 176).
Model-building therefore involves a compromise between, on the one hand,
the incorporation of all the principal relationships necessary to
describe and explain a system and, on the other, the process of
simplification and abstraction from perceived extraneous influences
(cf. Koreisha 1980 p. 96). But the question then arises: on what basis
do we decide just what is 'appropriate', or 'relevant', 'necessary',
'extraneous' etc.? In making such decisions and judgements theoretical
preconceptions of the analyst must be of fundamental importance. In
the absence of prior theory all we can say is that everything depends
upon everything else. Although this is certainly true to a point it
does not provide a feasible basis for the construction of models;
selectivity is essential to model-building and in the process of
selection theory must playa crucial role whether we admit it explicitly
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or not (cf. Common 1976 p. 392).
The process of compromise and selection, then, involves judgements which
are applied in relation to the norms and conventions of the theoretical
framework, or paradigm, within which the modelling exercise is undertaken.
Furthermore, such judgements can be seen to be influenced by such factors
as the nature of the information available about the system (which is,
again, theory-dependent), and the purposes for which the model is intended.
For example, according to positivist criteria, models should ideally be
as simple as possible, consistent with 'accurate predictions'. We can
refer here to Machlup's argument, in relation to neoclassical economic
models, to the effect that:
"•..realism in a model constructed for the purposes of
analysis is undesirable if it reduces its simplicity
and may cause confusion by 'cluttering up' the model
with irrelevant detail." (Machlup 1978 p. 78).
Moreover, if simplicity is seen as an important consideration for the
purpose of analysis, then in cases where the primary purpose of a modelling
exercise is the production of results useful to the process of policy
formulation (cf. demand forecasts), rather than the analysis of the
processes operating in the system, then we might expect even greater
pressures towards the simplification side of the compromise.
In relation to the energy field, given, firstly, that a primary purpose
behind the development of econometric models of energy demand has been
to produce forecasts of demand as an input to the planning process and,
secondly, that such development has been guided mainly by criteria
deriving from a positivist epistemology, then the trend towards the use
of simple linear models of energy demand can be readily understood.
Indeed, the 1960s witnessed a mushrooming of modelling activity of this
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kind, a product of the so-called 'quantitative revolution' which overlook
the analysis of social phenomena, born of dual parentage - positivism
and the rise of social planning. Mathematical modelling became
synonymous with respectable scientific analysis in the study of social
systems, particularly where the results could be 'applied' to produce
insights for policy-makers (cf. Grahl 1979 p. 8). For example, the
'quantitative revolution' in geography provided the basis for the
mathematical modelling of urban systems which resulted in many models
being applied in the urban planning process, particularly in respect of
urban transport systems (cf. Chorley and Haggett 1967; Wilson 1972,
1974). In the energy field, the Fuel Policy White Paper of 1967
presented forecasts of demand for the first time based on a quantitative
modelling system and in the same year the Energy Model Group was formed
in the then Ministry of Power (Pearson 1981).
In the initial euphoria of quantification scientific activity in certain
areas of applied social studies came close to being reduced to model-
building in which even the tenets of traditional positivist epistemology
were neglected. The result was what Hindess (op. cit.) terms the
'vulgar epistemology of model-building'. Within this framework
scientific activity is seen to consist not in the testing of theories
and hypotheses against empirical observations but rather solely in the
construction and fitting of models, developed on the basis of implicit
preconceptions about the system of interest, to accepted theory-neutral
observation data. Theory, in the traditional sense, takes a back seat;
little attempt is made to explicitly test existing bodies of theory in
the analysis of social phenomena. Models, in effect, become the new
'theories', based only in an implicit and haphazard fashion on pre-existing
theoretical frameworks. Again, one can refer,
for example, to the new 'theories' of spatial interaction developed in
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urban geography in the late 1960s which were little more than a collection
of models based on Newton mechanical analogies. The basis for this
'theory' was later rendered more mathematically sophisticated by the
application, by Alan Wilson, of 'entropy maximising' methods - basically,
statistical averaging procedures to estimate the most probably system
states given certain constraints (Wilson, 1970, 1974).
This trend towards mathematical modelling was perhaps encouraged by the
material social conditions which prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s.
This period was characterised by a high degree of social stability and
steady economic growth, at least up to the late 19605. Consequently,
many empirically observable and measurable social and economic variables
became subject to strong and steady time trends (e.g. GOP, income, output,
consumption etc). Simple models, expressing a linear relationship over
time between such variables, therefore performed reasonably well in
empirical terms in the absence of abrupt social change during the period
over which data were collected.
In this context, then, developed the practice of using simple linear
models to express energy consumption as a function of Gross Domestic
Product and other time-trend variables such as population, manufacturing
output and income. The economic content of such models, in terms of
an explicit relationship with behavioural hypotheses of neoclassical
economic theory, is negligible; rather, within the 'model-building
epistemology', the model is the theory. The test of the model is
the extent to which it 'fits the facts', but since such models are
essentially designed to fit the available facts the 'goodness of fit'
statistic can provide no indication of explanatory validity and therefore
no warrant for prediction, the basic purpose behind the development of
such models.
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The underlying problem of models developed upon the basis of observed
regularities between phenomena derives from their superficiality.
The so-called 'independent variables' of such relationships are themselves
dependent upon the same processes which influence the level of energy
consumption. In other words, all the observable and quantifiable
variables which are commonly used in such regression models of energy
consumption represent 'economic outputs' and correlations between them,
far from constituting an explanation, represent rather superficial
indicators to further analysis. It is hardly surprising, then, that
such quantities displayed a high degree of temporal correlation over a
period of reasonably steady growth, not subject to abrupt structural
discontinuities, as was experienced during the 1950s and for much of
the 1960s.
However, such simple models were eventually overtaken by events. The
late 1960s and early 1970s brought some significant changes in social
and economic terms as recession played havoc with smooth trends of
economic growth, and appearances of social harmony began to crumble
in the face of increasing industrial and social unrest. It is possible
to suggest that such events contributed to a breakdown in the predictive
performance of simple time-trend models fitted to historical data, and
led analysts to increasingly question the links of such models to
traditional bodies of theoretical knowledge. This can be seen as
reflected, for example, in the new trend towards so-called "behavioural
models' which became evident in the early and mid-1970s in areas of
social analysis concerned with aspects of economic behaviour. In a
search for new respectability modellers now turned more explicitly to
neoclassical economic theory for a 'behavioural basis' for their work.
Again in the field of urban modelling, for example, 'utility' began to
appear in an attempt to provide a theoretical basis to models concerned
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with travel demand, residential location etc (cf. Wilson 1974).
In the energy field, the events of 1973-4 caused quite an upheaval as
considerable increases in the price of OPEC oil drove up average prices
of energy, resulting in the breakdown of the barriers which had developed
to partition the energy market during the period of low prices, and in
substantial changes in modes of energy consumption (Chateau 1975
p. 37-8; Chateau and Lapillonne 1978 p. 141-2). During the post-war
period of relative stability in energy markets the price of energy
was subject to comparatively little change (actually declining in real
terms) and was therefore excluded as an explanatory variable from
energy demand models based on trends over this period. However, with
sudden increases in price, followed by short-term reductions in
consumption, analysts began to reject non-price models, with their
assumption of zero price elasticity of demand, and, increasingly, to
insist upon the need to incorporate the price of energy as an explanatory
variable. Much of the substantial effort which has been put, since
the 'energy crisis' of 1973-74, into the modelling of energy demand
has been concerned with such an incorporation. In this programme,
moreover, analysts would appear to have 'rediscovered' the neglected
link with neoclassical economic theory of demand as the source of
hypotheses, assumptions and preconceptions for their attempts to develop
a 'better science'. The position is well stated by Brada and King
(op. cit. p. 589) as follows:
"The building of econometric models depends on
economic theory to suggest possible causal
relationships, to specify the form of the
equations, to indicate which variables are
likely to explain particular phenomena, and
often to state 'a priori', the sign of particular
coefficients. Thus, if any progress is to be
made in econometric work, we must first understand
what the difficulties have been with the underlying
theory in the past and what changes must be wrought
so that both economic theory and econometrics can
progress more rapidly through mutual support."
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As regards the analysis of energy demand as a basis for forecasting
exercises, then, econometric models incorporating energy price variables
are conventionally regarded as representing 'good scientific practice'.
Certainly, as far as the Department of Energy is concerned, the
development of such models represents a 'major improvement' in the
methodology for producing energy 'projections' to provide a framework for
the consideration of energy policy issues (Wigley, 1981; Department of
Energy 1982). The basis for such confidence is essentially a faith
in the notion that the process of testing such models in relation to
empirical data provides a means of rejecting 'false' models and hypotheses,
a means of reflecting upon the soundness of the underlying theoretical
framework of neoclassical economics, and, therefore, a means of defending
against the influence, on theories, hypotheses and models, of implicit
judgements, perceptions and selective processes which represent the
vehicle for evaluative and ideological 'intrusions'. Of course, to
the extent that such methodological guarantees cannot, in practice, be
maintained then much of what is taken for granted in the rationalist
conception of energy policy formulation becomes highly problematical.
To what extent, then, do price models of energy demand represent 'good
science'?
The development of energy demand relationships is founded upon the
neoclassical 'subjective theory of value'. The basic purpose behind
their development is the determination of the social value of energy
products as revealed in market activity, where social value is conceived
in relation to the subjective preferences of rationally-behaving
individuals for energy products as a means to satisfying desires for
other services and products to which energy is a necessary input
(Boulding 1973 p. 121; Uri 1981 p. 244). Consequently, the demand
13-3
for energy is seen as a 'derived demand' for a commodity as manifested
in market exchange relationships.
The hypothesis from neoclassical economic theory to which price models
of energy demand relate has been simply stated as follows:
"Neoclassical demand theory predicts that an increase
in the general price level of energy relative to
other prices would reduce its consumption, and similarly
that a relative increase in the price of one fuel would
tend to reduce its share of the energy market."
(Webb and Ricketts 1980 p. 76; cf. also Department of
Energy 1977 p. 4).
Certain observations can be made about such a hypothesis. Firstly, it
implies a relationship of determination between price and consumption
of energy - price changes will predwce consumption changes. Secondly,
such a hypothesis must necessarily be supported by 'ceteris paribus'
clauses which state that the relationship specified will hold if, and
only if, other things remain equal. In other words, the relationship
between price and consumption of energy is abstracted from other factors
which influence consumption (e.g. tastes, income, prices of other goods
and services etc.). Thirdly, the hypothesis is stated at a high level
of generality and, in order to be subject to any form of empirical
testing, must be made operational by obtaining empirical measures for
the theoretical terms and by defining the boundaries of the empirical
system to be used in the test situation. These features imply certain
problems in the specification and estimation of models, and in the
process of testing hypotheses via such models.
The fundamental problem concerns the extent to which econometric models
can actually represent the real causal structure of the energy system.
Thus, severe specification problems arise from neoclassical economic
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hypotheses of the kind outlined above. A severe form of specification
error in econometric model building relates to the functional form of
the demand relationship. In theoretical terms, as indicated above,
energy demand is seen as derived from consumer preferences; more
specifically the demand relationship is obtained from the maximisation of
a consumer preference function subject to a budget constraint (Uri op.
cit. p. 245). However, since such preference functions cannot be
empirically determined their form is not known; some function must be
specified and econometrically estimated. As Uri (op. cit. p. 246)
argues:
" we do not know what these preference functions
look like so it is impossible to know the one exact
functional form for the demand equation which yields
an exact, quantitative estimate of demand elasticities."
The usual outcome is the choice of linear or log-linear relationships on
the grounds of ease of estimation and interpretation (ibid. p. 247).
A second major form of specification error occurs with the omission of
relevant, or inclusion of inappropriate, explanatory variables (Common
op. cit. p. 320). The problem also extends to the specification of
inappropriate 'independent' variables: thus, it is possible to select as
exogenous variables which are actually dependent upon other variables,
producing faults in the causal structure of the model. For example,
the specification of energy consumption (endogenous, dependent variable)
as a function of price (exogenous, independent variable) is in error to
the extent that prices are influenced by levels of consumption. In
the short term fuel prices are partly determined by the amount of fuel
consumed in cases of stepped, multi-part tariff systems; higher levels
of consumption mean lower average prices. In the long term eco~mies
of scale, deriving from increasing consumption levels (as general
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prosperity increases and consumption habits change etc), results in
lower real prices as, for example, the case of electricity has illustrated
in the past. In the simple demand equation these effects would be
wrongly presented as lower prices leading to higher consumption implying
a price-elastic demand in situations where the real price elasticity
may be zero. In such cases estimation of the model will not provide
relevant estimates of 'real-world' elasticities and consequently cannot
provide a decisive test of the hypothesis (cf. Halvorsen 1978 p. 7-9,
Department of Energy 1977 p. 7, 45). This example illustrates how,
with the available data on price and consumption, 'ceteris paribus'
conditions must be violated in a time-trend analysis since economies of
scale cannot be excluded from price-trend observations; a decisive
test of the hypothesis is, therefore, not possible.
The source of this problem can be seen to lie essentially in the mode
of abstraction used in the development of models within the neoclassical
economic paradigm. In the positivist 'regularity theory of causation'
explanation consists in the development of empirical regularities
between phenomena which permit prediction. A distinctive characteristic
of the process of theorising within neoclassical economics is, therefore,
the focus on, and selection of, contingent 'ex post' phenomena of
market exchange and the formulation of empirical variables representing
such phenomena into relationships of statistical regularity (cf. above
p 130 ) . Both energy consumption and price are 'ex post' market
outcomes which are dependent upon other technological, economic, social
and political processes, and to express one as a function of the other
within a linear econometric model is to impose a distorted relationship
of determination that can have little bearing upon the explanation of
real world processes.
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Consequently, the process of abstraction and selection employed in
developing such models can be seen as excluding many of the factors
which are significant in the determination of the demand of energy.
The grounds upon which they are excluded obviously relate to preconceived
notions of 'relevance' which have their source in the neoclassical paradigm,
and such notions may operate at different levels of explicitness. For
example, there exist certain implicit theoretical notions about the
irrelevance of certain social variables (e.g. social class). However,
a particularly important criterion through which explicit selection
occurs is that of quantifiability. On the one hand, special efforts
may be made to find a quantifiable expression of variables which have an
important place in the theoretical and conceptual framework (for example,
the concept of 'utility'); on the other hand, variables may be perceived
as relevant by virtue of their ready quantifiability (cf. market
exchange outcomes) or, conversely, omitted on the grounds of an absence
of appropriate numerical measures (usually compounding low theoretical
priority) • In this context, what has been termed the 'McNamara fallacy'
has significant implications:
"The first step is to measure whatever can be easily
measured. This is okay as far as it goes. The
second step is to disregard that which cannot be
measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value.
This is artificial and misleading. The third step
is to presume that which cannot be measured easily
is not really very important. This is blindness.
The fourth step is to say what cannot be measured
irleallydoes not exist." (quoted in Daly 1976 p. 9).
Examples of variables which are commonly omitted from energy demand
models but which nevertheless can be seen to have an important influence
on demand are: advertising and publicity, especially by energy supply
corporations, consumer expectations and tastes: social attitudes to,
for example, the 'convenience' of different fuels; and the costs,
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efficiencies and lifetimes of energy-using appliances (Department of
Energy 1977 p. 6, 45). More fundamental, perhaps, are variables relating
to a wide variety of complex economic, social and political factors which
constitute the wider determinants of the specific arena of contingent
market exchange phenomena.
Variables relating to energy-using technology can be seen as particularly
important omissions from the perspective deriving from neoclassical demand
theory which emphasises the subjective preference of rational autonomous
individuals to the neglect of the 'constraints' on individual behaviour
and choice deriving from supply-side considerations and broader social
factors. The influence of technology on energy demand is emphasised,
for example, by Chateau (1975; cf. Chateau and Lapillonne 1978) who
argues as follows:
"It is difficult to understand how a concrete economic
system determines a level and a tendency in the
consumption of energy at any given time. One can
nonetheless insist on the primary role played by
technology, since it is the technological choice at
a given moment which implicitly determines future
energy consumption." (op. cit. 1975 p. 38).
Chateau proposes that 'technology' can be seen to comprise three major
elements: firstly, objects produced by the production system; secondly,
processes used in the production system; and, thirdly, the equipment
necessary for various production processes (ibid.). He then argues
that such technology is important in determining the consumption of
energy at three levels in the economic system. Firstly, as a raw material
consumption is determined by the production volume of the industries using
it as a raw material. Secondly, as a factor of production consumption
is determined by, for example, the equipment used in the production process.
Thirdly, as a final consumer good consumption is determined by the chosen
equipment (e.g. heating appliances, transport vehicles etc) (ibid. p. 38-9).
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Consequently, from this point of view, for many applications energy
consumption must be seen as a complement to the consumption of expensive
and long-lasting energy-using equipment (cf. the concept of 'derived
demand') and changes in the efficiency and choice of equipment in
response to changing fuel and equipment prices will have important effects
on fuel consumption, effects which will vary over time (Department of
Energy 1977 p. 46). For example, in the short term one would expect
the response of energy consumption to price increases to be constrained
by past commitments of investment in energy-using appliances. In the
longer term, however, technological changes could be expected to occur
resulting in a greater response in consumption (cf. a move away from
energy-intensive products, increases in efficiency of energy-using
equipment, changes in industrial production methods) (Chateau 1975
p. 39-40).
This distinction has led Khazzoom (1974), for example, to postulate
the classification of 'captive' and 'free' demand for energy.
'Captive' demand is that which, at anyone point in time, is immobilised
by a given stock of appliances and which is generally immune to the
influence of economic stimuli. 'Free' demand is that which can be
reasonably expected to be responsive to changes in economic conditions
(ibid. p. 360). Khazzoom then argues as follows:
"The predominance of the captive component in the
total results in a reduction in the consumer's
agility (or the producer's agility if the commodity
in question is a factor of production) and the
overall response of total demand to, say, price
variations, will be much more restrained than economic
theory would lead one to believe." (ibid. p. 364).
Models based on such theory, excluding important technological determinants
of demand and their effects over time inevitably, then, face serious
difficulties in the analysis of the response of energy consumption to
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changes in economic conditions and, more specifically, in attempts to
forecast future levels of consumption. The point has been well
illustrated by Chapman (1976; cf. Energy Research Group 1976) who
analysed the forecasting failures of the electricity industry in terms
of the neglect, in demand forecasting models, of variables relating to
trends and patterns of use of electrical appliances. However, as
indicated above, the problem of neglect and omission of variables within
the econometric modelling framework goes beyond the realm of technological
determinants to social and political influences. Brief reference can
be made to some recent work which is critical of this dimension of the
'superficiality' of economic modelling.
Chateau, together with Lapillonne (1978), developed his critique by
outlining a framework for the more 'realistic' analysis of energy demand
within the emphasis is placed upon identifying mechanisms behind growth
and causal linkages. Two major types of 'determinants' of energy
demand are seen as important (ibid p. 145-6). Fir.stly, 'direct
determinants' may be technological (e.g. industrial process, modes of
transport), socioeconomic (e.g. pattern of economic activity, consumer
behaviour), and political (e.g. choices of decision-makers and economic
aspects in respect of industrial location, process, equipment etc).
Secondly, 'indirect determinants' exist at different levels including
macroeconomic variables (e.g. economic growth rate and structure,
income level and distribution, energy prices), organisational variables
(e.g. settlement pattern, degree of centralisation, transport
infrastructures), political variables (e.g. government policy-making), and,
finally, social variables (e.g. social values and organisation).
The neglect of political influences on energy consumption is also emphasised
by Erickson (1980) who employs a 'political economy' approach in the
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comparative analysis of energy consumption in the United States,
Sweden and West Germany, justifying such an approach in the following
terms:
"In searching for the causes in national differences
in energy consumption patterns, it does not restrict
itself to the traditional economic topic of supply
and demand. Rather, it focuses on the political
dimension and highlights key public policies that
structured the market and ultimately established or
gave sanction to current use patterns." (ibid p. 113).
Erickson goes on to establish that significant degrees of consumption
differences can be explained in terms of such factors as public
transit and land use policies, fiscal and taxation policies, building
standards and insulation practices, the characteristics and efficiency
of energy-using equipment and technology, and the extent to which
public authorities have promoted the use of total energy systems which
make use of 'by-product' heat from electricity generation. He
summarises his argument as follows:
"..•it is critically important to recognise that public
policy, not the 'pure' economic interplay of supply
and demand has shaped the price structure and, hence,
the market." (ibid p , 116)
".•.market forces influence individual decisions, but
the structure of the market itself is shaped by
broader political and institutional factors. Among
these are the attitudes and actions of utilities;
the regulatory bodies that oversee them; their large
customers; elective and appointed officials; and
individual citizens as political and economic
participants." (ibid p, 120)
A similar point is also forcefully made by Goode et al (1980). In the
explanation of energy demand ....
"••.while individual free market style decisions by
individuals are important and must not be neglected,
nevertheless social decisions in this field are
important, pervasive and in some instances dominant."
(op. cit. p , 25).
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Like Erickson, the authors of this study place the emphasis on such
factors as land use and transport policies, taxes and subsidies, building
regulations, standards and practices, institutional intervention
etc (ibid).
All this is to argue, then, that, within the framework of econometric
modelling of energy demand, many factors which represent fundamental
determinants of demand are excluded from analytical attention. A
meaningful analysis of energy consumption is therefore rendered extremely
difficult within this framework. In order to make such models
operational it is necessary to 'assume away' such factors as changes in
relationships over time, changing expectations, tastes and attitudes,
the effects of stocks of energy-using appliances and other techno~ogical,
social and political influences. It is, indeed, necessary to assume in
advance that the equations to be estimated represent a true description
of the system of interest. In view of the specification errors inherent
in such models this assumption is invalid, and to this extent the results
of the estimation process can be seen as inappropriate to the analysis
of the response of the system to the manipulation of policy variables,
to the forecasting of future system states, and to the assessment of
the validity of the underlying theory.
Severe problems of estimating econometric demand models would exist
even if the assumption of correct specification were vali;d, but they
are compounded by problems of mis-specification. Thus, the greater
the degree of mis-specification, the greater the amount of variability
in the dependent variable which will be due to factors which are
(wrongly) assumed to be constant (i.e. to have no effect), and the
greater the problems associated with estimating meaningful parameter
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values for the variables which are included in the model. Moreover,
the methods of testing the significance of such parameter estimates are
generally not capable of unambiguously indicating that the model
specification and its parent hypothesis are incorrect.
An important category of estimation problems derives from the
difficulties of deciding upon appropriate empirical measures for the
theoretical terms in the model. For example, what we are trying to
explain, in theoretical terms, is energy demand, but what we can
actually measure, in empirical terms, is energy consumption. However,
an estimate of energy consumption elasticity is not the same as demand
elasticity; the plotting of consumption and price data captures the
intersections of supply and demand curves, but the consumption curve
is not the same as the demand curve (Chateau and Lapillonne op. cit.
p. 142). Again, there exist difficult problems in the observation and
measurement of a significant price of energy. In theoretical terms
the appropriate variable for inclusion in a demand model, for the
purposes of estimating the price elasticity of demand for a fuel, is
the marginal price since in neoclassical theory a necessary condition
for utility maximisation is that the consumer equates marginal rates
of substitution to the ratio of marginal prices of different fuels
(Halvorsen op. cit. p. 7). However, marginal price does not incorporate
all the relevant information about price tariffs, and a measure of
average price is required in cases where price depends on quantity
purchased in order to reflect the cost of intramarginal units (ibid.
p. 7-8). This difficulty compounds the specification problem deriving
from the dependence of long-run prices on consumption effectively
preventing the explicit relationship of model to background hypothesis
and theory.
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Problems in achieving the identification of the demand relationship
from the empirical terms of energy consumption and price exist
independently of difficulties which arise from the quality of economic
data, but are compounded thereby. For example, theoretical considerations
may be overridden due to problems of obtaining data of a sufficiently
disaggregated nature to permit estimation of variables which are
meaningful in theoretical terms. Lack of disaggregated price data
may force analysis involving aggregation over processes governed by
different mechanisms and determinants, producing inaccurate estimates
of elasticities; this can be an important problem in analysis of
the industrial sector (Koreisha 1980 p. 97; Verleger 1974 p. 35).
Moreover, the entire process of econometric estimation is founded upon
assumptions of randomness and normality in data, assumptions which are
difficult to test and, indeed, commonly violated (Georgescu-Roegen
p. 261-2).
A particularly severe estimation problem arises due to the existence of
the strong time-trends in many of the variables which are considered
relevant to econometric models of energy demand, such as price, income
and consumption (cf. above p.129 ). Consequently, difficulties arise
in respect of serial correlation between observations on variables in
time-series data:
"Energy consumption and economic activity have both
grown strongly over time and this makes it virtually
impossible to separate out the effects of any long-
term trend in prices, or changing tastes. It is
largely for this reason that we are reduced to
measuring the effects only of fluctuations of price
levels about their trend. Indeed, the problem is
even worse than this, if we suppose that real price
changes in the nationalised industries are correlated
with the phase of the economic cycle (for which there
is some evidence)." (Department of Energy 1977 p. 46)
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The problem of multicollinearity plagues most attempts to estimate
econometric demand models using time-series data. In the presence
of linear stochastic relations between the explanatory variables of
a model the precision of parameter estimates falls and the standard
errors of estimates may be misleading. Basically, it becomes difficult
to disentangle the relative influence of different explantory variables
and possible to wrongly reject variables, which in reality have an
explanatory influence, on the basis of misleading information from
significance tests (cf. Common op. cit. p. 362-2; Johnston op. cit.
p. 159-60). More generally, it becomes difficult to discriminate
between alternative model formulations which would provide an adequate
fit to the data, the number of which proliferates in proportion to the
degree of collinearity in the data (Grahl 1979 p. 13-14).
In an attempt to overcome the problem of multicollinearity econometricians
commonly pool both time-series and cross-section data to provide
variation in expLanatory variables over both time and space(cf. Halvorsen
op. cit.; Mount 1974; Department of Energy 1977 p. 19-43). But, as
the Working Group on Energy Elasticities has pointed out, this does
not necessarily eliminate the problem. Even in such studies, they
argue, ".•.. there is still considerable multicollinearity and they
have tended to produce elasticity estimates which are either statistically
barely significant, or which are statistically significant but subject
to controversy." (ibid. p. 46). Another possible response to the
problem is to lengthen the time period of the study to collect more
information, but this increases the likelihood of violated 'ceteris
paribus' assumptions due to structural changes in underlying processes,
and therefore creates severe problems in the use of the model to reflect
on competing theoretical positions (Grahlop. cit. p. 14-16).
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Problems of specification and estimation are, therefore, closely
interrelated as the case of multicollinearity illustrates. If a
demand model is specified in terms of 'explanatory' variables which
all represent phenomena which are contingent upon the same underlying
socio-economic processes then any attempt to estimate the model using
time-trend data will inevitably produce problems of multicollinearity.
In a sense, a situation of 'vicious circularity' is created to the
extent that the initial problem of mis-specification produces subsequent
problems in respect of estimation which effectively prevent the decisive
testing of the model as specified. Only if the model is initially
correctly specified can its correctness be tested! Moreover, the
possibilities of breaking out of this situation are circumscribed by
the nature of the system which produces the data for the estimation of
such models. The stochastic properties of economic phenomena do not
conform to the models of classical statistics, and enquiry into the
nature of these phenomena cannot be pursued using 'controlled experiments'
in which only one variable changes at a time and where reference can be
made to 'control groups' (Brada and King op. cit. p. 588). In other
words, economic data is conventionally extremely long on 'noise' and
short on information, thus providing the scope for formulation and
reformulation of a multitude of competing hypotheses and compounding,
as indicated above, the problem of identification (Grahlop. cit. p. 16).
Hence the need to make certain assumptions about stochastic conditions;
and the estimation of any economic relationship must be made subject to
specification, estimation and measurement errors of the kind outlined
above. Econometric relationships cannot be precise functional
relationships but rather are seen to represent 'mean behavioural
patterns' as discernible for observed data (cf. Kelejian and Dates
1974 p. 33-5).
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A closer look at the process of estimating econometric relationships
will illustrate more fully the implications of these problems. An
example of a typical functional form of econometric models of energy
demand is provided by Halvorsen (op. cit). In a study of US
electricity demand he presents a structural demand equation in the
following log linear form (ibid p. 9):
In Q In P +
M
L
i=2
a,Z, + u
1 1
Here Q is the average quantity of electricity purchased per customer,
P is the marginal price of electricity, Z, are other exogenous variables
1
and u is an 'error' or liisturbance term' which incorporates both the
inherent variability of economic phenomena and behaviour, and errors
which derive, on the one hand, from the shortcomings of the model
as a meaningful description of the real structure of the system in
question and, on the other hand, from the problems of expressing such
structure in the form of quantitative, empirical variables.
Consequently, it can be seen that econometricians normally deal with
rather imprecise relationships and, indeed, in the estimation of such
relationships the error term u can take on considerable significance.
The role of this term would appear to be basically similar to that
played by the 'ceteris paribus' clauses of economic theory
(Koutsoyiannis 1973 p. 53). In economic theory it is postulated
that functional relationships between variables are exact given
'ceteris paribus' assumptions (i.e. subject to other things remaining
constant). However, since theories are necessarily abstractions from,
and simplifications of, the complex relationships which hold in the
real world, 'ceteris paribus' assumptions can seldom be fulfilled.
In econometric models, therefore, the error term is used to accommodate
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the changes in factors not explicitly incorporated into a relationship.
But a fundamental problem arises here. Just as in economic theory
the requirement to use 'ceteris paribus' assumptions prevents the
decisive empirical reputation of theories, so the inclusion of all data
variability and specification and measurement errors in a residual u
term can be seen as promoting the preservation of relationships once they
have been specified and estimated. It is largely a matter of judgement
as to whether the 'unexplained' variation in a relationship is sufficient
to warrant its rejection, particularly as the source of this variation
may not be specifically identifiable. It could be argued, for example,
that omission of relevant variables and misrepresentation of the form of
functional relationship are more serious errors than those arising from
problems of estimation and measurement since the former involve changing
the specification of the model. However, such distinctions cannot
easily be made on the basis of a single value for u. Moreover, the
judgement which must be brought to bear upon the question of the
validity of an econometrically-estimated relationship as a test of an
economic theory can easily be coloured by the interest of applied
econometricians in obtaining empirical relationships which can be used
to achieve practical results.
Indeed, the problem goes somewhat deeper than this. The estimation of
the parameters (a.) of the relationship requires prior observations
1
on dependent and independent variables and, strictly, on U; but u
cannot be observed directly and so the econometrician must make
assumptions about the shape of the distribution of u which represent
guesses about its true but unobservable values. It is conventionally
assumed, then, that u is a normally distributed, random, real variable
with, in any particular period, a mean of zero and a constant variance.
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Further, it is assumed that the error terms of different observations
are independent and that u is not correlated with any of the explanatory
variables, z ..
1
These assumptions can only be tested after the
estimation of the model by examination of the regression residuals, e,
which are taken as the estimates of u.
However, there are difficulties associated with this method. For
example, there is no possible formal test of randomness of u because
the true values of u are not observable and their estimates, e, are
obtained with the assumption of randomness built into the estimation
procedure. Similarly, the assumption of zero mean of u cannot be
tested because E(u)=O is taken as axiomatically true for the purposes
of estimation. As Koutsoyiannis (op. cit. p. 174) states:
"It is necessary to make the zero mean assumption
so as to be able to apply the rules of algebra to
stochastic phenomena and relationships. In other
words, this assumption is imposed upon us by the stochastic
nature of economic relationships, which otherwise it would
be impossible to estimate with the common rules of
mathematics."
Again, the assumption that u is normally distributed is difficult to
validate because the regression residuals, e, may be effected by
mis-specification of the model and hence do not always reflect the
true distribution of u.
The usual approach adopted by econometricians to the question of the
validity of the above assumptions underlying estimation procedures
is either to ignore the implications of their violation or to
attempt to rationalise them on 'a priori' grounds by assuming the
absence of the very errors that the u term is supposed to accommodate.
For example, it is commonly assumed in applied econometric work that
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models as initially specified include all the important and relevant
variables so that those excluded are individually unimportant and equally
likely to have either positive or negative effects on the dependent
variable thus offsetting each other. Moreover, it is usually implicitly
assumed that there are no systematically positive or negative errors in
measurement of variables and, again, that such errors will tend to
cancel each other out. Finally, then, there arises the assumption
thatsinceu absorbs mainly the influences of numerous unimportant
variables and 'erratic' elements in human behaviour, small values are
more likely than large values; it is assumed to be more likely that the
econometrician will make minor rather than major mistakes in decisions
and judgements on what constitute important and relevant variables
(Koutsoyiannis op. cit. p. 173-93).
Since the validity of some important tests of the significance of parameter
estimates (e.g. t-tests, F-tests) is dependent upon the realism of
such assumptions, doubts must be cast upon the process of econometric
estimation in terms of its contribution to providing meaningful tests
of hypotheses and models concerning the demand for energy. One can
refer, in this context, to the wide range of results wfuich have been
produced by econometric studies concerned to estimate the response in
consumption of different fuels to changes in their price relative to
other fuels. The Working Group on Energy Elasticities has tabulated
the results of several studies on the price elasticities of fuel
consumption in various markets, illustrating the variation which arises
due to the use of different assumptions, data and techniques
(Department of Energy 1977, Annex III p. 19-43).
commented as follows:
The Working Group
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"No two studies can be said to be analysing the same
problem. Some differences are trivial - such as
differing conventions for weather adjustment.
However, some are probably very important, such as
the differing time periods and geographical areas,
the differing definitions of price (e.g. marginal
versus average, and measured relative to other
fuel prices or all fuel prices, or all commodity
prices), and the exclusion or otherwise of stocks
of energy using equipment." (ibid. p. 19).
In an econometric study of electricity demand in the United States
Mount et al (1974) also refer to the controversLal nature of demand
elasticities with some studies indicating inelastic relationships,
some elastic relationships and others being inconclusive (ibid.
p. 323-5). In such a situation it is difficult to see how the
econometric estimation of models of energy consumption can provide a
means of decisive testing of hypotheses deriving from economic theory
and therefore a means of guaranteeing 'good science' defined as
objective knowledge free from the intrusion of evaluative and
ideological themes.
Now, as we have seen, there is considerable scope for selectivity and
judgement on the part of the analyst, exercised in relation to
pre-conceived ideas and assumptions about the nature of the problem
under analysis and, moreover, to the requirement often to produce
results which are useful in terms of their contribution to policy-
making:
"....those carrying out the studies are not always
free from pressures to produce sensible looking
results. It would be naive to suppose that,
however much analysts try to be unbiased, this
does not sometimes influence the detailed selection
of data and methodology which are finally published.
For example, studies which fail to reveal significant
elasticities are less likely to be published."
(Department of Energy 1977 p. 46).
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However, such influences are likely to be much more pervasive than
this, affecting the whole approach to, and structure of, the analysis,
the process of variable selection, judgement about the importance
of different sources of error and of violations of assumptions upon
which econometric estimation rests, about the extent to which tests
of significance of parameter estimates are valid, and so on. And
such influences cannot be relegated to a 'psychology of knowledge'
with their implications neutralised by the 'logic' of empirical
testing.
Indeed, the basic approach to much economic work, especially that of
an applied nature, does not conform to the philosophy, imperatives
and ideals provided by the doctrine of empirical falsificationism,
models which, nevertheless, are so widely accepted, on the philosophical
level, as constituting the necessary criteria for 'good science'. In
practice, therefore, given the stochastic properties of economic
phenomena and the scope for judgement in what are rather 'messy' test
situations, an insistence that economic hypotheses and models be
formulated in such a way that they could, in principle, be indubitably
falsified would result in the classification of much of economics-
as-practiced as 'unscientific' against such criteria. Yet economics
is conventionally regarded as the most 'scientific' of all the social
sciences due primarily, indeed, to the development of econometric
modelling as the supposed vehicle of empirical testing.
The method of indirect statistical inference, adopted in econometric
work as the means to overcome the impossibility of isolating controlled
experimental situations, can be seen, then, as embodying neither the
spirit nor the letter of the falsificationist programme. The
152
fundamental problem has been outlined by Leontief (1971 p. 4) as
follows:
"As theorists, we construct systems in which prices,
outputs, rates of saving and investment etc, are
explained in terms of production functions, consumption
functions and other structural relationships whose
parameters are assumed, at least for arguments' sake,
to be known. As econometricians, engaged in what
passes for empirical research, we do not try, however,
to ascertain the actual shapes of these functions and
to measure the magnitudes of these parameters by turning
up new factual information. We make an about face
and rely on indirect statistical inference to derive
the unknown structural relationships from the observed
magnitudes of prices, outputs and other variables that,
in our role as theoreticians, we treated as unknowns."
Since much econometric work is undertaken within the context of
contributing towards the formulation of policy, whether by firms or
by government (cf. Ramsey op. cit.), the underlying concern tends to
be more with fitting models to available data and deriving useful
quantitative parameter values than with testing the validity of models
and the underlying hypotheses and theories. Global goodness-of-fit
statistics and correlation coefficients can lead to the rejection and
reformulation of a model but provide only a superficial insight into
the complex nature of possible defects; such statistics are suited
more to the assessment of a model as a computational device than to
its evaluation as an empirical test of theory.
In general terms then, the justification for the use of econometric
models of energy demand as a contribution to 'improved' procedures
of policy formulation is essentially instrumentalist: better forecasts
of demand can be produced through an approach which is taken, almost
without question, to be 'scientific'. It is often argued, that a
test of such models does exist to the extent that predictions turn out
to be wrong over the time period for which they are made. In
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other words, we may have to wait some time for our falsification
but it is nevertheless, in principle, eventually possible. However,
there are two basic problems with this argument. Firstly, in order
to produce a forecast of an endogenous variable (e.g. energy consumption),
forecast values of the specified 'exogenous' variables (e.g. household
expenditure, manufacturing output, GDP etc) are required and as much
uncertainty may surround the latter as the former. In a model where
'exogenous' variables represent contingent economic outputs there may
be no greater policy control over such variables than there is over
the endogenous variable, nor any basis for greater confidence in
their predictability. For example, forecasting of household expenditure
and GDP is fraught with the same difficulties as forecasting energy
consumption. Moreover, even if realised values of such 'exogenous'
variables are, at a later date, used to test the output of the model
against the realised value of the endogenous variable, any discrepancy
can always be blamed on the fact that other things will inevitably
have not remained constant. Indeed, this procedure is often used to
re-estimate the parameters of the model against newly available time-
series data, not to seriously reflect on the validity of its structure.
The model may be modified somewhat but the soundness of the underlying
theory cannot be thereby seriously challenged.
The second problem concerns the validity of realised, 'ex post' values
of endogenous variables as a possible test of a model. If a model
forecast is adopted at a partio~lar time as a basis for formulating
policies for the future then the realised value of the endogenous
variable at a later date will inevitably be influenced by the adoption
of those policies; in a sense, then, the forecast will be to a
certain extent 'self-fulfilling'. Consequently, a realised value
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of an endogenous variable at a later date cannot provide a valid
independent test of a model. Furthermore, we need to know the
validity of a model before it is used in the policy-making process;
even if we could obtain such knowledge 'a posteriori' it would, by
then, be too late since the model will have already been used as a
basis for changing the system. The 'damage' will have been done
and it will be irretrievable. Finally, as noted above, 'ex post'
assessments can merely result in recalibration as a basis for new
forecasts and policies; the system rolls on with no independent
basis for refutation.
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3.4 Conclusion
It can be concluded, then, that the conception of objective knowledge
guaranteed as rational by the methodological imperatives of
falsificationism has little validity in practice. If such imperatives
were strictly imposed then much of what is currently accepted as
'scientific' knowledge of economic (and, indeed, all social) phenomena
would have to be discarded. That such imperatives are unattainable
has been demonstrated in the logical sense. That they are seen as
inappropriate is perhaps reflected in social scientific practice;
most social scientists pursue their craft in a way which does not
conform to falsificationist strictures. Again referring to economics,
Blaug (1980 p. 128) argues:
"Modern economists frequently preach falsificationism .....
but rarely practice it "
Of course, there is a relevant distinction to be made between arguments
concerning the actual nature of social scientific practice on the one
hand, and those concerning the desirable nature of such practice on
the other. That falsificationism is not actually practiced does not
itself invalidate it as a possible ideal of scientific practice; it
is with reference only to logical arguments that such invalidity is
demonstrable. Our concern here is essentially to understand the
nature of social scientific knowledge as produced in our society:
to understand the extent to which it is possible to derive social
knowledge which is 'cognitively well'founded' or 'reliable'; the
means by which such knowledge can be produced; and the 'deficiencies'
in this respect which are present in the bodies of social knowledge
and their means of production extant in our society. Having concluded
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that falsificationism does not provide criteria relevant to this
undertaking it is appropriate to proceed to an examination of other
criteria which might be so relevant.
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Chapter 4: Rational Social Knowledge: Towards an Alternative Conception
4.1 Introduction
Knowledge about social phenomena which can be taken as 'rel~able' or
'scientific' is an important commodity in our society. Public and private
institutions and organisations must continually make decisons about courses
of action and an important input to the decision-making process is
available knowledge concerning the operation of social processes and
the likely response of those processes to alternative courses of action.
The discussion in the previous two chapters has attempted to indicate
the difficulties in producing such knowledge and, more specifically, to
demonstrate the illusory nature of conventional sets of ideas concerning
its 'scientific' nature. However, in spite of these <ftifficulties,
recognised or not, the 'social requirement' for such knowledge (e.g. from
the state for purposes of economic and social planning and from companies
for the purpose of product planning and marketing) causing pressures for
i~" production in 'useful' forms. This trend was discussed in
chapter one and can be seen as producing a problem for the policy making
process: as the demand grows for rel~able knowledge to guide decisions
on social and technological developments so too do the problems associated
with the development of such knowledge.
The major components of this problematic can be briefly stated. Firstly,
as the involvement particularly of the state in planning economic, social
and technological development has grown, so has the requirement for useful
knowledge to inform such planning activity. Secondly, the increasing
complexity and scale of social and technological development has produced
a greater demand for predictions and, moreover, longer planning lead-times
and, therefore, a need to forecast further into the increasingly complex
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future. Thirdly, the increasing scale of impact of social and
technological developments on society and on the environment implies a
need for more reliable knowledge about the nature of such impacts.
However, fourthly, because of the problems of pace, scale and complexity
of such change and the consequent difficulties of establishing controlled
experimental situations in such 'open system'contexts there exist
several obstacles to the production of social knowledge of demonstrable
reliability (cf. Hutchinson 1977 p. 28-32; 1981, p. 284).
The problematic has evoked a distinctive response in the social sciences.
Within the framework of orthodox positivistic epistemology the standard
of scientific respectability is provided by the experimental natural
sciences and the attempt to emulate such respectability in response to
the above problematic has resulted in the widespread emphasis in the
social sciences on quantification of phenomena and on the employment
of mathematical modelling and computer techniques. Referring again to
neoclassical economics, widely claimed to be the most 'effective' and
'mature' of the social sciences (Hutchinson 1977 p. 1), it is the
development of mathematical economics and the fact that ..•... "economists,
in their criteria, objectives, and methods, have attempted to follow
much more closely and explicitly the natural sciences ••." (ibid. p. 14)
which is largely responsible for such claims of effectiveness. The
developmental view of maturing economic science, proceeding along the
secure and well-charted path of the natural sciences, is expressed by
Neal and Shone (1976 p. 20), for example, as follows:
"If the economist is going to construct operational
models so that he (sic!) can undertake the indirect
tests of theories then these will be inevitably
mathematical in form, and if they are not so at the
present moment it will not be long before this comes
about". (emphasis added)
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Consequently, it can reasonably be argued that the essential hallmark
of respectability and usefulness in the social sciences has become the
ability to develop precise relationships expressed in mathematical form.
It is by virtue, then, of the more ready susceptibility of the subject
matter to quantification and the development of econometric modelling
(in addition to pressures from the requirements of economic planning)
that economics has come to be called the 'Queen of the Social Sciences'
and the standard against which 'progress' and 'maturity' in other social
sciences is measured (cf. Dror 1971). More generally, Nagel (1975), for
example, stresses the need for social sciences to emulate the models
developed in the physical and biological sciences and to employ mathematical
and computer techniques. However, since such a trend cannot be justified
in terms of the falsificationist framework we have the problem of gaining
an understanding of the rationality of such knowledge as part of the
wider task of understanding the nature of the process of production of
social knowledge in our society.
4.2 The Problem of 'Understanding' Social Phenomena
An emphasis, in the development of social scientific knowledge, upon the
search for, and formulation of, quantitative mathematical relationships
produces certain important implications. For example, focussing on the
nature of such relationships can lead to a neglect of the problem of
theoretical development or even the reduction of theory to mathematics.
Mathematics is essentially merely a set of logical constructs which
makes no direct reference to phenomena in social reality; if it is
used as a tool in the explanation of social phenomena the translation
between the mathematical and empirical domains must be regarded as highly
problematical and crucial to the nature of the resulting knowledge.
However,once such a translation is made (e.g. via the process of
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selective abstraction) the problems and qualifications inherent in it
are often forgotten and the domains become inverted: the mathematical
relationship becomes the 'reality', considerations of 'substance' (i.e.
thecuniquecharacteristics of social phenomena) become subordinated to the
question of 'form' (i.e. the generalizable relationships between
measurable characteristics). Shils (1949 p. vii) has commented on these
trends as follows:
"(M)uch of the acceptance and appreciation of the utility
of social science in the circles with the power to finance
it and use it, extends largely to just those aspects of
social science research which are almost exclusively
descriptive or in which the task of explanation is disposed
of by correlations of indices of ambiguous analytical
meaning or by ad hoc common sense interpretations. The
fact that correlations among the indices of ambiguous
analytical meaning is often high and that the possibilities
of successful practical manipulation are thus enhanced
constitutes a barrier to our perception of the need for
theory."
The nature of trends in social science since the time that Shils wrote
these comments would appear to make them even more apposite today.
Lukacs (1971) is also critical of the 'naturalistic' approach to social
science. He argues that if the ideal of knowledge is a formal system
of mathematical relationships then this leads to the elimination of
"••.• every subjective and irrational element and every anthropomorphic
tendency ••." (ibid. p. 128); social science becomes radically separated
from ethics and rational social knowledge is seen as free from the
contamination of subjective value considerations. In other words, in
such an approach knowledge becomes 'distanced' from the substantive
objects of study in the interests of formal representation; considerations
of 'realism' in relation to such objects become subordinated to those
of methodology (cf. Machlup 1978 p. 78). The realm of the subjective
is neutralised by that of the objective.
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A further manifestation of this problematic concerns the neglect of
the historical and institutional dimension of social phenomena, a
dimension which, some analysts argue, is fundamental to an understanding
of such phenomena and which essentially embodies the difference between
them and the phenomena of concern to the natural sciences. Referring
again to economics, Hutchison (1977 p. 94) presents Phelps-Brown's
belief that ...
"••.we ought to value powers of observation more highly
than powers of abstraction and the insight of the historian
more than the rigour of the mathematician."
Hutchinson himself argues as follows( 19B1 p. 276):
"Difficulties in quantifiability, heterogeneity, the absence
of 'constants', the 'openness' or the 'complexity' of the
material of ~ocial and economic systems, or what might be
called the historical and institutional dimension (which
implies the existence of only trends and not laws), these
are all different aspects or ways of describing the different
characteristics of the material of the social, as contrasted
with the natural sciences."
And, finally, it is perhaps worth quoting at length the views of
Kenneth Boulding on the contemporary trend towards mathematical
economics:
"The antihistorical method leads to the development of
slick technicians who know how to use computers, run
massive correlations and regressions, but who do not
really know which side of anybody's bread is buttered,
who are incredibly ignorant of. the details of economic
institutions, who have no sense at all of the blood, sweat
and tears that have gone into the making of economics and
very little sense of any reality which lies beyond their
data. We seem to be producing a generation of economists
whose main preoccupation consists of analysing data which
they have not collected and who have no interest whatever
in what might be called a data reality function, that is,
in to what extent a set of data corresponds to any significant
reality in the world. The antihistorical approach,
furthermore leads to a rejection of any information which
cannot easily be fitted onto punched cards or their
equivalents, and hence results in a distortion of the
information input in the direction of that which can easily
be quantified and away from those intangibles and
imponderables which may nevertheless be an essential part
of reality. The antihistorical school, furthermore, leads
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into what I have called ptolemaic economics, that is, an
endless modification of variables and equations in regions
of strongly diminishing returns in the knowledge function,
and still sharper diminishing returns in the significance
function. We seem to be engaged in finding out more
and more numbers which mean less and less, and the parallel
with the ptolemaic epicycles is not difficult to draw."
(quoted in Hutchison 1977 p. 95).
Objections to the application in the social sciences of the methods and
procedures employed in the development of knowledge in the natural
sciences derive broadly from the view, therefore, that the object of
study in the two cases is fundamentally different. The implications
of this view for the question of the rationality of social knowledge
can be examined by considering the position which has developed in this
respect on the basis of the work of Max Weber. Reference was made at
the beginning of Chapter 3 to Weber's view that the task of explanation
of social phenomena is very different from that of the phenomena of
concern to the natural sciences. Whereas the latter are concerned
to develop law-like generalisations based on the regular recurrence of
relationships, Weber arg~es, on the contrary that:
"Sociology ..•••• is a science which attempts the interpretive
understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive
at a causal explanation of its course and effects."
(Weber quoted in Benton 1977 p. 113).
Therefore, Weber considered that action has the central place in
sociology and saw its defining feature as 'meaningfulness':
" in action is included all human behaviour insofar
as the actor attaches a subjective meaning to it."
(Weber quoted in Rex 1961 p. 78)
Only the individual is considered capable of 'meaningful social action'
and action is social to the extent that it takes account of the
behaviour of other people (Parkin 1982 p. 17; Benton 1977 p. 119).
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The study of action, then, is concerned with the penetration of the
subjective understandings of individuals in order to establish motives
for social action. What is required is 'Verstehen', the comprehension
of the meaning of social action through an empathic identification
with the actor in order to be able to develop an explanatory
understanding of the reasons and motives for action (Parkin ~1_982p 19-20;
Benton 1977 p. 120, 128-9).
However, Weber distinguished two levels of adequacy for such motivational
explanations and in so doing made some concessions to the naturalist
position which stand somewhat at odds with his basic neo-Kantian
insistence on the methodological peculiarities of the cultural sciences.
In addition to "adequacy on the level of meaning', which establishes
plausible hypotheses in relation to intelligible sequences of motives,
Weber insisted that explanations should be 'causally adequate', and
this involves some empirical testing of hypotheses in order to establish
generalisations of a law-like kind. (Ibid; Keat and Urry 1975 p. 145-7;
Giddens 1974 p. 6-7).
Moreover, in the development of hypotheses adequate on the level of
meaning, relating to actions defined in terms of cultural complexes of
meaning, Weber argued that generic concepts (attempting to 'reproduce'
social reality) were inapplicable (Weber 1949 p. 106). Interest in
the "...concrete individually-structured configuration of our cultural
life in its universal relations ..." (ibid. p. 74) results in the need
for 'ideal-typical' concepts designating not what aharacterises a class
of phenomena, but rather a particular aspect of those phenomena manifest
to a greater or lesser extent as an 'ideal limit' against which actual
cultural phenomena can be compared and therefore understood and
explained .••" in their independence, their causal conditions and their
significance. II (ibid p. 92)
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The formulation of ideal-types, then, involves the selection and
accentuation of certain elements of social reality and Weber argued that
the processes of selection and accentuation take place under the guidance
of culturally-contingent viewpoints such that it is not possible to
talk of a 'real essence' (ibid. p. 90-1). As Parkin (1982 p. 28
states) :
"Social reality does not possess a real essence because
it is always capable of being constructed or represented
in various different ways. What counts as social reality
depends pretty much upon the conceptual apparatus through
which we view it in the first place."
For Weber, then, the selection and formulation of problems for investigation
by the social sciences is 'influenced' or 'governed' by their 'value-
relevance' i.e. by their relationship to motives and values arising
out of cultural interests in a specific historical context (Weber 1949
p. 21-2, 61; 1978 p. 87-8). The explanation of the 'cultural
significance' of social and economic phenomena must always, therefore,
be founded upon an evaluative framework related to 'value-conditioned
interest'; knowledge of social phenomena cannot be 'objective':
"There is no absolutely 'objective' scientific analysis
of culture - or ..•.of 'social phenomena' independent
of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which -
expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously - they
are selected, analysed and organised for expository
purposes." (Weber 1949 p. 72)
In the development of such value-conditioned knowledge, Weber saw
regularities, laws and universal propositions as playing a limited and
specific role, as indicated above. Weber rejected the notion that the
ability to develop law-like regularities is the decisive criterion for
relevance and significance of social phenomena; knowledge of recurrent
sequences plays only a preliminary role as a guide to cause and effect
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and, therefore, as a rather limited means to the end of causal
explanation (ibid. p. 72-80):
"The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena
and the basis of this significance cannot .... be derived
and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws .•. ,
however, perfect it may be, since the significance of
cultural events presupposes a value-orientation towards
these events. The concept of culture is a value-concept.
Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us because and
insofar as we relate it to value ideas." (ibid. p. 76).
Much more important in the development of meaningful knowledge of
cultural phenomena, then, are the evaluative ideas of the investigator
which arise from the historical and cultural context in which the
investigator is located and which, as a form of social consciousness,
become embedded in a conceptual, value framework upon which social
knowledge is founded (ibid. p. 82). Benton (1977 p. 126) states
Weber's position as follows:
"The general value framework in terms of which a cultural
object is to be interpreted (i.e. in terms of which its
concept is to be constructed) is .... a function of both
the value framework in terms of which the cultural
object was itself constructed .•.... and the value-choices
of the historian/sociologist, these value-choices
themselves being relative to the culture of the historian
or sociologist concerned."
Weber's arguments, then, lead him into a relativist position; he sees
all knowledge as a product of culture •..•
"...even the knowledge of the most certain propositions of
our theoretical sciences - e.g. the exact natural sciences
or mathematics, is, like the cultivation and refinement of
the conscience, a product of culture" (Weber 1949 p. 55)
However, given a particular culturally-contingent value-framework, Weber
insists that we can talk about 'objective knowledge' of social phenomena;
in other words, while rejecting the notion of 'absolute' or 'universal'
objectivity he nevertheless retains the idea of a 'bounded' or 'contingent'
166
objectivity. Fundamental to this position is his argument in respect
of 'value freedom', and this argument will now be briefly outlined.
Weber defined value-judgements as practical evaluations of social phenomena
subject to our influence as desirable or undesirable, satisfactory or
unsatisfactory, whether on ethical grounds or on the basis of some
attitude to culture, or for any other reason (Weber 1949 p. 1; 1978
p , 77). Basically, Weber argued that although the selection of relevant
and significance problems and phenomena for analysis necessarily takes
place in relation to values, the scientific analysis of those phenomena
can and should be undertaken in a manner which eKcludes all considerations
of practical evaluation. Such analysis is concerned only with factual
descriptions and explanations and cannot establish the truth or falsity
of any value-judgement. It is therefore imperative that the
investigator keep "...unconditionally separate .... " the establishment
of empirical facts and practical evaluations of those facts (Weber
1949 p. 1-12; Keat and Urry 1975 p. 196; Lessnoff 1974 p. 131-6,
147-9; Ryan 1970 p. 230-1). In Weber's own words:
"What is at issue ..... is exclusively the requirement,
utterly trivial in itself, that anyone engaged in research
or in presenting its results should keep two things
absolutely separate, because they involve different kinds
of problem: first, the statement of empirical facts
(including facts established by him about the evaluative
behaviour of the empirical human beings whom he is
studying); and, secondly, his own practical value-
position, , that is, his judgement and, in this sense,
'evaluation' of the facts (including possible 'value-
judgements' made by empirical human beings, which have
themselves become an object of investigation) as satisfactory
or unsatisfactory." (Weber 1978 p , 78)
Consequently, if scientists heed this imperative and subscribe to the
'scientific values' of truth and objectivity our knowledge of society
can be 'objective' according to Weber's 'bounded' definition; he
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summarises his position as follows:
It ••• the choice of the object of investigation and the
extent or depth to which this investigation attempts
to penetrate into the infinite causal web, are
determined by the evaluative ideas which dominate the
investigator and his age. In the method of investigation,
the guiding 'point of view' is of great importance for
the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be
used in the investigation. In the mode of their use,
however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms
of our thought just as muchhere as elsewhere. For
scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who
seek the truthlt (Weber 1949 p. 84)
It is apparent, then, that in Weber's scheme much rests upon the
investigatory's committment to particular 'norms of thought' and
to the 'search for truth' i.e. to a particular set of scientific ethics.
The degree of 'objectivity' of social scientific knowledge which can be
conceived of within the framework must, however, be highly circumscribed.
There are two main problems. Firstly, having conceded the fundamental
dependency of social knowledge on culturally-determined value-frameworks
there must be a severe limit on the extent to which objectvity can be
guaranteed by individual 'impartiality' within such frameworks.
Secondly, the capacity of investigators to actually achieve the required
standards of ethical neutrality in one part of the process of
investigation when their work in the other part is admittedly determined
by their values must be open to question. These problems can be
elaborated further and related to the previous discussion of
falsificationism.
In relation to the first problem the difficulty for Weber's notion of
objectivity is illustrated by the consideration of the implications of
the existence of divergent value-systems within a particular culture.
In a culture composed of classes and groups with conflicting social
interests and values and with the existence of competing 'general
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views on life and the universe', there will exist, in Weberian terms,
several alternative value frameworks and, therefore, several different
possible 'knowledges' of social reality. In such a context the notion
of a 'culturally~ounded objectivity' breaks down and becomes essentially
equivalent to the 'epistemological anarchism' propounded by Feyerabend
(cf. Chapter 2). Given such relativistic implications it is difficult
to continue to adhere to the notion of 'objective knowledge'.
The second problem relates to the question of guarantees to ethical
neutrality. For Weber it was, as indicated above, primarily a matter
of individual integrity and adherence to the discipline attendant upon
the 'pursuit of truth'. Clearly, however, this was not enough for those
who wished to develop and 'firm up' Weber's notion of objective social
scientific knowledge. There has been a tendency, therefore, by those
of positivist philosophical inclinations, to reinterpret Weber's work
through Popperian spectacles and to introduce empirical falsificationism
as the necessary guarantee of objectivity. The first step is to
interpret "Verstehen' as a method for capturing the 'meaning' of cultural
phenomena rather than as the essential aim of the cultural sciences
(as Weber saw it). (Benton 1977 p. 120). "Verstehen' can then be presented
as a method for generating hypotheses about intent~onal action which are
then subjected to empirical tests in an attempt to refute them (cf.
Popper 1979 p. 179-85). In the Popperian position, it can be accepted
that values playa role in the generation and formulation of hypotheses
(i.e. in the 'psychology of knowledge' or the 'context of discovery'),
but the discipline of specifying hypotheses in empirically falsifiable
form (and indicating the conditions under which they would be rejected)
and subjecting them to severe criticism and empirical tests (in the
'logic of knowledge' or the 'context of justification') ensures the
objectivity of social knowledge. As Runciman (1972 p. 39) states:
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"If explicability in principle has once been accepted, it
does not matter where the social scientists concepts and,
therefore, his hypotheses come from but only whether the
hypotheses are so framed that in principle, at least, they
are capable of empirical disconformation."
The Popperian interpretation of the Weberian position can also be fOUlld,
for example, in Taylor (1980) who argues:
"...what the phenomenological method suggests are ways
in which we might, sensitively and humanely,arrive at
hypotheses and theories to describe and explain people's
behaviour, attitudes and aspirations in the situations
in which they find themselves. In other words phenomenology
is a theory concerned with the psychology of knowledge.
But the logical question still arises as to how we might
test the validity of any theories that we might come up
with by phenomenological analysis, and here it can be
argued that one must fall back on something like the
popperian scientific method of critically testing these
theories by seeing if there is any empirical evidence which
may suggest their refutation or revision." (ibid. p. 169)
Now, it has been argued, in the previous two chapters, that in order
to stand as a valid, distinctive methodological position, falsificationism
must provide guarantees of the cognitive reliability of social knowledge;
that, in practice, no such guarantees can be provided; and that, in
consequence, popper's argument reduces, in the looser 'critical
rationalist' form, to the establishment of a set of ethical imperatives
or ideals which scientists ought to pursue. In relation to what social
scientists can achieve in practice much of the falsificationist 'logic
of knowledge' can be seen as a set of impracticable ideals which are
all-too-readily invoked to justify and support knowledge which is in
fact developed with little reference to them. Taking what is actually
practicable in Popper's position brings us back nearer to Weber's
original position of reliance on the subscription of individual scientists
to particular 'norms of thought'. However, Weber's insistence on the
dependency of bodies of social knowledge on culturally-contingent
value-frameworks provides a considerably more coherent account of the
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nature of social science, although in the looser form Popper's argument
must forego the distinction between the psychology and the logic of
knowledge and accept the significance of the former for the nature of
the final product.
Consequently, it is possible to move towards a position from which an
understanding of the nature and rationality of social knowledge in our
society can be achieved. Based on our considerations of Weber's arguments
we can accept that social knowledge is a product of culture, is founded
upon value-frameworks which are culturally determined, and is formulated
from particular value-relevant points of view of which there may be
several in a particular cultural context due to the existence of various
classes and groups with divergent interests and world-views. On the
question of the 'cognitive reliability' of the knowledges which thus
arise, it has been suggested that both the Popperian and Weberian
positions effectively reduce to a recognition of the central importance
of the behaviour of scientists, as individuals and as a community, in
terms of the rationale of judgements, decisions and choices. A necessary
corrollary of the argument of the importance of adherence to particular
'desirable' values and standards for the achievement of 'good science',
is the argument that the 'quality' of current social knowledge in our
society is contingent upon the values and standards which are actually
currently present in the social scientific community.
On this basis it is possible to refer back to the neo-Kuhnian position
outlined previously (cf Chapter 2) which also places prime emphasis on
the dependence of the process of knowledge formation upon its social
and historical context. From this perspective the process of knowledge
formation is seen as a social-psychological process, an essentially
value-conditioned enterprise in which scientific knowledge is a product
of socially- and historically-conditioned, value-laden judgements,
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choices and decisions. This perspective accords well with our 'neo-
Weberian' approach, which accepts Weber's arguments on value-relevance
but rejects his position on value-freedom as inconsistent with his
wider position. This, indeed, is argued by Parkin (1982) who suggests
that the specification of an imperative for scientists to make every
attempt to distinguish between statements of empirical facts and value-
judgements and to avoid making value-judgements cannot guarantee that
results are value free:
"The working assumptions that guided the research, and
the choice of concepts employed, would ensure that the
final product had a certain moral coloring .•... Weber offers
no guidance on how it would be possibe to arrive at value-
free results with the aid of these constructs." (ibid. p. 33)
Of course, this does not imply that Weber's strictures are irrelevant
or inappropriate. It is indeed possible to legitimately insist that
scientists are as thorough and impartial as possible, and pursue their
work with maximum integrity, without pretending that objectivity is
thereby guaranteed. Conversely, the recognition that science is
".... a species of value-conditioned practical judgement ....."
(Schuster 1979 p. 307) does not provide a warrant for scientists to
abandon any attempts to proceed with 'scientific integrity'.
Referring again to Parkin's comments on Weber's position:
"He could have conceded that since all forms of social
enquiry entail the use of concepts and constructs that are
morally tinted, the research product could not possibly be
value-free. At the same time he could quite reasonably
have sustained his case against partisanship in the lecture
room and in academic publications. The sociologist cannot,
try as he (sic!) may, avoid making value-judgements in his
work. But he can avoid spouting his own tedious opinions
on this and tha~ The fact that implicit evaluations cannot
be expunged from social enquiry is no warrant for giving a
completely free rein to the soap-box brigade."
(Parkin 1982 p. 33-4)
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4.3 Values and Rationality in Social Scientific Knowledge
As a product of human thought and activity in a particular socio-cultural
context social scientific knowledge must be seen, then, as inevitably
conditioned and moulded by judgements formulated in relation to the
ethical and moral dimensions of social existence. The recognition
that there can be no guarantees of value-freedom and objectivity re-focusses
attention on the question of 'scientific ethics'. It has been suggested
that the Weberian and Popperian positions effectively reduce to a set
of procedural maxims or scientific values and imperatives: that we
should attempt to avoid making value judgements and that we should subject
our theories and hypotheses to the severest critical tests that we can
devise. The rationality of existing social knowledge certainly cannot
be established by appeal to imperatives but adopting this position raises
some important questions concerning the nature of the procedural values
currently pertaining in our society and the relationship between such
values and the social and cultural context.
As regards the question of the current nature of 'scientific ethics',
it would appear that an important implication of the development of
positivist social science has been the tendency to neglect the problem
of such ethics as essentially irrelevant because of the alleged
methodological guarantees of objectivity. As Blaug (1980) argues in
relation to economics, the development of mathematical modelling and
the lip service paid to Popper appears to provide most economists with
sufficient self-assurance as to the 'scientific' quality of economic
knowledge. The result has been the development of a rather un-critical
and complacent attitude towards the value judgements which are actually
inherent in economics because of the adherence to the 'ideology' of
value-freedom (ibid. Hutchison 1977, 1981). As regards economic science,
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then, current practice would appear to fall short of the ideals propounded
by Popper, producing a situation in which many value-laden concepts
and constructs are falsely presented as objective knowledge (Blaug
1980 p. 153-4).
In considering this problem, the question of the relationship of
scientific practice to the social context in which it takes place
becomes important. If we support the argument that the socio-cultural
context has an important determining influence upon the character of
social scientific practice and its products then we must be aware that
any procedural ideals that we propose might require special socio-cultural
conditions for their implementation and acceptance. When Blaug (1980)
and Hutchison (1977, 1981), for example, argue that economics should
introduce and adhere to the principles of critical rationalism,
involving "... constant criticism, and the constant pressing of critical
distinctions and demarcations as far as they will go ••"••. (Hutchison
1981 p. 270), they imply that it is simply a matter for decision by the
scientific community to adopt these principles and that there are no
social and political factors which might have to be changed as a
precondition for such an adoption. Hutchison (op. cit. p. 298-9) does,
however, provide some insight into this problem by arguing that critical
rationalism does presuppose an 'open society'.
"All methodological prescriptions are inevitably based on
some kind of ethical or political presuppositions or
valuations, and we are assuming as one of the
presuppositions or purposes of our prescriptions than an
opposition to dogmatism must be the intellectual foundation
of a pluralist or 'open' society, where there are no
privileged or protected positions. II (ibid. p. 298)
A fundamental problem faced by proponents of critical rationalism, then,
concerns the means by which political change is to be brought about to
174
create the necessary socio-cultural context for such a procedural
ideal.
The social and political context of social scientific activity is
therefore of fundamental importance to an analysis of the nature and
rationality of our knowledge of social phenomena providing the
differentiation and structuring of interests and 'world views' and
therefore of evaluative perspectives on the social world which influence
the determination of problems, concepts and constructs of analysis and
the nature of scientific ethics and behaviour. The process of knowledge
development involves various conceptual, theoretical and methodological
judgements and decisions of 'relevance' and 'appropriateness' which
are made in relation to value-frameworks. Such commitments, largely
tacit and implicit can be seen, in Kuhnian terms, as constituting a
'paradigm'. Since there exists differentiation of values and world-
views between different classes and groups in society, knowledge of
social phenomena develops from 'particular points of view' and
conflicting interpretations of the same phenomena arise.
A particular body of social knowledge is therefore characterised by
its value commitments as expressed in its concepts, constructs and
working assumptions, and in the judgements and interpretations which
went into its development. It can therefore be expected that an
important factor in the determination of the extent to which a
particular body of knowledge is regarded as 'rational' is the nature
of the value commitments upon which it is founded. Different societies
are characterised by different sets of 'conventional' or dominant
values and the pattern in this respect relates to the characteristics
of the social structure. What is seen as 'rational' and 'scientific'
in one society may not, therefore, be so regarded in another. Similarly,
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within a society, given the existence of certain values which are
considered to be 'conventional' and dominant, what is regarded as
'rational knowledge' will be that whiah has a 'moral coloring'
which accords with those values. The basic problem here is one
discussed by Weber (1949) viz. that dominant values in a society which
are presented as widely accepted and conventional are taken as self-
evident and thereby transformed into ethical imperatives with an
apparent 'scientific' backing.
Indeed, Weber argues that the problem goes somewhat deeper than this
to the extent that value judgements are (illegitimately, he argues)
derived from 'factual assertions' about past trends and tendencies
(ibid. p. 27-38). He cites the example of the concept of 'progress'
which, he argues, can be used non-evaluatively to mean the "...continuation
of some concrete process of change viewed in isolation .." but can
easily take on an implied evaluative meaning viz. an increase in value.
The problem is then that this evaluative meaning gains authority from
the 'scientific' work which established the trend. Weber also refers
to the economic theory of rational consumer behaviour with perfect
information which, he argues, has been taken by supporters of free
market philosophy as a picture of the 'natural' state of affairs and
has therefore been elevated into a moral imperative (ibid. p. 44).
These two tendencies, then, (the attachment to observed social trends
of implied evaluative meaning and the elevation of widely accepted
values, which appear self-evident, to the status of ethical imperatives)
have the effect of producing biases in the perception of rationality in
social knowledge towards that which embodies conventional, dominant
values and values which imply the continuation of 'business-as-usual'
without radical social change.
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TO the extent, then, that the apparent rationality of a body of social
knowledge derives from its 'moral colouring' or embodied values there
arises a situation where a particular set of values is being promoted
in the name of 'value freedom' and therefore legitimised by the authority
of 'science'. If we reject the notion of value-free social science
as illusory then we have to contend with the notion of 'ideological
knowledge' or knowledge, the value-contingency of which is concealed
behind the facade of objectivity. This notion is obviously of
considerable importance to our position so it is worth briefly examining
in rather more detail the concept of 'ideology~
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4.4 The Concept of Ideology
'Ideology' is a term which must be used with considerable caution and,
indeed, much confusion is generated by the widespread tendency to employ
the concept without explicit definition. The problem is that the
meaning of the concept is dependent upon the epistemological standpoint
within which argument is developed: there are as many alternative
possible meanings as there are alternative epistemologies. Larrain
(1979) presents a discussion of the meanings of ideology and argues that
it can be conceived of in two ways. Firstly, it has a 'positive
. ,mean1ng as .....
" a system of opinions, values and knowledge which
are connected with certain class interests and whose
cognitive value may vary." (ibid. p. 172)
In this sense ideology is not seen as contrasting with science but rather
all knowledge is to some extent 'ideological', even that which is based
upon scientific premises. On the other hand, ideology can be conceived
of as having a 'negative meaning' as essentially distorted knowledge,
in contrast to science which is seen as true knowledge:
"While ideology remains trapped in the appearances,
science manages to penetrate the phenomenal forms of
reality, uncovering the laws and the real relations
beneath the surface." (ibid. p. 173)
However, ideology may be viewed in this latter, negative sense from two
very different epistemological standpoints. Firstly, from the positivist
position ideology is the antithesis of science, comprising distortions
and dogma founded upon value-judgements, which can be overcome only by
the application of a universal scientific methodology. Alternatively,
from the standpoint of Marxist dialectical materialism, ideology and
science refer to rather different realms of social reality and the
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problem of the former cannot be understood merely with reference to
'deficiencies' in scientific rationality. Rather, ideology is seen
as essentially rooted in 'material social contradictions', serving to
conceal those contradictions, and can only be dispelled by their
'practical resolution', not by science. However, science itself,
being also rooted in material social conditions, can be subject to
ideological penetration (ibid. p. 174-6).
Now, having rejected the positivist conception of ideology the problem
essentially reduces to the consideration of the relative merits of
the Marxist perspective as against the first position outlined above,
viz. the 'positive meaning' of ideology. It can be argued that
Larrain's discussion of this latter position is rather inadequate in
the sense that it fails to accommodate the full implications of the
hermeneutical tradition for the conception of scientific rationality.
Defining ideology in such a way that there is basically no distinction
between it and science fails firstly to do justice to the notion of
science which emerges from the 'neo-Weberian' position which we have
considered, and, secondly, to provide the conceptual machinery with
which to accommodate the discrepancy between this notion of science
and that which holds sway in our society. Thus, if we conceive of
science as a system of value-contingent knowledge of varying cognitive
value and connected to certain social interests, then the concept of
ideology can usefully be reserved for the false presentation of such
knowledge as objective and value free. From such a perspective it
is possible for ideology to have 'negative meaning' without insisting
that science can reveal a 'true' essence of social reality.
Essentially, then, the concept of ideology can be seen as referring
not to the actual characteristics of a particular body of knowledge
but rather more to the attempttopo~tray that knowledge as embodying
'truth'.
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Such a conception of ideology, although incorporating 'negative
meaning', nevertheless stands somewhat at odds with certain elements of
the Marxist conception. In terms of Marx's descriptive scheme of the
structure of a social formation, ideology is seen as a 'superstructural'
element, determined by the development of the mode and relations of
production in the economic base or ~nfrastructure'. As Lecourt (1975
p. 208) argues in endearing Marxist terminology:
"To determine ideology as an 'instance' in all social
formations is in fact to accept the obligation ...
to think the constitution, functioning and function
that instance as a material, historically determinate of
instance in a complex social whole, itself historically
determinate. "
The 'historically determinate complex social whole' of relevance to the
present discussion, then, is provided by an advanced capitalist,
class-structured society comprising various class-based 'needs -
interests' systems. Within this context:
"Ideologies function most centrally in the social process
as the abstract generalisation of the practical outlook
of social classes." (Shaw 1975 p. 65)
The basis of the relation of ideologies to the practical outlook of
social classes lies, it is argued, in the latter's relationship to the
means of production, their different roles in the social organisation
of labour, their different ways of obtaining a share of social wealth
and their different material interests (Cornforth 1976 p. 69).
Therefore, ideologies are based in human experience; they provide
relatively coherent ensembles of representations, values and beliefs
which translate peoples' 'real' relation to their conditions of existence
into a partially imaginary relation, thus providing partial and
distorted knowledge of the social structure, and 'inserting' agents into
their practical activities supporting this structure (Poulantzas 1975
p , 206-7).
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The capitalist mode of production is seen as producing a structure of
social relations embodying the domination of capita: over labour, or
rather the domination of the capitalist over the working classes, and
it is from this structure that the dominant ideology arises to serve
the interests of the dominant capitalist classes. It achieves this
end basically by distorting and concealing the 'reality' of exploitation
and domination embodied in capitalist social relations to defuse
discontent and opposition and ensure the maintenance of such social
relations (Keat and Urry 1975 p. 178; Poulantzas 1975 p. 209; Shaw
1975 p. 64). It is not necessarily a question of the dominant
classes intentionally and conspiratorially aiming to dominate ideologically;
rather, the ideological distortions which serve their class interests
are seen as being systematically generated from the material structure
of social relations. Consequently, it is through the basic social
institutions of capitalist society that the dominant ideology operates.
These institutions influence the nature and content of daily life and
experience, they are essentially organised and operate in the interests
of the dominant classes; that is, the dominant classes 'wield
institutional power' (cf. Parkin 1972 p. 84), while the dominant
ideology justifies and facilitates their operation.
Therefore, within the Marxist framework ideology can be distinguished
from science. Ideology is a form of consciousness, rooted in material
social contradictions, which abstracts and fixes, 'surface' processes
and phenomena or 'appearances', giving them an apparent but illusory
autonomous existence, thus concealing the 'real' contradictory social
relations of a capitalist society in the interests of the dominant
classes. Science, on the other hand, should seek to reveal the 'real
essence' of social relations by penetrating behind delusive surface
appearances (Larrain 1979 p. 176-81). However, Marx argued that
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science in a capitalist society is susceptible to ideological penetration
by limiting enquiry to surface appearances thus being diverted from its
potentially progressive role in unmasking the deceptions of ideology
and liberating subordinate classes, to a repressive role in furthering
the interests of the dominant classes (ibid. p. 181-7).
Within the Marxist tradition, however, there has developed something
of a controversy in the theoretical discussion of the formation of
ideology. This controversy relates basically to the question of the
role and place of the 'historical subject' in the development of ideas
and derives from the distinction between the early and later work of
Marx. The 'historicist' school of Marxism, based on the earlier work,
tends to see ideology essentially as 'false consciousness', as a
"•.• problematic centred on the subject ..." (Poulantzas 1975 p. 195-6),
reflecting the tradition of German historicism and relating most closely
to the hermeneutic approach. For example, Lukacs interprets ideology
as the development of class-consciousness and argues that the hegemonic
class in capitalist society develops a coherent 'world-view', in its
attempt to achieve control over society, which can act as a 'cement'
for the social formation. This world-view includes theories of economics,
politics and society in a comprehensive ideological framework which
also comprises a conception of what constitutes 'science' (Lukacs 1971
p. 46-80).
However, other Marxist theoreticians, perhaps best represented by
Nicos Poulantzas (1975), criticise the historicist conception of
ideology with reference to the later work of Marx which emphasises the
idea of people's 'real' relations to their conditions of material
existence - to nature, society, other people and to their own economic
and political existence (ibid. p. 206-7). Poulantzas aruges that the
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elevation, in the 'Lukacsian problematic', of the conscious elaboration
of a world-view by the dominant classes as a prerequisite for hegemony,
places on that world-view the role of 'central determining instance' of
the social whole and of the unity of the social formation. On the
contrary, he argues, ideology should be seen as reflecting this unity
and reconstituting it on an imaginary plane. The direct identification
of class political organisation and consciousness with a world-view
does not allow the 'ideological instance' a specific autonomy or
independent theoretical status. Moreover, he insists that it results
in a misleading interpretation of the relation between the dominant
ideology and politically dominant classes due to the failure to
incorporate the influence on such ideology of the political relation
between the dominant and subordinate classes, and of 'historical class
influences' (ibid. p. 202-5). Consequently, Poulantzas maintains that
the starting point in the analysis of ideology must be the 'concrete
structure of social relations' between various classes rather than the
world-views of each class in isolation. In this context the dominant
ideology can be seen to contain elements related to the conditions of
existence of non-dominant classes and ...
".•.dominated classes necessarily experience their relation
to their conditions of existence within the discourse of
the dominant ideology." (ibid. p. 209).
It is not really appropriate to enter into the controversy between the
'historicist' and 'structuralist' schools of Marxism. From our
perspective, it can be argued that Poulantzas under-states the role of
the subject and provides a rather deterministic and abstract account
which has, indeed, been criticised by Miliband (1972) as over-deterministic,
inappropriate to a proper analysis of the 'dialectical relationships'
in society, and lacking in 'concrete empirical analysis'. Lukacs'
account, which indeed does relate the development of class-based world-
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views to the concrete historical and social context, does appear to
be rather more appropriate in its greater emphasis on the 'subjective'
aspects of the process of production of social knowledge and on the
social process of knowledge production under the influence of the
interests and values of various classes and groups in society.
What we cannot accommodate from the Marxist account is the notion that
science can provide an objective account of the 'real essence' of
social phenomena. This is incompatible with the view of social
scientific knowledge as thoroughly contingent upon value-frameworks
defined in a particular socio-cultural context. From this point of
view ideology does not refer to 'distortions' of a 'reality' which can
be known through science because, it is argued, science cannot know a
'true social reality' independent of value-conditioned perceptions and
judgements. The term 'distortion' is therefore inappropriate; rather
all social knowledge is knowledge from a particular point of view and,
consequently, inevitably has a particular 'moral colouring'. The
concept of ideology refers, then, to the problem of a particular body
of value-contingent social knowledge taking on the guise of 'true
knowledge of social reality', of the embodied values receiving implicit,
but illegitimate, accreditation, and of the social interests to which
such values relate thereby being promoted at the expense of others.
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4.5 Conclusion
The discussion so far provides a basis for proceeding to the development
of a rather more detailed conception of ideological social knowledge
and this will be attempted in the next chapter. However, it is perhaps
appropriate at this juncture to briefly indicate the nature of some of
the questions to which such a conception must provide answers and to
summarise in a preliminary way the implications of our position for the
form of such answers. Firstly, our position can be briefly summarised.
Based on the Weberian position I have aruged that our knowledge of
social processes and phenomena is contingent upon evaluative frameworks
which are related to 'value-conditioned interest' defined in a particular
socio-cultural context; all social knowledge arises 'from a particular
point of view' and is a 'product of culture'. The existence of social
stratification and differentiation produces conflicts between classes
and groups in terms of both interests and 'general views on life and the
universe'; consequently, different value-frameworks arise and these
constitute the basis for conflicting interpretations of social phenomena.
Within this position the concept of 'value-freedom' cannot be upheld;
it can be seen to be inconsistent with the relativistic notion of
competing knowledges of social reality and can be shown to reduce to
a question of 'scientific ethics' at which level there can be no
guarantees of ethical 'neutrality'. Social knowledge comprises concepts
and constructs which are necessarily 'morally tinted' and the process of
its development is an essentially value-conditional enterprise guided
by judgements, choices and decisions made in a particular social context.
A particular body of social knowledge can therefore be seen as
characterised by its 'value commitments' and such commitments become
crucial to the question of 'rationality'. The tendency for those values
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which are dominant in a society, and which are regarded as 'conventional',
to become widely accepted as self-evident imperatives (rather than as
contentious values) means that social knowledge derived from the
viewpoint of such values will be promoted as apparently 'value-free' and,
therefore, as the more 'rational'. As a result, a particular
evaluative position is promoted in the name of 'value freedom',
legitimised in the name of 'science', and elevated behind the guise of
'rationality' out of the realm of contention.
The concept of ideological knowledge, then, can be taken to refer to
value-contingent social knowledge which is falsely portrayed as
objective and free from the 'intrusion' of values. On this definition
ideology does not refer to the nature of social knowledge as such;
that is, it does not refer to the 'distortion' of social phenomena
which can be contrasted with the penetration of the 'real nature' of
such phenomena by 'science'. Rather, all social knowledge is morally
slanted and the concept of ideology becomes relevant when such knowledge
is falsely promoted as morally neutral.
From this perspective we can ask why the problem of ideology arises
at all; that is: why is it necessary for particular bodies of social
knowledge to be presented as objective, true or on 'firm cognitive
ground'? This question was touched upon at the beginning of this
chapter where it was suggested that social scientific knowledge performs
an essential social function as an important basis for action by social
agents and that this function imposes the requirement that knowledge so
used must be defensible as 'reliable' in order to provide social action
with credibility in this realm. It is possible to elaborate somewhat
on this within our developing conception of social knowledge. For
example, the institutions of the state constitute major users of what is
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considered to be scientific knowledge of society and their purpose can
be seen as the attempted solution of perceived social problems or, put
another way, the attempt to overcome impediments to the achievement of
some defined social condition. Whether 'problem solution' is achieved
through changed material conditions or through the transformation of
perception of given conditions from 'problematical' to 'acceptable', and
whether action is actually based on scientific knowledge or on alignments
of power politics, the appeal to a conception of action based on a true
knowledge of society produces obvious legitimatory advantages. Firstly,
it provides action with a legitimacy which it would not have if it were
presented as the outcome of the balance of political power. Secondly,
it could be argued that the admission of the value-contingency of social
scientific knowledge would introduce the need for debate and discussion of
the values which underlie different bodies of knowledge. This would
produce a recognition of the contestability of value-stances which would
tend to undermine the taken-far-granted nature of dominant values and the
social group interests to which they relate.
From this point of view, then, the importance of the claim of the
possibility of objective knowledge is readily appreciated. Indeed such
an ideological claim can be seen as playing a central and fundamental role
in advanced industrial and industrialising societies which rely heavily
on the concept of 'material progress' and require a considerable degree
of social organisation to achieve such progress. However, the form in
which the claim manifests itself clearly varies with the nature of
political and economic organisation. For example, in 'state socialist'
societies, where explicit values are held to guide all social action, the
later, materialistic, Marxist conceptions of science tend to dominate in
which a true knowledge of society is presented as achievable from a
perspective based upon the interests and values of a particular class.
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Since it is held that such values are those which are explicitly
embodied in the State, action by the State can be legitimated with
reference to the claim of objective knowledge. However, in the
Western capitalist societies no particular set of values is explicitly
held to guide social action and positivistic conceptions of science
tend to dominate in which a true knowledge of society is presented as
achievable from a perspective which is free from the 'intrusion' of all
value stances. In such societies it is claimed that the State acts
impartially in the interests of all groups and therefore an important
source of legitimation for state action is a conception of knowledge
'above' any influences from particular social interests.
If we accept the argument of the importance of the ideological claim of
the possibility of objective knowledge the question then arises as to
the nature of the particular bodies of knowledge which will be presented
as representing the truth about society. Our perspective suggest a
western
hypothesis, which can be developed in relation to the problem in~advanced
industrial societies. Such societies comprise several social classes
and groups and this situation generates conflicts between social interests
and different 'world-views' founded upon 'evaluative ideas'. The
resulting value-stances and frameworks are not all equally weighted;
in particular, it was argued earlier that certain values tend to become
regarded as 'conventional' and 'dominant' and to be taken as 'self-
evident', losing their overtly evaluative nature and taking on the
guise of 'facts'. Social knowledge which is produced on the basis of
such value-frameworks will therefore be seen as free from the intrusion
of values - the fulfilment of the ideological claim of objective
knowledge. It is such knowledge, then, which can be defined as
constituting a 'dominant ideology'.
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Therefore, it can be argued that what is presented as 'rational
social knowledge' in a society is basically a function of the value-
frameworks upon which social knowledge is founded; knowledge developed
within the framework of conventionally accepted dominant values in
society will tend to be regarded as 'rational'. Having put forward
such a hypothesis an important question then arises as to the way in
which social values and interests are 'embodied' in social knowledge
and as to the nature of 'dominant values' and the 'dominant ideology'
in our society. This brings us to the concern of the next chapter
which will attempt to undertake an examination of the process of
social knowledge development, of bodies of social knowledge which
are conventionally regarded as 'rational' in our society, and of the
nature of the evaluative frameworks which they embody.
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Chapter 5: Ideological Knowledge, Social Problems and the State
5.1 Introduction
The conclusions from the discussion of the previous chapter provide a
broad outline of a conception of ideological social knowledge. My
intention in this chapter is to elaborate on and develop this position
as a hypothetical descriptive schema - an attempt to provide a
representation of social scientific knowledge as it is constituted in
our society as a basis for a fuller understanding of controversies
over public policy issues. Within the framework adopted certain issues
are of particular importance and warrant more detailed attention. My
major concern will be to examine the nature of ideological knowledge
and its relationship with the socio-historical context in which it is
developed and used, and in this examination particular emphasis will be
placed upon the role of a 'practical' requirement to solve problems and
contradictions which arise in society. In this way I hope to be able
to present a conception which embodies a coherent integration of the
issues raised in the previous chapters.
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5.2 Ideological Knowledge and Social Problems
The problem of the relationship between the form of development of
scientific knowledge and the social and historical context in which such
development takes place has long been the focus of the sociology of
knowledge, a field of enquiry that originated in Germany in the 1920s
from the concern to develop scientific historical scholarship (Berger
and Luckmann 1979 p. 16-17). The viability of this field of enquiry
depends essentially upon its ability to discover general causal or
functional relationships between social structures and scientific ideas
and this has been a central concern in the work of such sooial theorists
as Scheler, Marx, Dilthey and Mannheim (ibid. p. 17-23). However, it
has been argued that the sociology of knowledge is characterised more
by controversy over alternative theoretical approaches than by
conclusive evidence of the nature of such relationships:
"Whether we look to Marx, Mannheim, Merton or to any
of the other leading sociological theorists, we are
left in the dark when it comes to the specification
of a general mechanism for explaining the connection
between social situation and ideological commitment in
the scientific or philosophical sphere." (Laudan
1977 p , 219)
Now, it may be that such a critical stance overemphasises the degree to
which it is possible to derive 'conclusive demonstrations' of the
operation of what are likely to be rather subtle and general 'influences',
rather than discrete 'mechanisms'. Nevertheless, the force of the
criticism undoubtledly remains. However, this does not necessarily
imply acceptance of the argument that scientific knowledge is unaffected
by social and political factors as propounded by the positivistic
approaches to the problem. As we have seen, the traditional orthodox
sociological perspective in science argues that scientific knowledge
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provides an objective account of the external world independently of
the social and cultural 'position' of scientists. This is seen as
achieved through the application of socially invariant 'scientific'
norms and values, institutionalised in the form of rules which govern
scientists' behaviour and choice. The values conventionally emphasised
are those of, for example, 'universalism', 'disinterestedness',
'criticism', 'emotional neutrality' and 'humility' and it is argued that
the scientific community is organised in such a way as to ensure that
these values are minimally distorted by pressures of a personal or
social nature (cf. Mulkay 1979).
In previous chapters I have attempted to demonstrate the untenability
of this position and elaborate the implications of the 'neo-Kuhnian'
and 'neo-Weberian' critiques. Thus, Kuhn argued that scientific
values cannot be given and universal but rather must be contingently
variable between scientific communities and over time and must influence
choices, judgements and decisions in complex ways depending on the
social context in which knowledge development takes place (Kuhn 1977
Ch. 13). Kuhn's arguments have therefore pointed the way towards a
conception of social science as an enterprise which is thoroughly
contingent upon institutional, social and political processes. Social
scientists within a research community are influenced by values whose
meaning is established in interpretive fashion with reference to the
prevailing paradigm and to their social and cultural setting. In the
development of knowledge, therefore, judgements concerning, for example,
what constitute important problems and significant solutions emerge
from a social process "... inextricably bound up with the particular
cognitive, evaluative and power political structures of the discipline"
(Schuster 1979 p. 304). We have seen, moreover, that such a perspective
is consistent with an interpretation of Weber's arguments to the effect
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that knowledge of social phenomena is necessarily contingent upon
evaluative frameworks which are related to 'value-conditioned interests'
defined in a particular social context; all social knowledge is
therefore 'morally tinted' arising from a particular social perspective.
However, having arrived at such a position we are still faced with the
problem of specifying the precise way in which the development of social
scientific knowledge in our society is influenced by the particular
social, cultural and political characteristics of that society. If we
are to progress in the development of our conception of ideological
knowledge we must be able to say something about the way in which social
interests and values are embodied in social knowledge and to provide a
possible explanation of the emergence of what we have defined as a
'dominant ideology',
At the most general level it is necessary to conceive of the process of
development of social knowledge not as an isolated mental process taking
place in a realm of pure intellect 'above' the influence of social and
political factors, but rather as a process firmly rooted in human social
activity and in the socially-structured relationships between people
which arise from such activity. More specifically, we can argue that
our knowledge about the world develops primarily through the continuous
attempt to confront and solve problems which arise (and are perceived as
significant) concerning the relationships between a social entity and
its natural environment and between people in different social positions
within that entity. If we conceive of human existence as developing
under the influence of the natural environment, the prevailing level of
technology and the means to produce social wealth, and the prevailing
institutional framework (e.g. the structure of access to 'life
opportunities', the distribution of wealth and power, the existing stoc~
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of knowledge etc) then problems arise, and are perceived, within this
framework of social and material constraints, and with their attempted
solution knowledge about this 'constrained world' develops. That
which becomes encoded as scientific knowledge therefore depends
fundamentally upon the terms in which the 'important' and 'significant'
problems for a society are perceived and defined. Such 'terms' will
vary between different social groups occupying different locations in
the social and institutional structure; different groups with different
interests and values see social problems in different ways. Therefore,
what becomes accepted as viable knowledge is contingent upon the social
perspective from which 'relevant' problems are defined and from which
attempted solutions are derived.
It is apparent, then, from this perspective, that the pace and direction
of social research is heavily conditioned by particular interpretations
and perceptions of what are 'important' problems. Since the
investigation of such problems requires their specification as
'intellectually constructed objects' (cf. Ravetz 1971) their definition
in a particular socio-historical context depends not only on the material
nature of the contradictions which produce them but also, and more
importantly, on existing frameworks of knowledge which provide the
concepts and language for the definition. (Ravetz op. cit. p. 340-1)
argues that:
" the statement of the goal of the problem, as well
as those of the controlling judgements, presupposes
a social and moral philosophy. This may be implicit
and informal, and may seem obvious common sense to its
proponents. But it is an ideology, a universe of
reality and value, which itself is incapable of simple
testing and scientific control..... The work of
investigating and solving the practical problem will
necessarily be done within the framework of that
ideology in whose objects the problem is conceived
and first assessed."
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Now, to the extent that 'conventional' and 'normal' interpretations
and definitions of problems are provided by the dominant 'universe of
reality and value' in society there will arise an in-built tendency
towards the strengthening of such knowledge frameworks through the
process of problem investigation. The ability to 'solve' problems can
be seen as an important factor in the maintenance of the legitimacy of
a particular framework of social knowledge. However, the actual
achievement of solutions is highly problematical; given the essential
nature of practical social problems an 'objective' solution is not
possible. Therefore, it is possible to conceive of 'solutions' as
comprising twc components. Firstly, some progress can be made towards
a circumscribed understanding of the situation, on the basis of cognitive
elements in the knowledge framework, and changes made to the material
conditions which produce the problem as perceived. But this partial
process must be supplemented by a 'rationalisation' of the problem in
order to reduce its perceived threat to society; this can be achieved
by legitimising elements of the situation and by presenting the impression
that the contradiction can be resolved within the knowledge framework
(cf. Ravetz op. cit. p. 397-8). The presentation of social knowledge
as objectively true or at least 'cognitively well-founded' can be seen as
an important means to the achievement of such an impression.
This conception of ideological social knowledge is rather abstract and
generalised and requires 'flashing out' somewhat with reference to a more
practical account of the process of social knowledge development. It
is appropriate, therefore, to look briefly at some aspects of the
evolution of particular bodies of social knowledge in our society. The
examples chosen are sociological and economic theory. Therbmrn (1976),
for example, provides an analysis of the development of sociological
thought in relation to changes in the socio-economic context of
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nineteenth century Europe. He argues that sociology developed during
this period in response to the problem of political reconstruction,
emerging first in France after the Revolution as an expression of a new
awareness of social problems promoted by the changes caused by the
Revolution (ibid. p. 128, 210). Specifically, Saint-Simon and Comte
were concerned with the problem of the transition to a new industrial
society, and Comte in particular promoted the view that modern society
should be studied by the methods of observation and analysis pioneered
in the positive natural sciences (cf. above Chapter 3). Indeed, he is
regarded as the founder of positivist social science, presenting the
'science of society' based on the empirical analysis of what is, and
deserting the earlier philosophical perspectives on what ought to be.
On the basis of such scientific analysis the new 'useful' classes in
society (workers and employers) could exercise political power to achieve
the rational society (ibid. p. 211-5; Rex 1973 p. 9).
In England, where the Bourgeoise Revolution had occurred much earlier,
the nineteenth century was dominated by the process of rapid capitalist
industrialisation and social thought was dominated by the rise of
economics. Consequently, Spencer's sociology was developed within the
framework of classical economics and was based on the work of Adam
Smith and Jeremy Bentham which was concerned to rationalise the capitalist
economic system by identifying progress with the free operation of
market forces and self-seeking behaviour by free and rational
individuals (ibid. p. 91-3). Therborn argues, therefore, that all the
early sociologists displayed a fundamental attachment to the emerging
capitalist society in rationalising its developing problems and defending
it against reactionary feudal forces as well as revolutionary socialist
ones (op. cit. p. 219-24).
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In the late nineteenth century the orientation of British sociology
changed in response to increasing concern with the social problems
caused by the rapid development of capitalist industrialisation which
began to present threats to social stability and to continued capital
accummulation. But the response was in the form of what Therborn
calls an 'Administrative Sociology' based upon empirical investigation
of the social conditions of workers and the poor and framing
recommendations for social policy to improve these conditions. (op.
cit . p , 230). The work of Booth, Rowntree and the Webbs tended to
conceive of the problem in terms of 'maladministration' rather than in
terms of the underlying structure of power and wealth in society; it
did not question the fundamental basis of the society which produced
such problems nor challenge the interests of the dominant classes.
Even Fabian Sociology was, Therborn argues, "•...drenched in the
established assumptions of the prevailing social order" (op. cit. p. 235);
adhering to the basic principles of marginalist economics it represented
"... a theory of economic reconstruction developed in opposition to the
proletarian revolution." (ibid. p. 237).
Consequently, it can be argued that the broad ideological framework of
mainstream sociological thought developed in relation to emerging problems
of capitalist development as they were interpreted and defined from the
perspective of dominant class interests. The work, for example, of the
'social reformers' of late nineteenth century Britain can be seen as
producing solutions to the problems-as-perceived partly on the basis of
legitimations of the prevailing social order (e.g. a 'concerned' State
and reassurance that the problems could and would be alleviated) and
partly on the basis of material changes to the living and working
conditions of the poor deriving from the analytical findings of the
developing sociological knowledge.
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A similar picture emerges from a study of the evolution of economic
thought in Britain as it underwent the process of capitalist economic
development during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the
rise of merchant capitalism in the seventeenth century based upon trade
and commerce there had been a substantial increase in the degree of
government intervention in the economy, particularly in the sphere of
international trade in order to secure profits for trading companies,
increase government revenues and ensure imports of precious metals
(Hunt 1972 p. 15-28). But the changing nature of the economic system
with the development of small-scale industrial capitalism provided the
basis for the emergence of new economic ideologies which came
increasingly into conflict with prevailing modes of thought. The
'Christian Paternalist Ethic' had promoted the idea that the State had
an obligation to promote general welfare and protect the poor and needy
(ibid. p. 28-39). However, the ascendant market capitalist system
was based on individualism and self-seeking behaviour contradicting this
ethic; Protestantism and the new philosophies of 'possessive
individualism', developed, for example, in the theories of Hobbes
and Locke, provided the necessary basis for a new ideology to justify
individualism, profit-seeking and minimum government intervention in
market processes. (ibid; Macpherson 1962).
With the rapid progress of capitalist industrialisation in the late
eighteenth and the nineteenth centutiasa new individualistic world-view
of 'classic liberalism' matured into the dominant ideology of capitalist
society (Macpherson 1972 p. 19-21; Hunt op. cit. p. 41-4). A central
feature of the ideology was provided by Bentham's utilitarianism which
combined the philosophies of individual self-interest with an hedonistic
view of human motivation in a justification of the liberal capitalist
economy on the grounds that it promoted the maximisation of aggregate
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utilities through the market, if the latter was left free from state
interference to determine the allocation of material product amongst
individuals (Macpherson 1972 op. cit.). The economic aspects of this
ideology were further developed by Adam Smith who argued that the pursuit
of individual self-interest in a context of free market competition
would produce the best use of resources and maximise the welfare of
society as a whole. The free market, liberated from 'unnecessary'
government interference, would produce continued social and economic
progress through a mutually reinforcing division of labour which would
increase productivity and profits and promote capital accumulation
(Hunt op. cit. p. 47-50).
The political component of this ideology, concerning the role of the
State in capitalist society, was therefore of fundamental importance.
Considerable attention was focussed on the problem of adapting the
State to the perceived needs of the capitalist economic system.
Smith's arguments, together with those of Thomas Paine, resulted in a
conventional view of government as a 'necessary evil' but this was
translated in practice as a justification for the elimination of
government 'interference' where it obstructed profit-making and
capitalist accumulation, but the retention of 'intervention' where it
promoted such ends. During the nineteenth century, therefore,
'legitimate' government functions related to, for example, fiscal
policy, protection of the country from 'external threat' (commonly
reducing to the protection and extension of foreign markets), the
maintenance of law and order (mainly involving the protection of private
property, the enforcement of labour contracts and the suppression of
workers' revolts and the labour movement), and, finally, the development
of public works and maintenance of institutions necessary to profitable
production and exchange (e.g. stable currency, communications, education)
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(ibid. p. 52-4; Therborn op. cit. p. 84-6).
During the latter part of the nineteenth century the process of
capitalist economic development was characterised by the increasing
scale of production and the increasing concentration of capital and
income in fewer hands. Also, the rapid growth of industry had
resulted in increasing concern about scarcity of raw materials for
future growth. Moreover, with increasing industrial concentration and
concern about poverty and poor living and working conditions, the
strength of workers' movements was growing which led to fears, amongst
bourgeoise and upper classes, of possible conflict, fears which were
exacerbated by the work of Marx and events in Paris in 1870. The
work of 'Classical' economists (e.g. Ricardo) was focussed on the
circumstances and conditions of production and the problem of the
distribution of wealth between social classes thus highlighting the
problems of capitalist development. It was in this context that the
so-called 'marginalist revolution' in economic thought occurred
pioneered mainly by Jevons, Walras and Marshall and members of the
Austrian School (e.g. B8hm - Bawerk) (Dobb 1973 Chapter 7; Meed 1972;
Robinson and Eatwell 1973 Chapter 3).
The main arguments of the neoclassical school concentrated on the
position of the individual and on the process of commodity exchange,
with the theory of relative prices of commodities based on Bentham's
concept of utility. The marginal utility theory of value was based
on mental relations between individuals and commodities rather than
social relations between humans in the production of commodities; the
emphasis upon the capacity of commodities to satisfy the subjective
wants and desires of consumers strengthened the individualist bias of
the dominant ideology of capitalist society (Dobb op. cit. p. 167-8;
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Meek op. cit. p. 90). The theory presented the distribution of income
as an outcome of the market exchange process; as a natural derivative
of a process of exchange which maximised utility and gave everyone what
their contribution was worth. Consequently, the question of the
distribution of wealth and income between social classes was removed
from explicit consideration; such distribution was a product of 'natural
laws' and could not be rationally discussed outside the framework of such
laws (Dobb op. cit. p. 169-72; Macpherson 1972 p. 23). Also the theory
of marginal utility, by showing how 'optimum' allocations of resources
were achieved in free market competitive conditions, provided a
justification for minimum interference of government, strengthening the
tradition deriving from Adam Smith. Finally, by promoting the mechanical
analogy as the appropriate methodology for the new economics Jevons
encouraged a preoccupation with static equilibrium conditions thus
neglecting the process of change and implying the immutability of the
existing nature of capitalist society( Dobb op. cit. p. 172-5).
These tendencies, therefore, strengthened the ideological nature of
economic thought as a response to the emerging problems of capitalist
economic development as they were perceived from an essentially
'bourgeoise' class perspective. Therborn (op. cit.) makes this point
forcefully arguing that the scientific community concerned in the
development of economic thought was firmly rooted in such a perspective;
many economists had business and political careers providing a direct
link between theory and a practical context which inevitably provided
'definitions' of economic experience (ibid. p. 89-92).
concludes that:
Therborn
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"....marginalism, like classical economics, was certainly
the product of a mainly bourgeoise intelligentsia ....
None of the prominent representatives of the new econom!i:c
doctrine was associated with the working class movement.
On the contrary, many were outspoken critics of it, above
all its revolutionary and Marxist tendencies ..•• "
(ibid. p. 93-4).
Of course, this is not to argue that such economists consciously developed
theories to justify the new capitalist order. Rather, it is to suggest
that the developing capitalist economy presented problems which were
interpreted by the intellectual community in accordance with their
class-based experiences and interests and that the process of formulating
theories and hypotheses to solve these perceived problems was inevitably
influenced by evaluative perspectives, the meaning of which gained
their interpretations in relation to 'life-experiences' and world
views derived from a context of relatively wealthy and privileged social
existence in business, political and intellectual circles.
The 'Keynesian Revolution' in economic thought in the 1930s illustrates
a similar overall pattern. Keynes' 'General Theory' emerged as a
response to the severe world economic crisis of the late 1920s and early
1930s but from a perspective which was concerned to make adjustments to
the capitalist system in order to ensure its preservation. Keynes
accepted the general framework provided by the neoclassical theory of
value and distribution which, therefore, heavily influenced his
perception of the problem and the nature of the questions he asked
(Dobb 1973 p. 214-5). Keynes' solution permitted the preservation of
the broad system of capitalist enterprise and was therefore seen as
'legitimate' and 'scientific'. Indeed, its strength lay in the fact
that it could be interpreted as providing benefits to everyone; to
workers through the achievement of full employment; to capitalists
through public investment in 'support infrastructure'; and to
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government through increased legitimation of its activities. It is
notable that other approaches to the problem, such as those of Kalecki
and Hobson, were not seen as legitimate because they were much closer
to a Marxist analysis and, consequently, presented policy implications
which were threatening to the basic structure of the capitalist economic
system (e.g. Hobson proposed equality in the distribution of wealth).
On the other hand, Keynes had a well-known aversion to socialist ideas
(ibid. ).
Having indicated the broad outline of a conception of social knowledge
development in relation to dominant perspectives on the nature of social
problems, it is possible to further elaborate such a conception by
referring to ideas which have developed out of the German historicist
tradition and are expressed in, for example, hermeneutics, the
phenomenologist school, the early perspectives of Marx and the work of
the 'Critical Theorists'. Two sources of such ideas appropriate to
the present discussion are firstly, the work of Berger and Luckmann and
secondly that of JUrgen Habermas.
Berger and Luckmann (1979) analyse the process of development of
conceptions of reality as 'social constructions' and conceive of social
theories as legitimations of particular constructions of reality. They
therefore provide a possible broad problematic as a rationale for the
development of social knowledge. Berger and Luckmann argue that
human activity in any social and cultural context is subject to an
artificial ordering which provides necessary direction and stability
(ibid. p. 65-70). Such 'habitualisation' of activity, which also allows
specialisation, becomes encoded into institutions which essentially
serve to maintain and transmit social order and stability; institutions
control human conduct by channeling it according to pre-defined patterns
203
(i.e. prior to explicit control mechanisms) (ibid. p. 70-73).
However, in order to succeed in this role, institutions must claim
authority for their definitions of society and social conduct; that
is, they must be 'legitimised' in terms of an interpretation of their
'social meaning' which can be maintained as an orthodoxy. Therefore,
legitimation is achieved via social knowledge which embodies 'socially
articulated and shared universes of meaning', presents institutions as
natural entities rather than human constructs, and provides the
framework in terms of which the social world is perceived and constructed
(ibid. p. 79-84):
"What is to be taken for granted as knowledge in the
society comes to be coextensive with the knowable,
or at any rate provides the framework within which
anything not yet known will come to be known in the
future ..•.• knowledge in this sense, is at the heart
of the fundamental dialectic of sOciety.... It
objectifies this world through bnguage and the cognitive
apparatus based on language, that is it orders it into
objects to be apprehended as reality." (ibid. p. 83-4)
Legitimation, then, requires the 'explanation' and the 'justification'
of the institutional order; the provision of "••. a protective cover
of both cognitive and normative interpretation ..." (ibid. p. 79) from
which higher-order integrative meaning can be derived. Berger and
Luckmann emphasise this dual nature of legitimation:
"Legitimation 'explains' the institutional order by
ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated
meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional
order by giving a normative dignity to its practical
imperatives." (ibid. p. 111)
Moreover, the process of legitimation takes place at various different
'levels' and these cognitive and normative components can be seen as
playing different roles at each level. At the highest level there
arise 'symbolic universes' which are defined as "•.bodies of theoretical
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tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass
the institutional order in a symbolic totality ..•" (ibid. p. 113); in
other words these are all-embracing frames of reference or world-views
(in Weberian terms - 'general views of life and the universe') which
integrate subjective experiences within an 'overarching universe of
meaning' or 'put everything in its right place' (ibid p. 113-21).
Since such symbolic universes are rather far removed from the 'pragmatic
sphere of everyday life', they can be seen as comprising a very strong
normative component.
Within the framework of symbolic universes lower levels of legitimation
of the institutional order are achieved by more specific bodies of
theoretical knowledge more directly related to social action and
therefore having a stronger cognitive component (ibid. p. 112-3).
In particular, social scientific knowledge can be seen as playing an
important role in supporting and legitimising higher level symbolic
universes; that is, such knowledge constitutes a 'conceptual machinery
of universe-maintenance', playing an important role in the maintenance
and transmission of institutional and social order (ibid. p. 127-30).
Indeed, modern science is seen as a very advanced form of legitimatory
framework, an "..extreme step .... in the secularisation and sophistication
of universe-maintenance .•." (ibid. p. 130) but nevertheless a framework
which systematises both cognitive and normative components of
legitimation as embodied in the symbolic universe that it serves to
maintain (ibid. p. 127).
The situation is, however, complicated by processes of social
segmentation. The division of labour and production of an economic
surplus permits the development of specialised activities and roles
which in turn results in specialisation and segmentation of knowledge
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in terms of which the segmented institutional order is understood and
legitimised (ibid. p. 89-102; 134-5). Therefore, social segmentation
and structuring produces a problem of "•..socially segregated sub-universes
of meaning ..." (ibid. p. 102) associated with role-specific knowledge.
These 'sub-universes' provide different perspectives on society which
are related to the concrete social interests of the groups which are
their 'carriers' and which produce the meanings in question. Conflict
between such groups is then translated into conflict between rival
'sub-universes' or bodies of knowledge (ibid. p. 102-4). As Berger
and Luckmann state:
"Conflict or competition may exist between such groups. On
the simplest level, there may be conflict over the allocation
of surplus resources to the specialists in question, for
example, over exemption from productive labour .•..• Such
social conflicts are readily translated into conflicts
between rival schools of thought, each seeking to establish
itself and to discredit if not liquidate the competitive
body of knowledge .....• ln advanced industrial societies,
with their immense economic surplus allowing large numbers
of individuals to devote themselves full-time to even the
obscurest pursuits, pluralistic competition between sub-
universes of meaning of every conceivable sort becomes the
normal state of affairs." (ibid. p. 103)
Moreover, because such bodies of knowledge are removed from the 'concrete
experience of everyday life' and comprise important normative components,
conflict between them cannot be settled on an empirical basis; knowledge
is validated by social rather than empirical support; theories are
convincing because they become taken-for-granted:
" there will always be a social-structural base for
competition between rival definitions of reality and ..•
the outcome of the rivalry will be affected, if not
always determined outright, by the development of this
base.", (ibid. p. 137)
Therefore, the validity of a particular definition of social reality
will be decided in terms of its applicability to the social interests
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of the group that is its 'carrier'; groups require solidarity and
bodies of knowledge related to their interests are important in
generating solidarity and promoting those interests in relation to the
wider symbolic universe (ibid. p. 137-42).
Berger and Luckmann's analysis provides a broad framework within which
it is possible to develop our conception of ideological social knowledge.
The broad social problem of the maintenance and transmission of social
order and stability requires the legitimation of the institutional
order via an 'official' definition of 'social and institutional reality'
which must be 'made to stick' (cf. ibid. p. 126). This is partly a
question of power but in modern 'democratic pluralist' societies other
forms of legitimation are important, in particular the acceptance of
certain bodies of knowledge as taken-for-granted or as encompassing the
'truth' about society. Since certain social interests and values come
to be regarded as 'orthodox' and 'conventional' (and, indeed, even taken-
for-granted as self-evident) the definition of reality relating to such
interests and values will become dominant and must be presented as a
'true' definition in order to be 'made to stick'. From this perspective,
therefore, the concealment of the inherently value-conditioned nature
of social scientific knowledge behind a facade of objectivity can be
seen as essential to its power as a conceptual machinery supporting the
maintenance of our dominant symbolic universe or world-view and
therefore legitimating the existing institutional order.
A further perspective on the relationship between the development of our
knowledge about the social world and the problems of human social
existence is provided by the arguments of JUrgen Habermas which were
outlined in Chapter 2 (cf. above p.102-4). To re-cap briefly, Habermas
argues that scientific knowledge is formed within a framework which
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develops through the relationship between human beings and their
natural environment as manifested in the labour process. Human
existence is inherently action-oriented and human behaviour involves a
system of instrumental, feedback-monitored action. Our knowledge of the
world therefore arises to guide our purposive-rational behaviour in a
context of an overall human interest in technical control over our
environment. In advanced industrial society technical control over
nature has reached a high level of sophistication through the knowledge
produced by the positivist 'empirical analytic' sciences and the
administration of human beings has been continually refined through the
positivist social sciences.
Habermas' arguments provide a high-level conception of a broad
problematic which determines the development of ideological social
knowledge, mainly, indeed, in terms of its underlying epistemological or
methodological character rather than the substantive content of its
theoretical systems. The theme is developed by Dreitzel (1972):
"Today the production and distribution of scientific and
scholarly knowledge are institutionalised according to
the functional imperatives of industrialised social
systems. The process of research can no longer be
separated from the utilisation of the products of
research." (ibid. p. 167)
He argues that the social function of social science research is
determined not only by the problem area under study but even more so by
the methodological approach used. Most social science in our society
is .••.
"•.•dedicated to the positivistic program of a unified
behavioural science, a programme which, in the more
refined versions of behaviourism, is methodologically
oriented towards the sciences, and, especially in the
general theory of action, conceptually oriented toward
a bureaucratised society's understanding of rationality."
(ibid. p. 167-8).
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Empirical positivistic research, then, is oriented towards the
production of social techniques in relation to vested interests'
perceptions of the problems of 'exploitation of the labor force' and
'the maintenance of mass loyalty'. Knowledge produced by the theories
of action functions as an ideology which contributes to "....establishing
and maintaining the technocratic consciousness of the educated middle
classes ..." by obscuring relations of production and their historical
context (ibid. p. 168-9).
This line of argument is also pursued by Fay (1975). The progress and
cultural support of science in modern industrial society is linked to
the problem of ensuring the continued expansion in the forces of
production and extending the administration of all facets of social
life (ibid. p. 44-6):
lilt is thus no accident that a positivist conception of
social science which was tied to an engineering notion
of theory and practice gained credence as industrial
society developed, for it was just such a conception
which this society required for its continued existence.
The idea of a positivist social science emerging into a
policy science is to advanced industrial society what
liberal economic theory was to the early forms of
laissez-faire capitalism. A positivist social science,
technical control, and industrialism: these are mutually
reinforcing features of modern social age." (ibid. p. 47)
Of course, such arguments face the danger of succumbing to a form of
functionalism which is not particularly enlightening as a means to
understanding the relationship between scientific knowledge and its
socio-historical context. Although it is difficult to derive any
'firm evidence' as to the nature of the determinants or influences at
work in this relationship the adoption of a functionalist approach can
often be an 'easy option' which circumscribes our ability to develop
our understanding of social systems. Nevertheless, there do appear to
be reasonable grounds for relating the development, in particular, of
'mainstream' conceptions of social scientific knowledge to the
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attempted solution of problems which arise in the course of social
development within an interpretive framework established in relation to
the social experiences and interests of dominant classes and groups.
In order, therefore, to provide a basis for a conception of the current
nature of 'orthodox' ideological social knowledge, or of a 'dominant
ideology', it is necessary to examine in rather more detail the
characteristics of the 'problem-interpretations' which can be seen as
predominantly influencing the process of social knowledge production in
advanced capitalist society.
Here we must move towards an analysis of the power political correlates
of the process of knowledge production and begin to examine the role of
the institutions of the state in this process. The decisions and
judgements made by social scientists concerning 'relevant' and
'important' problems to be investigated in research and the appropriate
methodological approach to such investigations are made within the
framework of existing paradigms and subject to the influence of the
institutions of the state which have an impact on the determination of
research priorities. Research within an 'orthodox paradigm' will tend
to be self-perpetuating with problem-perception and choice of methodology
influencing the nature of the resulting additions to the conceptual
framework of the paradigm. The existence of an 'orthodox paradigm'
within a wider dominant ideology tends to ensure continued concern with
problems defined and interpreted in an 'orthodox' way. External control
of the process derives primarily from institutions of the State which
provide 'official' interpretations of what are priority problem areas and
which control the allocation of research funding. Social interests and
values can be seen as underlying the whole process being reflected both
in the institutional forms of the state and in the interpretations,
judgements and decisions which are embodied in the process of social
knowledge production.
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Moreover, in a general sense much social scientific knowledge is
concerned with areas of state activity in society, for example,
management of the economy, the maintenance of health, social welfare
and law and order, the provision of education etc. Consequently, the
development of such knowledge is closely related to the needs of the
State to carry out its 'necessary functions' and we need a theory of
the role of the state in capitalist society in order to understand the
rationale of the process of production of social scientific knowledge.
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5.3 Social Problems and the State
As a starting point in the analysis of the State it is perhaps useful
to consider critically the theoretical positions which derive from
the Marxist tradition. Indeed, within this tradition there are quite
substantial differences between various theoretical approaches to the
relationship between the capitalist state and society. However, the
different views tend to be unified through a common concern with specific
modes of production, their conditions of existence and their effects
on social formations (Jessop 1977 p. 369). The primary orientation of
the Marxist approach is towards an analysis of the role of the State in
relation to the economic system - particularly in relation to the process
of capital accumulation. Marx himself did not provide a specific,
rigorous theoretical analysis of the capitalist state emphasising
instead the ability of the capitalist economy to regulate itself without
state intervention, and to generate spontaneously a particular form of
economic development (Rowthorn 1977 p. 327). However, Marx conceived
of this self-regulation not as an harmonious process (as presented in
neo-classical economic theory) but rather as a very irregular succession
of economic booms and crises. It is appropriate, therefore, to
initially briefly outline the theory relating to the nature and causes
of economic crises in the capitalist economy.
Basically, the capitalist economic system is seen to proceed through
capital accumulation - through the accumulation of surplus value
extracted from labour - which is, in turn, used to reproduce, extend
and develop capitalist production (Grahl 1979Ap. 76). However, the
profitable investment of accumulated capital is limited, on the one
hand, by the growth in the market for consumers' gpods (i.e. in
workers' wages) and, on the other, by the growth in the availability of
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exploitable labour power, both relative to the growth in production
capacity (ibid. p. 77-8). Both of these factors, it is argued, tend to
squeeze the rate of profit which leads to a relative over-accumulation
of capital since surplus cannot be invested without reduction in the
rate of profit. As expansion slackens, therefore, industries producing
investment goods can no longer sell their products and a crisis occurs
(ibid; Rowthorn op. cit. p. 328).
Two main types of processes then operate in the resulting crisis to
restore the rate of profit and re-establish the necessary conditions
for profitable expansion. The first type of process acts directly to
increase profits at the expense of wages (i.e. increasing absolute
surplus value) and is manifested particularly in unemployment. The
second type of process operates to devalue large fractions of obsolete
capital equipment in order to prepare the way for substantial increases
in labour productivity(Le. increasing relative surplus value) (Grahl
op. cit. p. 78-9; Rowthorn op. cit. p. 328; Harris 1977 p. 119).
Economic crises are therefore seen as both the product of contradictions
within the capitalist mode of production, and also the basic means by
which they are temporarily and partially overcome; they are therefore
seen as intrinsic and necessary to capitalism:
"In terms of the basic categories of historical materialism,
crises are an expression of the growing contradictions of
the capitalist mode of production, between its increasingly
obsolete production relations, based on private control,
and the increasingly social productive forces that develop
within it. Crises are both the concrete result of these
contradictions and the basic means by which they are
temporarily and partially overcome. Crises thus bring
about an adaptation of capitalist production relations to
a given level of development of production."
(Grahl op. cit. p. 75).
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As capitalism has developed, however, it has become increasingly clear
that it cannot be a self-regulatory system and this is manifested in
increasing intervention by the State in the process of capital
accumulation and in the management of economic crises. Yet only
relatively recently have Marxist theorists begun to confront the question
of the different forms of the capitalist state and their adequacy to
continued capital accumulation in different situations. In general
terms, the traditional Marxist view of the capitalist state is to see
it essentially as the coercive instrument of the ruling classes. Since
the capitalist class holds the dominant power in capitalist society, it
exercises that power to maintain the social and political institutions
which function in its favour; consequently, the state basically operates
in the interests of the dominant class (cf. Miliabnd 1973 p. 7; Edwards
and MacEwan 1971 p. 19-20; Dear and Clark 1978 p. 176-7). This
traditional view is reflected, for example" in the current theories
of the 'State Monopoly Capitalist' school which emphasises state
intervention in the workings of the modern capitalist economy on behalf
of monopoly capital to maintain the dynamics of capital accumulation
and offset the tendency towards a falling rate of profit. The state
is therefore seen essentially as an instrument of the dominant monopolies,
reflected in the class background and class affiliation of the personnel
of the state, the formulation and implementation of state policy, and
the dominance of monopoly capital in, for example, the education system
and mass media (CPGB 1978 p. 6-10; Jessop op. cit. p.360-1).
However, such a conception is really rather too simplistic failing, in
Miliband's words, to confront .....the concrete socioeconomic and
political and cultural reality of actual capitalist societies .•."
(op. cit. p. 8) . Now, although one can argue with the use of 'reality'
as a standard for criticism, the limits of this approach are indicated
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simply in an inability to explain how the state can remain an instrument
of class rule when the dominant class patently has no immediate control
over it. In an attempt to overcome such problems the theory of the
capitalist state has been more recently advanced, particularly by
Poulantzas within the French structuralist school based on the
Althusserian brand of Marxism. Poulantzas' arguments are highly
abstract and complex but I shall attempt a brief outline.
Basically, Poulantzas (1975A, 1975B) is primarily concerned to refute
the view of the 'state monopoly capitalist' school of the state as an
instrument of monopoly capital. The capitalist state, he argues,
cannot be seen as a passive tool in the hands of any class or fraction;
rather, it is a complex 'social relation' or , more specifically, a
condensation of class power relations. Social classes should not be
seen simply as economic forces existing outside and independently of
the state and capable of manipulating it since their political influence
partly depends on the institutional structure of the state and on the
effects of state power. The state apparatuses do not possess 'power'
of their own but reflect and concentrate class relations while at the
same time playing a constitutive role in the class struggle. The
state represents the political interests of the dominant class 'power
bloc', constituting their political power centre and the organising
agent of their political struggle. But the relationship between the
state and this 'power bloc' is not one of identification or
manipulation;the state maintains a 'relative autonomy' in relation to
the dominant classes (op. cit. 1975A p. 190-3; 1975B p. 26, 157-61).
The fundamental functions of the state, therefore, are seen by
Poulantzas to relate to the field of the political class struggle.
Specifically, the state has the function of maintaining 'social
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cohesion' - maintaining order and unity in the social formation
within which contradictions condense into political class domination.
The state plays the role of political unifier of the dominant power
bloc concentrating and sanctioning its hegemony and therefore
reproducing social class relations. Within this global political role
of social reproduction, economic and ideological functions play
important parts. The economic function may be dominant in certain
capitalist social formations involving the management of economic crises
and the promotion of capital accumulation as the major problematic in
the reproduction of capitalist social relations (op. cit. 1975A
p. 44-55; 19758 p. 27-34, 165-72). Finally, social cohesion through
political domination requires a dominant ideology which attempts to
impose a 'way of life' on society through which the state can be
experienced as representing society's 'general interest', as a neutral
instance representing the interests of all equal and free individuals,
thus concealing the nature of political power embodied in the state
(op. cit. 1975A p. 188-9, 214-6; 19758 p. 173).
Apart from problems of dogmatism and scholastic obscurity, perhaps
the major criticism of Poulantzas' approach relates 00 its
functionalism. Rejectina the notion that the state is under the
direct control of capitalists and dismissing the 'historicist'
(Lukacsian) school of Marxism, the formulation must rely on a
functionalist account: the state is capitalist because that is the
nature of the society in which it exists. Such an account is not
helpful in explaining how political actors are forced to act in a
way compatible with the general interests of the dominant classes;
nor can it easily accommodate the view of the state as a system of
political domination the institutional form of which may be more or
less adequate to securing the various requirements of capital
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accumulation in different situations (Crouch 1979 p. 26; Jessop op. cit).
A further problem resides in the treatment of the State's response to
non-capitalist interests: if the state is functional to the maintenance
of capitalism and representative of the interests of the dominant classes
it cannot respond positively to the demands of subordinate classes
(Crouch op. cit. p. 27-8). Indeed, Poulantzas argues that concessions
can be made to dominated classes but these never threaten the political
hegemony of the dominant classes and may even be aimed at increasing
the political disorganisation of the subordinate classes (Poulantzas
1975A p , 190-3). As Crouch (op. cit. p. 28-9) well argues:
"It is almost as though, having admitted the idea of the
relative autonomy of the State, a structuralist theory
has to move quickly to close the loophole to elements of
pluralism which this might imply by pitching the theory
at such an abstract, rigid level that all questions of
the respective positions of labour and capital are
resolved in the initial formulation and not left open
to any modification by actual behaviour."
More generally, the structuralist account implies that the capitalist
system necessarily functions in a self-preserving fashion - it is a
system of structures which becomes totally unalterable. Social change
can therefore only occur by thorough-going revolution. This leads to
fatalism and a total neglect of processes by which change can, and
does occur:
"Structuralism, therefore, leads to either a passive
acceptance of the status quo or an anarchist
condemnation of its entirety. Neither position is
very helpful in changing it." (Wolfe 1974 p. 140).
An alternative approach to the analysis of the capitalist state within
the Marxist tradition is provided by Miliband (1973, 1977). In his
initial work Miliband was primarily concerned to provide a critique of
'democratic-pluralist' theory and an empirically-oriented analysis of
the class character of the institutions of the State. This drew
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considerable criticism from Poulantzas, on the grounds of its
a-theoretical and 'bourgeoise' nature, and a long controversy developed
resulting in some concessions to the structuralist approach in Miliband's
later work. He is essentially concerned to demonstrate, firstly, the
existence of an economically dominant class and, secondly, the ways in
which it wields decisive economic power (op. cit. 1973 p. 23). He
develops his argument for domination of the State by the capitalist
classes in terms of three main features. Firstly, control of the
central institutions of the state system is in the hands of interrelated
elites with common social backgrounds:
"(In) terms of social origin, education and class situation,
the men who have manned all command positions in the
state system have largely, and in many cases overwhelmingly,
been drawn from the world of business and property or
from the professional middle classes." (ibid. p. 61).
Secondly, within the state system governments are committed to the
maintenance of "...the existing economic and social system of private
ownership and private appropriation ..•" (ibid. p. 64) which limits their
policies and actions and produces a bias in favour of capitalist
interests (ibid. chap. 4). Moreover, other institutions in the state
system (e.g. bureaucracy, military, judiciary) are similarly committed
to the "•..maintenance and defence of the structure of power and
privilege inherent in advanced capitalism." (ibid. p. 115-6; chap. 5).
Thirdly, a process of legitimation of class rule ensures the 'political
socialisation' or indoctrination of subordinate classes to accept the
existing social order and to confine their demands and aspirations
within its limits (ibid. p. 159-61). Miliband adopts Gramsci's
concept of 'hegemony' denoting the establishment by the dominant
classes of an ideoloqical discourse which provides 'conventional'
interpretations of social existence thus leqitimisinq the existinq
social order (ibid. chaps. 7-8).
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In his later work (1977) Miliband made some concessions to Poulantzas
in the form of a qreater emphasis on the "...structural constraints
imposed bv the mode of production .." (ibid. p. 74) and on the
'relative autonomy' of the state from sections of the dominant classes
which is seen as essential to the performance of its role in relation
to the general interests of the dominant classes as a whole (ibid.
p. 87). This has overcome some of the criticisms of his earlier work
to the effect that it reproduces the 'liberal' tendency to neglect the
relationship between the form and content of political institutions
and underlying economic forces and that it leans towards the
traditional instrumentalist problematic of the state as a tool of the
ruling class (Jessop op. cit. p. 357; Dear and Clark 1978 p. 179).
But an advantage of Miliband's analysis is its ability to accommodate
challenges to the authority of the dominant classes and advances by
subordinate classes in terms of their perceptions of their interests.
Jessop (op. cit.) has argued that a more adequate theory of the
capitalist state, particularly as regards its role in capital
accumulation, can be derived by integrating three stands in neo-Marxist
thought in order to overcome the excessive rigidity of deterministic
'structural-functional:~m' and to be able to accommodate change
initiated by non-capitalist forces. In this way we can arrive,
Jessop argues, at a conception of the state as ".•.a system of
political domination, whose forms may be more or less adequate to
securing the various requirements of capital accumulation in different
situations. " (ibid. p. 361).
The first strand is provided by the 'capital logic school' which sees
the state as necessarily separated from civil society because an
institution which is not immediately subordinate to market forces is
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required to provide the general preconditions of capital accumulation
which particular competing capitals cannot secure. The state is
therefore an 'ideal collective capitalist', a distinct political
institution corresponding to the common needs of capital. The state
then intervenes in the process of capital accumulation to mobilise
counter-tendencies to the falling rate of profit to attempt to avert
crises by, for example, the restructuring of capital and the reorganisation
of the labour process. (ibid. p. 361-4).
Secondly, attempts have been made to introduce more historical specificity
and greater awareness of the role of the class struggle into the study
of the capitalist state. It is argued that the state must be
understood in terms of its changing functions in the class struggle over
the organisation of the labour process and the appropriation of surplus
value and not simply in relation to the needs and interests of capital
in isolation from its antagonistic relationship with labour. State
intervention to mobilise the counter-tendencies to the falling rate of
profit must therefore be seen in the context of the changing character
of the class struggle over time (i.e. the changing nature of the
domination of capital over the labour process), with the form of the
state apparatus changing also so as to be suited to the task of
reorganising social relations in favour of aanital accumulation (ibid.
p. 364-6).
Thirdly, the above analyses, which emphasise the structural constraints
on the state deriving from the capitalist mode of production, can be
supplemented by the 'neo-Gramscian' perspective which places more
emphasis on political and ideological domination. Broadly, this
approach sees the state not simply as an instrument manipulated by a
unitary bourgeoise class, but rather as playing a vital role in
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organising the unity,and political and ideological hegemony, as a
fractioned dominant 'power bloc' (while at the same time disorganising
the dominated classes) in order to secure the necessary conditions for
capital accumulation. The ability of a power bloc of dominant classes
to maintain its hegemony is seen as depending upon its commitment to a
common ideology, and also on its ability to articulate opposition from
dominated classes into that dominant ideology in order to deflect it
from revolutionary tendencies (ibid. p. 367-9).
Therefore, the theory of the capitalist state has progressed beyond
the 'orthodox' Marxist approaches in terms of the state as a 'thing'
or subject external to the capitalist mode of production. Jessop
argues that the state must be conceived of as a system of political
domination, playing an essential role in securing the historic
preconditions for the capitalist social organisation of production; the
state and state power must assume a central role in the process of
capital accumulation. It is not a case of the way in which the dominant
capitalist classes actively and internally use state power to defend
and promote the capitalist system but rather a question of seeing state
power as an institutional manifestation of the class struggle (i.e. as
a particular field of conflict between different class interests), and
as an essential element in the reproduction of capitalist social
relations. The state institutions and apparatuses are, therefore,
not neutral acting in the interests of 'society as a whole', but
integrated into the movement of capital, and they will change as
capitalism changes and develops. Hence, the success of state
intervention in securing the conditions for capital accumulation,
managing crises and solving perceived problems will depend upon the
balance of political forces in various class and popular democratic
struggles and failure of policy measures can be analysed in terms of
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the balance of such forces, the adequacy of forms of political
representation and the structure of the state apparatuses and the
nature of the perception and analysis of the problem (ibid. p. 369-71).
Such an approach, then, provides useful elements for a conception of
the rationale for the development of social scientific knowledge in our
society. The central point which can be extracted from the 'Marxist'
account is the essential dual role performed by the state involving,
firstly, the promotion of the conditions for capital accumulation and,
secondly, the legitimation of its activities in this respect. More
generally, this can be seen within the context of a broader role of
maintaining the stability of the capitalist system on the basis of a
contradictory process of expropriation of power from the people on the
one hand and its re-imposition upon them, in the form of an 'objective'
consciousness on the other (cf. Crouch op. cit.; Wolfe op. cit).
The primary means to the maintenance of social stability in liberal
democratic capitalist societies is through economic prosperity; the
major preoccupation of the state, therefore, is with securing the
interests of the existing mode of production viz. managing the economy
in the interests of capital accumulation (Crouch op. cit. p. 40). But
also important are means to ensure the maintenance of existing structures
of political power involving, for example, legal frameworks and their
imposition by the institutions of 'law and order'. Finally, a dominant
ideological discourse, and the means to propagate it, are essential to
the legitimation of the state as a 'universal' institution pursuing the
'common interest' of society as a whole and to the manipulation of
consciousness so as to achieve a broad consent in the basic structure
of capitalist society (cf. Wolfe op. cit. p. 156-9).
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At this point, then, we can relate the discussion back to the framework
provided by the consideration of the work of Berger and Luckman and
Habermas (cf. above p.202-8) and summarise some common elements in a
conception of the broad 'problematic' in relation to which social
knowledge is developed in our society. Firstly, there is an emphasis
on the maintenance and transmission of social order and stability and
of the means to achieve social control. Such control and stability is
maintained through the development of an institutional structure which
arises out of and embodies (and in turn reinfores) the pattern of
segmentation and structuring of relationships between different groups
in society. Within this institutional structure, the institutions of
the state have achieved a predominant position and require legitimation
in order to claim the authority required to achieve order and stability.
Legitimation is achieved through a system of social knowledge and
language within which broad 'world views' provide people with
interpretations of the 'meaning' of institutions and society; more
specifically, bodies of knowledge are produced which are 'taken-for-
granted' and can command authority (for example, as 'the truth') in
presenting institutions as 'natural' (even as 'supra-human' entities)
and as existing to serve the interests of all people in society.
However, we can take the conception further with reference to the work
of Claus Offe (1975, 1976). Offe attempts to move beyond the
traditional Marxist formulations of political authority based on
structurally privileged interests of the dominant classes while still
accommodating the 'authoritarian' nature of the organisation of political
power in an advanced capitalist society. He argues, specifically, that
the role of the state in such a society can be understood with reference
to an 'objective imperative' for the management of three fundamental
system problems which is vital to the survival of the capitalist system
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as a whole and to the maintenance of its stability (op. cit. 1976
p. 412-3).
The first set of problems have to do with economic stability and include,
for example, the maintenance of balanced economic growth and full
employment, the provision of investment incentives etc; these
basically refer to the political mediation of capital accumulation which
has a key role in maintaining the stability of the system (ibid. p. 413).
Since capitalism is neither self-regulating nor self-sufficient the
state must create and sustain the conditions for capital accumulation and
its decision-making power depends, in turn, upon the continuity of the
accumulation process and, for example, the taxation revenues based upon
it (op. cit. 1975 p. 126).
A second class of problems relates to foreign policy, trade and military
policy which are again important to social stability (op. cit. 1976 p.
413) • And, thirdly, there are problems concerned with ensuring 'mass
loyalty' or 'legitimation' involving the control of conflict between
interest groups and the maintenance of "... apathetic conformity to the
agencies of the political system •.." (ibid. p. 414). This requires an
ideology to identify the measures required for capital accumulation
with the pursuit of the 'national interest'; Cffe argues that:-
" only if (and only as long as) the capitalist state
manages, through a variety of institutional mechanisms,
to convey the image of an organisation of power that
pursues the cornmon and general interests of society as
a whole, allows equal access to power and is responsive
to justified demands, (can) the state ... function in its
specific relationship to accumulation." (op. cit. 1975
p. 127)
Cffe therefore derives a 'model of rational administration' involving
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.....cautious crisis management and long-term avoidance strategy .....
(op. cit. 1976 p. 415); priority will be accorded to problem areas in
proportion to their perceived importance to stability and to social
needs in proportion to their potential contribution to the maintenance
of a risk-free situation (ibid. p. 416). As the capitalist state is
increasingly forced to become itself involved directly in the
production system as well as to provide the general social conditions
for accumulation, so the process of policy formulation becomes
increasingly concerned with responding to perceived problems. In such
a context, Offe argues, decisions cannot be made solely on the basis
of overt class or group interests in the political system; rather, new
formal procedures are required to balance the functions of the state
with its internal structure (op. cit. 1975 p. 128-34). The main
result has been the growth of the process and techniques of 'rational
planning' as a 'formal' construct. However, underlying contradictions
remain between the functions of the state and its internal structure
due to conflicts of interests between different classes and groups which
produce conflicts over the goals and side-effects of the state's
productive activities (ibid. p. 134-44). As Habermas (1976B p. 375)
argues, the state then faces a 'crisis of rationality' to the extent
that its policy outputs fail to solve the problems of control taken
over from the economic system.
Offe and Habermas develop further the theme of the essentially
contradictory nature of the role of the state and the implications of
this for the model of 'rational administration'. In addition to the
'crisis of rationality' arising from the state's extension of its
productive activities and formal planning procedures, such an
extension also exacerbates the problem of legitimation. Thus, as
the state exten4s its activities and areas of life previously assigned
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to the private, 'market' sphere are 'politicised' and subject to practical
discussion and planning, so the burden of legitimation increases (Habermas
1976B p. 375-8). This produces strains upon the dominant legitimising
frameworks of knowledge due to the growing discrepancy between the need
for motives and meanings announced by such frameworks on the one hand,
and the motivation actually offered by the capitalist social and
economic system on the other (cf. ibid p. 379-83).
The problem of legitimation is further aggravated, Offe argues, by the
disparities which arise from the 'priorities of rational administration'
for the capitalist state. Concern by the state for the priority
problems of stability through capital accumulation, management of
effective demand, maintenance of foreign trade relations, avoidance of
military crisis and prevention of domestic conflict, will result in
certain other social needs (e.g. social welfare and support) being
afforded peripheral importance (Offe 1976 p. 416-7). However, such
disparities require further legitimation and aggravate the difficulties
for legitimising frameworks of knowledge which present the state as
an institution which embodies the 'general interest' of the population.
As Habermas (1976B p. 379) argues:
"Even if the state apparatus were to succeed in increasing
the productivity of labour and in dividing the profits of
productivity in such a way that economic growth free from
crisis if not from disturbance were assured, this growth
would come about in accordance with priorities whose
development is not dependent on the generalizable interest
of the population. The pattern of priorities which
Galbraith has analysed under the heading of 'private wealth
v public property' results from a class structure however
much that class structure may be rendered latent."
Moreover, problems of maintaininq the legitimacy and authority of the
state can be seen as reacting back on the 'crisis of rationality'.
For example, in order to ensure continued loyalty and support the
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state cannot permit 'public poverty' to become sufficiently
problematical as to promote opposition and protest which might pose a
threat to the stability of the system. Consequently, public
expenditure must be allocated to such needs (for example, in the form
of welfare payments and public housing) and such expenditure is boosted
by such political pressure as can be brought to bear by representatives
of the classes and groups concerned. However, the need for such
expenditure then exacerbates the 'fiscal problem' which arises with
growing state participation in rationalising the productive activities
of the capitalist economic system.
Within such a conception, then, social knowledge can be seen as having
to bear a dual burden. On the one hand it must provide a basis for
the rationalising activities of the state in relation to the problem of
the maintenance of stability and order through analyses of economic,
political and social processes upon which action can be based. On the
other hand, it must contribute to the legitimation of the existing
institutional order by providing a 'form of consciousness' through
which the system is perceived as a natural, historical necessity,
providing for all social needs according to just and proper principles
of individual achievement and responding to all interests freely and
equally expressed. These elements interact in a complex way and,
indeed, are unlikely to be seperable into discrete components; for
example, the 'solution' of a particular social problem will, as
argued earlier, involve both 'rational' and 'legitimatory' (or, in
Berger and Luckman's terms 'cognitive' and 'normative') components
which operate through the states of perception, analysis, decision
and action to produce material changes in the particular system of
interest and to legitimise the problematical situation. The
presentation of social knowledge as objective and independent of
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of normative foundation disguises its legitimatory component and
therefore provides the authority which such knowledge requires for the
achievement of legitimation under the banner of 'rational scientific
analysis' .
5.4 Conclusion
It is now appropriate to summarise the discussion as it has developed
in this chapter. The central concern has been with developing our
conception of social knowledge as a necessarily value-contingent
phenomenon, in terms of the nature of its relationship with characteristics
of the social, cultural and political context with a view to better
understanding the way in which social knowledge develops upon a
particular normative foundation. The discussion has focussed upon a
view of the development of social knowledge in relation to the need to
confronlandsolve problems which continuously arise concerning social
relationships. Such problems are perceived and tackled within a
particular institutional and social framework which constitutes a
'constrained world' and different world-views arise from different
locations within this framework. Such locations are defined in terms
of social values and interests which provide the essential normative
bases for cognitive structures. That which is accepted as viable and
relevant knowledge can be seen as contingent upon the normative basis
upon which 'relevant' and 'significant' problems are defined and
attempted solutions derived.
Consequently, it can be aruged that particular interpretations of the
meaning of the social world and its problems condition the process of
development of knowledge about that world. Such interpretations,
constituting 'universes of reality and value' are reinforced by the
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problem-solving process which involves a complex interaction of
'rational-cognitive' and 'normative-legitimatory' components.
'Conventional' or 'orthodox' interpretations of social meaning become
taken-for-granted definitions of social and institutional reality which
serve to legitimse the institutional order and therefore contribute to
the solution of the broad problem of the maintenance and transmission of
social order, stability and control. Such dominant schools of thought
about the social world, although underlain by particular evaluative
frameworks and embodying particular normative presuppositions, must be
presented as 'above' all such partisan normative influences in order to
retain their power as conceptual machineries legitimising the existing
institutional order.
In advanced industrial societies the institutions of the state have
become particularly important within the wider institutional structure
and it can be argued that the process of social knowledge development has
become closely tied to the functions and requirements of the state. In
broad terms, the state in advanced capitalist societies can be seen as
primarily concerned to maintain social order and stability through
promoting the conditions for continued long-term capital accumulation,
through maintaining the stability of foreign relations, through
maintaining institutions of social control, and through securing the
conditions for the hegemony of a particular 'universe of meanings' or
framework of social knowledge which legitimises the institutional order
and therefore serves to secure mass loyalty to the system. As concern
with these problems has led the state to expand its sphere of activity
in the capitalist democracies there has been an increasing requirement
for the development of 'formal procedures' of planning and allocation
overlaying the realm of power political conflict. This can be seen as
having increased the burden on the state in respect of its problem of
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maintaining the legitimacy of the institutional order and also as having
placed greater demands upon the processes of social knowledge production
for knowledge which is widely accepted as constituting a firm, 'rational'
foundation for action by the state in the 'formal realm'.
Therefore, as the role of the state in advanced capitalist society has
expanded so the development of social knowledge can be seen as having
become increasingly tied to Offe's broad problematic of 'cautious crisis
management and long-term avoidance strategy'. In many subject areas
'applied studies' have increasingly dominated the development of the
field as a whole; this is shown particularly strongly in neo-classical
economics in which attention has focussed progressively more on
econometric modelling in a macro-economic context as a basis for
economic planning. The field of planning studies as such has
burgeoned, becoming increasingly the focus for applied studies in the
fields of, for example, economics, politics, sociology and geography.
These developments, then, have substantially increased the burden on
social scientific knowledge in terms of the requirement for both
'rationality' and 'legitimation'. Against this background it is
possible to develop an interpretation of the ideological implications of
recent trends in the nature of such knowledge and in views relating to
its usage in the political-administrative process. Two trends are
perhaps of particular significance. Firstly, as argued in earlier
chapters, the last two decades have been characterised by the growth of
quantitative modelling and techniques of analysis in the social sciences,
within the positivist epistemological tradition, and in emulation of
the 'respectability' of the natural empirical sciences; such techniques
are conventionally interpreted as increasing the 'scientific quality'
of social science and consequently its reliability as a basis for
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action. Secondly, concomitant with these trends, there has been an
increase in faith in the results of science as a guide to political
action and in the opinions of 'scientific experts' relative to those
of 'ordinary citizens'. More generally, with the growing intervention
of the state and the development of rational administration politics
has become increasingly governed by " technically interpreted
avoidance imperatives ..." at the expense of "...guidelines for action
based on a consensus." (Offe 1976 p. 419). Rules guiding
administrative actions are, therefore, non-practical, 'technical
preventive' rules which are seen as derivable from science. But the
legitimacy of such a model of politics depends upon the assumption that
political outcomes from such a process are in the interests of society
as a whole and somehow 'better' than those which would arise from the
traditional exercise of political power. As Offe (ibid p. 419-20)
argues:
"Unconditional technocratic rationality can only flourish
in the shadow of ideological postulates ••.•• it is the
task of the ideology planners' to produce this
rationality."
The result can be seen as a 'technocratic ideology' which legitimises
modern politics in terms of a rationality based upon the guidance of
objective knowledge dispensed by impartial experts. This is now an
important component in the dominant framework of ideological knowledge
in our society, a development from theoretical frameworks which have
traditionally provided the basis for social guidance and legitimation.
Since its themes can be expected to exert an important influence upon
the consideration of public policy issues the next chapter will be
concerned to elaborate a conception of this 'dominant ideology' as it
relates to the state and the problem of public policy formulation.
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Chapter 6: Normative Themes of a Dominant Technocratic Ideology
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that the development of social know-
ledge has become closely tied to the requirements of the state to
achieve and maintain social order and stability and has been parti-
cularly influenced by the greater involvement of the state in the
economic sphere and in social life in general. The policy activities
of the state, and the institutional forms through which they are mani-
fested, are influenced by the balance of social forces in the complex
structures of social relationships and with the emergence of modern
procedures of 'rational administration' and planning, interpretations
v.hichrely solely on the class dimension of political power would
appear to have been rendered rather too simplistic. Through such
institutionalized procedures the realm of political power, based on
conflicts between various class and interest groups, can be seen as
overlain by a 'technical'process based on a rationality derived
primarily from the realm of knowledge. The nature of policy outputs
can therefore be seen as increasingly mediated through this 'technical
domain' and an understanding of the nature of the 'rationality' of
social knowledge and its use in this domain has consequently become
of considerable importance. I have argued that the process of pro-
duction of social knowledge in our society is such that a dominant
framework of ideological knowledge arises which serves both to inform
the problem-solving activities of the state and to legitimise those
activities and the wider institutional structure. As the nature of
the state has evolved so too has the nature of the 'dominant ideology',
now refering more to the 'technical domain' of the state's activities
while power political aspects have tended to become more submerged.
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This ideology is, therefore, increasingly 'technocratic' - increasingly
concerned with the application of knowledge to social guidance in
technical administration.
The concept of ideological hegemony has been defined as ...
" an order in which a certain way of life and thought is
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused through-
out society in all its institutional and private manifestations,
informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs,
religious and political principles, and all social relations,
particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations."
(quoted in Miliband 1973 p. 162).
Within such a comprehensive order it is possible to define the main
ideological features relating to the problematic of the state and
public policy formulation; it is this more limited definition to
which I shall refer when using the term 'dominant ideology'. Such
a sub-ideology' (or 'practical ideology') can be conceived in terms of
three primary conceptual components or attributes: firstly, a conception
of the process of production or development of knowledge; secondly, a
conception of the substantive nature or content of the social world;
and, thirdly, a conception of knowledge utilization i.e. the way in which
knowledge is to be applied in informing human practical action. These
components should be seen as interrelated and mutually reinforcing in
relation to the role of informing and legitimising the activities of the
state; for example, the nature of the theoretical content depends upon
the process of development, and the conception of utilization necessarily
embodies a model of development and, in turn, plays a part in justifying
such a model. This chapter will therefore be concerned to examine the
nature of these components as they are manifested in the dominant ideology
of our society in relation to the consideration of public policy issues
with a view, in particular, to identifying the underlying normative
commitments of this framework of knowledge.
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6.2 A Conception of Knowledge Development
This fundamental component, which determines the broad outline
character of the dominant ideology, is provided by the positivist
epistemology which underpins the development of orthodox social science.
The major elements of this epistemological position were critically
analysed in chapters 2-3; here the focus is on their ideological
implications. The main tenets of the positivist account are, once
again, firstly, that scientific knowledge must be based upon facts-as
experienced, secondly, that value judgements and normative statements
cannot be scientific because there is no empirical basis for testing
their validity, and, thirdly, that social science must proceed by
way of the methods of the empirical natural sciences in order to achieve
'objective knowledge'.
The positivist conception, then, is founded upon an acceptance of
empirical facts as they present themselves to experience and is con-
cerned with the construction of abstract, formal laws on the basis
of such 'given' facts. But this apparently scientific method can be
seen as neglecting the historical, social and dynamic character of
those facts and, in the quest for universal, abstract laws, as
'fixing' the phenomena of capitalist society as 'suprahistorical
essences' (cf. Lukacs 1971 p. 5-14). Consequently, the notion that
capitalist society is an historical and transitory phenomenon subject
to continual change is 'written out' of social theory.
"The crudeness and conceptual nullity of such thought lies
primarily in the fact that it obscures the historical,
transitory nature of capitalist society. Its determinants
take on the appearance of timeless, eternal categories valid
for all social formations." (ibid. p. 9)
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This theme is also taken up by Bhaskar (1975) who argues that the
assertion by positivism that experience constitutes the basis for
all valid knowledge rules out the possibility of questioning the
conditions under which experience is significant in science:
"The concept of the empirical world is anthropocentric. The
world is what men (sic!) can experience. But the couple of
this concept, and from a realist meta-perspective necessary
to sustain it, is the absence of the concept of antecedent
social activity necessary to make experience significant in
science. And this has the objectionable ideological con-
sequence (from the point of view of the practice of science)
that whatever men currently experience is unquestionably
the world." (ibid. p. 58)
"It is clear that if knowledge is regarded as justified
in terms of given experience we have the makings of what
is in effect a conservative ideology, in which the current
experiences of a science are rationalised in being thought
of things themselves." (ibid. p. 243).
Of course, the notion that experiential data can provide a firm
foundation for scientific knowledge of the social world is based upon
the assumption that such data can be observed independently of
theoretical and subjective presuppositions. As indicated in chapter
2, acceptance of the arguments on this issue of Popper, Kuhn and philo-
sophers of the 'conventionalist school' renders such an assumption
untenable. Indeed, the Popperian position now relies on the
distinction between the 'psychology' and the 'logic' of knowledge
the latter, in the form of falsificationism, applying equally to
natural and social sciences and guaranteeing objective social know-
ledge. But I have argued that this position, too, is untenable and
it can be suggested that its acceptance serves to promote the ideolo-
gical purpose of concealing the value-commitments which must be
manifested in social knowledge being a legitimizing facade of
'objectivity' .
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Consequently, such an epistemology, in denying the necessarily
value-contingent nature of the social knowledge which it produces,
serves a fundamental legitimatory role, shielding the components of
the dominant ideology from criticism on the basis of their scientific
validity. As Habermas has argued ...
.....by making a dogma of the sciences' belief in themselves,
positivism assumes the prohibitive function of protecting
scientific inquiry from epistemological self-reflection.
Positivism is philosophical only in so far as is necessary
for the immunization of the sciences against philosophy."
(quoted in McCarthy 1978 p. 40).
At the highest level positivism legitimizes itself as an episte-
mology with reference to the development of objective knowledge about
the world to counter-act the influence of dogma. I have already
referred to Habermas' argument to the effect that positivism
therefore embodies a value - commitment which renders it, in itself,
ideological (cf above ch 2 Habermas 1976A).
Moreover, the positivist emphasis on quantification and mathematical
organisation of formal systems of laws has important implications.
For example, with reference to neoclassical economic theory Dobb
(1973) criticises the notion that formal economic analysis using
quantitative techniques and mathematical language is objective and
independent of statements with substantive content; on the contrary,
he argues that the structure of mathematical models in economics is
highly relevant to the nature of the statements they make about the
economic world:
"In choosing one structure in preference to another, the
model-builder is not only providing a scaffolding or
framework within which human though can operate, but
is laying emphasis on certain factors and relationships
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and exluding others or casting them into the shadows-
and in doing so he (sic!) can be judged to be distorting
or illuminating reality, and thus affording an unsound or
sound basis for interpretation and prediction - more likely
perhaps he is illuminating some corners or facet of
reality, or certain situations that recur, at the same time
as he is obscuring, or totally concealing, others."
(ibid. p , 7).
Further, such trends towards quantification, in particular towards
the apparent descriptive neutrality of systems of simultaneous
equations, have concealed ideological imp~cations deriving from
various sources (ibid. p. 8-10). Firstly, the treatment of certain
variables in such a system as exogenously determined, or as constants
specified as data, can result in an order of determination being
imposed on the system in an implicit manner. Secondly, the intro-
duction of additional hypotheses that were no part of the scheme
in its 'pure' form, for example, by imputing particular values to
certain variables, yields interpretations which give a theory its
essential character and practical implications. And, thirdly, the
defini tion of the;boundaries of the theoretical system (L, e. the sphere
of 'relevant' interactions) is crucial to the identification of
determining influences. All these are sources of 'bias' in the ana-
lysis of the economic system which are regarded as unproblematical
within the positivist tradition but which should be seen as meaningful,
deriving from paradigm-dependent judgements by the analyst and impar-
ting socially - and historically-conditioned value commitments to the
analysis of the economic world.
The emphasis on the attainment of social knowledge via the
development of abstract formal system and mathematical models pro-
duces further potential problems. In particular, an important source
of models in the process of theory development is provided by analogies
with processes already conceptualised in more established, perhaps
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more 'respectable', areas of inquiry. The nature of such substantive
analogies can therefore be of considerable significance. In general
terms the positivist framework lacks a high-level conception of science
as a process-in-motion, and of the process of production of knowledge
as rooted in a particular material social context (rather than an
isolated mental process). As a result, science and philosophy tend
to become tied together in a self-perpetuating ideology. Philosophy
is derived with reference to the current state of science and is, in
turn, called upon to rationalize and justify the continuing activity
of science. Moreover, since philosphers of science have tended to
concentrate upon particular scientific disciplines for the raw material
of their reflections then to the extent that these reflections sub-
sequently influence the practice of science in other disciplines,
these can result something of a 'convergence' effect, with our
understanding of a complex world developing in terms of a particular
image.
For example, physics has tradionally been the discipline which has
attracted most the reflective attention of philosophers of science
and which, moreover, has actually produced such philosphers. Levy-
Lehlond(1976) refers to the 'ideological exploitation' of modern
physics in terms of the uses of the results of quantum physics,
particularly, for example, the invocation of the 'free will' of the
electron to establish the free will of human beings (ibid. p. 158-9).
He quotes from Max Born's autobiography as follows:
"Eastern (sic!) Marxism teaches that communist economy is
a historical necessity, and from this conviction stems its
fanaticism ••..• Physics has now developed the statistical
interpretation of the laws of nature which corresDond better
to reality; from this new viewpoint, the belief of the
communists in the inevitable realisation of marxist predictions
seems grotesque." (ibid. p. 159).
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Clearly, this is an extreme example, the absurdity of which really
requires no elaboration; however, most analogical influences are
rather more subtle. Historically, perhaps the most important of all
sources of substantive analogies in the development of western science
has been Newtonian Mechanics. Bbaskar (op. cit. p. 61) suggests
that ...
" the influence of Newtonian Mechanics on 18th century
philosophy led to a kind of stasis in thought from which
the philosophy of science has still to recover. Action-by-
contact as a paradigm of causality, the celestrial closure as a
model of knowledge, gravity as a template of our ignorance
all had a disastrous effect."
Amongst these effects the idea that the 'celestrial closure' embodied
both a model of phenomena and a model for science created a miscon-
ception of considerable consequence. The founding of science upon
the notions of constant conjunctures of events and the deterministic
nature of the universe derives from the tacit assumption of the
universality of closed systems (ibid. p. 67-9). Now, system closure
requires three primary conditions: firstly, isolation from external
influences or constancy of those influences; secondly, isolation of
individuals within the system from the influence of other individuals
or constancy of those influences i.e. atomicity; and, thirdly, the
assumption that overall system states represent the sum of the states
of the (atomistic) individual components i.e. additivity (ibid.
p. 73-7).
However, the conditions of atomicity and additivity imply a
particular 'paradigm of action'. Based upon a conception of matter as
passive, inert, rigid 'corpuscles' moving under external stimuli
according to strict laws of mechanics, and of causation as linear
and unidirectional, with no qualitative variety and transformation,
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the positivistic epistemology of this paradigm of action views
things as ultimately resolvable into simple quantities apprehended
in sense-experience, and causation as the regular concomitance
of atomistic events. The concept of action presented by this world-
view therefore involves the simple response of passive atomistic
individuals to external stimuli in a linear process, with such events
directly amenable to observation. Events are conceived as 'dis-
placements' rather than 'transformations' - there is no conception
of the transformation of complex, pre-formed situations with material
continuity preserved through the change. If all efficient causes are
extrinsic then the structure or organisation of an environment cannot
be a determinant of what happens within it (ibid. p. 79-90).
Embodied within this classical paradigm of action, then, is a model
of humans as sensors of given facts and recorders of their
regularities. That is, humans are seen as passive spectators of a
given world rather than active agents in a complex and dynamic one.
As Lukacs (op. cit.) argues, in the positivist ideal of formal systems
of mathematical relationships the attempt to eliminate all sub-
jective elements and ..."every anthropomorphic tendency ..... "
transforms the subject, the knower, into a purely passive 'contempla-
tive' role. Knowledge becomes transformed ...•. " more and more into
the systematic and conscious contemplation of ...• purely formal •..
'laws' which function in - objective - reality without the interven-
tion of the subject ..." (ibid. p. 128). Human relations become mere
objective elements in such abstract formal systems, therefore defined
as immutable. (ibid. p. 127-31).
The content of this world-view has had considerable substantive
influence upon the development of scientific knowledge within the
positivist tradition. The impact can be seen especially in the social
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sciences and it is possible to illustrate the implications with
reference, once again, to neoclassical economics. The arguments of
Georgescu-Roegen (1971, 1976) are of particular relevance here. He
argues, basically, that the development of neoclassical economic
thought on the basis of the analogy of classical mechanics, and the
resulting dominance of the conception of the economic process as a
mechanical analogue, renders such though incapable of accounting for
the existence of enduring qualitative change which characterises
economic phenomena. More specifically, neoclassical models treat
phenomena undergoing continuous change as if they were not changing
with time:
"In this representation, the economic process neither induces
any qualitative change nor is affected by the qualitative
change of the environment into which it is anchored. It is
an isolated, self-contained and a historical process -
a circular flow between production and consumption with
no outlets and no inlets." (op. cit. 1971 p , 3).
Consequently, the economic process is reduced, by physical analogues,
to the 'Jevonian problematic' of the .•.. "mechanics of utility and
self-interest" ... (op, cit. 1976 p. 53; cf. above chapter 3)
essentially merely a ..."jigsaw puzzle with all its elements given."
(op.cit. 1971 p. 319). The fundamental laws of economics are seen
as deducible from universal principles of individual behaviour and
therefore as universal themselves. And this has produced a conception
of society based on the hypostatisation of the institutional traits
of western industrial capitalist societies. In this conception
individuals are seen as maximising their 'utility' or satisfaction
only in terms of commodities - goods and services obtained through
market exchange perceived in abstraction from an economic process
involving irrevocable, qualitative material change which occurs subject
to the dominant values of a specific institutional and cultural con-
text (op. cit. 1971, 1976).
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Positivist epistemology therefore constitutes a fundamental underlying
component of the dominant ideology providing a basis both for the
development of ideological social knowledge and for legitimization
of such knowledge. In particular, the positivist tradition produces
knowledge primarily in the guise of formal systems of quantitative
relationships while at the same time justifying such a form of
knowledge as objective, value-free and of superior cognitive
validity. The substantive theoretical content of the dominant
ideology must therefore be analysed in this context.
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6.3 The Theoretical Content of the Dominant Ideology
In relation to the problem of public policy making in advanced
capitalist industrial societies certain bodies of theoretical know-
ledge can be seen as of particular importance to the structure of
the dominant ideology. Anderson (1976 p. 195) argues as follows:
"In the Anglo-American world particularly, we continue to
define public problems and to deliberate policy alternatives
largely in terms of the conceptual apparatus of the common
law, democratic theory, and a market-based political economy,
and this despite the almost total transformation of these
societies in the last two hundred years. Certainly, the
content and character of these systems of thought has
changed with time, but the basic logic and the essential
standpoint for appraising public issues has been retained."
Within this conceptual apparatus of the dominant ideology, the
framework of law obviously has important influences on the consider-
ation of public policy issues; however, this complex area requires
detailed study in its own right and is beyond the means of the present
analysis. Rather, I shall concentrate on the nature of theoretical
knowledge in the fields of democratic political theory and neo-
classical economic theory.
The development of both these theoretical frameworks can be related
historically to the broader tradition consti tuted by 'classical
liberalism' which matured in the late eighteenth century in
'utilitarianism' (Macpherson 1972; Ward 1972). The emergence of
neo-classical economic theory was examined above (in ch. 5 ) but it
is appropriate here to relate this tradition to the classical
philosophical world-view which, I have argued, developed under the
influence of the 'mechanical analogue'. Classical liberalism, then,
was essentially characterised by three major assumptions (or doctrines)
about what was inherent in 'human nature' (Ward Ope cit. p. 24-5;
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Hunt 1972 p. 44-7). Firstly, Hobbes' egoism, which held that all
motives were a disguised species of self-interest, was combined, by
Bentham, with an 'hedonism' which reduced human behaviour to the
satisfaction of urgent demands of mind and body. This selfish
view of human motivation was also supported by Locke and Smith.
Secondly, 'rationalism' characterised hedonistic behaviour in terms of
conscious choice amongst alternative means to maximise achievement
of ends. Thirdly, an 'atomism' emphasized the essential separateness
and autonomy of each individual; individuals were the fundamental
unit in society, social institutions being merely a product of such
individuals whose freedoms were regarded as paramount.
This scheme can therefore be seen as introducing a social and
behavioural dimension to the classical 'paradigm of action' which
provided a basic framework for the developmen t of social theories.
From this tradition emerges the picture of free, autonomous indivi-
duals behaving rationally and maximising their 'utility' in market
exchange and of a political system which exists to maximise the
welfare of society as a whole by protecting the individual's
freedoms and the resources privately accumulated through the exercise
of those freedoms in the market place. As regards the economic
component of this picture, then, Ward (op. cit. p. 25-6) argues
that:
"The model of liberal man (si c l) is exemplified in the theory
of consumption which appears in all the economic textbooks
and informs a great deal of the research .... The autonomous
individuals of economics come into conflict, but this
conflict is dramatically transformed by the bargaining
processes of the market place into a harmony of interests,
a Pareto-optimality in principle whose liberal credentials
are impeccable."
244
Consequently, the basic assumptions upon which neoclassical economic
models are founded can be seen to derive from, and in turn reinforce,
an essentially normative tradition which promotes a view of society
as a homogeneous, uniform collection of autonomous individuals tending
towards a state of social harmony through a process of equal exchange
in the market place. For example, assumptions of rational action to
maximise given ends, of consistent arrangements of individual pre-
ferences, of homogeneity of economic agents, of equilibrium tendencies
in market exchange processes, of perfect substitutability and flexi-
bility in production, of uniformity in processes over time - such
assumptions are basic to neoclassical models. Underlying them are
two essential theses which characterise the normative orientation of
neoclassical economics: firstly, that all market payments are simple
exchanges in an equal sense so that in equilibrium all agents bene-
fit and maximise their satisfaction or utility; and, secondly, that
all market costs are costs paid for productive work in an equal
sense, and that in equilibrium remuneration for an agent is pro-
portional to marginal productivity (Hollis and Nell 1975 ch. 8).
The claim of objectivity and value freedom in the application of
neoclassical economic theories and models to the analysis of economic
phenomena produces ideological consequences deriving from the above
theses and the more specific assumptions to which they give rise.
A picture is presented of household and firms as equivalent free
agents involved in the essential process of exchange of productive
services and final products controlled by the mechanism of 'rational
choice'. Householdssupply the services of productive factors (mainly
labour) and demand final goods and services in quantities and pro-
portions that best satisfy their 'relative preference schedules' (or
maximise their utility). Firms demand labour and other 'factor
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services' according to their technical opportunities and needs in
relation to consumers' demand for products, and supply final goods
and services, in relation to prices which consumers are prepared to
pay, so as to maximise their profits. The equilibrium supplies and
demands finally chosen will be simultaneously compatible solutions
to these different individual, rational, maximisation problems. In
the equilibrium solution, which is achieved automatically by the
'invisible hand' of the market clearing process, consumers achieve
maximum possible satisfaction, with the value of household factor
supplies just matching aggregate household demand, and the output of
goods and services by firms matching consumers' demand and also
equalling the value of productive services which business demands.
Competition ensures that all markets are cleared and that excess
profits are eliminated (ibid. p. 14-15, 206; Nell 1972 p. 76-7,
86-8).
Now this outline is admittedly a rather crude and simplified version
of the neoclassical theory and modifications are made to it in order
to take account of 'imperfections' in competition. However, such
modifications do not alter the basic model and the above outline does
represent the underlying scheme. The focus is on the process of
exchange but economic agents and the exchange relations into which
they enter are abstracted from their social, political and historical
context provided by the institutional structure of an advanced
capitalist society. The mode of abstraction adopted in developing
the theory derives from the positivist epistemology which emphasises
the creation of logical and precise abstract systems rather than
the identification of 'causative' elements in the actual situation.
Consequently, exchange phenomena are abstracted from a wider set of
economic and social relationships, in an attempt to derive abstract,
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logically complex and quantifiable generalisations which will hold
for any type of exchange economy (Dobb 1972 p. 42).
Of course, all models or representations of the economic system must
be based upon generalised, value-contingent abstraction from a
'perceived reality' and therefore none can be upheld as embodying
the 'essence' or 'truth' of an economic reality. The dominance of
neoclassical economics as a supposedly value-free science can be
related to the normative basis of its particular form of abstraction.
In general terms, in abstracting from the social and institutional
context of a capitalist economic system neoclassical theory neglects
questions relating to the social relations of production and to
important processes behind the distribution of income and wealth.
By essentially ruling such questions outside the realm of 'scientific'
investigation neoclassical theory serves to legitimise the 'status
quo' in relation to such issues and therefore can be identified with
the interests of those social classes and groups with wealth and
privilege within the existing economic order.
More specifically, the emphasis within the theory on purely market
relationships and on the primacy of the 'subjective theory of value'
results in a neglect of the process of production, technological
interdependencies and the role of various institutions (e.g. financial
institutions). Neoclassical analysis therefore tends to play down
the influence of supply-side factors on prices, the role of profits in
determining the choice of industrial techniques and the dependency of
and
such profits upon aggregate demandAthe state of the labour market.
Moreover, profits are represented as exchange payments in the same
sense as wages; that is, the ownership of capital and labour are pre-
sented as equivalents (Nell Ope cit. p. 81-8; Hollis and Nell Ope cit.
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p. 15-16). Income distribution between 'factors of production' is
therefore shown to be an outcome from the market exchange process
arising from the prices of productive services or factors which are
derived from the market for final products - that is, according to
the structure and intensity of consumers' demand.
Consequently, marginal productivity theory, in the neoclassical
scheme, provides a particular perspective on the question of the
distribution of income and wealth. That it is a selective and partial
perspective is indicated by the existence of alternative partial per-
spectives which emphasize different economic processes. For example,
it is possible to argue that consumers' demand is to a consid-
erable degree determined by the prior distribution of income between
individuals; income distribution is determined prior to, and as a pre-
condition for, the determination of price relations or exchange values.
Similarly,it can be maintained that the provision of labour in return
for wages is not equivalent to the ownership of capital leading to
accumulation of profit (cf. Nell op. cit. p. 78-88; Dobb 1973 p. 34).
Nell (ibid. p. 77-8) criticizes the neoclassical scheme from the
latter position:
"Basically, orthodox theory is a theory of markets and market
interdependence. It is a theory of general equilibrium in
exchange, extended almost as an afterthought to cover pro-
duction and distribution. It is not a theory of a social
system, still less of economic power and social class.
Households and firms are considered only as market agents,
never as parts of a social structure. Their 'initial endow-
ments', wealth, skills and property, are taken as given.
Moreover, the object of the theory is to demonstrate the
tendency towards equilibrium; class and sectoral conflict
is therefore ruled out almost by assumption."
In presenting a partial analysis from a particular viewpoint as an
objective scientific analysis neoclassical economics 'fixes' certain
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biases in the way that economic processes are conceptualised and,
further, renders the study of factors excluded from its scheme
'non-scientific' from an economic point of view i.e. to be accepted
as given to economic analysis. However, to criticise it simply as
a distortion is to miss the point that any conception of the economic
system must involve 'distortion' due to the necessarily value -
condi tioned nature of the process of social knowledge development.
The essential problem lies in the representation of this particular
conception as embodying true knowledge of capitalist economic
reality and therefore in the promotion of a particular normative,
value stance in the name of 'value freedom'. The same argument can
be applied to any attempt to portray an analysis of the economic
system as capable of uncovering objective truths. However, in our
present society the neoclassical scheme is dominant and can be seen
as legitimising certain social interests and promoting a broad
normative tradition deriving essentially from the classical liberalist
view of society combined with a materialist orientation inherent in
the focus on the process of market exchange of commodities and in
the identification of social welfare with quantities of such exchange
commodities.
As indicated above modern political theory shares common origins
with neoclassical economic theory and the historical development
of the two fields can be seen to follow similar paths. As we have
seen, the development of classical liberal theory in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, through the work of Hobbes, Locke, Hume,
Burke and Bentham, was closely related to the fundamental economic
and social changes which were resulting from the emergence of the
capitalist industrial system and the establishment of market relations.
The 'hedonistic', 'atomistic' and 'rationalistic' nature of classical
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liberal thought was analysed above (cf. p.243 ) as providing an
underlying normative framework for the development of economic theory.
With reference to political thought, C.B. Macpherson (1962, 1973)
has suggested the concept of 'possessive individualism' to characterise
the underlying assumptions of classical liberal theory.
Briefly, 'possessive individualism' presents a view of humans as
essentially characterised by individual freedom from dependence on
relations with others except those voluntarily entered into with a
view to promoting self-interest. Such self-interest is served by
maximising satisfaction in terms of possession; therefore, freedom
is identified with possession or ownership and everyone is free
because they possess at least their own capacities. Society is
seen not as a system of relations of domination and subordination
between individuals and groups held together by reciprocal rights
and duties, but rather as a collection of free and equal individuals
related to each other through possessions - through ownership of
capacities and what they have produced and accumulated through their
use. In other words, human society is seen as consisting fundamentally
in a series of market relations for the exchange of indivduals'
possessions. Finally, political society is conceived as a rational
human contrivance for the protection of the individual's personal
capacities and freedoms and of the properi:y accumulated through the
exercise of those freedoms (Macpherson 1962 p. 263-4; 1973 p. 199).
However, during the nineteenth century there was a reaction against
the bare materialist and market morality embodied in this classical
view of infinite appropriate as the essence of rational human behaviour.
For example, John Stuart Mill rejected the narrow materialist con-
ception of the human essence embodied in 'possessive individualism'
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and emphasised instead a broader conception of this essence embodying
moral, intellectual,aesthetic and emotional, as well as productive,
capacities. Society was therefore conceived in terms of the maxi-
misation of such human capacities not merely as means to material
satisfaction but as ends in themselves (Macpherson 1972 p. 21-3; op.
cit. 1973 p. 4-6). Cbnsequently, the liberal tradition was modified
into liberal-democratic political theory in an attempt to reconcile
bourgeoise materialist individualism with concepts of social democracy
derived from the Western humanist tradition of political thought
(ibid.) .
Macpherson argues, therefore, that the resulting theory legitimised
the developing institutional order with respect to two primary claims
of moral justification (op. cit. 1973 p. 6-15). Thus, it was claimed
that the capitalist market economy, with the requisite social and
political institutions, would ensure, firstly, the equitablemaximis-
ation of individual utilities and, secondly, the maximisation of 'extra-
utilitarian' human capacities. As in the case of neoclassical economic
theory this normative orientation is achieved by adopting a parti-
cular conceptual viewpoint on the processes of distribution of poli-
tical 'rewards' and by neglecting the question of the influence of
prior patterns of ownership of resources on these processes.
Consequently, liberal-democratic political theory can be seen as
having arisen from a particular viewpoint on the nature of capitalist
society and as being complementary to neoclassical economics. Two
conceptual components can be identified as particularly important in
relation to its normative basis: firstly, the representation of society
as a collection of free autonomous and equal individuals and the
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denial of a class structure of social relations or any other 'struc-
tural' inequalities between different social groups; and, secondly,
the representation of the state as embodying the interests of all
individuals and as established to protect the freedom of such indivi-
duals to exercise their natural capacities. More recently, modifi-
cations have been made to this political theory to accommodate the
implications of political grouping, producing what is usually called
'democratic-pluralist' theory which retains, nevertheless, the basic
orientation of the liberal-democratic tradition.
Democratic-pluralist theory, then, presents a conception of capitalist
political society in which power is highly fragmented and shared
amongst many overlapping and competitive social groups none of which
has any structural predominance. All groups are seen to have an
influence in forming socially-binding decisions and, the fact that they
share a broad 'consensus' system of beliefs and values encourages the
resolution of conflicts between them within established frameworks
(Connolly 1969 p. 3; Miliband 1973 p. 4-5). Social classes are assumed
to be only one of many clusters of interests in society, if they are
recognised at all, counteracted by the capacity of minority groups to
influence the political process (Alford 1975 p. 147).
Within this conception the state in capitalist society is seen as an ...
.. institution established in the interests of society as a
whole for the purpose of mediating and reconciling the anta-
gonisms to which social existence inevitably gives rise."
(Sweezy 1971 p. 25).
The state therefore responds to the wishes and demands of all competing
interest groups and, since there are no dominant classes, interests or
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groups, cannot be biased towards particular interests (Miliband op.
cit. p. 5-6). The state is considered, then, as an arbiter - as an
'arena' for debating and resolving inter-group conflicts, or as an
'umpire', setting rules for conflict resolution on the basis of a public
consensus (Connolly op.cit. p. 8-13; Dear and Clark 1978 p. 176).
As an institution the state is seen as a multiplicity of overlapping
jurisdictions each competing for resources and its bureaucratic pro-
cess are assumed to be responsive to the political process in their role
of equating the supply of political goods with the competing demands of
the diverse groups in political society (Alford op. cit.; Macpherson
1973 p. 201-3).
It is notable that 'democratic pluralist' political theory has developed
to make use of the analogy with the subjective theory of value in neo-
classical economics such that voters are considered to express preferences
for political goods and the state is then seen to respond to 'consumer
preferences'. More generally, while in neoclassical economic theory
rational autonomous individuals maximise their subjective desires in
competitive markets and competitiion results in prices which produce
equilibrium solutions, so the dominant model of the democratic political
system has adopted the notion of this system as a mechanism for recon-
ciling or balancing a multitude of diverse and conflicting interests and
achieving equilibrium through trading outputs of political goods for
inputs of political 'resources' (ibid. p. 185-7). Basic assumptions of
this model include the rational behaviour of voters and politicians, and
free competition between political parties (ibid. p. 188).
Consequently, in this scheme democracy is treated as a mechanism, the
essential function of wh~ch is to maintain an equilibrium between a
plurality of social groups. At the same time the focus of political
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inquiry has become the empirical analysis of political behaviour within
the pluralist equilibrium framework - in particular, the observable
'preferences' of individuals and groups. But the functionalist
orientation of the 'democratic pluralist' model can be seen as pro-
ducing restrictive implications (KariE!!l1970). The model posits
a coordinated, healthy social organism with each part functionally
adjusted to all the others, free to operate as each member performs
its function. Such an abstract, comprehensive behavioural system,
based on an assumption of the underlying harmony of the parts of the
social whole, is claimed to provide an objective, value-free approach
to political analysis (ibid. p. 149-54). But Karielargues that such
analysis betrays an normative commitment supportive of existing dominant
values, representing a •.."norm of social health ..." and an ..."ideal
immanent in reality ..." (ibid. p. 156):
"It offers not an approach but a norm, not a tool for
analysis but a theory justifying an existing state of
affairs." (ibid. p. 154).
The concern to develop a theory of democracy from the empirical analysis
of existing 'democractic' systems results in tendencies which are
actually detrimental to the advancement of democracry in its classical
sense. For example, in such theory descriptions of present patterns
of activity and participation in the equilibrium system take on normative
connotations and become 'democratic values' replacing the classical
prescription of the politically active and informed citizen (Davis
1970). In this way particular values are promoted in the name of
• •'value freedom'; ideals are set to correspond to reality thus ensuring
social and political stability (ibid. p. 223-6). As Macpherson argues:
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"Democracy is held to be consistent with, and even to require,
a low level of citizen participation: only so, it is said, is
the political system likely to stay in equilibrium. Democracy
is reduced from a humanist perspective to a market equilibrium
system. And although the new orthodox theory claims scientific
neutrality, its value judgement is clear enough: whatever
works is right - thatis, whatever enables the ex i st Lnq class-
stratified society to operate without intolerable friction is
best." (Macpherson 1973 p. 78-9).
Preoccupation with the observable political behaviour of individuals
and groups also produces important implications for the 'democratic-
pluralist' model. The focus on conditions of mobilization of particular
groups and individuals for political action and on strategies of
influence and outcomes of action in particular observable situations
abstracts such overt behaviour from the .."societal and organizational
contexts of action .." (Alford op. cit. p. 152) which can be seen as
important in shaping it. For example, Lukes (1974) criticizes the
pluralist concern with observed decisions and behaviour on two
grounds. Firstly, it neglects the exercise of power through the
restriction of the political process to 'safe' issues by the creation
or reinforcement of social and political values and institutional
practices. Control of the political agenda can be non-conscious
and non-intentional resulting from socially-structured and culturally-
patterned organizational constraints (ibid. p. 16-22). Secondly, it
neglects the most 'effective and insidious' use of power as the pre-
vention of actual grievances and conflict through the influencing,
shaping and determining of people's perceptions, thoughts and prefer-
ences via processes of socialization which persuade people of the
legitimacy of the 'status quo' (ibid. p. 23-4). In abstracting from
the social, historical and institutional context of political behaviour,
democractic-pluralism renders this context unproblematic and beyond
scrutiny - and therefore beyond change.
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Consequently, democratic-pluralist theory can be seen as neglecting cer-
tain important influences on political action and providing a parti-
cular viewpoint on the politics of capitalist society. Like neoclassical
economics it hypostatizes selected phenomena of capitalism as perceived
through a conceptual framework which "processes out' structural
inequalities in the distribtuion of political and economic power. Con-
siderable criticism has in fact been directed at the assumption or pro-
position of diffusion of power amongst a plurality of interests.
One line of criticism has emphasized the 'biased context' of political
power and action pointing to the institutional and resource barriers
that hinder or prevent the formation of groups to defend or promote
certain interests and values. On the other hand certain organizational
elites with command over resources of expertise, class status or wealth
monopolise access to political power and restrict the participation of
individuals and disadvantaged groups. The resulting 'power elite' have
an interest in maintaining the existing distribution of power and
wealth and consequently restrict the scope of public policy-making by
state institutions to options which will not fundamentally change this
distribution (Presthus 1970; Connolly 1969; Alford 1975).
"Viewed as independent systems, then,the private groups that
give meaning to pluralism are rarely pluralistic, in the sense
of having competing power centers within them. Such groups
no longer meet traditional pluralist assumptions, because of
the great inequalities in bargaining power that characterizes
them. The pluralism that exists is too often restricted to
the few powerful organizations that monopolize most social
areas. Producer groups, linked fundamentally by an economic
interest, dominate, and the less disciplined voluntary
organizations rarely compete successfully with them in the
struggle for access and influence".
(Presthus op. cit. p. 288).
Some more radical critics go further and argue that structural inequal-
ities in political power derive from the social context of capitalist
society in which the class structure of social reactions is seen as of
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fundamental importance. From our perspective these alternative
conceptualizations represent partial and selective perspectives on the
nature of political systems in capitalist society based upon different
value-conditioned viewpoints, containing different normative impli-
cations and relating to different social interests. The claim of
democratic-pluralist theory to the status of 'value-free science' ren-
ders it ideological since a particular value position is being pro-
moted in the guise of value freedom. The assumptions of 'possessive
individualism', of diffused political power, of equality of competition
between a plurality of interests and of a state instituted to serve
the 'general interest' of society indicate the nature of the normative
tradition embodied in the dominant ideology.
Therefore, neoclassical economic theory and liberal-democratic-
pluralist political theory can be seen as important closely-interrelated
elements of the conceptual apparatus of the dominant ideology of our
society. Together with other bodies of social knowledge, such as
sociology, psychology arid jurisprudence, they make up the 'substantive
content' of the ideology appropriate to the state's activities in sol-
ving practical social problems. As such they provide conceptions or
interpretations of the nature of 'social reality' which in their appli-
cation to practical problems constitute a basis for both changing and
legitimizing that reality-as-perceived. Through the examples of economic
and political theory I have attempted to indicate the ways in which
their pictures of the world are developed and serve to promote the
wider legitimation of the capitalist economic and political system.
However, the analysis remains incomplete without a consideration of the
dominant conception relating to the appropriate utilization of social
knowledge: that is, its appropriate mode of application to the solution
of social problems.
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6.4 A Conception of Knowledge Utilization
With the changing nature of capitalist industrial society this component
of the dominant ideology would appear to have become increasingly
important and influential. I have presented the argument that as the
state has become increasingly involved in economic management, in the
production activities associated with the provision of 'collective
consumption goods', in the activities required of the 'welfare state',
so there has been an increasing requirement for institutionalized
production and decision rules for these activities in a domain 'above'
(but still related to) that of social interests and power relationships
which are manifested in the political process. As this 'technical
domain has increasingly overlain the political so the question of the
use of social scientific knowledge has become more problematical since
the establishment of decision rules relies heavily on such knowledge.
Therefore, in order to carry out its functions the state has needed
guidance on the appropriate modes of application of social scientific
knowledge within this 'technical domain'. But, at the same time, it has
required developments in legitimizing frameworks to justify both its
expanded activities and the procedures adopted and applied in the
'technical domain'.
Consequently, it can be suggested that the changing character of the
state has been reflected in the changing nature of the dominant ideo-
logy, with an emergence to a pre-eminent position, of a 'technocratic
region', relating to knowledge utilization. Such a component would
remain closely inter-related and inter-dependent with the other ideo-
logical components considered above (ie the positivist conception of
knowledge development and economic and political theory) but never-
theless can be seen as increasingly providing the major framework of
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discourse in relation to the policy activities of the state. I shall
therefore now consider the characteristics of this component.
The development of the technocratic conception of knowledge utili-
zation can be related to the post-enlightenment intellectual tradition,
aspects of which I have already examined as the context for the emergence
of social theory within the positivist epistemological framework. The
basic notion underlying this conception is traceable back to the Platonic
problematic of assimilating power and knowledge and developing a science
of politics grounded in theoretical knowledge of true propositions
but oriented towards the transformation and control of society (cf.
chapter 2 ). In the mid-seventeenth century this theme was devel-
oped by Hobbes who proposed a science of human behaviour which reflected
the shift in philosophical thought taking place in the context of an
emerging capitalist-industrial syst.em. McCarthy (op, cit. p. 4)
outlines the orientation of Hobbes' work as follows:
"Given a correct understanding of the laws of human nature,
it would be possible to establish once and for all the
oonditions of a proper ordering of human life. The classical
instruction in leading a good and just life, the formation
of virtuous character, and the cultivation of practical prudence
were to be replaced by the application of a scientifically
grounded social theory, by the production of the conditions
that would lead to the desired behavior according to the
laws of human nature. In this way the sphere of the practical
was absorbed into the sphere of the technical. The practical
problem of the virtuous life of the citizens of the polis
was transformed into the technical problem of regulating
social intercourse so as to ensure the order and well-being
of the citizens of the state."
Consequently, a new 'technical' concept of reason began to emerge and the
development of science became tied to the standards of observability,
as the basis for the development of true knowledge, and applicability,
as the primary justification for scientific activity (cf. Dreitzel op.
cit. p. 166). These standards can be seen as closely inter-related.
On the one hand, the application of scientific knowledge in the
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direction of human progress was justified with reference to the object-
ive law-like nature of that knowledge derived from pure observation.
On the other hand, the orientation of the sciences of society towards
the production of law-like knowledge can be related to political and
social trends, particularly the development of the secular state with
its emerging rationalizing activities in the economic and social spheres
involving the application of knowledge free from the ignorance, sup-
erstitions and dogmatism which were seen as characterizing the 'old'
forms of political activity.
The development of positivist philosophy can therefore be seen as
confirming and consolidating the post-enlightenment tradition.
Habermas (op. cit. 1976A) argues that the achievement of modern posi-
tivist empirical science is denoted by two essential characteristics.
Firstly, its 'affirmative achievement' lies in the commitment to pro-
ducing predictive laws which reveals an interest in technical control
over the objects or objectified processes of nature and society
(ibid. p. 334; cf. above ch.2 ). Secondly, its 'critical achiev-
ment' lies in the argument that through the application of the scientific
method to the study of social phenomena involving rigorous avoidance
of normative considerations, the influence of pseudoscience, ideology
and dogma on political action can be eradicated. Value-neutral scien-
tific reason is thereby elevated to a standard against which all other
claims to the guidance of purposive action can be rejected as ideology
(bid. p. 334-5; McCarthy op. cit. p. 5-6). But through these achieve-
ments positivism betrays a commitment in favour of a particular int-
erest or 'value'. 'Scientific' questions are those restricted to the
refinement of means for the purposive-rational pursuit of ends.
Practical questions relating to the selection and justification of ends
cannot be answered scientifically (and therefore 'rationally'); only
technical questions, relating to the efficient achievement of given
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ends, can be answered by science. Therefore, positivism provides a
form of 'committed reason' in favour of extending and rationalizing
technical control over nature and society. 'Rationality' becomes
identified with behaviour in accordance with the technical recommend-
ations of 'value-free' science and a particular value-system is thereby
dictated in the name of value freedom (Habermas op. cit. p. 335-40).
Such developments in thinking about the relationship between knowledge
and action, or about appropriate modes of knowledge ultilization,
can be related to trends in the process of capitalist economic and
political development. Two such trends during the present century
have been of particular importance: firstly, increasing state inter-
vention to secure the stability of the capitalist system; and, secondly,
a growing interdependence of scientific research and technology which
has turned 'science' into a leading productive force (Habermas 1971
p. 100). As indicated above the increasing involvement of the state
in productive activities has resulted in a growing orientation towards
the solution of 'technical' problems relating to the economic system's
stability and growth as given ends. This has produced increasing
demands on social science to provide appropriate knowledge which can
be applied in the solution of such problems - hence the orientation
towards 'value free' knowledge and towards the production of technical
decision rules concerned with evaluation of alternative means (eg
optimisation techniques). As the social sciences have been increasingly
related to the activities of government so they have become more
important as productive forces and this has provided a basis for the
legitimization of the expanded role of the state with reference to its
emergent 'technical domain' of activity. Politics is portrayed as a
purely technical activity concerned with instrumentalist decisions on
the means to achieve given ends in the rational administration of the
economic system; public discussion of practical questions concerning
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alternative ends and values is depicted as irrational if not irrele-
vant; the development of the social system is presented as essentially
dependent upon the logic of scientific-technical progress. The operation
of political power is therefore reduced to a technical construct - in-
volving the rational choice of means on the basis of objective scienti-
fic information dispensed by impartial experts for the use of politicians
(ibid. p. 101-6; Fay 1975 p. 44-6).
This technocratic conception of knowledge utilization can therefore be
seen as arising in response to the changing nature of the modern
state, particularly the increasing importance of a 'technical level' of
policy-making relative to the 'political level'. Nevertheless, to
argue that the traditional framework of the exercise of political
power has been overlain by a 'technical domain' of the exercise of
rationality is not to argue that the policy-making process can be redu-
ced to a purely technical construct. However, the technocratic con-
ception, does just this; it focusses on the emergent technical domain,
abstrasts if from the underlying political basis and hypostatizes it
as 'reality'. As such it can be seen as ideological, serving to
divert analytical attention from the power political bases of the
state's policy making activities and, therefore, to legitimize such
activities as well as providing a justification for low levels of poli-
tical participation amongst the majority of the population (Habermas
op. cit. p. 104-12).
Moreover, this 'technocratic consciousness' provides a modern ideo-
logy for capitalist society which has arguably become increasingly pre-
valent somewhat at the expense of the ideological components provided
by, for example, neoclassical economic and democratic-pluralist poli-
tical theory. Although the latter can, as discussed above, be seen
as still providing important 'legitimatory frameworks', the changing
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nature of the capitalist state has produced a requirement for the new
technocratic component relating to the application of scientific know-
ledge in the guidance of political action. To be rather more specific
the implications of the technocratic ideology can be considered by
examining in more detail the prevailing conception of the appropriate
relationship between social scientific knowledge and public policy-
making.
The last twenty years, in particular, have witnessed an increasing
predominance of the view that the means to the solution of our social
problems lies in the application of 'better' and more 'relevant' social
scientific knowledge and information in the process of public policy
formulation. Moreover, the development of this belief has resulted in
many attempts to 'improve' the policy-making process through the
increased orientation of social scientific research towards the pro-
duction of 'policy-relevant knowledge' and technical aids to decision-
making. Many observers have noted these trends. For example,
Nelkin (1979B p. 106) argues that since the late 1950's there has
been ...
" an increased integration of scientific knowledge as an
instrument of public policy, and a growing ideology that
science is a model for rationality in public affairs."
straussman (1976 p. 130-1) and Gunnell (1976 p. 33-4) both point
to the trend during the 1960s towards disillusionment with the apparent
irrelevance of much 'pure' social science research to pressing social
problems and a greater insistence on 'relevant' research to provide
better information for application in the planning process. Dallmayr
(1981 p. 523-4) highlights Easton's presidential address to the
American Political Science Association in 1969 as a landmark in this
trend. In this address Easton criticised the focus on 'abstract
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explanatory schemes' and the 'simple cultivation of science for science's
sake' and urged a revolutionary realignment in political science
towards the solution or amelioration of major social and political
problems based on the 'findings of contemporary behavioral science'.
Since the late 1960s there has indeed been an increasing concern,
within political science, with 'policy analysis' - with the generation
of information and knowledge which can be applied so as to ..."improve
the basis for policy-makers to exercise their judgement." (Rhodes
1979 p. 23).
These trends reflect an intellectualist and rationalistic view of the
role of social scientific knowledge in public policy making which is
encapsulated in Dror's definition of 'policy sciences':
"Folicy sciences is concerned with the contributions of
systematic knowledge, structured rationality and organized
creativity to better policy making. It constitutes a main
effort to reassert the role intellectualism and
rationalism in guiding human destiny ..... policy
sciences is essential for improvement of the human
condition and, indeed, for avoidance of catastrophe."
(Dror 1971 p. Lx)
The intellectualist policy science model therefore assumes that social
science is essential to making sound policy decisions both in terms of
the formulation of improved procedures for decision making and in terms
of increasing scientific knowledge and information that makes intelli-
gent and rational decisions possible (Gunnellop. cit. p. 30-1).
Knowledge gained from social science will permit the control and manage-
ment of society to promote a rat~onal social structure congruent with
the needs and wants of its members (Fay 1975 p. 19). In this view
political considerations tend to be seen as obstacles to the progres-
sive rationalization of decisions and actions; the utilization of
knowledge is taken as a technical problem of linking the point of
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knowledge production to the point of action (Ezrahi 1980 p. 111-2;
Kerr 1981 p. 484). As Nelkin (1979B p. 106) argues:
"The well-structural logic, clarity and preC1Slon of
scientific knowledge appeals to policy makers as a way
to enhance the quality and efficiency of the decision-
making process. Scientific knowledge has, according
to many analyses of advanced industrial society,
assumed increased importance as an 'apolitical' basis
of policy formulation."
Of course, this implies that behind this view of the role of social
knowledge ir.public policy formulation lies a particular view of the
nature of such knowledge. In particular, the model assumes that the
ability to act competently in the context of some activity is a fun-
ction of an objective understanding of that activity (Gunnell op. cit.
p. 35). Indeed, in this model we find many of the positivist assump-
tions which underlie the dominant ideological conceptions of our society:
knowledge developed independently from its application, standing in an
abstracted, intellectualist relation to practice, permitting social
control through its quantitative, predictive laws (ibid. ; Fay op. cit.
p. 20-1; Nelkin 1979B p. 108). Consequently, a particular conception
of 'policy-relevant knowledge' emerges which venerates the precise
quantitative laws of the natural experimental sciences as the epitome
of rationality. This view is expressed, for example, in many of the
studies in Nagel (1975) who argues that .•."the quantitative and com-
puter science tools that are ultimately associated with mathematics ..•"
can provide an antidote to ..."eval uati ve gut reactions, armchair
speculation, and isolated historical anedotes" (ibid. p. xiii).
He goes on to argue that:
"Physical and biological science to some extent provide
models to emulate in the development of mathematically
scientific laws, provided one always considers the
differences in the behavioural instability of people as
compared to physical or biological objects." (ibid.).
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This theme is deve Lopedby Montgomery (1975 p. 221) in the following
terms:
"The techniques of mathematics and natural science that are
likely to be useful in policy studies are primarily quantitative
ones. Hence whenever we deal with social variables, such as
national income or poverty level, that by their nature
require quantification, we have available a battery of
techniques and methods that have proved themselves useful
in science and engineering. What may be of profound consequence
moreover, is that natural science may demonstrate the neces-
sity and possibility of quantifying concepts traditionally
held to be non-quantifiable. The quantification will give
these concepts operational meaning and thus enable them to
have increased impact on actual decisions."
Finally, Dror (1971) refers to 'weaknesses' of behavioural sciences which
he considers to be obstacles to the development of 'policy sciences'.
The standard against which 'weakness' is assessed is implicitly that
provided by the mathematical formulations of the natural sciences;
the exception, he argues, is economics which has been successful in
providing policy-relevant knowledge:
"Well-recognized reasons for. the special nature of economics
include the different intellectual history of economics, which
has been more policy-oriented; the susceptability of large
parts of its subject matter to quantitative treatment; the
reductionability of many of its variables to a limited number
of main aggregate categories which are operational and
measurable; and the releatively simple characteristics of
some main category interrelations which permit quite
isomorphic simulation of important aspects of economic
phenomena in modern societies by compact and exercisable
models." (ibid. p. 8)
The intellectualist policy science model of the relation between
social knowledge and public policy formulation can therefore be seen
as intimately related to the positivist theory of knowledge. Indeed,
such a conception of the relation between knowledge and action is
implied in the positivist epistemology. Moreover, when this conception
is elaborated as a means to understanding the process of policy-making
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in our society it, in turn, implies a particular model of the political
system (cf. Fay Ope cit. p. 15-16). This model produces important
implications for our views about the nature of both valid political
argument and appropriate political institutions.
Firstly, as regards the nature of political argument the policy science
model implies a view of the increasingly 'scientific' and 'technical'
nature of such argument as political decisions becomes less a matter of
'conjectural, arbitrary and emotional' debate in relation to imprecise
objectives, and more a matter of the technical application of reliable
social scientific knowledge to the analysis of means to achieve
defined ends (ibid. p. 22-4). Within this conception there has been a
progressive extension of the rationalization of politics to cover the
ends, as well as the means, of political action. At the most basic level
social scientific knowledge in the form of lawlike regularities and
SCientifically-tested predictions provides technical criteria to
gUide selection of means to achieve given ends which are beyond the
realm of rational discussion (cf. Habermas 1971 chap. 5, 1976A p.
340-6; McCarthy 1978 chap. 1). At the next level the ends of poli-
tical action are subjected to decision-theoretic techniques which
provide a formal rationality but which do not permit of rational dis-
cussion of the content of goals. (ibid.)
However, higher levels of rationalization have been introduced to
incorporate social goals. For example, game-theoretic approaches
rationalize values in terms of successful self-assertion to secure
survival and risk minimisation and therefore begin to introduce an
imperative into decision-making systems (Habermas 1976A p. 343-4).
And the highest expression of the technocratic consciousness embodied
in the policy science model is to be found in the notion of a
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.."cybernetically self-regulated organization of society ..•" (ibid.
p. 346) with decision-making in self-programming feedback systems
guaranteeing the fulfilment of objectively-necessary system goals
(eg stability, adaptability, growth etc). Such goals, rationalized in
terms of necessity, are therefore again placed beyond the realm of
rational public discussion (ibid. p. 345-6; McCarthy op. cit. p. 10-11).
At whatever level the rationalization is applied the implications for
the view of the nature of political argument are the same; politics
is reduced to the technical application of social scientific know-
ledge to the determination of means to achieve given ends.
Such a reduction produces important implications for views on the
nature of political institutions, in particular on the respective roles
in the policy-making process of politicans and 'scientific experts'.
Within the policy science model it is argued that the increasing
importance of social scientific knowledge to rational political argument
and policy making necessarily implies a shift in power from politi-
cians to the 'knowledge elite' - to those who have control over the
scarce resource of scientific knowledge (Fay op. cit. p. 26; Straussman
1976 p.1SO-l). Policy formulation is seen as increasingly dominated
by experts who monopolize the difficult technical choices which are
involved. Therefore, the traditional role of political institutions
is seen as progressively eroded by 'societal guidance', on the basis
of expert technocratic counsel, in the form of planning and bureaucratic
management (cf. ibid.; Melanson 1972, Nelkin 1979B p. 107-8). This
view is evident, for example, in Galbraith's analysis of 'advanced
industrial society' in which, he argues ..." the educational and scient-
ific estate is becoming a decisive instrument of political power."
(Galbraith 1974 p. 296). He goes on to suggest that:
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" it is safe to say that the future of what is called
modern society depends on how willingly, rationally and
effectively the intellectual community in general, and the
educational and scientific estate in particular, assume
responsibilities for political action and leadership."
(ibid. p. 373)
This perspective achieves its most mature state in the concept of the
'post-political', 'post-industrial' society managed equitably by the
knowledge elite through the application of social sCience, no longer
subject to 'irrational' political conflict and struggle over scarce
resources (Hennessey and Peters 1976 p. 115; Dahlstrom 1976 p. 6-7).
The fundamental problems with the technocratic model of knowledge
utilization derive from its location within the positivist philosophical
tradition - indeed, from its development as the political manifestation
of the positivist enterprise. On the basis of our critique of the
ideological nature of social scientific knowledge developed within the
positivist epistemological framework, it is obviously not possible to
uphold the notion that the rationality of the public policy-making
process derives from the application of objective social knowledge to
guide political action. Since, I have argued, according to positivist
canons of rationality, social theorizing must be done 'irrationally'
then it can have no 'a priori' warrant to provide criteria for rational
action. The criteria which it does in fact provide, in the form of
knowledge about social phenomena and procedures for decision-making,
should be analysed in relation to the nature of the value commitments
and ideological frameworks which arise from the process of production
of social scientific knowledge within our particular social context.
In general terms this amounts to an orientation towards the preservation
of basic social institutions and structures of economic and political
power through the circumscription of the scope of 'rationality' in
political action.
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More specifically, the positivist segregation of facts and values,
translated into the technocratic distinction between means and ends,
produces an instrumental 'technological rationality' which necessarily
embodies a political commitment. The assumption that only questions
concerning the best means to achieve given ends are amenable to
scientific solution produces the view that debates about political
ends, principles, ideals and basic values are necessarily 'irrational'.
Consequently, political discussion is seen as restricted to technical
questions about the efficiency and economy of means in relation to
given ends (Fay 1975 p. 61; Habermas 1976A; Cotgrove 1975). But the
effect of this is to impose by default a particular value-system in the
name of value-freedom and this 'technocratic' value-system is inherently
conservative. To label as rational only that action which is in
accordance with the technical recommendations of so-called value-free
science is to outlaw discussion of alternative political and social
goals and to give credence only to those analyses which implicitly
accept the social and institutional structure, and the dominant values,
of our existing society (Habermas op. cit.):
"The subjectivistic reduction of the interests which are
decisive in the orientation for action to 'sentiments' or
'perceptions', which cannot be rationalized beyond that,
is a precise expression for the fact that the value freedom
central to the technological concept of rationality functions
within the system of social labour, and that all the other
interests of the practice of life are subordinated for the
benefit of the sole interest in effeciency and economy in
the utilization of means. The competing perspectives of
interest, hypostatized to values, are excluded from
discussion." (ibid. p. 342)
That certain values are imposed by default can be established from the
argument that means and ends cannot (like facts and values) be radically
distinguished. All possible means are ends relative to other means
required to achieve them so the choice between means, as a species of
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moral statment, cannot be politically neutral (Fay op.cit. p. 51-3).
Moreover, the choice of 'best' means requires some criteria and the use
of those of economy or efficiency cannot be neutral with respect to
values because the specification of the content of these criteria (eg
money, labour, time) must embody certain values (ibid. p. 50).
Further, the technocratic conception implies a particular view of
political participation. If political activity is seen as a question
of solving technical problems relating to means, with discussion of ends
or values of society dismissed as 'merely subjective', then the role of
the general public in politics and, indeed, of elected politicians,
becomes suboridinated to that of the technocrats, experts and planners.
This conception can therefore be seen as providing a justification for
low levels of political participation and debate which, again, serves
to promote the stability of eXisting dominant values and social arrange-
ments.
The technocratic idea that power in advanced capitalist democracies has
passed to experts because of latter's command over the increasingly impor-
tant and scarce resource of scientific knowledge can be seen, then,
as representing a partial and selective conception of policy-making
systems. Notwithstanding the growing importance of such knowledge
as a productive factor and the increase in 'rational administration'
by the state on the basis of 'technical' decision criteria, the techno-
cratic conception of knowledge utilization tends to focus on and
abstract this 'technical domain' of state activities from the wider
political context thus neglecting the operation of political influences
on policy formulation.
The imporance of such political factors in public policy making has
been asserted by analysts in critiques of the 'policy science' models.
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For example, Ezrahi (1980) emphasizes the primacy of political activity
which he defines as .•."the creation and preservation of order while
pursuing practical objectives which are usually incommensurate,
inconsistent and ambiguous" (ibid. p. 131). Given this nature of
political considerations he argues that scientific knowledge is likely
to be used more for its political value in legitimizing decisions than
for its intellectual value in informing them (ibid. p. 127). He
refers, as an example, to the controversy over the nuclear test ban
treaty during the 1960s and quotes one commentator's conclusion to
the effect that .••
"..the major importance of scientific advice lay not so much in
that it provided the basis of decision as that it helped
create a political consensus in favour of the decision. In the
process of acquiring scientific advice the prestige and presumed
objectivity of scientists were mobilized to ascribe to the
treaty a certain aura of technical legitimacy." (ibid. p. 126)
Moreover, Ezrahi sees certain incompatibilities between the nature of
scientific knowledge and the information requirements of policy makers
(ibid. p. 127-8, 130). This theme is also taken up by Higgins (1980)
who argues that politicians and social scientists have different
orientations and needs so that the technical quality of social research
is largely irrelevant to its political usefullness. (ibid. p. 201-2).
For examples, whereas the social scientist requires specific goals and
objectives in advance of action, the political process is characterized
by imprecise and ambiguous goals because of political uncertainties
and conflicts, and advantages to politicans of retaining a degree of
ambiguity (ibid. p. 202). Consequently, there has been a neglect by
social scientists of ..•" the political viability of their researches"
(ibid.) •
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However, despite these difficulties there has nevertheless been an
..."increasing importance attached to 'expert knowledge', 'scientific'
problem-solving and sophisticated research methodology"... (ibid. p. 199)
which suggests an important legitimizing role for such knowledge and
techniques, and for the 'policy science' model itself. This can be
related, as argued above, to the increased requirement for the state
to become involved in planning and bureaucratic management, especially
directed at th0 problem of maintaining the stability and growth of the
economic system. The increasing importance of this 'technical domain'
of state activity, then, has resulted in the emergence of a 'modern'
ideological framework which legitimizes the state with reference to
science and 'technique'. The liberal democratic~pluralist political
ideology, which legitimizes the state primarily by presenting it as the
embodiment of the 'general interest' of an essentially conflict-free
society, is therefore refined in the emergent 'technocratic ideology'.
In this framework the state is still presented as serving the general
interest but now this is achieved through the application of scientific
rationality rather than through the political process; indeed, in this
ideology politics is reduced to rational technocratic guidance. But
this ideological framework can thereby be seen as abstracting the
technical aspect of policy formulation from its political context and,
consequently, as diverting analytical attention from underlying struct-
ures of power and dominance. It prOVides, then, a conception of
knowledge utilization with inherently conservative implications pro-
moting acceptance of prevailing values and social relations by defining
value questions and politics as 'irrational', and providing bureaucratic
elites within the institutions of the state with powerful 'social
technologies' (eg decision techniques such as CBA, PPBS) through which
policy decisions can be legitimized on the technical level.
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6.S Conclusion
It is possible to hypothesize, then, that this 'technocratic ideology'
has a prevailing contemporary influence upon thinking about social and
technological development in our society. As a basis for an attempt
to examine the validity of this proposition it is appropriate to sum-
marize the major themes of this ideological framework. I have argued
that the dominant ideology contains conceptions of the appropriate mode
of development of social knowledge, of the nature of the content of our
social world, and of the appropriate mode of utilization of such
knowledge to influence the process of social development. In their
mutual inteaction and interdependence these components can be seen
as generating certain fundamental normative themes.
Firstly, there is an underlying liberalism in evidence particuarly in
the models of the social world provided by orthodox economic and poli-
tical theory. Such models, developed according to positivist epistemo-
logical tenets are based primarily on the observable and measurable
phenomena of capitalist society abstracted from their institutional
and historical context. Market exchange processes are abstracted from
various important processes influencing the distribution of income
and wealth; aspects of political behaviour are abstracted from processes
behind the distribution and exercise of political power. What emerges
is a view of society as composed of free, autonomous rationally
behaving individuals, maximising their self-interest in a process of
equal exchange in the market, and thereby producing tendencies towards
an equilibrium which optimises individuals' and society's welfare and
which brings about social harmony and balance. The social mechanisms
of market exchange and democracy therefore achieve a balance between
individuals' preferences for economic, political and social 'goods'
and the provision of economic, political and social 'outputs'. It is
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the 'autonomous preferences' of individuals which have prime importance
in this scheme, not to be interfered with, providing the basic impulse
for economic and political change, and to be protected by the institutions
of the state. Groups of individuals may compete for scarce resources
but such competition is mediated by the state established in the gen-
eral interest of society as a whole. No fundamental deep-seated social
conflict is seen to exist; the concept of social classes with con-
flicting interests is not incorporated into social analysis. And,
finally, social change is conceptualized in gradualist, quantitative
terms, the mechanistic paradigm unable to accommodate the idea of funda-
mental qualitative institutional change.
The second theme is provided by a rationalism which is epitomised by
'technocratic rationality'. Embodied in this rationalism is a prag-
matic notion of the manipulability of nature and society and a
mechanistic notion of the partitionability of the world producing a
disaggregated and sectoral approach to its analysis. Technocratic
rationality assumes the primacy of instrumental reasoning concerned
with the achievement of given ends through the selection of the best
means on the basis of objective, 'value-free', social knowledge.
Rationality therefore applies only to the consideration of means which
are radically distinguished from ends and values, the consideration of
which must be 'subjective' and, therefore, irrational. Means are con-
sequently abstracted from the ends and values which they serve and imply
and this is reflected, for example, in abstraction of technological
developments from their social and institutional contexts. Moreover,
technocratic rationality implicitly imposes certain values, particularly
those of 'efficiency' and 'economy', in the idea of value-free selection
of the 'best' means. And, at a higher level, it implies a conception of
political society which again involves the imposition of a particular
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value-system in the name of value-freedom. 'Progress' is seen to involve
the replacement of politics with rational technocratic guidance invol-
ving instrumental reasoning applied by experts whose influence on
social development therefore increases at the expense of that of
politicians. There arises the ideal of the 'post-political' society
managed equitably by expert technocratic counsel, not requiring a
high level of citizen participation and therefore no longer subject
to 'irrational' political disputes and antagonisms.
By removina the goals and values of society from the realm of
rational discussion, technocratic rationality~ can be seen as producing an implicit acceptance of a materialist
imperative; such a materialism constitutes a third major ideological
theme. The priority afforded to the process of capital accumulation
within the capitalist economic system and the functions of the state
in relation to the maintenance of social stability through the
establishment of the conditions necessary for continued accumulation
and growth produce a pervading materialist context for the operation
of social processes in our society. The expansion of material outputs
is an essential component of the 'raison d'etre' of advanced industrial
societies. Moreover, the orthodox perception of social goals and
values in our society is heavily conditioned by the economistic
orientation of the dominant ideological framework. Neoclassical
economic theory abstracts commodity exchange processes as the essence
of the economic system and defines social welfare in terms of goods
and services which can be exchanged in the market. Progress - the
expansion of social welfare - is therefore defined in materialist
terms, and materialist goals become reified, unchallengeable within
technocratic rationality. More specifically, progress is seen to
involve the extension of rational technocratic guidance to promote
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the development of technological means to achieve expansion in the
output and consumption of material goods and services, and to balance
the demands of all individuals and social groups for such material
outputs and resources so as to maintain social harmony.
We have, therefore, now arrived at a conceptual framework comprising
a set of hypotheses about the nature of social scientific knowledge,
the basis for its 'rationality', and its role and influence in debates
and decisions about public policy issues. In particular, I have
produced a conception of ideological knowledge and of a 'dominant
ideology' and its major normative underpinnings in our society.
This conception now provides a framework for examining a specific
public policy issue - that concerning the development of nuclear
energy - with a view to, firstly, making an assessment of the 'useful-
ness' of this conception and, secondly, attempting to provide some
insights into the present state of the debate about the implications
of proceeding with (or not proceeding with) nuclear power as a possible
solution to the 'energy problem'. This analysis will be the concern
of the second part of this thesis.
278
PART TWO: Ideology and the Nuclear Power Debate
"Abundant energy is perhaps the
of an industrialised society.
meet this need and surely will
(Hill 1981 p. 519)
most essential need
Nuclear power can
go on to do so."
"While delay is an easy option, the risk and high cost
to the economy in terms of loss of output, unemployment
and social unrest, that would follow any severe or
prolonged energy shortage would seem to be too high a
price to pay for appeasing the opponents of nuclear
power, if indeed this is possible .•..••
Governments should then, wherever possible, take what
steps are readily available to increase the rate of
construction of nuclear stations; to promote the use
of electricity and nuclear power .... " (Greenhalgh
1980 p , 117).
"The as yet unsolved problem of waste management and
the possibly unsolvable (in an absolute sense) problems
of catastrophic releases of radioactivity and diversion
of bomb grade material combine to create grave and
justified misgivings about the vast increase in the
use of nuclear power that has been widely predicted.
The wisdom of such an increase must at the present time
be seriously questioned." (from the Statement of the
23rd Pugwash Conference quoted in Lovins 1975 p. 9)
"(N)uclear power involves a set of unresolved physical
dangers, ..•. it propels a dangerous social instability
both domestically and internationally, and •..•• it is
not relevant to the main problems of energy supply
facing Britain." (Prior 1980A p.8)
Such statements as these provide some indication of the degree of
polarisation which has developed in the debate about the need for,
and desirability of, the development of nuclear power as a contribution
towards the solution of the energy problems which we face now, and in
the anticipated future. The strength of feeling and depth of
controversy which has emerged over this issue can be seen as a function
of the 'special' character of nuclear technology compared with other
types of technology of which we have experience. There are perhaps
two primary aspects of this special character (Bickerstaffe and Pearce
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1980 p. 311-2). Firstly, civil applications of nuclear power
developed out of an original military programme and there are necessary
continuing linkages with a realm of technological application of
horrendous destructive capacity. Secondly, the 'social costs'
associated with nuclear power potentially achieve a scale of collective
impact not found in other fields of technological development. For
example, the potential impact of a reactor accident is many orders of
magnitude worse than the severest consequences of non-nuclear
technologies (setting aside the question of probabilities).
This latter characteristic is of some considerable importance to the
debate about nuclear energy. The general point has, as we have seen,
been made by Wolf H~fele (1974). He argues that nuclear power is
representative of a scale of technological development, which we have
now achieved, the implications of which impinge upon "...the widest
determinants of our normal existence." (ibid p , 317). Therefore, the
scale of the potential collective social costs, in relation to safety,
environmental, social and political implications, is such as to pose
threats to some of the fundamental bases of our social existence. In
this context, Hafele argues "•.. the public concern about nuclear power
is not unfounded" (ibid); Bickerstaffe and Pearce (op. cit.) go
further and suggest that opposition is 'legitimate'. An important
corollary of this characteristic of nuclear technology is a limit on
the extent to which we can learn from experience the actual magnitude
of the social costs involved due to the obvious inapplicability of the
'trial and error' approach and to the inappropriateness of analogies
with other highly engineered systems whose potential risks are
qualitatively different (Hafele Ope cit. p. 313-4; Lovins 1975 p. 12).
Consequently, the knowledge which can be brought to bear upon the
controversy over nuclear power is subject to certain limitations and
this has important consequences. In particular, it can be seen as
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reducing the potential basis for consensus, aggravating the
controversial nature of the issue.
Moreover, a parallel corollary of this 'special' nature of nuclear
technology makes the situation even more convoluted. It is now
widely accepted that debates about technological developments are
underlain by questions relating to value systems relevant to what is
seen as a 'desirable' society; such arguments were considered briefly
in chater one (see p.48 ). The existence of divergent value systems,
then renders disputes about social and technological change extremely
complex and difficult to resolve due to disagreement on the definition,
magnitude and evaluation of costs and benefits. However, this
dimension of the controversy would appear to be rendered substantially
more important in the case of nuclear technology because the potential
scale of its impacts is so great in relation to our social existence.
Many who emphasise the possible number of casualties from a reactor
accident, possible long-term hazards of nuclear waste, possible
implications for civil liberties etc., may be less concerned with
statistical calculations of low probabilities than with the ethical
and moral implications of potential consequences (cf. Taylor 1980).
Therefore, the strength of such quite legitimate ethical and moral
concerns about the impacts of nuclear technology may greatly overwhelm
the consideration of the 'facts' relating to the magnitude of such
impacts, 'facts' which, in many cases, (as argued above) are indeed
based upon a limited foundation.
On the question of the development of nuclear energy, then, we have a
recipe for a particularly intricate and intractable controversy, in
which cognitive and evaluative structures operate in a complex
interrelationship. As a basis for an attempt to investigate the
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nature of this interrelationship it will be useful to outline in
broad terms what is at issue in the debate over nuclear energy and the
nature of the major arguments. Basically, the controversy centres on
the question of what are, in the widest sense, the costs and benefits
to society associated with the development of nuclear power. However,
questions of magnitude form only part of the debate. More fundamental
are disputes which arise due to differences in values concerning, for
example, just what are the relevant costs and benefits. What impacts
are to count as 'costs' and which are to count as 'benefits'? The
problem is that when value systems differ one person's 'benefits' may be
another person's 'costs' so there may be little common ground on which
agreement can be reached. Indeed, the problem extendsto the actual
identification of impacts; such an identification is contingent upon
the employment of some conceptual framework concerning the interrelationships
between technology and society and the existence of alternative frameworks
or paradigms or ideologies produces problems of incommensurability in
the debate.
Such effects are largely implicit and invisible. Perhaps the most
obvious influence of values on the debate concerns the weighting of
different costs and benefits and the establishment of 'trade-off
fu~ions'. Together with disputes about magnitudes of costs and
benefits and about appropriate units of measurements, this area of
disagreement constitutes perhaps the most visible part of the controversy.
For example, for David Pearce (l980A) the 'energy equation' involves
trading the economic benefits of nuclear power compared with alternative
energy solutions against the alleged higher social costs of a nuclear
future. The major part of the controversy concerns the relative
magnitudes of the economic benefits and the social costs and the
weighting of these magnitudes. But adherence to alternative value
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systems can result in the rejection of this framework; for example,
those who deny the benefits of economic growth will see a nuclear
future as all cost and no benefit (ibid. Pearce and Nash 1981 p. 18).
In addition there is the problem of identifying what the economic I
impacts of nuclear power actually are; we have seen (cf. Chapter 3)
that there is no possibility of objective economic knowledge and it
is possible to adopt hypotheses which point to a negative economic
impact for nuclear power.
For the purposes of exposition, then, I will first consider argments
(in Chapter 7) relating to the economic implications of nuclear power,
the predominant view being that here lies the benefits against which
any social costs must be offset. Then, in Chapter 8, I shall look,
in turn, at safety, environmental, social and political implications
and consider arguments which, to a large extent, relate to the
measurement, magnitude and weighting of the 'social costs' involved.
The emphasis in these two chapters will be on developing outline
positions of supporters and opponents in relation to the primary issues
with the intention of presenting what might be seen as 'typical' or
'characteristic' stances rather than exhaustive representations of all
possible arguments. It is hoped that the conceptual advantages of
this approach outweight the disadvantages due to synthesis and
aggregation. Finally, in Chapter 9, I shall examine certain aspects
of the debate, focussing primarily upon stances which favour the
development of nuclear power, with a view to assessing the extent to
which the arguments developed in chapters 2 to 6 provide a meaningful
conceptual framework for gaining an understanding of the complex
interrelationship between the cognitive and evaluative dimensions of
the debate.
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Chapter 7: The Economic Benefits of Nuclear Power
7.1 Introduction
There are two major interrelated economic issues at stake in the nuclear
debate. The first concerns the extent to which nuclear power is
necessary to prevent future shortages of energy and therefore, by
keeping the cost of energy down, to guarantee the continuation of
economic growth. Accepting, for arguments' sake, that economic
growth represents a benefit the central question becomes: what are
the economic benefits of nuclear power measured in the form of the
future increase in gross domestic product which would necessarily be
foregone if nuclear power were not developed? (Pearce 1979A p. 35).
The second related issue concerns the extent to which the cost of
nuclear generated electricity is less than that of electricity
generated from other sources and, consequently, the extent of the
economic benefit to be derived from generating electricity from nuclear
reactors as opposed to other sources. Again the benefit is in the
form of GDP otherwise sacrificed. Obviously, the issues are extremely
complex and I shall attempt only a brief survey of the arguments pro
and anti.
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7.2 Avoiding an Energy-Constrained Future
The argument in support of nuclear power as the means to avoid an
energy-constrained future can be broadly outlined. The population of
the world is increasing rapidly and living standards are rising.
While standards in developed countries will continue to increase, Third
World countries want to close the 'development gap' at the same time as
supporting rapidly rising populations. The increases in food supply
required will need higher energy inputs (Greenhalgh 1980 p. 13-21;
Jones 1980A p. 18; Hill 1976 p. 3; Tombs 1979 p. 116). It is
imperative that economic growth be maintained and indeed encouraged in
order to maintain stability and provide development in poorer countries:
"There can .... be little doubt that increasing economic
growth has been and is the only means of providing the
large majority of the world's population with those
goods and services which were once the prerogative of
the few. Any alternative may lead to the introduction
of a dirigistic economy with an associated police state,
or at the international level a conflict between the
underdeveloped and the industrialised countries."
(Greenhalgh op. cit. p. 3)
Since there exists a well established empirical relationship between
economic growth and energy consumption, a relationship which cannot be
completely decoupled, continued growth must mean increasing energy
consumption (Jones 1980A p. 18; Greenhalgh 1980 p. 4-7; Hill 1977;
Bethe 1978 p. 91). There is a limit, then, on the extent to which
conservation and energy efficiency measures can reduce the rate of
growth in energy consumption in a healthy economic climate due to
technical and economic factors and problems relating to consumer
choice; in a context of low growth investment in energy saving would
be even more constrained. Moreover, there are severe limits on the
extent to which conservation measures can reduce the growth of energy
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consumption in less developed countries (Jones op. cit.; Greenhalgh
op. cit.; Weinberg 1980 p. 32). It is even suggested that conservation
represents a waste of resources compared with alternative investments
(Tombs 1978 p. 3, 1979 p. 116).
Because of technical, economic and environmental problems renewable
sources of energy will, it is argued, be able to make only a limited
contribution to energy supplies in the foreseeable future, probably
little more than 10-12% on a world scale by the end of the century and
less than 15% in 2020 (Jones op. cit. p. 18-19). Due to problems of
high capital costs and variable output investment in such sources as
solar, wind and wave energy is likely to be 'uneconomic' (Tombs op. cit.).
At present rates of consumption oil and natural gas reserves can last
only a limited time,~t the most about 30 years, perhaps up to 50 years
in the case of natural gas. As prices rise more marginal sources will
be used and greater exploration and enhanced recovery will increase
supplies but it is argued that this will have relatively little impact
(Greenhalgh op. cit. p. 45-6; Bethe op. cit. p. 85-7). Moreover,
such fuels should be reserved and conserved for premium uses such as
transport, chemical feedstocks and even synthetic protein: "we should
not then consider burning hydrocarbons; we may need to eat them"
(Greenhalgh op. cit p. 19). Although coal reserves are considerable
they are poorly distributed in r~lation to areas of demand thus creating
a trade problem, and will become increasingly expensive to mine.
Moreover, occupational risks from coal mining are high and there are
likely to be environmental obstacles to the full exploitation of coal
resources. Nevertheless, coal is seen as indeed making a significant
contribution to satisfying future energy demand (up to about a quarter
of world primary energy supply by 2000-2020), but given that it will
2~
have to be used increasingly to substitute for declining hydrocarbon
resources, it cannot in itself provide for the growth in demand for
electricity (Jones op. cit.j Hill 1976, Tombs 1979).
Indeed, it is envisaged that an increasing proportion of the total
demand for energy in the future will be for electricity. Electricity
consumption has grown in the past faster than energy demand in general
and should continue to grow rapidly especially in developing countries
(Greenhalgh op. cit. p.99-l0lj Bethe op. cit. p. 94-5). Given the
advantages of electricity as an energy carrier and the future need to
substitute oil and gas, Weinberg (1980 p.32) for example, sees no
reason why we should not envisage a predominantly electric future.
Therefore, it is argued by proponents of nuclear power that, in
spite of conservation efforts, the growth in energy demand will
eventually begin to 'outstrip' available supplies from fossil fuels
and renewable sources creating an 'energy gap' or 'shortfall'. This
would obviously not appear as a physical gap or shortage but would
manifest itself in the form of rapidly rising energy prices and depres-
sed growth. This problem could then present a real threat to the
stability of Western economies and to the development hopes of the Third
World, and would create international tension due to competition for
scarce energy and measures to protect national economies (Jones 1980B
p.154j Tombs 1978 p.4). In particular, an 'energy trap' could arise
with rising energy prices producing a downward spiral of recession in
which falling demand limits the scope for the investment in supply
needed to break out of the 'trap' (Greenhalgh op. cit. p. 113-5).
In order to avoid such potential problems, then, it is considered
imperative that all energy options open to us are exploited to the
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maximum possible extent and with some urgency so as to keep our
options for the future open and to minimize the risk of energy short-
ages and, consequently, constraints on economic growth (Jones 1980A;
Weinberg 1980). In particular we must develop nuclear power on a sub-
stantial scale since it provides the best prospects for reducing the
pressure on other energy sources (releasing coal to substitute for oil
and gas) and for stabilizing energy prices (Jones 1980B p. 154-5).
In other words, the development of the nuclear option minimizes the
risk of contrained GDP growth and therefore provides the greatest
benefits in terms of GDP which would otherwise be sacrificed.
In the longer term, moreover, in view of limits to the availability
of uranium resources and the relatively low efficiency of t.he once-
through fuel cycle of thermal reactors, it will be necessary to intro-
duce fast neutron breeder reactors. On the basis of current estimates
of uranium reserves and likely annual availability it is argued that,
even with a low growth in demand from thermal reactors, there will
arise constraints on thermal reactor programmes sometime between 2000
and 2Q25, or even earlier (Greenhalgh 1981 p.24; Jones 1980A p.20).
Fast reactors, however, can extract 50-60 times more energy from
uranium than current thermal reactors and are therefore essential if
nuclear fission is to make more than a transient contribution (measured
in decades) to world energy needs (ibid. p. 21). Experience with
experimental fast reactors has shown that the technology is feasible
and safe; indeed, it is argued that it provides safety and environ-
mental advantages over both fossil-fu.eled electricity generation and
thermal reactors as well as reducing proliferation risks (cf.
below section 8.3.1) (Greenhalgh 1981 p. 23-5).
Consequently, longer term growth prospects can be guaranteed only if
fast reactor technology is developed as rapidly as possible to the
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stage of commercial deployment. Moreover, even if the future is not
as certain as this, it is irresponsible to gamble on nuclear power not
being necessary. We need to keep all our options open and proceed
along all reasonable lines of development including nuclear power.
The burden of proof should lie on those who argue for delays to
the development of nuclear power since delay now may mean undue and
dangerous risks later on with possible restrictions on economic
growth and decreased safety levels (cf. Posner 1978 p. 50-1).
An illustration of the basic reasoning behind the general economic
case is provided by Maddox (1975 p. 185):
"The plain truth is that in the advanced communities of the
industrialised world, as well as in developing countries,
the need to increase energy consumption is irresistable
It is unthinkable that communities such as the British
would consider the unemployment that a sharp decrease in
energy consumption would cause as more acceptable than the
small risks of reactor accidents, just as it is politically
unrealistic to expect developing countries to settle for slower
economic growth or reduced agricultural output for the sake
of keeping nuclear power at bay. Moreover, the rapid devel-
opment of nuclear power offers the most promising route to
the realignment of the cost of energy on which the economic
welfare of the next ten years depends. The future, in a sense,
is unavoidable."
The argument for nuclear power as a means of avoiding an energy-
constrained future and consequent losses of benefits of economic growth
tends to be associated with optimistic views about future growth pro-
spects, and therefore in the past few years has perhaps become less
forceful as forecasts of economic growth have been down-graded. How-
ever, it is still to be found in the context of the 'high growth'
scenarios produced by, for example, the Department of Energy (1982)
and the CEGB (1982A). In its case for the Sizewell B reactor the CEGB
argued that in the event of the high growth scenarios coming to pass
up to 28 c:;w of new capacity would be needed by 2000 to accommodate
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growth in electricity demand and pressures on fossil fuel supplies
would be such that a substantial increase in nuclear capacity would
be needed to provide secure energy supplies to guarantee growth pro-
spects (ibiq. p. 55-7; Jenkin 1982 p. 37-48).
As far as opponents of nuclear power are concerned various arguments
are presented in relation to this aspect of its economic implications.
For example, some deny that economic growth is a benefit and that we
should be concerned with achieving non-materialist values in an
energy-efficient society based on sustainable and renewable sources
(cf. Avebury 1978, Lovins 1977). Alternatively, it is possible to
argue that economic growth can be sustained without the need for large
increases in energy supplies if we pay more attention to the efficiency
with which energy is used in relation to the tasks performed (cf.
Leach et al. 1979). Indeed, some argue that increasing investment
in the supply of more and more energy can actually hinder economic
growth and therefore reduce the benefits of avoiding an energy-constr-
ained future relative to those obtainable from measures to improve
efficiency of use (cf. Commoner 1976). Particular at t.ent.Lori will be
paid here to the second position due to its apparently more widespread
currency.
A central feature of the argument of opponents of nuclear power is a
cri tique of the official practice of producing projections of future
energy demand on the basis of macro-relationships with gross domestic
product. For examples, Leach (1979 p. 10) argues as follows:
"Until recently, most long-range energy forecasts rested on
the observation that in many countries over long periods of
time primary energy consumption rose in line with GOP. From
this arose the belief that the energy-GOP linkage was a rigid
economic law; that energy use must grow with rising GOP and,
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conversely, that a low energy future must involve fewer
goods and services, fewer jobs, and belt-tightening
deprivation.
Even before 1973/74 belief in this idea was beginning to
crumble; the years since have all but shattered it.
Numerous studies have shown that such gross relationships have
no intrinsic validity beyond that of coincidence, although
the accompanying mythology that energy equals wealth has
been slower to die."
It is argued, then, that the development of an empirical relationship
between GDP (or other measures of economic output) and energy use in
in the U.K., for example over the period 1950-73, is inherently
unsound as a basis for projecting future energy demand. This is
because such a relationship neglects the factors which are actually
responsible for determining energy use. For example, much of the
increase in final energy use between 1950-73 was due to increases
in road traffic which is subject to saturation effects, as are
electricity-consuming domestic appliances ownership of which also
increased rapidly over this period (ibid). Moreover, as standards
of living increase rising proportions of disposable income tend to
be spent on goods with a higher ratio of price to energy consumption
(eg TV, Hifi) relative to goods bought at lower levels of wealth
(eg space and water heating) (Coyne 1978). Substantial amounts
of energy consumed are unrelated to GDP and considerable savings could
be made (for example in space heating and lighting) with no effect on
GOP; conversely much of GDP creation (e.g. in the service sector) is
only indirectly linked to energy use and considerable growth could
be achieved with little effect on energy use (Leach Ope cit.).
Consequently, traditional methods of demand forecasting are criti-
cized as embodying assumptions which exclude many possible choices
and result in a 'pre-conditioning' of policy outcomes. To the extent,
then, that such forecasts are at least partially self-fulfilling,
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the potential for changing energy consumption patterns is being
precluded at the level of basic assumptions (Lovins 1977). The
'energy gap' or 'shortfall' which provides a major basis of the argu-
ment for nuclear power is merely •.. "a figment of forecasters'
imaginations" (Leach 1978 p.66) •
Specific criticisms have been directed at the energy demand forecasts
produced by the Department of Energy. Even if it is accepted that
there is some validity in an energy/GDP relationship the economic
growth assumptions or targets used by the Department of Energy have
been too high reflecting an over-optimism about growth prospects
(Pearce 1980A p.10; 1981 p. 24-5; Friends of the Earth 1981 para 28).
On the basis of economic performance in the second half of the 1970s
and perceived prospects for the mid-1980s, Pearce (op. cit.)
argued that even a growth rate of 2% is optimistic as an average up to
the end of the century. In their most recent energy projections the
Department of Energy (1982) develop a range of scenarios based on
economic growth assumptions for the period to 2000 ranging from 0.5%
p.a. to 2.5% p.a.; this high figure was criticised as over-opti-
mistic at the Sizewell Inquiry by the C.P.R.E. (Sizewell Transcripts
Day 45 p. 36-9). Similar criticisms were directed at the CEGB's
high growth assumption of 2.6% - 3.4% p.a. (Sizewel1 Transcripts Day
76 p. 45-56). The implication of over-optimism about economic growth
in official forecasts is that benefits attributable to nuclear power,
in the form of the quantity of GDP growth which ~uldbe sacrificed
should it not be developed, are overstated. The overstatement is
compounded, moreover, if the relationship between energy demand and
GDP is not immutable.
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As far as critics are concerned, then, the official case for nuclear
power overstates the extent to which there will be an energy shortfall
by the end of the century and therefore exaggerates the adverse
economic consequences which would follow from a failure to supply
sufficient energy. But the case against nuclear power goes further,
arguing that even greater energy savings can be achieved, at no expense
in terms of sacrificed GOP, by increasing the efficiency of energy
conversion and use and by improved matching of energy sOUrce to the
work requirements of the end use. Lovins (1979B p. 188-90) refers
to studies which indicate that the application of currently cost-
effective technologies could at least double Western European end-use
efficiency and lead to stable or declining energy use in an expanding
economy. Work by Friends of the Earth points to a possible quadrupling
of the nation's fuel efficiency (FOE 1981, para 32). The influential
study headed by Gerald Leach indicated that UK primary energy con-
sumption could be stablized at the present level while GOP trebled
between now and 2025 if conservation measures and technical improvements
that are currently available (or should be so by the mid-1980s) and
economically attractive, were implemented in a concer~ed conservation
programme (Leach 1979).
A variety of measures are therefore available, it is argued,to conserve
energy and improve end-use efficiency without impacting adversely on
economic growth prospects: indeed, some argue that investment in such
measures would produce an economic stimulus (ibid; CSENE 1981). For
example, a domestic insulation programme at a rate of half a million
homes a year could save 3% of UK primary energy demand (CSENE 1981
p.27). Moreover, the economic return on investments in conservation
measures can be much greater than investment in further supplies: some
US utilities are obtaining higher returns on capital invested in
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measures to avoid the need for extra generating capacity (Walker 1981).
It has been estimated that combined heat and power schemes with district
heating could supply one third of the low temperature heat market
saving about 13% of end-use needs and 12% of primary energy demand
(Marshall 1981 p. 14-15; FOE 1981 para. 35-9). A 30% improvement in
motor vehicle fuel efficiency could save 40% of primary energy
(Marshallop. cit.). Inreased efficiency of domestic electrical appli-
ances and lighting, and of electric motors used in industry could also
produce substantial savings (Conroy 1972 p. 494). Electric and gas-
fired heat pumps could take 15% of the space heating market by the
end of the century (Leach 1979). All these measures are alleged to
be cost-effective in comparison with investment in further supply of
energy and imply a degree of government intervention which does not
pose a threat to the freedom of consumer choice (ibid. p 16).
Consequently, this 'technical fix' position asserts that continued
material prosperity is consistent with a stabilized or even reduced
consumption of primary energy and, as a result of the more efficient
use of energy, our fossil fuel resources, particularly coal, are
sufficient to see us well beyond the end of the century without the
need for nuclear power. As Leach (ibid. p. 19) states:
"Nuclear power in our projections thus becomes a peripheral
issue and could be abandoned as an option if - for whatever
reason - it became prudent to do so".
Two important features of this 'technical fix' approach, as epito-
mized by Leach's work (also see Chapman 1975, chap. 11), are firstly,
the assumption of continued economic growth along conventional lines
and, secondly, the assumption that renewable energy technologies will
not make significant contributions until well into the next century.
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However, some opponents of nuclear power adopt more 'radical' posi-
tions by questi<Llning these asswnptions.
As indicated above, some critics reject the notion that economic
growth represents a benefit which can be accounted to justify social
and technological developments. They argue that the use of GDP
as a measure of social welfare represents bankrupt, narrow 'material-
ist' thinking and that the continuous pursuit of increasing consumption
of material goods within a growth-orientec society cannot solve funda-
mental social problems. An example of this position is provided by
Avebury (1978 p. 19).
"Is the so-called civilised world really so bankrupt of
ideas that the only major political goal is perpetually
increasing consumption of material goods and -thus of energy?
We consume more already than we need to keep ourselves
properly nourished there is enough accommodation for all;
we have enough fuel to keep warm; and there are the means
of adequate mobility. The reasons why some people do not
have enough of these goods still are not inadequacies of
supply, but waste, misallocation, and inefficiencies of
distribution. And experience shows that continued growth
does not solve the question of poverty, on a world scale or
withi~ur country".
Rather, it is argued that there is a desperate need to consciously
re-evaluate our social goals and priorities instead of implicitly
accepting the 'status quo', and to see energy as a cost of achieving
these consciously-desired values so that the emphasis is placed on
achieving these with maximum efficiency in primary energy use, and so
that the development of nuclear power does not occur, as it were, by
default, merely to postpone what must eventually be a necessary social
exercise in one form or another (Lovins 1977 p.12-13; Commoner 1976
p, 257).
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Many opponents of nuclear power are critical of the pessimistic
assumptions which, allegedly are applied to the assessment of the
supply potential of renewable sources of energy no less than those
applied in respect of the potential for conservation (Patterson 1977
p. 42, 89; 1978 p. 129; Leach 1978 p. 55, 66; Lovins 1977 p. 15-16,
22). It is argued that the low energy scenarios based on renewable
technologies and conservation, which are in fact being developed
and demonstrated throughout the world, are attacked and dismissed
by supporters of nuclear power as hypothetical, speculative and
presenting severe technical problems. On the contrary, high
energy scenarios based on nuclear power, which are seen as repres-
enting very challenging options in terms of complex technology and
massive investment programmes, attract favourarle and optimistic
evaluations in spite of a record of disappointed expectations as
epitomised by the British AGR programme (cf Burn 1978, Henderson 1977).
This asymmetry is seen as prevading energy forecasting and policy
making reflecting the power of institutions with a vested interest in
the expansion of fuel supplies; while the interests behind fossil fuel
and nuclear energy supply are institutionalized, those behind conser-
vation and renewable sources of supply are not. It is argued that
the asymmetry is reflected, for example, in the economic evaluation
of renewable in relation to nuclear options, renewable technologies
being subjected to rigorous economic evaluation and dismissed as
'uneconomic' in relation to conventional rates of return on capital
invested, while over the past 25 years the nuclear power programme
has been developed on the basis of a huge public subvention not sub-
jected to conventional economic criteria. Therefore, it 19 alleged that
the potential economic contribution of renewable energy sources is
greater than supporters of nuclear power are prepared to admit and,
296
given a 'balanced and fair' assessment programme such sources could
provide a significant proportion of our energy needs. (Lovins 1977)
The question of the relative costs of renewable and nuclear energy
will be considered more fully in the next section; more relevant
here are arguments to the effect that the potential of renewables is
such as to render invalid the image of the energy-constrained world
prevalent in pro-nuclear thinking. For example, Lovins (1979) argues
that in combination with measures to improve end-use efficiency,
renewable sources of energy can make a significant contribution to
energy supplies in both developed and developing countries, could
achieve 'impressive deployment rates', and indeed have advantages in
terms of technical risk and 'resilience' (ibid p.194-7). In relation
to countries of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) he argues
that ...
" an extremely wide range of practical, technically
sophisticated, and economically interesting devices in each
end-use category is in commercial production, currently
entering such production, or technically mature enough to
enter such production a year or two after a modicum of
final product engineering. It appears that such
existing technologies for solar space and process heat,
pyrolysis and fermentation of biomass residues, wind collection,
microhydroelectrics and low-temperature solar heat engines -
suffice to meet all or a very large fraction of the long-term
energy needs of even the least favourably situated ECE countries
(Denmark and the UK). In short, deployment could begin immed-
iately without waiting for any technological break throughs
(many of which, however, appear imminent). (ibid p. 194-5)
Studies for the UK by the National Centre for Alternative Technology
(NCAT 1978) and by Friends of the Earth (FOE 1981)
also argue for significant contributions from renewable energy in
conjunction with concerted conservation efforts;solar, wind and biomass
technologies are seen as being particularly appropriate in the UK
context. Friends of the Earth (1981) argue that solar collec1 ors could
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supply 'virtually all' our water heating and most space heating re-
quirements. As regards wind energy, the CEGB has estimated a
potential contribution from offshore sites of up to 230 Twh which
exceeds the current level of annual sales of electricity in the UK
and which should increase with technical developments in the near
future (Wright 1982A).
A variety of positions are therefore adopted by critics of nuclear
power in relation to the issue of avoiding an energy-constrained
future and the resulting adverse consequences for economic growth.
Such positions are, in broad terms, characterized by varying emphases
on the desirability of economic growth, the potential for energy
conservation through demand management and measures to improve end-
use efficiencies, and the potential for energy from renewable sources
As indicated earlier, the position which appears to have gained the
most currency (perhaps becnase it is the one taken most seriously by
supporters of nuclear power) is that characterised by Gerald Leach's
work, accepting continued economic growth, emphasizing conservation
and efficiency and assuming that the potential of renewables will not
be realized until well into the next century. From this perspective
there are two further arguments which are commonly put forward to
suggest that the development of nuclear power does not promote the
objective of securing future economic growth.
Firstly, it has been argued by some critics, notably Lovins (1975,
1977, 1979B) and Commoner (1976), that the extreme capital intensity
of nuclear power may actually hinder economic growth prospects.
Lovins, for example, suggests that substantial nuclear power programmes
would place such demands on the mechanisms of capital formation and
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allocation that non-energy sectors might be starved of capital,
especially in times of public expenditure restraints, thus jeopardizing
the economic growth which is assumed to generate the demand for nuclear
electricity, and exacerbating unemployment problems (1975 p. 42;
1979B p. 184). Further, he argues that the high capital intensity
and long lead times of large nuclear plant, by tying up large amounts
of capital non-productively during the long construction period,
exacerbate inflation and destabilize utility cash flows (ibid; 1977
p. 9-10). Consequently, nuclear power programmes might well aggravate
the already serious economic predicament in the western economies
rather than guaranteeing future growth as argued by its proponents
(see also Patterson 1978 p.132; Matthews 1980 p. 26-7).
This line of reasoning is further elaborated by Commoner (1976
chaps. 8-9) who maintains that nuclear power development actually
exists in a parasitic relationship with economic growth and not the
symbiotic relationship hypothesized by its proponents in which the
investment funds for nuclear power are generated by the growth in
GDP which it stimulates. He argues, then, that in a capitalist
economy the logic of the profit motive results in the continual
substitution of capital and energy for labour. But such a process
of substitution tends to result in the declining productivity of
capital and energy, and the increasing productivitv of the remaining
labour, resulting in further pressures to substitute labour (ibid p ,
223-4). As the productivity of capital declines private sector
generation of investment funds becomes increasingly difficult and public
sector investment grows as the state intervenes to subsidize the
economy's capital needs, and to attempt to promote economic growth in
order, firstly, to alleviate the unemployment problem which results
from labour substitution and, secondly, to stimulate private capital
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formation. However, it is argued that economic growth derives pri-
marily from increases in labour productivity which result from capital
investment and the implication is that nuclear power, having little
impact upon labour productivity and, indeed, diverting investment from
sectors which could have such an impact, may actually hinder the process
of economic growth and contribute to the severity of the state's
public expenditure crisis (ibid chap. 9). This crisis is also likely
to be exacerbated by the increases in unemployment that derive from
diversion of investment to (unnecessary) capital-intensive energy
production from more labour intensive sectors of the economy.
A similar line of reasoning is presented in a Western European con-
text by the Agenoy Cooperative (Agenor 1979) which argues that the
massive capital requirements of nuclear power constitute a real threat
to economic growth and to employment prospects particularly in
countries like Britain which have a relatively high ratio of energy
consumption to GDP (ibid p. 18-21). Employment implications have
also been singled out for special attention. For example, studies in
Germany have argued that nuclear programmes create fewer jobs at
higher cost than alternative programmes of energy conservation and re-
newables (ibid p. 7-9). In the UK context Elliot (1979) has pre-
sented similar arguments although his work has been criticised by
Pearce (1979B) from the 'conventional' perspective which sees nuclear
power as providing the best means of guaranteeing future growth and,
therefore, future employment prospects.
There is a further argument which is relevant to the economic growth
issue. It is sometimes argued by critics of nuclear power that if the
cause of the future economic well-being is served by maintaining a
capability for flexible response and 'keeping all our options open'
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(as implied by offical UK policy objectives) then the development
of nuclear power does not best promote that cause. Specifically, it
is suggested that pushing ahead with the development of nuclear power
at the present time requires very large amounts of public money for
investment and research and development at a time when such funds
are in short supply thus effectively starving alternatives, such
as conservation and renewables, of funds (cf Flowers 1976 p. 195-7).
Secondly, the early development of nuclear power would produce
increased dependence on a centralized electricity distribution system
which reduces the scope for later change to alternatives not con-
sistent with such a system (Patterson 1977). Moreover, as energy
demand continues to grow to higher and higher levels it becomes
increasingly difficult to sustain and the options available for such
sustenance become increasingly limited (cf Lecomber 1979 p. 179-80).
Finally, pursuit of the nuclear path strengthens the power and
influence of the institutions behind nuclear power and electricity
supply on the energy policy making process (Patterson 1977, 1978).
It is argued, then, that all these factors would maintain and even
strengthen the existing asymmetries which pe~ade policy making and
would therefore detract from the cause of keeping future policy options
open with possible adverse implications for economic stability. On
the contrary, the cause of future flexibility is seen as best served
by placing maximum effort on eliminating waste, increasing efficiency
of use and conservation, and developing the most promising renewable
energy sources in order to buy time to undertake a thorough assessment
of the need for, and the risks involved in, nuclear power development
(Lovins 1975 p. 52-4, Flowers 1976 p. 194-5).
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There are, therefore, fundamental divergencies of opinion between
supporters and opponents of nuclear power in relation to the issue of
the extent to which nuclear energy is necessary in order to avoid an
energy-constrained future and the resulting adverse consequences for
economic growth. The principal focus of controversy in this context
concerns the potential for energy conservation, with nuclear critics
tending to emphasize the technical potential while supporters emphasize
macroeconomic problems and behavioural constraints. This controversy
will be examined rather more closely in Chapter 9. As regards alter-
native sources of supply arguments about potential contributions
must proceed beyond the technical level to the question of the
relative costs of energy from different sources. Specifically, in
any assessment of the economic benefits to be derived from nuclear
power the question of its contribution to the avoidance of future
energy shortages has only partial relevance. Perhaps of greater
importance particularly in the present'low growth' context is the
question of the cost of nuclear energy compared with alternatives
and therefore of the extent to which investment in nuclear power
represents the best use of available resources by providing electricity
at the lowest possible resource cost.
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7.3 The Cost of Nuclear Electricity Generation
This issue has in recent years come to the fore in the official case
for nuclear power development in the UK and is the basis for the argu-
ment that nuclear power is economically justified at the present time
simply on a fuel substitution basis, given current fossil fuel prices,
irrespective of future trends in the demand for electricity (Secretary
of State for Energy 1981 p.4; Department of Energy 1982). The posi-
tion has been stated in broad terms as follows:
"Nuclear power stations have much higher initial capital costs
than coal-fired stations, but because of their low fuel costs
and operating characteristics are particularly suited to
continuous baseload operation. They therefore displace
existing coal or oil-fired power stations in the 'merit
order' • . • . and lead to substantial savings in fuel
costs. The CEGB calculate that over the life of a new nuclear
station its total cost, including both capital and running
costs, should be outweighed by the fuel savings in other
stations which it will make possible".
(Secretary of State for Energy op. cit.para 25).
As a result of such fuel cost savings, therefore, fewer resources
are required for the generation of a given amount of electricity
and more resources are available for other investment with consequent
GDP gains.
Indeed, this aspect of the economic case for nuclear power is at the
forefront of the CEGBs case for the Sizewell B nuclear power station
(CEGB 1982A). Although it is argued that the construction of the
reactor is justified on the grounds of lifetime operational cost
savings, the contribution to the diversificatin of power station
fuell&ng,and the provision of capacity to replace time-expired plant
and meet any increase in electricity demand, it is the first of
these grounds which is considered paramount (ibid. p. ii-iii):
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"The economic appraisal of Sizewell 'B' shows it to be a
good investment in its own right and a superior investment
to a coal-fired station. The CEGB's studies also indicate
that within a wide range of futures the provision of further
nuclear generation would be more economic than coal and
would serve to minimise the cost of electricity •
The overall cost of generating electricity by a nuclear
station is less than by a fossil fuel station because the
operating costs, including those of the nuclear fuel cycle,
are so much less. The economic advantage achieved by savings
in the use of costly fossil fuels is not significantly
altered by variations in the electricity demand since savings
against fossil-fired plant still remain". (ibid. para. 13-14).
Until relatively recently comparisons of the generation costs of
electricity from different sources were presented in terms of 'works
costs' which include costs of fuel, operation, repairs and maintenance.
In 1976 the CEGB incorporated residual fuel reprocessing and disposal
costs into ex-works costs; in 1979 the first comparisons were publi-
shed which included capital charges and provision for decommissioning;
and in the following year interest during construction and expenditure
on research and training were incorporated. On the latter inclusive
basis the CEGB has, since 1980, published comparative generation costs
for nuclear, coal-fired and oil-fired power stations (cf. CEGB 1980 )
and recently the Board has again expanded the scope of its comparisons
to examine lifetime station costs and to accommodate the opportunity
costs of invested capital (CEGB 1983). The more recent figures and
the assumptions upon which their calculation is based, are set out
in Annex 2 Tables Al-A3.
Tables Al and A2 illustrate the sensitivity of calculations of
generation costs to changes in the basis of costing. On the monetary
interest cost basis (employing current cost depreciation) there is
little difference between the 1981/82 generation cost of Magnox
and modern coal stations. However, the effect of discounting on the
basis of opportunity cost is to significantly increase capital charges
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and this disproportionately affects the older more capital intensive
Magnox stations. This affect is less marked over longer periods
of analysis (ie lifetime-to-date and total lifetime) but nevertheless
the advantages of modern coal stations over the Magnox stations is
maintained if the 5% discount rate is applied. This places a question
mark against the economic benefit accruing from the investment in
Magnox stations although, given their existence, the fuel and operating
cost advantages merit their operation on baseload.
However, the Board's figures for the Hinkley Point AGR indicate that
such newer nuclear power stations are currently producing cheaper
electricity even employing 5% opportunity cost. (Table A2) . On the
basis of assumed future trends in costs the Board calculates that
Hinkley Point should produce a lifetime economic benefit although the
cost of lifetime-ta-date generation is significantly higher than that
of Drax First Half due to the transition period to maximum output.
As regards power stations currently under construction (or recently
completed) (see Table A3) anticipated lifetime generation costs of
the nuclear (AGR) stations are lower than those of Drax Second Half
with the exception of Dungeness B, the higher cost of which is due
to the considerable delays in the construction period.
It is evident from these figures that investment in the past and up
to the present time in nuclear capacity has not resulted in an economic
benefit in the form of cheaper electricity than could have been
obtained from coal-fired stations; however, the CEGB remains optimistic
that over their full lifetimes the AGR stations currently operating
and under construction will produce such an economic benefit (except
for Dungeness B). The Board's economic case for nuclear power there-
fore refers primarily to their anticipation of the future costs and
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and performance of electricity generating plant and in such a context
the performance of such plant to date is seen as providing little
guidance.
The running cost advantage of nuclear power stations indicated in the
CEGB's calculations results in their being operated to the limit of
their availability, providing base-load electricity. However, the costs
estimated for stations already in operation are historic costs and
therefore do not constitute an appropriate basis for decisions on
future investment in new capacity (Hunt 1978 p. 339; Department of
Energy 1981 p. 12-13). The case for continued investment in new
nuclear capacity, such as the proposed PWR at Sizewell, rests upon
calculations of the marginal effect of new stations on the costs of
the generating system as a whole over the lifetime of such stations.
Briefly, the investment appraisal method used by the CEGB assesses
the effect o£ tre addition of 1 KW of new capacity on the cash flows of
the Board from the start of construction to final decommissioning
including, firstly, the direct and indirect costs of station construction
(including interest during construction), fuel and operating costs
over the life of the station and an annual charge for the cost of
decommissioning and, secondly, the net system fuel savings which
result from the displacement of older, less efficient plant with higher
fuel costs. The cash flows of expenditure and savings are discounted
to the date of commissioning at the required rate of return laid
down by the government for Nationalised Industries (currently 5%)
and averaged over station lifetime. The difference between generation
costs and marginal savings gives at 'Net Effective Cost' (NEe) expressed
in terms of £/KW p.a., to allow for different lifetime load factors.
The objective for investment in new capacity, then, is to choose plant
with the lowest NEC (ie the smallest positive or largest negative value)
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and introduce that plant up to the point at which the savings of Net
Avoidable Costs (NAC) due to retirement of old plant just cease to offset
the NEC of the new plant. At this point optimal plant mix is achieved
(CEGB 1981A p. 59; 1981B p. 559-60; Baker 1982 p. 22-3; Jenkin 1982).
The Net Effective Cost calculations produced by the CEGB for the proposed
Sizewell B PWR nuclear power station in comparison with AGR and coal-
fired capacity are reproduced in Annex 2, Tables A4 and AS. These figures
indicate that over the wide range of possible future trends in economic
and energy demand growth the Sizewell B PWR has a lower Net Effective
Cost than the alternatives and futher that AGR stations have a lower
NEC than coal stations. The advantage of the PWR is maintained in all
the 'nuclear backgrounds' (ie independently of assumptions about the
build-up of nuclear stations in the plant mix) but is most pronounced
in the lower nuclear backgrounds where fossil fuel savings would be
greatest. Moreover in all scenarios and against all nuclear backgrounds
the CEGB calculates a negative NEC for the PWR which means that it is
economic to construct such nuclear plant on energy cost savings grounds
alone to replace existing fossil fired plant which has a positive annual
Net Avoidable Cost (Jenkin 1982 p. 48-62).
Consequently, as far as the CEGB is concerned, in all reasonable futures
and for parameter assumptions which are considered to be 'best estimtes',
the PWR maintains its economic advantage and electricity generation costs
would be minimised by substantial commissioning of such reactors. As
Table AS indicates, the NEC advantage of the Sizewell station arises
because the higher capital cost is very much outweighed by the extra
fuel cost of coal-fired stations particularly in a low nuclear background
where the higher demand for coal would mean that marginal supplies would
be higher cost imports (Hughes 1982 p. 70-82; CEGB 1982A p. 58-60).
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These calculations of future costs and system savings rest upon certain
jUdgements and assumptions about parameter values. Of particular
importance are assumptions relating to capital costs and fossil fuel
prices. The CEGB assumes that the Sizewell PWR could be constructed at a
cost of £1172 mill. over a period of 7~ years and would achieve a
settled-down average annual availability of 64%. As regards future
coal prices, it is assumed that the CEGB will be faced with substantial
increases in real terms over the next fifty years or so of the order of
about 2 - 3% p.a. Recognising the uncertainty surrounding such key
assumptions (and respnding to certain criticisms by the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission) the CEGB tests the sensitivity of its calculations
to changes in these and other assumptions. However, it is argued that
the economic advantage to nuclear plant is robust against lower fossil
fuel price increases, construction delays, capital cost escalation,
nuclear fuel cycle cost escalation and decreases in power rating of
magnitudes considered to be extremely unlikely (CEGB 1982A p. 60-1;
Jenkin 1982 p. 67-75).
The CEGB's arguments in relation to the costs of nuclear-generated
electricity have been subjected to severe criticism over the years by
opponents of nuclear power. For example, a study was recently under-
taken by a group of critics in the guise of the Committee for the Study
of the Economics of Nuclear Energy (CSENE) and their argument was pre-
sented in CSENE (1981). Colin Sweet, a prominent member of CSENE, has
separately published his views in Sweet (1978, 1982) as has Professor
Jim Jeffery (1980, 1982) who acted as consultant to the committee.
To a large extent the criticisms which were directed at the CEGB's
figures for comparative generation costs related to the statement in
the Annual Report (cf CEGB 1980 ) in which such costs were expressed
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in terms of historic prices without allowances for the effect of
inflation. It was argued that revenues from electricity sales have
in the past been generated only to cover actual expenditure undertaken
and not to cover the true replacement of assets at current prices.
In effect customers have enjoyed artifically cheap electricity
resulting in a misallocation of resources and placing an excessive
burden on future customers for the replacement of depreciated assets
i.e. retired power stations(CSENE 1981 p. 20; Jeffery 1980 p. 344;
Sweet 1982 p. 33-5, 56-7). The 'hidden subsidy' resulting from historic
cost accounting has, it was argued, attached particularly to nuclear
power stations because of their high capital costs and because fuel
for a nuclear station is paid for in the more distant past than that
for fossil-fired stations (CSENE op. cit). Therefore, more electricity
has been sold and more nuclear power stations built than should have
been the case had prices reflected the real cost of resources used.
As we have seen, the CEGB now uses current cost accounting procedures
in order to value its assets in terms of current replacement cost, and
the most recent analysis by the CEGB of its generation costs incor-
porates many of the accounting modifications suggested by critics.
The effect on nuclear costs in particular of taking account of the
opportunity cost of capital was indicated above (see p.3o~; both
capital and fuel costs of nuclear stations are affected but only
capital costs for coal-fired stations since coal is purchased during
the year in which it is used (CSENE op. cit. p. 21). The figures
reproduced in Annex 2 Section A show that the use of a real interest
rate of 5% applied to costs related to current costs results in an
increase in the 1981/82 generation cost of Magnox stations of
64% compared with 11% for coal-fired stations. For Hinkley Point B
and Drax First Half the equivalent figures are 38% and 13%. Using
such an opportunity cost of capital the Board now recognises that the
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Magnox stations will not produce an economic benefit over their
lifetimes.
However, there are certain other arguments put forward by critics of
nuclear power which are not met by the CEGB's present accounting pro-
cedures. For example, when costs are presented in terms of pence per
KWh of output those stations producing the greatest lifetime output
are at an obvious advantage. The calculation of generation costs is
heavily dependent upon load factor - the higher the load factor the
greater the number of units of electricity generated to which the
'overhead' costs of a power station can be apportioned (Sweet 1978
p. 108-9; Jeffery 1980 p. 345). The relatively high capital costs
of nuclear stations means that they must be operated at as near to
maximum capacity as possible (ie at the top of the merit order) ,
producing baseload electricity, if the target of low unit costs is to
be achieved. However, this means that the coal-fired stations, with
which cost comparisons are made, are displaced down the merit order,
used more for peak load and consequently operate at less than the cap-
acity that would have been the case had such stations been built
instead of nuclear stations. As Jeffery (1982 p. 77) argues:
"If coal-fired stations had been built instead of Magnox
nuclear stations they would have replaced them on base-
load, i.e. on full availability. The comparison must
therefore be on the basis of LF .•• (load factor)
equal to availability. In the absence of nuclear
stations these new coal-fired stations would have been
at the top of the merit order. There would therefore
be no question of running these out of that order".
Therefore, it is argued that in cost comparisons the generation costs
of coal-fired stations should be reduced to what they would have been
had they been operating at the same capacity as nuclear stations. The
CEGB rejects this argument in relation to comparisons of existing plant
but accepts its importance in future appraisals (cf. CEGB 1983 Appendix D) .
310
Several critics have argued that there are many costs associated with
nuclear electricity generation which are not, but should be, included
in the CEGB's accounting costs; the bearing of such costs elsewhere
is seen to result in an effective subsidy to nuclear power. For example,
the CEGB's own research and development (R & D) costs are now included
but the exceptionally large R&D spending by the UK Atomic Energy
Authority (AEA) is not covered by royalties even though it is widely
accepted in principle that they should (Sweet 1982 p. 56). It has been
argued that the scale of public funding of the AEA has been heavily
influenced by the military implications of nuclear power development
(particularly in the case of the plutonium-producing Magnox reactors)
and therefore insulated from commercial considerations (Patterson 1977
p. 19-20; 1978 p. 127). Further, the value of plutonium in spent Magnox
fuel was credited against Magnox generating costs although this
practice was never justified (Sweet 1982 p. 36-7). Various other dis-
tortions due to the exclusion of 'internal' costs have been criticized,
for example, extra costs of providing an electricity distribution system
suitable for nuclear power, the full cost of government-financed fuel-
cycle and storage facilities, the full costs of decommissioning nuclear
reactors and of finally disposing of waste products, and the cost of
publicity material for nuclear power produced by the AEA, Electricity
Council and CEGB which would have to be covered in prices were these
private companies (cf. Sweet 1982; Coyne 1978; Patterson 1977;
Bunyard 1980) .
The implications of such additional factors have not been precisely
costed but it is argued that they could be expected to further increase
the true cost advantage which accrues to coal-generated electricity in
relation to that produced by nuclear stations. Consequently, the
building of such stations by the CEGB is seen as having resulted in
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dearer electricity than would have been the case had coal-fired
stations been built instead and, therefore, in a misuse of resources
and an adverse impact upon economic growth. This position was adopted
by the Select Committee on Energy in their First Report on the nuclear
power programme:
"Enormous past nuclear investments have had exceptionally
low productivity; great resources have been used with
little direct return and a serious net loss"
(Select Committee on Energy 1981 para. 172).
Moving on to the question of investment appraisal in relation to future
generating capacity the CEGB has once again come in for heavy criticism.
The above-mentioned Select Committee Report contained the following
criticism(ibid. para 71) :
".••. (I)n view of the inevitable uncertainties surrounding
many of the Board's key assumptions, the obscurity of
presentation of much of the relevant information, and
the Board's less than satisfactory attitude to cost com-
parisons, we remain unconvinced that the CEGB and the
Government have satisfactorily made out the economic and
industrial case for a programme of the size referred to by
the Secretary of State in his statement to the House in
December 1979".
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) report on the efficiency
and costs of the CEGB published in May 1981 was somewhat less equi-
vocal:
".. (W)e consider that there are serious weaknesses in its
investment appraisal. In particular a large programme of
investment in nuclear power stations, which would greatly
increase the capital employed for a given level of output,
is proposed on the basis of investment appraisals which
are seriously defective and liable to mislead. We con-
clude that the Board's course of conduct in this regard
operates against the public interest".
(Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1981 p. 292).
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The MMC was particularly concerned about the way in ~hich the Board
derived assumptions used in investment appraisal both in respect of
fuel availability and price and construction times and costs of new
plant. It argued that the Board should conduct wider sensitivity and
risk analysis and, indeed, the Board has responded by improving its
appraisal procedures as exemplified in its case for the Sizewell B
PWR power station as considered above (see p.306). Therefore, the
Board's approach to investment appraisal is not now a focus for cri-
ticism (cf. Conroy 1983 p. 61): rather the attention now tends to
be placed upon the parameter assumptions which are input to the
appraisal process.
In general terms, it is argued by opponents of nuclear power that
the assumptions used by the CEGB as 'central estimates' incorporate
a degree of optimism which reflects a prior commitment to a signi-
ficant programme of nuclear power construction (Jeffery 1982 p. 85;
Sweet 1982 p. 11-12). As indicated earlier, the results of invest-
ment appraisal are highly sensitive to, in particular, assumptions in
respect of future cost of fuel (especially coal) and future capital
costs of nuclear plant and critics argue that the biases operate via
both of these sets of assumptions.
As regard the price of coal, then, the CEGB's net effective cost (NEe)
calculations for new plant, as epitomised by the case for Sizewell B
discussed above, employ a central assumption of an increase of around
2% p.a. from 1984-85. This has been criticised as an over-estimate,
based on over-optimistic assumptions about future economic growth and
not taking account of the effects of conservation and structural change
in the economies of DECD and newly industrialized countries (Conroy
1983 p. 74). The Department of Energy's assumptions about future fossil
fuel prices for their 1982 Energy Projections also came in for sub-
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stantialcriticism at the SizewellB Inquiry for giving too much weight
to higher rates of increase (cf. Sizewell Transcripts Day 41 p. 19-27,
49-50). Indeed, the National Coal Board, in their evidence, argued
that future coal prices were likely to be "..• around the bottom of
the range of ..... assumptions and estimates submitted to the Inquiry
by the Department of Energy and by the CEGB". (ibid. p. 25).
On the other hand the CEGB is criticised for making optimistic assum-
ptions concerning the future cost of nuclear fuel. Jeffery (1982 p.
82-8), for example, has argued that a complete assymmetry pervades
the CEGB's reasoning since, whereas coal costs have been relatively
stable in the recent past and seem 'virtually guaranteed' to be so in
the near future, the cost of nuclear fuel has increased considerably
since 1973/74 and shows no signs of slowing down in the future.
Nuclear fuel costs have been increasing due to the effects of inadequate
provision for inflation, a series of accidents and difficulties at the
Sellafield reprocessing plant and increasing uranium prices (Jeffery
1980 p. 345-6; Sweet 1978 p. 114). However, although Magnox fuel
has been subject to cost escalation primarily due to the reprocessing
element, the CEGB expects that the cost of reprocessing oxide fuel
(from AGRs and PWRs) will prove to be lower; this expectation is
reflected in the assumptions incorporated in the NEC calculations
for Sizewell 'B' (cf. Wright 1982B). Critics argue that the CEGB is
guilty of 'wishful thinking' and that the real replacement fuel costs
for both AGR and PWR stations (after fully allowing for inflation) is
likely to be substantially higher than is assumed (Jeffery 1982 p.
88-90; Conroy 1982 p. 492).
Assumptions about the future capital costs of nuclear plant are also
of crucial importance to the calculation of economic benefits: indeed,
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such costs are the most important factor in determining total nuclear
generation costs. In its case for Sizewell B the CEGB used estimates
of capital cost for PWR plant of £1056/KWSO (March 1982 prices) and
an assumed construction period of 7~ years which allows for an extra 18
months over the target period of 6 years to accommodate design changes
and uncertainty (CEGB 1982A p. 21-30). However, considerable criticism
has been directed at these assumptions, again to the effect that they
represent wishful thinking and bias in favour of nuclear power
(Jeffery, 1982 p. 96-7; CSENE 1981 p. 30; FOE 1981 p. 523; Sweet 1982
p. 42-9; .Conr oy 1982 p. 491-2, 1983 p. 65-72).
More specifically, these critics argue that the capital cost of future
nuclear plant is likely to be considerably higher than the CEGB's
estimates due to construction time overruns (which boost interest
charges and other indirect costs) and due to various other elements of
construction cost escalation. Much has been made of the CEGB's poor
construction record, especially with the AGR programme. Hinkley Point
B, commissioned in 1978-79, took 12 years to complete (twice the planned
construction period), Hartlepool 15 years and Heysham A 13 years;
Dungeness B is due to complete commissioning in 1984 18 years after
start on site. The combined time overrun of these reactors is 142%.
These delays, combined with cost escalation due to design changes
have had a considerable impact on capital costs. Sweet (1982 p. 43)
cites an increase from an original estimate of £430 million to an
outturn of about £1800 million in the official figures, but the CEGB
have presented an estimate of £2500 million (including interest during
construction) to which should be added the cost of generating electricity
in other power stations to replace that which was not available as
a result of delays to AGR stations; the Board estimate the latter cost
to be £1200 million at January 1980 (CEGB 19813 paras 5.1 - 5.2).
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Burn (1981) has updated Henderson's (1977) figures for the cost of
the AGR programme (including the SSEB's Hunterston B reactor)
presenting an estimate of between £8,700 and £11,100 million. In
the light of such estimates it is argued that the AGR programme
will never provide a return on the capital invested and that there
can be little confidence in the ability of the CEGB to build
future reactors to time and cost (FOE 1981, p. 523; Conroy 1982
p. 491-2; Jeffery 1982 p. 97).
As we have seen, the CEGB does not accept this argument insisting
that, with the exception of Dungeness B, the AGR programme will
result in net system savings; over its whole lifetime Hinkley Point
B is expected to have lower generation costs than coal plant and
the Hartlepool and Heysham reactors are calculated to have NECs which
are lower than the cost of retaining the least efficient plant on
the system (Ie Net Avoidable Cost). Moreover, the Board argues
that the factors responsible for the delays and cost overruns in
the AGR programme have been identified and will not apply in the
future to either AGR or PWR construction; progress at Heysham II
is held up as vindication for this position.
However, the critics remain sceptical of this argument. For example,
at the Sizewell B Inquiry it was suggested by witnesses for the
Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) that the CEGB
have underestimated potential problems in respect of design changes
for safety reasons and construction delays with consequent distor-
tion to the calculation of economic benefits (Conroy 1982 p. 492;
1983 p. 65-72). Komanoff's studies of American experience of PWR
construction were used; he had shown that greater construction
delays were experienced with PWRS than with coal-fired stations
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and average capital cost escalations between 1971-78 were estimated
at 13.5% p.a. in real terms for PWR stations compared with 7.7% p.a.
for coal-fired stations. Further, Komanoff calculated nuclear
capital costs in 1978 to be 50% greater than coal on average and
anticipated that this would increase to 73% by 1988, producing a
25% advantage to coal-generated electricity in the USA (cf. Taylor
1981 p. 31-2; Sweet 1982 p. 15). At the Sizewell Inquiry, Komanoff
argued that the CEGB had not used the most recent data available
on actual capital costs and construction periods for Westinghouse
plant, which indicated significant escalations, and that problems
originating from safety-related design differences and industrial
and construction conditions could result in a capital cost increase
of 50% over the CEGB's estimate (Komanoff 1983 p. 34-8). Conroy
(1983 p. 68) criticises the CEGB's approach to this question in the
following terms:
"The CEGB's capital cost estimate is to my mind an
engineering-based one conceived from a narrow techno-
logical perspective. When broader social, political
and environmental processes are taken into account it
is clear that the processes which have driven up
capital costs in the past will continue to do so in
the future". (ibid).
There is a further assumption which is important in the estimation
of the NEC of future nuclear power stations and this concerns the
performance of generating plant over its lifetime. In its calcul-
ations the CEGB assumes a settled-down average annual availability
on design rating for AGRs of 65% and for the Sizewell B PWR of 64%.
The latter figure was again criticised as over-optimistic by
Conroy and Komanoff who argued that US performance of Westinghouse
units of over IGW indicates an average settled-down availability
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of 57-61% and suggested that a figure of 58% should be assumed by
the CEGB and that even this may be over-optimistic over reactor
lifetime given the possibility of problems due to ageing and
saltwater cooling (Komanoff 1983 p. 36-7; Conroy 1983 p. 73).
More generally, for PWR stations in the 'Western World' the cumul-
ative load factor, weighted to allow for the range of reactor sizes,
stood at 54% in 1981 (Howles 1982). Further, experience to date
indicates inferior performance of larger plant in the case of almost
all reactor systems (ibid p. 16). Burn (1978) shows how the per-
formance of UK Magnox stations has deteriorated as their size
increased and Surrey and Thomas (1980) indicate that much of the
trouble is caused by higher coolant temperatures in larger units
and by steam generation components.
Opponents of nuclear power therefore argue that the combined effect
of introducing more realistic assumptions, in respect of future
fuel and capital costs, construction time and reactor performance,
into the economic appraisal procedure would be to render the NEC
of nuclear plant greater than that of coal-fired plant and, indeed,
than the system net available cost. Thus, the CPRE argued at the
Sizewell B Inquiry, that their figures ....
"...suggest that Sizewell B is likely to result in a
serious net loss of public money, and that it would
be at best a marginal investment". (Conroy 1983 p. 76).
However, the CEGB on the contrary argue that their case is robust
against adverse sensitivity tests assuming, for example, increases
in capital costs of 15%, in nuclear fuel cycle costs of 20% and in
construction time of one year and decreases in average annual
availability of 7%, in rating of 5% and in the growth of fossil
fuel prices by 25% (Jenkin 1982 p. 67-75).
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Finally on the issue of investment appraisal, opponents of nuclear
power have argued that the case presented for nuclear power is open
to criticism to the extent that all the possible alternative invest-
ment options are not fully evaluated. For example, at the Sizewell
Inquiry the CEGB was criticised for failing to properly analyse the
potential for conversion of oil-fired capacity to coal and perhaps
more significantly the potential of investment in electricity conser-
vation measures to produce system savings (Conroy 1983 p. 78).
The CEGB argued that conservation cannot be considered as an altern-
ative to the construction of further nuclear capacity since, whatever
the degree of conservation which might be achieved, the CEGB must
aim to generate the resulting requirement for electricity at minimum
cost. It is argued, therefore, that this aim is met by the constru-
ction of new nuclear plant to produce baseload electricity irrespective
of the effect of conservation on marginal generation by more costly
plant (Jenkin 1982 p. 57-8). However, this argument was criticised
by Barrett (1983), on behalf of the CPRE, whose analysis suggested
that conservation to reduce peak demand, and therefore fuel burn at
the times when the highest cost plant is operating, would displace
the highest cost generation and produce system savings which should
be compared with those of new plant. It was argued that by 2000 con-
servation could reduce restricted peak demand by 3.8 GW producing a
fuel saving of 60 mtce. and resulting in system generation costs
lower than those that would result from the construction of Sizewell
Bi consequently, investment in conservation measures should precede
investment in new capacity.
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7.4 Conclusion
The main thrust of the critics' economic case against nuclear power
is therefore directed at the proponents' arguments broadly accepting
the 'ground rules' and frameworks within which they are formulated.
The intention is to demonstrate that nuclear power is unnecessary
to the maintenance of future economic well-being and, further, that
it is likely to be detrimental to such well-being by using resources
in an uneconomic way. In answer, then, to the proponents' view
that there are substantial economic benefits which more than offset
any social costs and risks, the critics deny the existence of such
benefits and, indeed, argue that there are substantial economic dis-
benefits which must be added to the social costs and risks. How-
ever, the case is taken further by some critics who emphasize the
importance of 'external costs' of nuclear power which should be fully
compensated and therefore reflected in the price of nuclear-generated
electricity. This issue relates particularly to the safety and
environmental implications of nuclear power which will be considered
in the next chapter; however, the significance of the issue for
nuclear economics will be briefly considered here.
Obviously, not all social cosl~s and benefits can be monetarized
but some allowances are made for financial compensation of externali-
ties and some elements in the cost of nuclear power relate to social
costs. However, it has been argued that the resulting cost elements
fall well below full compensation and that, as a result, nuclear
electricity is receiving a substantial effective subsidy which dis-
torts resource allocation (CSENE 1981 p. 33-6; Shrader-Frechette 1980
p. 108-26). For example, despite the serious potential consequences
of accidents at nuclear plant the financial liability of the operator
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is limited to £5 million and underwritten by the Government for a
further £50 million causing a subsidization of nuclear electricity
from general taxation (CSENE op. cit. p. 36; Shrader-Frechette op. cit.
p. 113-4). Radiation emission controls at nuclear plant are governed
by economic considerations (in relation to what are perceived as
'acceptable risks') rather than a concern to achieve total contain-
ment; Shrader-Frechette (op. cit. p. 115-8) argues that all loss of
life is not therefore being compensated again an effective subsidy
to nuclear electricity. A further source of distortion of the cost
of nuclear electricity in relation to that of coal-generated electri-
city is cited by Jeffery (1982, note 7, p. 78). He argues that the
development of nuclear power on the basis of a massive public subsidy
(R & D funds and distorted cost calculations) contributed towards the
run-down of the coal industry in this country; if true commercial
consideration had been in operation coal-fired plant would have been
built instead and we would now have a more efficient coal industry,
producing cheaper coal under safer conditions. The implication is
that these extra costs in the coal industry should really be attrib-
uted to nuclear power. Similar arguments are sometimes made in
respect of the effect of distorted resource allocation on alternative
technologies (especially in the fields of conservation and increased
efficiency of use) which would otherwise have developed to promote
economic growth and, possibly, export earnings. For example, Sweet
(1982 p. 27) argues as follows:
"The cost of pursuing the nuclear option emerges not just
as the cost of building and operating nuclear power stations
but also as the cost of opportunities foregone. These
costs are rarely calculated but they are in the long
run the most important of all".
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However, whilst it is argued that such external costs of nuclear power
are of considerable importance there is a limit on the extent to
which they can be quantified and allowed for in economic calculations.
This is particuarly so in the case of safety and environmental impli-
cations and some critics of nuclear power reject any attempt to impose
an economic calculus, in the form of cost-benefit analysis, on what
they see as primarily an ethical and political issue (cf. Lovins
1975 p , 49). Therefore, although they have economic aspects, it is
appropriate to consider separately the implications of nuclear power
programmes which are collectively categorized as 'social costs'.
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Chapter 8: The Social Costs of Nuclear Power
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter an attempt will be made to indicate the main aspects
of the debate over the social or 'external' costs of nuclear power.
They will be considered in two categories: firstly, safety and
environmental implications and, secondly, social and political
implications. As regards the former the major areas of controversy
which are relevant here concern the question of routine radiation
emissions from nuclear plant, the issue of the risk of a major
accident producing substantial releases of radiation, and the problem
of the management and disposal of radioactive wastes. These issues
will be considered in turn in the next section followed by a brief
discussion of other environmental implications such as the problems
of atmospheric pollution and land-take. The main areas of controversy
which are of interest in relation to social and political implications
concern the linkages between the development of civil nuclear power
programmes and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the possible
impact of such programmes on traditional rights and liberties of
individual citizens.
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8.2 The Safety and Environmental Implications of Nuclear Power
8.2.1 Routine Radiation Emissions from Nuclear Power Plant
The operation of the nuclear fuel cycle necessarily involves some
release of radioactive substances which results in exposure of the
workers in the industry and the general public to small amounts of
radiation. The harmful effects are of two kinds: somatic harm,
the damage done to an individual (e.g. cancer) and genetic harm,
the damage done to descendants through exposure to radiation by
predecessors (Bonnell 1982 p. 2-7; Pearce et al 1979 p. 141).
Radiation is commonly measured in this country in terms of the 'rem'
('Roentgen Equivalent Man') which gives a 'dose equivalent' and is a
function of two variables, the absorbed dose ('rad') and the quality
or nature of the radiation (e.g. electrons, fission neutrons or
alpha particles) (ibid.; Wade 1981 p. 290-1).
The effect of low radiation doses on human beings (indeed, on all living
things) is an issue of some controversy, since relatively little
evidence is available on lbw-dose situations and the dose-response
relationship for such situations is obtained largely through backwards
extrapolation from high dose experiences (Pearce 1979A p. 37). The
'conventional wisdom', and the analysis largely subscribed to by
supporters of nuclear power, is the 'linear hypothesis' which suggests
that cancer incidence is a linear function of radiation dose and that
the function passes through the origin. It is held that this hypothesis
is 'cautious' in that it overestimates the risks from low doses of
radiation (Pearce et al 1979 p. 144-4; CEGB 1982A p. 71). Wade (1981
p. 292-3) argues that at such low doses, such as may be found near a
nuclear reactor, no significant adverse effects whatever have been
observed in humans nor indeed, in plants and animals.
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The linear dose-response hypothesis provides the basis for radiation
safety standards for occupational and public exposure as recommended
by the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP)
and agreed in many countries as the appropriate standards for
regulations (Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 317; Matthews 1982
p. 9-11; Wade 1981 p. 293). The annual dose limits recommended
by the ICRP are more stringent for public exposure than for
occupational exposure by a factor of l~, the whole body limits being,
respectively, 500m rem and 5 rem (dose equivalent) with a lifetime
average for the public of 100m rem (see Annex 3, Table AI; Matthews
1982 p. 17-18; Wade 1981 p. 294). Supporters of nuclear power
generally accept the ICRP recommendations as authoritative, as
providing a firm foundation for the standards actually set by the
National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and for legislation
controlling the release of radiation (e.g. Radioactive Substances Act 1948
and 1960, Factories Act 1961, Nuclear Installations Act 1965 and 1969,
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974) (ibid. p. 295-6; CEGB 1982A
p. 65-6, 71-3).
The radiation doses to workers and the general public deriving from
the routine operation of nuclear plant are relatively low compared
with ICRP dose limits and proponents of nuclear power emphasise that
they are strictly controlled by the well-developed safety practices
of the industry (ibid. Hill 1976, 1981B). According to official
figures the maximum exposures resulting from the UK nuclear industry
are typically less than 1 per cent of the ICRP standards (see Annex
3, Table A2). Moreover, it is widely argued that the risks from
low level radiation exposure due to nuclear electricity generation
are low in comparison with the risks from other sources, either those
naturally occurring or those already generally accepted. For example,
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natural background radiation contributes an annual average dosage
to the public of about 186m rem, or approximately three quarters of
the total dosage; by comparison the annual dosage attributable to the
nuclear industry is officially given as about 0.3m rem or approximately
0.15% of background level (see Annex 3, Table A3; cf. Hill 19818
p. 4; CEGB 1982A p. 68-70).
Comparisons with other 'human-made' sources of risk are also commonly
made to demonstrate the safety of nuclear power. Of the total radiation
exposure to the public from 'human-made' sources about 85% is derived
from medical irradiation, according to NRPB data; by comparison the
contribution from nuclear electricity generation is given as 0.5%
(see Annex 3 Table A3) . Comparisons are often made with the risk
of smoking cigarettes; Hill (1981B p. 4) argues that the current
level of radiation exposure from the nuclear power programme presents
a risk of cancer which is less than that attributable to smoking two
cigarettes in a lifetime. These radiation risks are also compared
with the carcinogenic and mutagenic effects of many other agents,
especially chemicals, which are seen as presenting far greater hazards
(cf. Hoyle 1977 Chap. 6). Moreover, much has been made of the work,
for example, of Inhaber who argued that of all the means of producing
energy (including renewable sources) nuclear electricity generation
is the safest (Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 317; Jones 19808
p. 149-51). As regards workers in the nuclear power industry NRPB
data, based on regular routine monitoring, indicates an average
annual radiation dO$~ of 0.5 rem (one-tenth of the ICRP recommended
maximum) which compares favourably with other industry, representing
about 16% of total occupational whole-body exposure (see Annex 3,
Table A3; Wade 1981 p. 297). Relative to all occupational hazards
the risks to radiation workers are calculated to be relatively small
involving, for example, an average life shortening of 7 days compared
326
to 20 days for all manufacturing industry and 150 days for coal
mining (ibid. p. 296-7).
It is evident, then, that in arguments designed to demonstrate the low
levels of risk involved in the routine operation of nuclear power plant,
comparisons with other risks and hazards play an important role. The
importance of comparisons has been argued by HMfele (1974). He suggests
that the only means of determining what constitutes an 'acceptable' level
of risk is by 'embedding' the estimated risk and standards into the
'normal conditions of life' - that is by comparing them with the risks
occurring in nature or as part of our accepted 'normal' social existence
(ibid. p. 308-11). The position presented by HMfele represents a
basis for the justification of the risks of nuclear power which is seen
as 'natural' by its supporters.
A final element in the argument of proponents of nuclear power in
relati.on to low-level radiation is a conviction that public concern
about the effect of radiation is misplaced. For example, Hill (1981B
p. 5) argues that because the human senses do not react to radiation
people are deprived of the ability to apply common sense to judgements
about the safety of nuclear power and, consequently, the publics fears
are unnecessarily magnified. It is argued that the effects of
radiation on humans is, in fact, well understood and easily measurable
to levels well below those of significance to health (Wade 1981 p. 296).
Radiation exposure is tightly controlled by a substantial body of
legislation and by several expert advisory and regulatory bodies for
example, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the NRPB and various
government departments (ibid; Hill 1981B p. 6-7). The public can,
it is argued, be assured that nuclear power does not present a
significant radiation hazard and is safer than other forms of energy
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and other occupations (ibid; Greenhalgh 1980 p. 143-70). Wade
(1981 p. 298) summarises as follows:
"The radiation dose to the public is demonstrably
quite trivial, and those working in the nuclear
industry have one of the safest occupations. The
residual risk is easily justified by the associated
benefits."
The critics of nuclear power, however, argue that the routine radiation
discharges from the operation of nuclear plant present a much greater
hazard to both the general public and to workers in the nuclear industry
than that accepted by its proponents. Their criticisms have three main
thrusts, directed, firstly, at the linear Gose-response hypothesis,
secondly, at the data on radiation dosage used to demonstrate the
comparative safety of the nuclear industry and, thirdly, at the
justification of radiation risks by comparison with other types of risk.
Criticism of the linear close-response hypothesis upon which ICRP
standards are based draws on experimental evidence which, it is alleged,
indicates that the hypothesis underestimates, possibly by a considerable
degree, the risks from low radiation doses. For example, a large amount
of evidence was presented at the Windscale Inquiry, in particular by
Dr Alice Stewart and Professor Edward Radford, in support of this
argument (Pearce et al 1979 Ch. 7). Stewart's early work on cancer in
children, found a significant effect due to low-level X-ray doses to
pregnant mothers (Bunyard 1981 p. 116-7). More recently, her work with
Mancuso and Kneale on radiation risks to workers at the Hanford reactor
plant in the USA suggested that low levels of radiation were responsible
for an excess number of cancers up to 20 times more than the linear
hypothesis would predict as a maximum feasible number (ibid p. 118-9;
Pearce et al 1979 p. 144-5). Radford also cited recent work to suggest
that low levels of radlation were more damaging than had hitherto been
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thought and that ICRP standards were therefore greatly in excess of the
desirable maximum (ibid. p. 144-6). Lindop (1980) also cites various
studies which cast doubt upon the linear hypothesis. For example,
data on the incidence of lung cancer at Hiroshima has indicated maximum
effectiveness of the irradiation at lower doses; linear extrapolation
from high dose data therefore underestimates the low-dose risk (ibid
p. 108-9). A similar picture emerges from studies of breast cancer
(ibid. p. Ill).
Consequently, opponents of nuclear power consider the ICRP recommendations
to be far too lenient, perhaps by as much as a factor of ten or twenty
(Bunyard 1981 p. 106). Recent modifications to these recommendations
involving the use of weighting factors for individual organs have
resulted in large increases in the dose limits for some organs, for
example, bone marrow and lung. These have been criticised as flying
in the face of evidence on low dose effects (ibid. p. 115; Lindop
1980 p. Ill; Pearce et al 1979 p. 146). Moreover, such modifications
are seen as totally inconsistent with the recent reduction, by the US
Environmental Protection Agency, of the whole body dose limit for the
general public from the ICRP's 500 mrem to 25 mrem per annum.
Finally, some critics argue that the validity of radiation standards
is jeopardized by the essentially 'committed' nature of the
organisations resonsible for them. The general problem here is seen
as the institutional framework within which standards are established
and monitored. It is argued that the impartiality and independence
of bodies concerned with recommending such standards (e.g. ICRP,
NRPB) is in doubt because their membership, and the research upon which
standards and recommendations are based, are not totally independent
from the specialist confines of government or the nuclear industry
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(cf Bugler 1979 p. 34-6). At the Windscale Inquiry, Radford
criticised the ICRP from this point of view (Pearce et al 1979 p. 145-6).
Further, some question the ability of current regulatory processes
and the institutional arrangements upon which they are based to
adequately monitor and enforce satisfactory standards and maintain
proper control (Bugler op. cit.).
The second major line of criticism for opponents of nuclear power
relates to the level of the radiation dose to workers and the general
public deriving from the nuclear industry. In effect, it is argued
that the official statistics do not present the true magnitude of the
problem of radiation exposure. The nuclear industry is relatively
young and its effect on people and the environment is still quite small
compared with other well-established industries (Patterson 1978 p. 128
Bunyard 1981 p. 111). The contribution of nuclear energy to the
worlds' energy consumption is currently less than one per cent and the
safety record to date must, it is argued, be set in this context
(Lindop 1980 p. 113-4). Moreover, the consequences of low dose
radiation are nearly all long term so current records of casualties
of radiation exposure can be expected to understate the problem
(Bunyard 1981 p. 111-2). However, cancers amongst radiation workers
are beginning to show up; BNFL have made out-of-court settlements
in relation to the deaths from cancer of two Windscale workers and
NRPB data is said to indicate an increase in cancer in incidence
amongst such workers (ibid. p. 120). Further, there is concern at
the alleged neglect of potential long-term genetic harm from nuclear
power programmes; Bunyard (ibid. p. 124-5) cites work by Dobzhansky
which suggests a possible increase in the genetic mutation rate
which would be a cause of concern.
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As nuclear programmes expand such long-term effects will become
increasingly problematical and it is therefore considered illegitimate
to justify such expansion on the basis of figures which do not properly
reflect the long-term implications. However, the official statistics
are also criticised for concealing the existing true dosage of many
workers. Lindop (1980 p. 114), for example, argues that present
occupational exposures in the fuel cycle are a matter for concern
indicating that a significant proportion of reprocessing plant workers
in the UK are receiving between 3.5 and 5 rem external radiation per
year excluding internal exposures. Bunyard (1981 p. 114) alleges
that the nuclear industry manages to keep average doses within limits
only by employing casual workers to perform tasks involving high
exposure who are then discarded and replaced when they have accumulated
their maximum radiation allowances. The impression given by the
official figures, that an installation is safe within accepted
standards for workers on a year-round basis, may therefore be misleading.
A further area of hazard which Bunyard argues is neglected in the UK
data concerns the risks to uranium miners, who suffer the highe~~casualty
rate from radiation-induced cancers, and the risk to the general public
from radioactive wastes from mining and ore milling operations (ibid
p. 120-2). A true picture of the hazards of nuclear power should,
it is argued, include the risk from all stages of the fuel cycle even
if all the stages are not present in anyone country (ibid).
The first two strands of the critics' case can therefore be brought
together. On the one hand, it is argued that the harmful effects of
low level radiation are underestimated in the linear dose-response
hypothesis and that exposure standards based upon this hypothesis
are therefore too lenient. On the other hand, it is alleged that the
figures used by supporters of nuclear power to demonstrate the safety
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of the industry understate the true extent of low level radiation
exposure attributable to the nuclear fuel cycle. The resulting
conclusion is that nuclear power causes far more harm to workers and
the general public by virtue of its routine low-level radiation
emissions than its proponents would have us believe and that this will
become a serious problem (if it is not already) as nuclear programmes
expand. It is therefore considered illegitimate to justify such future
expansion on the basis of this safety argument either in terms of
absolute levels or in terms of comparisons with other sources of risk.
However, the question of comparisons has another aspect besides the
relative accuracy of the comparative data and it is this aspect which
constitutes the third major strand of criticism for opponents of
nuclear power.
Basically, the issue is a moral and philosophical one and the essence
of the critics' position is that it is illegitimate to justify the
risks from nuclear power with reference to other risks partku:arly when
the comparison is made either with unavoidable risks or with risks
which people voluntarily choose to take. As Pearce et al (1979 p. 143)
argue it is widely felt that an involuntary risk (one 'imposed' upon a
person) is less acceptable than One which is freely entered into
(e.g. smoking). To the extent, then, that the risks to the public and
workers from nuclear power are not voluntarily taken, the comparison
between such risks and those, for example, of smoking n cigarettes a
day, are, it is argued, liable to mislead people into perceiving the
risks as equally acceptable. Moreover, the process of 'embedding'
the risks from nuclear power in the 'normal conditions of life' involves
the implicit imposition of 'naturalistic ethics' according to Shrader-
Frechette (1980). Briefly, she argues that the establishment of the
acceptability of the risks of nuclear power with reference to other
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risks which currently exist in our society is based upon the assumption
that the latter risks are in some way morally justified (ibid. p. 26-36).
In a sense, then, nuclear risks are being justified 'by the back door'
since the existence of certain risks in society (e.g. from other
industrial processes, from food and other environmental sources) does
not mean that they are considered 'acceptable' or necessary and there
is no a priori reason why people should accept the continued accumulation
of risks just because they do not exceed existing ones.
To opponents of nuclear power, then, routine radiation emissions from
the nuclear fuel cycle do constitute a non-trivial indeed significant
problem. In relation to official plans for nuclear expansion and, in
particular, the introduction of breeder reactors, Lindop (1980 p. 114)
concludes that "..•the radiation hazard to the population may prove
to be the factor limiting the utilisation of nuclear energy."
Prior (1980A p. 10) argues that as epidemiological evidence accumulates
radiation standards will have to be made more stringent and this
will cause nuclear costs to rise and public concern about nuclear
facilities to increase; both these trends will further militate
against the expansion of nuclear programmes.
8.2.2. The Risk of Major Accidents
In essence, supporters of nuclear power argue that the safety of nuclear
plant can be guaranteed to very high levels on the basis of engineering
measures and institutional safeguards. The probability of a major
release of radiation is very small and can be reduced even further with
continued experience of reactor operation. The safety record of the
nuclear industry compares most favourably with that of other high
technology industries and the risks associated with nuclear power are
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comparable to those widely accepted at the present time. While not
accident-proof, therefore, nuclear power is nevertheless safe to an
acceptable degree.
The argument can be outlined in rather more detail. The degree of
dilution of nuclear fuel in a reactor core is such that it cannot
explode like a bomb. However, certain types of failure, affecting the
cooling and moderation systems, could cause the co~e to overheat (and,
at worst, melt down) threatening the integrity of the containment
structure (due to steam explosions and pressure increases) and resulting
in release of fission product gases, radioactive coolant and other
radioactive substances into the environment. As Wade (1981 p. 297)
puts it, "...a reactor could accidentally overheat and it might then leak
some radioactive materials."
However, the nuclear industry is extremely safety-conscious and has a
very good safety record. A variety of precautions are taken ".•.to
ensure that the risks of any significant radioactive release are reduced
to vanishingly small levels." (Jones 1981 p. 149). Firsty, exceptionally
high standards of design, engineering and operation are maintained within
the industry (Hill 1981B p. 5; Wade 1981 p. 297). Secondly, multiple
safety provisions are incorporated providing 'defence in depth' to
prevent failures and to contain any adverse effects should they occur
(ibid. ). Thirdly, all these features of design, construction and
operation are subject to independent scrutiny and supervision by (in
the UK) the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NIl) throughout the life
of a reactor from initial design to final decommissioning (ibid; CEGB 1982A
p. 63-5; Jones 1981B p. 149; Hill 1981B p. 6-7).
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It is argued, then, that through these measures and procedures it is
possible to ensure exceptionally high levels of safety but not to
eliminate altogether a small 'residual risk' of a major accident.
Even though this residual risk may be small it is nevertheless seen as
important that continual efforts are made to improve procedures and
standards. In this context Hill (ibid. p. 8) refers to improvements
in techniques for detecting cracks in metal components; the discovery
of cracks in Magnox plant which, he argues, have been there from the
beginning, is seen not as an indication that such stations are 'unsafe'
but as part of the process of technical progress which will ensure
continued and improved safety in the future.
As regards the estimation of the small levels of 'residual risk', it is
not possible to base calculations on past events since the actuarial
record of operating reactors is not long enough (Bickerstaffe and Pearce
1980 p. 317). Neither, for obvious reasons, is ~t possible to calculate
such risks on the basis of 'trial and error', the traditional
engineering approach (H~fele 1974 p. 313). Rather, it is regarded as
necessary to estimate the probability of an accident in the future
within a formal, quantitative framework which derives the probability
of a final outcome from an analysis of component events in accident
sequences, which themselves are assigned probabilities in a 'fault-
tree' framework (ibid. p. 319-20; CEGB 1982A Ch. 17; Bickerstaffe
and Pearce 1980 p. 317). Such formal probabilistic analysis is
generally seen as providing a good 'scientific' basis to the study of
the safety of nuclear power, accepting that safety can never be a
matter of proof (Hgfele op. cit. p. 320-21; Greenhalgh 1981 p. 24).
Two basic principles therefore emerge from such an approach. Firstly,
although absolute safety is not obtainable the framework provides good
grounds for confidence that very low probabilities of failure can be
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achieved by exploiting favourab~characteristics in the system and
containing or reorganising the less favourable ones (ibid.). Secondly,
it is misleading to focus on the consequences of the worst possible
accident since this diverts attention away from the central issue of
probabilities and efforts to reduce them (ibid.; Hill 1981B.p. 3-4).
The most comprehensive analysis to date of the risk of major accidents
in nuclear reactors was undertaken by Professor Rasmussen of MIT for
the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This study employed the techniques
of probability analysis and is widely quoted by supporters of nuclear
power in support of arguments in respect of safety. Rasmussen's
calculations are commonly taken as probabilities which are comparable
with observed probabilities of other types of accident; Figure Bl in
Annex 3 reproduces the often-used comparisons (cf. Hill 1978 p. 14-15;
19818 p. 3-4). The target curve for nuclear reactors indicates a
probability of one in a million reactor years of an accident producing
as many as seventy fatalities (cf. Patterson 1976 p. 202); that is,
a chance of one in 10,000 years for a programme of 100 reactors.
Such estimated risk levels are small compared with frequencies of
accidents due to other 'human-made' causes.
The Rasmussen study related to American light water reactors but its
results are seen as vindicated by subsequent studies for British and
German reactors (Wade 1981 p. 298). Moreover, the accident at
Three Mile Island in 1979, the most serious;8ate involving a commercial
power reactor, is also seen as consistent with the Rasmussen estimates.
The accident which, according to the Kemeny Commission probably caused
no bodily harm, occurred after a few hundred reactor-years of
operation; its a priori probability has been estimated ab about one in
400 reactor-years of operation on the basis of the Rasmussen study
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(ibid.; Weinberg 1980 p. 35). The Three Mile Island incident, then, is
not regarded as having revealed any fundamental weakness in the PWR
concept or its basic engineering; rather, the Kemeny Commission has
placed the emphasis more on 'people-related problems' (CEGB 1981A p. 61).
More recently, the CEGB has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the
safety of the Sizewell B PWR using state-of-the-art probabilistic techniques
(CEGB 1982A Volume 2). The basic approach involves applying certain
design principles firstly to attempt to ensure that faults do not occur
and secondly to provide the means of limiting and mitigating their
consequences should they indeed occur (ibid. p. 98~101). Techniques
of probabilistic safety analysis were employed to assess the adequacy
of the design proposals and the CEGB's analyses indicated that safety
standards would be satisfied when the designed safeguard systems
operated at their minimum assumed performance. Radiation doses to the
public due to faults leading to release of radioactivity were estimated
in most cases to be negligible in relation to the NRPB's 'Emergency
Reference Level' Standard of 10 rem whole body dose above which
countermeasures (such as evacuation) are judged to be justified.
Faults within the design basis (e.g. Loss of Coolant Accidents) were
-6estimated to have probabilities within the design target of 10 per
reactor year for all accidents leading to uncontrolled releases.
Finally, as regards the 'remotely possible' accidents beyond the design
basis, probabilistic risk assessment methodology was applied and
indicated that degraded core accidents involving failure of containment
-7had probabilities of occurrence of no greater than 10 per year,
-8producing a risk of death of 10 for any individual close to the site
and a total number of early deaths of a few tens to a few hundreds.
These analyses were seen as providing justification for the safeguard
systems and barriers designed into the Sizewell PWR and confidence that
design targets could be achieved (ibid. Chapters 14-21).
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It is argued, therefore, that there are high standards of reactor
safety and that this situation reflects the substantial amount of care
and money that has gone into design and construction (Hill 1978 p. 14).
As indicated above supporters of nuclear power commonly place some
considerable emphasis on demonstrating that the risks involved are
'acceptable' and this involves comparisons with other risks which, it is
aruged, are widely accepted in everyday life (Matthews 1982 p. 37-40).
One approach to defining 'acceptable risk' is that illustrated by
Lord Rothschild who has argued that the risk of being killed in a car
accident in Great Britain (about one in 7,500 in 1974) can be used to
define an upper limit of acceptability (Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980
p. 319). Another approach has recently been adopted by the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission who have proposed that nuclear reactors should
be considered acceptable if, in the event of an accident, they caused
no more than two extra deaths for every 1000 deaths from other causes
amongst the population within a 50 mile radius (New Scientist, 18/2/82
p , 421).
The comparisons indicated in Annex 3 Figure Bl are often used in support
of the argument that the 'residual risk' from nuclear accidents is
very small and 'acceptable' in view of the countervailing economic
benefits. The Rasmussen probability estimates are compared with, for
example, the observed probabilities of people being killed by an
aircraft crashing on them (100 times more likely than death due to
nuclear power), by being knocked down by a road vehicle, or by choking
on food (Wade 1981 p. 298). Also comparisons are made with risks from
competing sources of energy; reference has already been made to
arguments based on Inhaber's analysis of the comparative risks of
alternative energy systems which concluded that nuclear power is safer
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than both conventional non-renewable and renewable sources (Jones 1981B
p. 149-52). Finally, the Rasmussen probability estimates are sometimes
compared with the frequency and magnitude of natural hazards and
conclusions drawn that the risk from nuclear power is, for example,
comparable with that from meteors and around 10,000 times less than that
from earthquakes and other natural disasters (Hill 1978 p. 15).
Notwithstanding the general belief in the safety of nuclear power
amongst its proponents there does exist some variation in the degree of
confidence in existing safety levels. For example, Tombs (1978 p. 5)
argues that " the safety of nuclear plants is no longer a matter for
major concern " and that continued efforts to improve safety levels
will cause an unnecessary escalation in costs; ".. fixation on the
safety of the nuclear process .•. (is resulting in) ... a growing and
continuing misuse of restricted resources to the detriment of the
welfare of mankind." (ibid). However, Alvin Weinberg adopts a more
cautious view. He argues that given Rasmussen's estimate of a
probability for an accident releasing 'sizeable amounts of radioactivity'
of one in 20,000 per reactor year, then in a world with 5,000 reactors
one might expect such an accident every four years and this he considers
to be unacceptable (Weinberg 1978 p. 78; 1980 p. 35). In such a
nuclear future, he suggests, the a priori accident probability must be
reduced by a factor of up to 100 (ibid). To achieve this, technical
improvements will make a contribution but certain institutional changes
are also required and he suggests the creation of large, confined,
permanent 'nuclear centres' in remote areas controlled by a 'cadre'
of "..•highly expert, professional people invested with institutional
longevity." (op. cit. 1978 p. 79; cf. 1980 p. 35).
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Misgivings about the likelihood and consequences of a major accident
involving nuclear fuel cycle facilities figure prominently in the
arguments of many opponents of the development of nuclear power.
Broadly speaking, three major elements can be detected in such
arguments: firstly, it is suggested that the safety record of the
nuclear industry to date does not inspire the degree of confidence that
proponents commonly exhibit; the second element comprises a critique
of the probabilistic analysis of risk upon which the safety case
primarily rests; and thirdly, opponents are critical of the practice
of justifying the alleged risk levels by comparisons with other risks
which presently characterise our social existence.
review these arguments in turn.
I shall briefly
Firstly, then, critics of nuclear power argue that the accident record
of the nuclear industry is not as good as it is often made out to be
Bunyard (1981 ch. 8), for example, argues that many accidents at nuclear
facilities involving small radiation releases, have not been disclosed
to the public and have only recently come to light; he cites evidence
of 194 accidents and incidents at the Windscale reprocessing plant
between 1950 and 1977 and refers to criticism of BNFL's 'inadequate
safety consciousness' by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate in
relation to leakages of radioactive wastes at Windscale (ibid. p. 156-60).
Lovins (1975 p. 26-7) refers to a US Atomic Energy Commission report
on the safety of light water reactors (LWRs) which found that many
incidents involved malfunctions or deficiencies in safety related
equipment and had potentially significant consequences; the report
concluded that the actual incident record was not consistent with the
estimated levels of risk which emerged from probabilistic analyses.
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Such probabilistic analyses of risks from nuclear power also come in
for heavy criticism. Such criticisms cover a broad range of
theoretical and practical issues and only a brief review will be
attempted here. Reference was made earlier to H~fele's (1974) argument
to the effect that the absence of an experiential basis for the
estimation of the risks of nuclear power necessitated the use of
formal simulation frameworks. But critics argme that the use of
such frameworks cannot bridge the gap which necessarily exists between
expectations and experience in cases where such experience cannot be
obtained because of the nature of the technology (Lovins 1975 p. 12-14,
25-7) . The safety of nuclear reactors cannot be proven by experiment
so it is necessary to rely on analogies with other highly engineered
systems whose potential risks are orders of magnitude less and
qualitatively different in kind, and on mathematical simulations in a
context of considerable uncertainty (ibid). But the resulting
probability calculations are estimates which are contingent upon certain
assumptions; they are effectively targets whose achievement depends
upon the assumptions being satisfied. They cannot be taken as 'facts'
of reactor performance although their precise quantitative nature
does tend to elicit this interpretation (Taylor 1980 p. 77-8). As
LovinS (1975 p. 25) argues (quoting Kendall) :
"•.. (m)athematical models cannot be used reliably to
span large gaps in engineering knowledge, owing to the
very great uncertainties that accumulate in long and
unverified chains of inference."
The question of the safety of nuclear power is therefore, as far as
the critics are concerned (and, indeed, as Alvin Weinberg has argued),
more one of opinion, judgement and instinct, human capacities which
are easily influenced by aspiration and expectation, than one of
scientific fact (ibid. p. 14). Calculations of low probabilities for
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major accidents are merely indications of what might be achieved if
the hypotheses and assumptions embodied in the analysis could be
verified. However, the hypotheses and assumptions commonly employed
in risk analyses have also been subjected to criticism. For example,
it is argued that the assumption of randomness and independence of
accident events is not always valid due to the importance of concurrent
or 'common-mode' failures in which events are interdependent or
causally related (ibid. p. 27; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 317).
Moreover, it is suggested that many engineering and operational
assumptions are highly optimistic neglecting the 'realities' of variable
production standards and quality control and, in particular, of human
fallibility; for exam~le it is argued that whatever the safeguards
operator error will always be a significant and unpredictable variable
(ibid.; Bunyard 1981 p. 167; Prior 1980A p. 9; Lovins 1975 p. 12-14,
27; Flowers 1976 p. 78).
Consequently, the problem of ensuring the safety of nuclear power is not
seen as merely, and exclusively, a technical and engineering problem.
Rather, the critics tend to emphasise what Lovins calls the
'paratechnical' domain in which the obstacles to the solution of the
safety problem lie "•.• in the interaction of people with technology,
in the social and psychological processes on which the implementation
of technical solutions must depend." (ibid. p. 14). The position has
been developed by Ravetz (1974) who questions the extent to which
our civilisation is sufficiently advanced in institutional, moral and
social terms to be able to ensure the high standards of social engineering
which are required for the safe operation of nuclear power facilities.
In particular, he argues that problems of commitmentbymanagers and
operatives, of the impossibility of strictly enforcing rules and
standards, and of 'degeneration' in the routine tasks upon which
safety engineering necessarily depends - such problems, which relate to
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the institutional social and moral 'quality' of our civilisation,
threaten the attainment of adequate systems of safety-control for
nuclear power and, indeed, for other technologies which have a similar
destructive potential (ibid. p. 323-5).
Various other criticisms have been directed at the framework of probabilistic
risk analysis. For example, it is argued that the emphasis on
low probability targets diverts attention from the likely consequences of
major accidents and therefore submerges subjective factors which are
important to the assessment of the social valuation of risk (Taylor 1980
p. 79; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 319). Also within a
quantitative framework consequences tend to be expressed in terms of
fatalities, neglecting other factors such as distress and anxiety
(ibid. p. 317). In general terms, it is argued that such a framework
provides and reflects the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness';
simulated numbers take on the appearance of facts disguising gaps in our
knowledge and devaluing unquantifiable phenomena (ibid. p. 320; Lovins
1975 p. 25). Moreover, the problem is exacerbated because some
proponents of nuclear power present the simulated target probabilities
as the actual chances of a reactor accident concealing the fact that
they are contingent upon a set of assumptions whose achievement in
practice is considered to be highly problematical (Taylor 1980 p. 77-8).
On the basis of this position, opponents of nuclear power have been
highly critical of the Rasmussen Reactor Safety Study which has been
widely used by supporters of nuclear power to support their arguments.
The methodological and statistical basis of the whole exerciase has
been questioned particularly in respect of assumptions of randomness
and independence of many variables for which knowledge is lacking
(Welch 1980 p. 29; Lovins 1975 p. 62). Critics argue that the study
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greatly underestimates the probability of failure in reactor systems
due to various errors and invalid assumptions. For example, Lovins
(op. cit. p. 57-9) argues that the study' fails to identify all the
ways in which complex systems can and do fail (e.g. multiple failure
of safety devices); cannot take into account currently unknown design
errors; assumes (wrongly) that common-mode failures are insignificant;
interprets optimistically the sparse data available on component and
human failure; neglects deliberate acts of non-complaince with
procedures and regulations (e.g. sabotage); and assumes no serious
inadvertent errors in construction and operation.
Moreover, the study has been criticised for seriously underestimating
the long-term health effects of the radioactive releases of a major
nuclear accident (ibid. p. 59-60; Welch 1980 p. 19-25). It is argued
that the study takes into account only prompt 'acute' deaths while
playing down or ignoring long term cancers and genetic effects thus
providing a distorted picture of consequences. Further, unrealistic
assumptions are used in respect of the long term biological effects of
radiation (e.g. dose response curves), the effectiveness and speed of
evacuation procedures, and weather and population variables (ibid.
p. 25-7; Lovins 1975 p. 60-1). Welch concludes that the study does
not provide a reliable estimate of the risks involved in nuclear power,
cannot be considered as impartial, has been widely misused to promote
political goals, and has served to mislead the public about the risks
and probable consequences of a nuclear reactor accident (op. cit.
p. 19, 31-3).
As regards the Three Mile Island incident, critics of nuclear power
insist that its implications are far more serious than the proponents
allow. For example, Bunyard (1981 p. 167-73) argues that the reactor
core came very close to melting down and that a catastrophic accident
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was avoided more by luck than by any intrinsic safety procedures.
Moreover, the economic implications are seen as very serious not only
due to the clean-up costs but also due to the loss of a relatively
new power station (ibid. p. 170). The Friends of the Earth (1981
p. 528-9) have argued that the Kemeny Commission conclusions on the
incident cannot be seen as giving the PWR design a 'clean bill of
health' since it was not remitted to study generic safety problems.
Indeed, it is argued that several such problems remain associated with
the high power density of the PWR's core, the use of water as a coolant,
and doubts about the reactor shut-down systems (ibid.; Conroy 1982
p , 493).
Other problem areas which are of concern to critics include the
increasing difficulty of maintenance and repair as reactors get older
and more radioactive, and the risk of accident at fuel reprocessing
facilities (Bunyard 1980 p. 126-7; 1981 p. 161-3, 177-8). Overall,
the opponents of nuclear power arS--Iethat the risks are considerably
greater than the estimates derived from probabilistic analysis
indicate, that such estimates are widely used in a misleading way and
that the framework of quantitative risk analysis, although a valuable
scientific tool, is open to considerable abuse. Finally, the critics
take issue with the practice of attempting to justify particular levels
of risk by comparing them with other risks which are considered to
be widely accepted as part of everyday life. Welch (1980 p. 34) puts
the argument in the following terms:
"It may be that a major nuclear accident would have
consequences which crudely are quantitatively comparable
to the health effects of widespread heavy smoking in
the same population. This would not diminish their
significance, however. Nor would it justify deliberately
dec.eiving the public in order to minimise its perception
of the magnitude of the risk. Rather, it would emphasise
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the need to face more squarely the risks of both smoking
and nuclear power. Relative risk assessment is always
important. But it is very important who assesses the
relative importance of the different risks, and whether
the risks experienced are accepted openly, knowingly,
and voluntarily."
The definition of acceptable risks carries an implication of valuation
of benefits which are considered to justify taking particular risks.
The cost-benefit approach may be more or less explicit; it is favoured
by economists but many object to the monetary valuation of human life
(Pearce 1980B). For example, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
recent proposals for levels of acceptable risk from nuclear power plants
have caused controversy because of their implication that the possibility
of 13,000 deaths during the lifetime of 150 nuclear stations in the
USA is acceptable and that spending on safety measures, to prevent one
rem of exposure per person, of more than $1000 is not justified by the
benefits (New Scientist 18/2/82 p. 421). Shrader-Frechette (1980)
argues that the definition of a particular level of risk as 'acceptable'
with reference to an associated level of economic benefits betrays a
utilitarian ethic representing a particular moral and ethical stance
(neglecting, for example, considerations of equity, need and future
generations) which is contestable (ibid. p. 147-9). Moreover, the
attempt to justify risk with reference to low probability calculations and
to other risks defined as 'normal' or 'natural' represents, she argues,
an example of the 'naturalistic fallacy' (ibid. p. 135-51). This
involves the unjustifiable derivation of ethical conclusions (about what
is 'good' and 'ought to be') from empirical observations (of what 'is').
In the argument that the risks from nuclear power are acceptable the
reference to economic benefits, to the low probability estimates and to
other risks present in our society begs the question of why they are
normally good or acceptable (ibid.). Value judgements are therefore
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being imposed implicitly in a sense 'by the back door', resulting in
the elevation of conventional values as 'common sense' and the
acceptance of the status quo as morally desirable (ibid. p. 151).
This practice of risk justification, combined with the great complexity
of probabilistic analysis of risk, has implications for the extent
and nature of public involvement in the policy-making process which
are a cause for concern to many opponents of nuclear power. However,
this issue will be taken up in the next chapter. It is necessary here
to go on to consider a further important safety and environmental issue -
the problem of the management of waste products from the nuclear fuel
cycle.
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8.2.3 The Management of Radioactive Wastes.
The radioactivity associated with the nuclear fuel cycle is almost
entirely created within the reactors, mostly in the fuel but also
from neutron activation of other materials in the reactor (Passant 1982
p. 2). Small quantities of fission products escape to appear in the
wastes within nuclear power stations but most radioactive wastes occur
in the form of a highly active liquid concentrate produced as a result
of recovering uranium and plutonium from irradiated fuel at reprocessing
facili ties. Such high level waste constitutes the primary focus for
concern in the waste management problem (cf. Patterson 1976 p. 108;
Marshall 1981 p. 262).
Radioactive waste management policy the the U~ has been based upon
guidelines set out in 1959 in The Control of Radioactive Wastes White
Paper and embodied in The Radioactive Substances Act 1960. These
guidelines related to an objective to ensure that doses to the public
should not exceed ICRP limits and, for the whole population, an average
of 1 rem per person in 30 years (Passant Ope cit. p. 4). In 1976 The
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution questioned existing
procedures for waste management, pointed to the absence of clearly
formulated policy and concluded that insufficient attention had been
given to long-term problems of waste management (Flowers 1976, Ch. 8).
The Government responded in 1977 with the Nuclear Power and the
Environment White Paper which gave to the Secretary of State for the
Environment responsibility for policy on the management of civil
nuclear wastes and, more specifically, the task of ensuring that waste
management problems were dealt with before any large nuclear programme
is undertaken (Passant Ope cit. p. 5). In addition an independent
standing committee (the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee -
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RWMAC) was set up to advise on the development and implementation of
policy and an Expert Group established to review existing legislation,
which reported in 1979. (ibid. p. 6). The recommendations of this
Group were substantially accepted by the Government and were embodied
in the Radioactive Waste Management White Paper of 1982 which based the
objectives of waste management in the UK on the ICRP system of dose
limitation as interpreted by the NRPB. (ibid. p. 7). Moreover, the
White Paper proposed a co-ordinated approach to the development and
management of waste disposal facilities and to this end the Nuclear
Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX) was set up as an executive
unit within the UKAEA comprising senior representatives from BNFL,
CEGB, SSEB and UKAEA (Flowers 1982). The role of NIREX, then, is to
secure the disposal of low and intermediate level wastes from all the
partner organisations (ibid. p.2).
At the present time low level liquid and gaseous wastes that arise on
nuclear sites are filtered, diluted and dispersed to the environm~i
low level solid wastes are disposed of by shallow land burial at the
BNFL site at Drigg in Cumbria. Intermediate level solid wastes have
been deposited in the deep waters of the NE Atlantic Ocean since 1949
under IAEA guidelines and although the London Dumping Convention in 1983
placed a two-year ban on such disposal while research continued, the
British Government did not adhere to the ban. However, greater emphasis
is now being placed upon land dumping of intermediate wastes and NIREX
has been examining possible new sit~s. High level wastes from fuel
reprocessing are currently stored at Sellafield but a vitrification
process is planned to be in use by 1990 and disposal by either deep
burial in stable geological formations or burial in the ocean floor is
being considered. In 1981 the Government abandoned its exploratory
drilling programme for land-based disposal on the grounds that its
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feasibility was established and placed the emphasis on longer-term
storage (Passant 1982 p. 8-14; Flowers 1982 p. 8-13).
As is the case with other issues there exists some variation in the
extent to which the management and disposal of waste products from the
nuclear fuel cycle is seen as problematical by proponents and opponents
of nuclear power. However, in broad terms, the former tend to
emphasise four main elements in their arguments: that the amounts of
waste products which give cause for concern are relatively small; that
the problem of the long life of fission products is exaggerated;
that the management of wastes is amenable to known technical solutions;
and that the problem is not great when considered in the perspective of
the nature and quantity of hazardous wastes produced by other industries.
As indicated earlier the major source of radioactivity in waste products
in the nuclear fuel cycle is the spent fuel elements from reactors;
more than 95% of the total radioactivity in waste material arises at
the fuel recovery stage of reprocessing (Flowers op. cit. p. 3).
Nevertheless, proponents of nuclear power emphasise that, in spite of
their 'unpleasantness', the amount of such high level waste is very
small - about four tons per year from Britain's present nuclear capacity
(Hill 1981B p. 4; Greenhalgh 1980 p. 196; Hoyle 1977 p. 62-3).
In the CEGB's case for the Sizewell B PWR it is argued that the amount
of irradiated fuel produced by that reactor and, indeed, by a future
programme of 20 GWe of PWR's would not create any significant waste
management problems (CEGB 1982A Chapter 27). On-site storage at
Sizewell B could accommodate 18 years of fuel arisings and fuel could
be stored on site for at least five years before transfer to
reprocessing facilities for further storage prior to reprocessing
(ibid p. 174).
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Some proponents of nuclear power argue, moreover, that the problem of
longevitiy of radioactivity in such wastes is often exaggerated.
For example, Greenhalgh (1980 p. 195) argues that the discussion of the
waste problem is distorted by misunderstandings about radioactive decay
and the concept of 'half-life' and points out that highly active
radioisotopes decay rapidly over short periods while those which have
a long half-life approximate stable elements with any hazard arising
from toxicity rather than their weak radioactivity. Hill (1978 p. 15-16;
1981B p. 4) similarly argues that the activity of most residual fission
products decays rapidly and after a few years only Strontium-90 and
Caesium-137 (with half-lives of around 30 years) remain problematical.
As regards longer-term management of high level waste there is a
widespread confidence within the nuclear industry and amongst supporters of
nuclear power that safe disposal routes will become available long before
they are required. It is planned to solidify waste in glass blocks
inside stainless steel containers, a process which has existed since
the 1950's as a proven laboratory technique, the 'scaling up' of which
the nuclear industry envisages as unproblematical (Pearce et al 1979
p. 160). It is envisaged that, due to their high residual radioactivity,
such solidified wastes will be contained in an engineered storage
system for a period of 50 years or more and that such a store could even
be sealed up as a final disposal facility (CEGB 1982A p. 169-71;
Marshall 1981 p. 262). Consequently, it is argued that there will be
no need for means of permanent disposal until the beginning of the next
century and, therefore, that there is no immediate urgency to
demonstrate the availability of such a means (Hill 19818 p4).
Nevertheless further research to determine the best disposal routes
from the viewpoints of safety, economy and public acceptability, is
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regarded as important and indeed is progressing particularly into the
options of disposal on or under the ocean bed now that the Government
accepts the feasibility of deep land burial (CEGB 1982A p. 170). No
technical obstacles are envisaged and public concern about such disposal
routes is seen as misguided because, it is argued, the vitrified wastes,
when safely buried, will pose very little threat to future generations
both in an absolute sense and in comparison with other problems which
such generations will face (cf. Hill 1978 p. 16-17; 1981B p. 4-5;
Hoyle 1977 p. 63-4).
Criticisms which have been directed at the nuclear industry in respect
of its approach to the waste management problem are therefore seen as
unwarranted. Sir John Hill perceives a 'Catch-22' situation. The
industry was criticised for not carrying out research on future disposal
methods yet when it began to carry out test drillings to examine rock
formations it came under attack again - a 'no-win' situation (Hill
1981B p. 5). As far as the nuclear industry is concerned, there is
plenty of time available to establish a totally safe means of disposal
but criticism from opponents of nuclear power could lead to the
premature adoption of inadequately-tested methods (cf. Williams 1980
p. 272). Indeed, Greenhalgh (1980 p. 203) argues that it might be
considered unreasonable to expect a demonstration of completely safe
disposal methods:
"The elaborate geological disposal schemes now being
worked out show the extraordinary lengths to which the
industry is prepared to go to demonstrate that a
'completely safe' waste disposal scheme is feasible.
Indeed there is now a growing feeling that the nuclear
industry has over-reacted to the demands that it must
demonstrate 'completely safe' disposal procedures.
It can be argued that such a requirement is both
unreasonable and unrealistic. It is unreasonable
because the radioactivity of the wastes will cease
to be a significant hazard long before it has
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completely decayed, and it is unrealistic to demand
scientific proof of safety procedures extending over
a period of several hundred thousand years."
The problem of high-active wastes is therefore seen in the nuclear
industry as of relatively little concern because of the small quantities
involved. Excessive concern by critics with such wastes has, it is
argued, distracted attention from the more difficult problem facing
the industry of handling the much larger volumes of low and intermediate
level wastes (Hill 1981B p. 6; Greenhalgh 1980 p. 205-8; Pearce 1979A
p. 38). Intermediate level wastes, for example, are currently dumped
in the sea but this practice, as indicated earlier, may not remain
feasible in the long-term. The CEGB has therefore been examining the
possibility of shallow land burial of intermediate waste and has
concluded:
"There is no doubt that suitable shallow land burial
sites could be found and shown to be technically
feasible and radiologically safe." (CEGB 1982A p. 169).
Indeed, in late 1983 NlREX announced that it had identified eight
possible sites in the UK for intermediate waste dumping (see Guardian
25/10/83) •
Finally, supporters of nuclear power see their critics as unreasonable
to the extent that they focus on the problem of nuclear waste to the
neglect of what is seen as the greater problem of waste from other
industries. Thus, whereas radioactivity eventually dies away, many
toxic heavy metal wastes from metal mining and extraction (e.g. mercury
and cadmium)and the lead added to petrol do not decay and their
potential danger never decreases (Greenhalgh 1980 p. 195-6; Brookes
1976 p , 11). Consequently, the hazards from nuclear wastes should, it
is argued, be set in context against those from other activities,
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and in such a context they become relatively insignificant (ibid).
In general terms, then, the waste disposal issue is, for proponents of
nuclear power, a 'non problem' (Hill 1981B p. 4); at the most it is
a problem which is amenable to a technical solution which will
eliminate any impact on present and future generations. As Sir
Walter Marshall (1981 p. 263) has stated:
"I am confident that by the time we need to dispose
of high level nuclear wastes we shall have an
entirely safe and acceptable means of doing so, and
will be able to demonstrate that this offers no risk
to society, even thousands of years into the future."
In view of such confidence it is argued that criticism and concern
in relation to this issue is essentially based upon " ignorance
and a fear of the unknown." (Hoyle 1977 p. 62-3; cf. Hill198l8).
Criticis of nuclear power, however, argue that such confidence and
optimism is unjustified and misplaced. In broad terms, their position
can be characterised by three main arguments: firstly, that it is
irresponsible to continue producing nuclear wastes in advance of a
demonstration of the feasibility of safe long-term disposal; secondly,
that there are certain technical problems which prejudice the
achievement of safe disposal; and, thirdly, that, notwithstanding such
technical difficulties, the problem is more one of a moral and ethical
nature due to the potential impact on future generations of long-lived
waste fission products.
In the first place, then, it is argued that the nuclear industry has
paid inadequate attention to the problems of long-term waste management
(Elliott 1978 p. 15; Flowers 1976 p. 193). As a result, there has
been a failure to fully assess the economic and social costs of waste
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management and this has produced, it is argued, an underevaluation of
such costs and an effective subsidy to nuclear power development
(Shrader-Frechette 1980 p. 49-53; cf above section 7.4). Until
there has been a demonstration of a safe, permanent method for long-term
disposal to provide a basis for realistic estimates of economic and
social costs, it is regarded as irresponsible for the nuclear industry
to continue producing wastes (Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 318).
The absence of such knowledge is seen as distorting the decision-making
process potentially leading to a reduction in our future options and
pressures to accept 'second best' solutions with higher attendant
social costs (Schrader-Frechette 1980 p. 55-9).
However, it is further argued by critics that this condition of
demonstration and guarantee of safe disposal cannot be met by the
nuclear industry and that confidence in the availability of technical
solutions to the problem is unwarranted. The first stage in the
industry's preferred route to disposal involves surface storage of
high-active wastes in tanks and this carries risks of leakages and
cooling failures (producing potentially severe accidents) and a
requirement for extensive surveillance (Bunyard 1981 p. 148-50;
Prior 1980A p. 11). As regards the problem of ultimate disposal
various criticisms have been directed at the proposal for deep burial
of vitrified waste. For example, the ability of the blocks to
withstand disintegrative pressures from radiation and heat over the
required periods has been questioned and similar doubts have been
expressed about the effects on the rock material in which the blocks
are buried (Bunyard 1980 p. 124; 1981 p. 150-1). Lovins (1975 p. 33-4)
argues that there is no evidence that solidified wastes will remain
monolithic, insoluble or inert over the required periods of isolation,
especially for actinides which have the highest levels of toxicity;
355
indeed, he suggests that the development of a perpetually closed
system has never before been accomplished in the management of other
hazardous substances particularly those which can be biologically
reconcentrated. Moreover, he argues (ibid p. 34) that since we can
have no geological guarantees, terrestrial disposal must be 'retrievable'
in case of geological contingencies; but such a condition of
'retrievability' imposes a requirement for surveillance on a time scale
far exceeding the observed life span of human cultures and this creates
unique social and moral implications which are neglected in 'technical'
definitions of the problem.
Indeed, some opponents of nuclear power see the waste management issue
primarily as a moral and ethical one with the technical problems attaining
only subsidiary importance. The major issue here, then, is that of
'intergenerational £airness' - whether any generation has the right to
leave such a potentially hazardous legacy to its descendants (Bickerstaffe
and Pearce 1980 p. 318; Shrader-Frechette 1980 p. 61). The storage
of nuclear wastes implies a technological as well as social
'irreversibility' in the sense that future generations will have to
suffer the potential hazards of wastes from the present whether or not
they themselves employ nuclear power (Bickerstaffe and Pearce op. cit).
Indeed, Routley and Routley (1978 p. 137) argue that given the potential
life of nuclear fission, many more generations will have to bear the
risks from nuclear wastes than will benefit from nuclear-generated
electricity. They go on to argue that we have a necessary moral
obligation to take into account the interests of future generations, as
much as those of present generations, in taking actions which will
affect them and that this obligation is in no way diminished by
uncertainty about the future (ibid p. 139 p. 139-54). Since nuclear
waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people
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moral constraints are applicable and cannot be devalued by reference to
claims of countervailing economic benefits; this is seen as
illegitimately internalising moral considerations within economics
rather than placing economics within a broader framework of moral
constraints (ibid p. 155, 161). From this perspective, the emphasis
by the nuclear industry on the 'technicalities' of the issue is seen
as disguising the true ethical nature of the problem and producing a
biased evaluatory context (Prior 1980A p. 11; Shrader-Frechette 1980
p. 59-61).
The critics' position in respect of the waste management issue in fact
found some support in the sixth report of the Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution which summarised as follows:
"We believe that a quite inadequate effort has been
devoted to the problems of long-term waste management,
and that there should be no substantial expansion
of nuclear power until the feasibility of a method of
safe disposal of high level wastes for the indefinite
future has been established beyond reasonable doubt."
(Flowers 1976 p. 192-3).
The position on the high level waste problem is, moreover, supplemented
by other concerns. For example, it is argued by some that there is
inadequate concern about the problem of disposing of intermediate
level wastes (e.g. fuel element cladding and the residues from reactor
decommissioning) which arise in greater volumes than high-active
wastes (Pearce 1979A p. 38; Lovins 1975 p. 34). As indicated earlier
such waste is presently dumped at sea by NlREX under lAEA and OECD
guidelines and the Government did not recognise the two-year ban on
such dumping imposed by the London Dumping Convention in February 1983
(Guardian 25/9/83). The Government has been advised by the Radioactive
Waste Management Advisory Committee that such sea dumping could safely
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continue and indeed be increased (Flowers 1982 p. 14-5); however,
critics such as Greenpeace have disputed this argument and the UK
transport unions managed, during 1983, to prevent the sea-dumping of
low and intermediate level wastes from proceeding (Guardian 25/9/83).
Also, current practices for the transport of spent reactor fuel by
rail from power stations to the Sellafield reprocessing plant have
attracted considerable criticism due to the risks of accidents in
heavily-populated areas and doubts about the ability of the spent fuel
flasks to withstand the worst possible accident (Bunyard 1981 p. 130-1).
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8.2.4 Other Environmental Implications
Arguments about other environmental impacts do not figure prominently
in the controversy over nuclear power so they can be considered very
briefly. Supporters of nuclear power tend to argue that its
environmental advantages derive primarily from the small quantities of
materials involved in the nuclear fuel cycle compared with the effects
of extracting, transporting and burning fossil fuels (Greenhalgh 1980
p , 143-5). One of the primary advantages is seen to lie in the
reduction of the problem of carbon dioxide accumulation in the
atmosphere due to fossil fuel combustion and the consequent avoidance
of a potentially catastrophic climatic change due to a rise in
temperatures caused by the 'greenhouse effect' (ibid p. 171-2;
Weinberg 1980 p. 33-4). In addition, it is argued that nuclear power
can contribute to a reduction in acid oxide emissions from fossil
fuelled power stations (especially sulphur dioxide) which currently
cause health problems, crop damage and corrosion (Jones 1980B p. 152;
Tombs 1978 p. 3). Finally, nuclear futures are seen as creating fewer
problems in respect of land requirements than alternatives involving for
example, more coal mining and renewable technologies such as wind
power and biomass (Greenhalgh 1980 p. 147; Bethe 1978 p. 97).
Opponents of nuclear power, while admitting that there are environmental
benefits to be obtained from the reduction of fossil fuel combustion,
nevertheless argue that the advantages claimed by the nuclear proponents
are overstated. For example, the adverse consequences of carbon
dioxide build-up can be exaggerated by neglecting the benefits that it
might bring for agricultural productivity (Wittwer 1982). The
problems currently associated with the burning of fossil fuels to
generate electricity can be significantly reduced, it is argued, by
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for example, reducing coal requirements through the implementation of
combined heat and power schemes and reducing acid oxide emissions
through the introduction of fluidised bed combustion systems
(Friends of the Earth 1981 p. 527-8; Leach et al 1979 p. 30). A
greater emphasis on renewable energy sources is seen as the best way
to avoid potential climatic and ecological problems since such sources
do not directly contribute to the thermal pollution which exacerbates
the 'greenhouse effect' (Lovins 1979B p. 197; cf. Lecomber 1979
p. 177-8). Finally, some critics (for example, the Council for the
Protection of Rural England) argue that the land requirements of
nuclear electricity generation do cause significant problems
particularly because, firstly, large central power stations require more
main transmission lines and, secondly, the requirement for coastal
siting creates a conflict with amenity and nature conservation interests
(Caulfield 1982; CPRE 1982).
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8.3 The Social and Political Implications of Nuclear Power
8.3.1 The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
"If man ever achieves this further control over Nature ...
War, unless in the meantime man had found a better use
for the gifts of science, would not be the lingering
agony it is today. Any selected section of the world,
or the whole of it if necessary, could be depopulated
with a swiftness and dispatch that would leave nothing
to be desired." (Soddy quoted in Trenn (1979 p. 267)).
Thus it was that in 1917 Frederick Soddy expressed his concern about
the destructive potential of the process of atomic fission which he
and Rutherford had confirmed fifteen years earlier. With the actual
demonstration of this potential in 1945 the issue of the linkage
between the development of nuclear power and the proliferation of
nuclear weapons came to the forefront in international politics.
Since that time continuing efforts have been made to find acceptable
means of controlling the development and dissemination of nuclear
technology as a source of energy for peaceful use while at the same
time preventing, or at least minimising the risk of proliferation of
nuclear weapons (Imai and Press 1980 p. 2). Although there are indeed
some who regard nuclear weapons proliferation as beneficial from the
point of view of reducing the likelihood of war (cf. Quester 1981 p. 2)
most participants in the debate do believe that it is desirable to
avoid or restrict proliferation. However, on the question of the
relationship between civil nuclear power development and the spread
of nuclear weapons there exists considerable disagreement.
After the end of the Second World War the thinking behind the development
of a non-proliferation regime was dominated by the conviction that the
scope for proliferation was limited by the technological complexity of
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weapons manufacture and by the difficulty of obtaining fissile material
suitable for weapons from commercial reactors (Pearce et al 1979 p. 167).
In 1946 the US Baruch Plan, based on the Acheson-Lilienthal proposals
for international co-operation in and supervision of nuclear energy
developments, failed to gain international acceptance (Imai and Press
1980 p. 2-3). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace programme, launched in
1953, was intended to assist countries in their development of civilian
nuclear energy in return for guarantees that such assistance would be
used only for peaceful purposes. (Nye 1981 p. 17). This had the
effect of promoting the rapid development of nuclear power programmes
but it also provided the basis for a system of international
safeguards and controls which was subsequently institutionalised with
the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
Vienna in 1957 (ibid; Imai and Press 1980 p. 4). The lAEA safeguards
system was designed to ensure the monitoring and inspection of civil
nuclear facilities in nonweapons countries to prevent diversion of
materials to weapons uses (Nye op. cit.).
However, as assistance with nuclear programmes progressed, as the
numbers of research reactors multiplied, and as the UK, France and
China developed nuclear weapons, fears of horizontal proliferation were
strengthened. This led to the formulation, during the 1960s of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was finalised in 1968. The NPT
was designed to limit the development of nuclear weapons (as a
forerunner to achieving nuclear disarmament), and to ensure the
acceptance of the IAEA safeguards system by nonweapons states in
return for supplies of nuclear materials and technical assistance in
the peaceful use of nuclear power (ibid p. 18). Not all nations are
party to the NPT but France subscribes to its spirit and in Latin
America the Treaty of Tlatelolco is designed similarly to limit nuclear
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weapons; moreover, most nuclear facilities in non-NPT countries are
subject to safeguards as a condition of obtaining fuel and equipment from
suppliers (ibid; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 313-4).
The NPT-IAEA non-proliferation regime formed the basis for confidence
on the part of proponents of nuclear power that there was no necessary
link with weapons development until the mid 1970s. However, certain
events and trends then contributed to a growing concern about the
adequacy of this regime (Nye 1981 p. 18-19; Imai and Press 1980 p. 5-7;
Pearce et al 1979 p. 168). Firstly, the explosion by India in 1974
of a 'peaceful' nuclear device using plutonium derived from a Canadian-
supplied research reactor was seen as undermining the regime.
Secondly, the 'oil crisis' generated a surge of expectations about
future nuclear power development which brought into question the
capacity of existing safeguards and institutions to handle such
developments. Thirdly, proposals were made for the sale of'sensitive'
nuclear facilities (for producing weapons-msable materials) to several
countries with only limited nuclear power programmes creating the
suspicion that they were required for weapons purposes in violation of
the existing regime. Other trends which were subversive of the regime
included the increasing separation of plutonium from spent fuel, more
economical methods of enriching uranium and the prospect of the
introduction of fast reactors.
In response to these trends and events certain initiatives were taken
in the USA to update and strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
Firstly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group was created in 1976-7 to attempt
to prevent the undercutting of safeguards obligations (Nye 1981 p. 21;
Imai and Press 1980 p. 6). Secondly, in October 1976 President Ford
declared that avoidance of proliferation should take precedence over
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economic interest and announced the deferment of commercial
reprocessing pending a solution of proliferation problems (ibid).
This deferment was confirmed by President Carter in 1977 in a policy
statement which was concerned to avoid the premature commercialisation
of fuel cycles utilising plutonium and therefore also cancelled the
commercial demonstration fast reactor project at Clinch River. Moreover
it proposed stricter controls on the development of reprocessing
capacity in other countries (Nye 1981 p. 22-3; Pearce et al 1979
p. 168-9). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 subsequently
in
embodied these proposals~stringent controls on the spread of enrichment
reprocessing and fast reactor technologies (ibid).
The American stance on non-proliferation also led to the establishment
of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) to promote
an international assessment of the proliferation risks of various
aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, in order to determine measures to
minimise such risks without jeopardising the development of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes (Nye 1981 p. 25). Nye argues that INFCE
helped to re-establish a basis for consensus on a refurbished
non-proliferation regime for the nuclear fuel cycle; specifically, it
has reduced pressures for the premature use of plutonium which threatened
the safeguards system:
" INFCE laid a basis both in time and institutional
suggestions for a cautious introduction of plutonium use
that would be guided by realistic development needs
rather than wasteful and dangerous imitation based on
a spurious conventional wisdom and exaggerated projections."
(ibid p. 26).
Having briefly reviewed the evolution of the current system of
international controls and safeguards we can now consider the major
arguments of proponents of nuclear power in respect of the proliferation
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risks from its development. It is generally argued, then, that although
the first civil nuclear programmes (in the USA, USSR, UK and France)
were started for military purposes and a civil programme can provide the
necessary materials, equipment and expertise for weapons production,
there is nevertheless no inevitable tie between civil and weapons
programmes(Greenhalgh 1980 p. 20). No country now possessing nuclear
weapons has development them, it is maintained, by diverting fissile
material from civil facilities and of the 22 countries which have
obtained commercial reactors since 1945, 17 have not developed nuclear
weapons (ibid; Imai and Press 1980 p. 17-18). Should a country wish
to undertake such development it is easier, cheaper, and quicker to
produce weapons grade fissile material in special facilities which
would be more easily concealed (Greenhalgh 1980 p. 210-1; Jones 1980B
p. 153; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 314). Moreover, the system
of international safeguards based on NPT/IAEA is widely seen as
providing the basis for effective guarantees against the use of civil
facilities for weapons purposes (Imai and Press 1980 p. 18). As
Greenhalgh (1980 p. 219) argues:
" proliferation is basically a political matter; while
there is no fuel cycle that is entirely proliferation
resistant, there is at the same time no fuel cycle that
cannot be reconciled with a non-proliferation regime given
improved institutional arrangements and improved safeguards."
Considerable emphasis is placed, then, on strengthening the existing
safeguards system in order to permit the expansion of civil nuclear
programmes, particularly in non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), without
additional proliferation threats. Imai and Press (op. cit) argue
that recent restrictions on transfers of technology, materials and
equipment imposed by America are unduly penalising developing countries
and threatening their capability to pursue programmes of economic
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Sevelopment based on nuclear power. They suggest that the
proliferation dangers arising from energy shortages and imbalances,
which might arise if the development of civil nuclear programmes is
restricted, far outweigh those arising from international supervised
fuel cycles (ibid. p. 15-20). It is argued, therefore, that fuel cycle
services should be made available on an assured basis to NNWS and that
the international non-proliferation regime based on NPT/IAEA should be
strengthened by enhancing the political commitment of sovereign states
to non-proliferation goals (ibid. p. 23-4; Nye 1981 p. 29-31).
Certain technical arguments are also developed in relation to the
proliferation issue. In particular, it is argued that the development
of fast reactor technology has significant advantages from the
non-proliferation point of view because it allows a greater degree
of control over plutonium (Greenhalgh 1980 p. 95; Imai and Press
1980 p. 19-20; Marshall 1978, 1980). The argument has been developed
by Marshall (ibid). He argues that thermal reactor policies can add
to proliferation risks because the once-through fuel cycle results in
an accumulation of stored plutonium which becomes increasingly accessible
over time. Consequently, it is necessary to retrieve plutonium and
subject it to close control but the ideal solution is to use it as fuel
in fast reactors thus rendering it inaccessible and producing a technical
means of controlling and limiting plutonium, reducing the amount of
'extractable' plutonium and, therefore, greatly reducing the risks of
diversion for weapons purposes (op. cit. 1978 p. 7-19). Indeed, with
Chauncey Starr, Marshall has proposed the development of a completely
automated process for the reprocessing and fabrication of fast reactor
fuel (the Civex process) which, he argues, could further reduce
proliferation and diversion risks (ibid. p. 25-6; cf. Bunyard 1981
p. 146-7).
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Such technical developments, then, combined with improved safeguards
and 'codes of practice' are seen as reducing to a negligible level the
contribution of civil nuclear power programmes to the problem of nuclear
weapons proliferation. Opponents of nuclear power disagree. Their
arguments on this issue are underlain by the view that the commonality
of materials between nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons is a major
factor in elevating the technology to a 'special' status (cf.p.279).
They see an 'intimate connection' between civil and military
spheres which can never be separated by absolute barriers (Prior 1980A
p. 11; Patterson 1978 p. 127). Although the link is not seen as
deterministic it is nevertheless argued that the development of civil
nuclear programmes constitutes a major driving force behind weapons
proliferation (cf. Nye 1981 p. 29).
As an example of the close connection between civil and military
programmes, opponents of nuclear power point to developments in the UK
where, it is argued, it is not possible to distinguish between civil
and military plutonium (Dombey 1981; Sweet 1982 p. 50-52). The Magnox
reactor system was initially developed in relation to the requirements
for weapons plutonium and considerable amounts of high-quality plutonium
have been produced as a by-product of electricity generation (ibid).
It is suggested that this plutonium is being diverted to weapons uses
in violation of the articles of the NPT (Sweet op. cit.). Moreover,
controversy has developed recently over exports of plutonium to the USA
to fuel its fast reactor programme (which it now wishes to resurrect);
critics allege that such exports will permit the US to convert its
Harford reactor to weapons plutonium production thus permitting the
development of weapons which would otherwise not have been possible.
This again is seen to constitute a threat to NPT (Dombey 1981;
Sweet 1982 p. 51-2).
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Moreover, opponents of nuclear power emphasise that it is now widely
recognised that nuclear weapons can be constructed using reactor
grade fissile material. The technical information and expertise
required to design and manufacture a nuclear explosive device is now
quite readily available (Barnaby 1977 p. 4). Reactor-grade plutonium
(and highly enriched uranium) can be used to manufacture militarily
useful weapons with reliable yields in the kiloton range which would
provide an entirely credible national nuclear weapons capability (Lovins
1980 p. 817-21; Selden 1976). Indeed, in 1977 the US Government
announced that it had successfully tested such a device (Sweet 1982
p , 52). Furthermore, it is argued that there are political and
economic advantages of using power-reactor plutonium to make weapons
which might outweigh the technical problems and, given the problems of
detection, governments might actually prefer this route in certain
circumstances (ibid. p , 50; Lovins 1980 p , 822). Finally, Barnaby
(1977 p. 4) argues that there are likely to be considerable pressures,
connected with scientific prestige and curiosity, technological
momentum and security considerations, for the development of a weapons
capability out of a civil programme producing significant proliferation
threats.
As indicated earlier, increasing quantities of plutonium are being
produced as a by-product of electricity generation by thermal reactors
employing the once-through fuel cycle and some supporters of nuclear
power are concerned at the proliferation risks of this build-up (see
above p.287 ). As the prospect of operational fast reactor technologies
draws closer demand is increasing in many countries with significant
nuclear power programmes for new reprocessing facilities to provide
plutonium fuel for fast reactors (Barnaby 1977 p. 4; Prior 1980A
p. 12-13). Many critics are concerned that such an expansion of
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reprocessing would considerably increase the proliferation threat by
producing easier access to separated plutonium and by spreading the
required knowledge and expertise for weapons manufacture (Marshall
1978 p. 24; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 314). Indeed, the US
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 is seen as some vindication of
such fears as are reports that Pakistan has developed an enrichment plant
based on expertise 'acquired' by one national who gained access to
details of sensitive researches at the URENCO plant in the Netherlands
(ibid) .
As regards the proposals made by supporters of nuclear power for the
prevention of weapons proliferation, the critics remain unconvinced.
For example, Jasani (1980) criticises proposed technical solutions.
Firstly, the suggestion that spent fuel from the once-through fuel cycle
of thermal reactors would be left unreprocessed, thus protecting the
plutonium with high radioactivity, is rejected because radioactive
decay would eventually render the plutonium potentially retrievable
(ibid. p. 184; Pearce 1979A p. 39). Moreover, supporters of the fast
reactor are unlikely to back such an option. Secondly, it is argued
that there is no way of 'denaturing' fissile material so that it cannot
be used for weapons manufacture (Jasani 1980 p. 184; Lovins 1980 p. 822;
Selden 1976). Finally, the notion of a proliferation-resistant
automatic fuel reprocessing and fabrication process, such as ClVEX, is
regarded as speculative, subject to technical criticism and of relevance
only well after 2000 (Bunyard 1981 p. 147; Pearce 1979A p. 39).
Furthermore, Jasani (ibid p. 185) argues that it cannot overcome the
problem which is common to all proposed technical solutions:
"(A)lthough schemes such as Civex may make it difficult
for a small group of people, or even e country with a less
developed technological base, to divert plutonium, it is
always possible for a sophisticated organisation to extract
weapons-grade plutonium if it is really determined to do so.
No technical measures can solve such proliferation dangers."
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The institutional and political measures embodied in the international
non-proliferation regime are also subject to criticism as inadequate to
prevent proliferation by opponents of nuclear power. Firstly, the NPT
is criticised as merely an undertaking of good behaviour which has not
been effective in preventing proliferation and is, in any case, so
fragile that its survival as a workable instrument is in doubt (Barnaby
1977 p.5; Dombey 1981). In the case of considerations of 'national
security' and commercial interests (for example, for the sale and
enrichment and reprocessing plant) the NPT can, it is argued, easily be
circumvented (Prior 1980A p. 13-4). Much depends in practice on the
IAEA verification and inspection procedures but these again come in for
criticism. Doubts are expressed about the IAEA's capacity to detect
the diversion of fissile material and to give a timely warning of such
diversion given the response time of the international diplomatic
system (Pearce et al 1979 p. 168; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 314).
With future increases in plutonium production the uncertainties would
be magnified (ibid). Moreover, critics also believe that the IAEA is
in a potentially self-contradictory position in attempting to both
promote nuclear power and prevent proliferation producing a likelihood
of bias in favour of promotion (ibid).
The concern of opponents of nuclear power in respect of the
proliferation issue was expressed by the Royal Commssion on Environmental
Pollution in the following terms (Flowers 1976 p. 76):
II (T)he spread of nuclear power will inevitably facilitate
the spread of the ability to make nuclear weapons and,
we fear, the construction of these weapons. In reality,
total agreement on a comprehensive international control
system for the products of civilian nuclear power that
are relevant to the construction of nuclear weapons would
be possible only in a climate of general disarmament, and
the prospects for this are receding rather than improving.
It has been argued that the possession of these weapons
by the USA and the USSR has been a powerful force for
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for mutual toleration, but however true this is, it
would be folly to suppose that proliferation would
necessarily lead to a similar balance and restraint
in relations between other nations. Indeed, we see
no reason to trust in the stability of any nation
of any political persuasion for centuries ahead. The
proliferation problem is very serious and it will not
go away by refusing to acknowledge it."
Finally, it should be noted that opponents of nuclear power reject the
argument that any direct proliferation risks are more than outweighed
by the indirect risks which would arise from energy shortages and
imbalances contingent upon the failure to promote widespread development
of nuclear power. Based on the economic arguments considered in
Chapter 7 (Section 7.2) critics deny that such indirect risks exist
because, firstly, nuclear power is not necessary to avoid energy
shortages and, secondly, the rejection of the nuclear option will bring
economic benefits and increase economic stability.
8.3.2 Terrorism and Civil Liberties
This issue is not widely considered by supporters of nuclear power to
be particularly relevant to the discussion of its implications. For
example, Geoffrey Greenhalgh (1980), in a book which purports to cover
the relevant issues, gives no specific consideration to potential
problems of terrorism and threats to civil liberties. When the issue
is addressed it tends to be so in a rather dismissive fashion. The
nature of the potential problem can be stated briefly. Firstly,
terrorists might regard nuclear fuel cycle facilities as potential
targets for sabotage or occupation or they might steal (or otherwise
acquire) fissionable material with which to manufacture explosive
devices (Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 315; Flood and Grove-White
1976 p. 5-6). Secondly, the security measures which might be necessary
to counter the threat (or occurence) of terrorist activity could
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contribute to a significant erosion of civil liberties, both of workers
in the nuclear industry and of the general public (Bickerstaffe and
Pearce op. cit.).
In broad outline the position adopted by proponents of nuclear power
takes the following form. In the first place (and as on the proliferation
issue) it is argued that by far the greatest threat to social stability,
and to traditional rights and freedoms, derives from the prospect of
energy shortages and imbalances which will arise if nuclear power is
not developed as quickly as possible. As Greenhalgh (1980 p. 238-9)
argues, without nuclear power "severe disruption" will result with
enforced zero or negative economic growth, recession and unemployment;
"...the consequences of a world plunged into severe and widespread
energy shortages would be catastrophic." Compared with such a
prospect, then, the threat of terrorism is not seen as important.
Moreover, it is argued that such a threat is not unique to nuclear
installations and that equally large risks are attached to, for example,
large dams or natural gas termini; in comparative terms, therefore,
nuclear plant is not seen as presenting any special risks (Bickerstaffe
and Pearce 1980 p. 315).
Indeed, the absolute level of the threat is also seen as insignificant.
The dangers inherent in trying to acquire plutonium, the security
measures at nuclear installations, and the construction standards
adopted are seen as sufficient to deter terrorist activity and prevent
significant adverse consequences from such activity (ibid. Jones
1980B p. 153). Further measures are seen as readily available should
they become necessary. Technical options include the 'spiking' or
'denaturing' of fuel to build in an inherent radioactive barrier to
terrorist diversion (cf. Bunyard 1981 p. 146). Increased security
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and surveillance can also be arranged and Weinberg (1978 p. 79-80)
suggests that the terrorist threat would be minimised in his 'center
siting' strategy in which large energy centres would be controlled and
supervised by highly-trained, expert personnel.
Such 'technical and institutional fixes' are seen, then, as sufficient
to protect society against terrorism and as themselves presenting no
incremental threat to civil liberties (Jones 1980B p. 153). The issue
is basically irrelevant to the nuclear power debate and "...not a
matter that would figure prominently in a full social cost-benefit study
on the choice of direction for future UK energy strategy ..." (ibid).
According to Tombs 1978 (1978 p. 5) the problems of terrorism and the
prospect of the erosion of civil liberties have been exaggerated by
opponents of nuclear power. Indeed, Greenhalgh (1980 p. 224) regards
as totally inappropriate the involvement of, for example, the National
Council of Civil Liberties, in the Windscale Inquiry in particular and
in matters of energy policy in general.
However, in the view of many opponents of nuclear power the civil
liberties issue is of fundamental importance to the question of its
desirability since the perceived threat involves basic social and
political institutions. In the first place it is argued that there is
a significant threat from terrorist activity involving nuclear
installations and fuel cycle activities. The main security threats
were indicated at the beginning of this section and basically involve
theft and malicious use of plutonium, sabotage of nuclear installations
or blackmail based on threats of the above activities or occupation of
nuclear plant (Flood and Grove-White 1976 p. 5-6; Bickerstaffe and
Pearce 1980 p. 315). For example, reference has already been made to
concern about the ability of competent amateurs to construct a nuclear
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explosive device from reactor grade plutonium; Bunyard (1981 p. 199)
refers to 'credible' bomb designs by US students and Lovins (1980
p. 820) quotes Willrich and Taylor as follows:
"Under conceivable circumstances, a few persons,
possibly even one person working alone, who possessed
~10 kg of plutonium oxide and a substantial amount of
chemical high explosive could, within several weeks (or
perhaps less), design and build a crude fission bomb .
(that) would have an excellent chance of exploding, .
probably .... with the power of at least 100 tons of
chemical high explosives. This could be done using
materials and equipment that could be purchased at a
hardware store and from commercial suppliers of scientific
equipment for student laboratories ..
Bomb attacks against nuclear plant have occurred in Germany, Spain and
France and nuclear installations have been entered though no serious
incident of sabotage involving releases of radiation is yet known to
have occurred (Flood and Grove-White 1976 p.6).
It is argued, moreover, that the threat to use a nuclear device or
commit sabotage is most effective as a means of blackmail and a
credible threat can easily be made given the wide availability of
information on bomb manufacture and the inability to account for all
fissile material throughout the fuel cycle (Bickerstaffe and Pearce
1980 p. 315; Lovins 1975 p. 37-8). The precision of inventory assay
(about one percent) is such that over a period of time a significant
quantity of fissionable material is unaccounted for; continual small
thefts of such material can therefore remain undetected (ibid.
Widdicombe 1980 p. 193). Widdicombe (ibid) refers to claims that
there already exists a blackmarket in fissile materials and to
records of 44 nuclear threats against US cities or industrial plants
since 1970 which were credible enough to be taken seriously.
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Consequently, for opponents of nuclear power, the threat of terrorist
activity is real and susceptible neither to elimination by safeguards
nor to justification by comparisons. The observation that the
terrorist threat applies to other industrial installations is seen as
in no way diminishing the 'more spectacular risks' attached to nuclear
facilities (Lovins 1975 p. 38). Moreover, it is argued that terrorist
and criminal activities have increased in other areas in spite of
expensive and thorough safeguardsi therefore "...it is impossible
to prevent the theft of strategic materials by sufficiently determined
groups whose motives are subversive or economic". (ibid p. 38-9), Such
misgivings were reflected in the report of the Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution (Flowers 1976 p. 81): "In sum, plutonium
appears to offer unique and terrifying potential for threat and blackmail
against society ..•"; and Willrich and Taylor have concluded that
"•..it seems only a question of time before some terrorist organisation
exploits the possibilities for coercion which are latent in nuclear
fuel." (cf. Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 315),
The security measures and precautions which necessarily accompany the
development of the nuclear fuel cycle in order to counter such threats
are seen by opponents of nuclear power as inimical to civil liberties
and democratic rights. Two major types of precaution are necessarYi
firstly, nuclear installations and materials in transit require special
guardingi, and, secondly, there is a need for security vetting of
personnel and surveillance of certain members of the public (Widdicombe
1980 p. 193). At the present time, for example, the guarding of
nuclear installations and materials in transit is understaken by the
Special Constabulary of the Atomic Energy Authority which has unique
powers to carry and use weapons, to engage in 'hot pursuit' of actual
or potential thieves, and to arrest on suspicion. Such powers are
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seen as a cause for concern because the force is not responsible to
Parliament for its day-ta-day operations (ibid p. 194; Flood and
Grove White 1976 p.8). Personnel employed at nuclear installations
and those engaged in transit operations are currently subject to
'vetting' procedures and the restrictions of the Official Secrets Act
(ibid p. 7-8).
Critics express considerable misgivings about possible future trends in
such measures and precautions if an expansion of nuclear power programmes
is undertaken. Firstly, it is suggested that there could be substantial
extensions of vetting procedures in the electricity supply industry and
associated industries and an expansion of special police forces not
subject to full political control (Flood and Grove-White 1976 p. 9-11).
In addition, it is suggested that the expansion of nuclear power will
result in an erosion of the interests of workers in respect of, for
example, the right to strike and participation in management decisions
(Mathews 1980 p. 26; Bunyard 1981 p. 202). The increased movement
of fissile materials round the transportation system is seen as having
potentially disturbing consequences in view of the need for special
restrictions and security (Lovins 1975 p. 31-2). Moreover, members
of the public will, it is feared, become subject to more extensive
surveillance involving, for example, phone-tapping, mail-opening and
the use of informers and infiltrators (Flood and Grove-White 1976 p. 11-17).
It is felt that such surveillance is likely to be extended to cover
politically radical groups, and environmentalist groups opposed to
nuclear power, indeed, to any groups or individuals which are defined as
actually or potentially 'subversive', with such a definition being made
by the security forces subject to little control (ibid p. 12-13;
Widdicombe 1980 p. 194-5). Taylor (1980 p. 83), for example, cites
the case of the German scientist Dr Traube who, on becoming opposed to
nuclear power, suffered the experience of phone-tapping and arrest on
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suspicion of having terrorist links.
Concern has also been expressed about the 'fragile' nature of a nuclear
society in which the above risks build up. Thus, a single serious
incident could bring about the introduction of draconian security
measures and surveillance which might well be subsequently maintained
on a permanent basis, applied to other law enforcement problems and
therefore threaten to disrupt and change the basic structure of our
social and political institutions with drastic implications for civil
liberties (Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p. 316; Lovins 1975 p. 16-17).
The requirement that certain risks and threats must not be allowed
to materialise is seen as producing necessary tendencies towards an
increasingly centralised and authoritarian political system (Prior
1980A p. 15; Mathews 1980 p. 26; Routley and Routley 1978 p. 164-5).
In such a context it is feared that opposition to nuclear power may
increasingly involve civil disobedience and violence which could
evoke an even stronger security reaction; and this might produce a
perpetual escalation of violcence and authoritarian reaction (cf. Pearce
et al 1979 p. 219-23; Flood and Grove-White 1976 p. 45-7).
A further focus of concern for opponents of nuclear power is the highly
centralised electricity generation and distribution system which is
implied by heavy reliance on nuclear power. It has been argued
that such a system would be vulnerable to subversion from inside or
outside the industry and that the measures required to prevent the
severe consequences of disruption could present a threat to civil
liberties and rights (ibid. p. 6; Patterson 1978 p. 133). Also, the
energy futures advocated by supporters of nuclear power structured
around this heavy reliance upon centralised, nuclear-generated
electricity, are seen to imply an erosion of the freedom of consumer
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choice, with no opportunity for consumers to indicate their
preferences in market behaviour (Patterson 1977 p. 95).
In view of this level of concern about the civil liberties issue,
opponents of nuclear power are highly critical of what they see as
the total neglect of the problem by government, the nuclear industry
and nuclear proponents in general. Indeed, such neglect has caused
disquiet amongst impartial analysts and commentators. For example,
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution stated that "....we
think it remarkable that none of the official documents we have seen
during our study convey any unease on this score .... Nowhere is there
any suggestion of apprehension about the possible long-term dangers
to the fabric and freedom of our society." (Flowers 1976 p. 193).
Pearce (1979A p. 39) accepts that "... (a)n expanded nuclear power
programme necessarily involves an increase in the infringement of
civil liberties ..." and finds Jones' (1980B)dismissal of the
problem" ... difficult to understand". This neglect, combined with
official secrecy about security measures, has promoted support for
conspiracy theories about the role of the security services as
concerned more to undermine rather than preserve civil liberties
(Pearce et al 1979 p. 175-6). Such suspicions have led opponents
of nuclear power to call for full and open discussions about security
measures in order to ensure that the security services are subject
to public accountability and support (ibid. p. 176-7).
To critics of nuclear power, then, the threat to civil liberties
represents a significant element in the debate. They dismiss the
suggestion that failure to proceed with nuclear programmes will produce
a greater threat to liberties and freedoms due to the economic and
social consequences of energy shortages on the grounds that such
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shortages are not the necessary consequence of a non-nuclear policy.
As discussed previously, many opponents of nuclear power argue that
such shortages and associated price leaps are avoi~able given serious
measures to conserve energy, reduce waste, increase efficiency and
develop alternatives to nuclear power and, further, that the adaptation
to a lower level of energy use can take place within the existing
structure of social institutions and values (and may indeed be the
only way of preserving many such institutions and values in the long
term) (cf. Leach 1979; Lovins 1975).
8.4 Conclusion
There exists, then, a considerable degree of controversy over the extent
to which the development of nuclear power produces safety, environmental,
social and political implications which are cause for concern and which
therefore prejudice the case for such development. A wide spectrum
of positions exists from those proponents who see nuclear power as
providing net benefits in these respects in relation to alternative
energy production technologies, to those opponents who argue that it
provides substantial net social costs which should not be contemplated.
In combination with arguments about economic benefits it is evident
that a complex matrix of stances on the nuclear power issue can be
identified and the rather generalised treatment of the arguments which
has here been necessary has obviously not been able to do full justice
to this complexity. However, a basis is provided for proceeding to
develop a categorisation of the debate and to an anulysis of certain
aspects of the cognitive and evaluative structures of the debate from
the standpoint of the conceptual framework developed in the first part
of this thesis.
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Chapter 9: Ideology, Rationality and the Nuclear Power Debate
9.1 Introduction: A Categorisation of the Nuclear Power Debate
Debates about public policy issues can be seen as debates about ends
and about alternative ways of achieving them; in other words, they
are arguably about the nature of the social values which are to be
desired and about the kinds of social action that might be pursued in
order to achieve them. Energy is an essential input to the process of
creating 'value' (the material and immaterial 'goods' upon which value
is placed in a particular social context). Consequently, debates
about energy policy issues should be seen in the wider context of
debates about social values and about ways of extracting useful energy
from the natural environment and ways of using it to help create and
sustain such values.
What are at issue, then, in debates about energy policy are not just
questions of alternative means - questions concerning the implications
of pursuing such means and the pros and cons in relation to the
achievement of desired values. Rather, such values themselves are
inherently contentious. In a social context of divergent value systems
there are alternative sorts of values which could be achieved; however,
not all such values can be achieved to the satisfaction of all groups
due to problems of mutual exclusiveness and finite resources. Moreover,
different means are variably suited to the achievement of different
values so that means to the achievement of one set of values may have
unavoidable implications which impede the achievement other values.
Debates about energy policy are therefore necessarily debates about
'means-ends' complexes'; any discussion of means must imply
consideration of the issue of desired values.
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If there is a consensus between parties to an energy policy dispute on
the nature of desired ends and values then debate can be effectively
reduced to the consideration of alternative ways of achieving those
ends. Two types of dispute arise in such a situation. Firstly, there
is disagreement concerning the nature and extent of the implications of
alternative means in relation to desired values; such disputes can be
called 'cognitive disputes'. Secondly, there arise disputes about
what the achievement of particular desired ends is worth in terms of
detrimental effects in relation to other ends and values. This type
of dispute can be termed an 'evaluative dispute' and can be further
categorised as a 'bounded trade-off dispute'. It is 'bounded' in the
sense that it takes place within the bounds of basic agreement on the
nature of desired values, and it is about trade-offs of the benefits of
a particular means in relation to certain desired values against its
disbenefits in relation to other desired values.
However, if no consensus on the nature of desired ends and values can be
negotiated between all the parties then debates about energy policy
inevitably involve disputes concerning both ends and the means to their
achievement. In such case a different form of evaluative dispute
arises to essentially displace bounded trade-off disputes. This form
can be termed an 'unbounded value dispute' since it concerns fundamental
unbounded disagreement about the nature of desired ends and values. In
the presence of this form of disagreement cognitive disputes can be
expected to become rather more severe and complex because of effects on
value-conditioned processes of knowledge formation. Trade-off disputes
are displaced because of a fundamental lack of agreement on the values
between which trade-offs are to be made. In order to be able to discuss
trade-offs between two ends it has to be agreed that both can be
assigned a positive valuation. If this cannot be agreed then the
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benefits that one group sees for a particular course of action will not
be recognised as such by another group and consequently no meaningful
discussion can be pursued concerning the trade-off of such 'benefits'
against 'disbenefits' which might arise in relation to other ends.
It is possible, then, to achieve some degree of categoriation of the
debate about nuclear power in terms of the above discussion. The
development of nuclear power programmes constitutes a means to the
achievement of certain ends and values but the debate is as much about
the relative desirability of the different ends for which nuclear power
has implications as it is about the nature and magnitude of those
implications. In other words the dispute has both 'cognitive' and
'evaluative' dimensions. In chapters 7 and 8 the distinction was made
between the economic implications of nuclear power on the one hand and
safety, environmental, social and political implications on the other;
categorising the latter group broadly as 'social' implications gave us
the two main types 'economic' and 'social'. Correspondingly, we can
talk of 'economic' and 'social' ends and values, the former relating to
such matters as, for example, the level of industrial costs, the growth
of output of goods and services, the nature of economic rewards, the
level and distribution of real income and so on, while the latter
(i.e. 'social' ends) relate, for example, to the health and safety of
the workforce and wider population, the protection of the environment,
and to the issues of civil liberties and nuclear weapons proliferation.
We can firstly analyse the debate in so far as it takes place within
the framework of agreement concerning the nature of the ends and values
which are desirable and worth achieving. It is indeed agreed by many
parties to the debate that the reduction of energy costs and the
promotion of material economic growth are desirable ends and that,
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moreover, we should be concerned to protect workers and the public from
radiation hazards, preserve environmental amenity, protect civil
liberties, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and so on. So,
it is quite widely agreed that any contribution of nuclear power to the
promotion of economic growth should be positively valued as a benefit
while any problems it creates in relation to 'social' ends should be
negatively valued as costs. Consequently, if the debate concerng the
issue of whether to purs~e a programme of construction of nuclear
power stations as opposed to an alternative programme of investment
(e.g. in coal-fired. power stations) then we can schematically represent
the possible stances in the debate with respect to two dimensions:
firstly, the net economic costs and benefits and, secondly, the net
'social' costs and benefits - in both cases of the nuclear option
compared to an alternative course of action.
the resulting two-dimensional representation.
Figure 9.1 illustrates
In this realm of the nuclear debate, then, the prot,agonists can agree
on what constitutes a 'benefit' and what constitutes a 'cost'; this is
a prerequisite for the application of a cost-benefit framework to be
meaningful. Within such a scheme it is possible to examine the
implications of the cognitive dimension of the dispute. Referring to
Figure 9.1, supporters of nuclear power tend to argue for locations in
this 'cost-benefit space' which represent substantial economic benefits
to be derived from the substitution of higher cost fossil fuels in
electricity generation and from the promotion of economic growth; in
other words, supporters argue that nuclear power will provide an
identifiable economic benefit of a magnitude that might lie, for
example, between 81 and e2· However, there is rather less agreement
amon~st supporters of nuclear power regarding the magnitude of 'social'
costs and benefits. The strongest advocates tend to argue that nuclear
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power may actually provide some net benefits compared, for example, to
coal-fired electricity generation, taking into account what are consi-
dered to be the relevant safety and environmental implications" This
position is argued mainly by those associated with the nuclear industry
(cf Jones 1980B, Hill 19BIB, Greenhalgh 19BO) and can be identified with
locations in the area A. It is also broadly representative of the posi-
tion presented by the CEGB in their case for the single PWR station at
Sizewell (CEGB 19B2A; Baker 1982). other supporters recognise the
existence of net disbenefits in relation to safety, environmental and
political implications (eg up to magnitude SI) and therefore would
argue for locations in, for example, area B (cf Weinberg 1978, 1980;
Pearce 19BOA; Pearce and Nash 19B1).
The position of opponents of nuclear power in relation to this dimension
of cognitive dispute (within a broad value consensus) can be seen as
something of a mirror image of the position of supporters. These
opponents tend to argue for locations which represent substantial dis-
benefits in terms of 'social' implications (eg between S1 and S2) but
display rather greater disagreement concerning the economic implications
of nuclear power programmes. The strongest opponents reject the argu-
ment that nuclear electricity generation will provide economic benefits
in the form of lower cost electricity and greater economic growth,
insisting that nuclear power will produce extra costs in all respects
compared to alternative investments; they would therefore argue for
locations in area E (cf Sweet 19B2; Bunyard 19BO, 19B1; CSENE 19B1).
On the other hand, some critical stances do recognise and accept that
nuclear power does provide economic benefits and would therefore argue
for locations such as those in area D (cf Flowers 1976).
Therefore, the cognitive dimension of the dispute about nuclear power
can be identified essentially as a dispute about claims concerning the
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actual implications of developing nuclear power programmes for 'economic'
and 'social' values. In the context of agreement about the desirability
of such values, cognitive dispute will exist even if there is further
consensus concerning the nature of 'appropriate' trade-offs between
economic benefits and social costs. Referring again to Figure 9.1,
for example, if supporters and opponents can further agree that T4
represents an appropriate trade-off function the dispute will nevertheless
remain. Both groups will agree that points above and to the right of
T4 represent outcomes for which nuclear power becomes acceptable (in terms
of the economic benefits more than outweighing the social costs); however,
opponents will argue that no such points exist (because the area DE defines
all possible outcomes) whereas supporters will argue that the acceptance
region contains all possible outcomes (cf area BA).
The existence of disagreement concerning the form of appropriate trade-
offs between costs and benefits introduces the further evaluative dimen-
sion of dispute - 'bounded trade-off dispute' (ie bounded by underlying
agreement on the nature of desirable values)o The implications of this
dimension of dispute can be illustrated by hypothesising an area e in
Figure 9.1 which can be agreed upon by both supporters and opponents as
containing all likely outcomes concerning the economic and social
impacts of nuclear power. Now, disagreement over trade-offs results
in several possible alternative trade-off functions being put forward by
different groups of supporters and opponents. For example, if T2
represents the trade-off function of supporters and T5 that of opponents
then, in spite of agreement on the cognitive level over the area e, the
dispute will nevertheless remain; all of area e is above and to the
right of T2 so all locations in it are acceptable to supportersi while,
on the other hand, no locations in C are in the acceptance region
defined by TS for opponents. Similarly, even if the point Cl could be
agreed upon as representating the most likely outcome, nuclear power
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would be acceptable to a group with trade-off function T3 but unacceptable
to those adhering to T4.
This analysis, albeit schematic and hypothetical, throws up an interesting
implication. Within the framework of broad agreement about desired
economic and social values, the dispute becomes increasingly complex and
intractable in proportion to the extent to which cognitive and trade-off
disputes become accentuated and interrelated. In particular, trade-off
disputes involve the explicit consideration of the weighting of alterna-
tive values and this activity is (as indicated in earlier Chapters)
conventionally seen as involving recourse to 'irrational' considerations"
On the other hand, cognitive disputes are widely seen as involving
matters of empirical fact and therefore as being rather easier to conduct
on territory which is familiar to the disputants (eg in the categories
'true' and 'false') 0 Consequently, it would appear, in these terms,
to be in the interests of those groups which have a strong commitment
either for or against nuclear power to attempt to avoid the realm of
evaluative trade-off dispute (which might be seen as containing the
potential for the rapid erosion of credibility) and to attempt to restrict
the dispute to the cognitive dimension where issues are translated into
'matters of fact' and therefore seen as more easily supported or refuted.
This can be illustrated by referring again to Figure 9.1. The implica-
tion is that parties to the debate would attempt to avoid arguing for
outcomes which involve locations within the range of disagreement con-
cerning trade-off functions ie within the area bounded by T1 and T6.
Rather, supporters would attempt to argue that, as a matter of 'fact',
nuclear power will provide substantial economic benefits and negligible
social costs, or even some social benefits (cf area A) and that no
'reasonable' person could insist on a trade-off which would render this
position unacceptable. Conversely, opponents would attempt to argue that
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nuclear power will provide substantial social costs for a small (or
non-existent) economic benefit (cf area E) and that the rational person
must therefore reject ito We have indeed noted previously the
affinity of parties to the debate for such positionso
Within the framework of consensus on desired economic and social values
it is possible, then, to distinguish two basic categorisations of
support for and opposition to nuclear powero On the cne hand, 'uncondi-
tional' supporters and opponents are those who argue in the cognitive
dimension for cost-benefit outcomes which would avoid the possibility of
the acceptability or otherwise of nuclear power being dependent upon
trade-offs which involve explicit reference to evaluative considerations,
On the other hand, 'conditional' supporters and opponents adopt positions
in the cognitive dimension which involve the question of acceptability
being contingent upon trade-offs between valueso Such 'conditional'
positions are therefore open to reassessment and challenge to a greater
degree than 'unconditional' positions given the dynamics of the dispute
which involves continual interdependent change in our knowledge about the
implications of nuclear power development and in peoples' valuations
of the 'goods' which are affected by such developmento Indeed, since
the attempt to avoid an explicit evaluative dimension may be important
in the establishment and maintenance of 'unconditional' positions, the
question arises as to the extent to which adherents to such positions
would ~e prepared to recognise the validity of changes in knowledge about
implications and outcomes which would lead them to adopt a 'conditional'
positiono In such a question we come up against the problem of the
interdependence of cognitive and evaluative processes in the determina-
tion of people's attitudes to such issues as nuclear power,
The debate about nuclear power does not, however, take place totally
within the confines of agreement between groups concerning the nature of
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desired endso The opposition of some to the development of nuclear
power is based upon the rejection of the values which prevail in our
society and which are supported, actively or tacitly, by most groups.
In this context there arises what can be called 'unbounded value dispute'u
In the presence of this type of dispute it is not possible to concep-
tualise the debate in terms of a cost-benefit framework because such
opponents will deny the existence of benefits; indeed, more fundamen-
tally, they may deny the relevance of the concept of 'benefit' in the
context of social, economic and technological development within the
existing framework of institutions and valuesu For example, such
opponents could agree that nuclear power may well promote economic growth
but if they deny the desirability of such material growth they will see
this as a disadvantage and as a reason for not pursuing nuclear power
programmes. Therefore, such 'radical opponents' question the concept
of economic benefits against which social costs can be offset (cf Commoner
1976; Lovins 1977; Mathews 1980)0 It is an interesting characteristic
of arguments that tend to be propounded from such a radical standpoint
that although the normal concept of benefits and the relevance of trade-
off disputes are questioned, the emphasis is nevertheless often placed
on presenting a cognitive position similar to that of 'unconditional
opponents'; for example, Commoner and Lovins (op cit) argue for outcomes
involving substantial social costs but also place considerable emphasis
on attempting to refute the argument that nuclear power will promote
economic growth. This may be due to a recognition that to have an impact
on the debate their arguments must be capable of 'translation' into the
context of an accepted framework of valuesQ
The above scheme, then, provides a framework for the categorisation and
analysis of the debate about nuclear powero It emphasises the two major
dimensions to the debate: the 'cognitive dimension' concerning the nature
of the implications of a nuclear power programme in economic, environmental,
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social and political terms; and the 'evaluative dimension' concerning
the perceived desirability of such implications. This distinction is
broadly consistent with Fishbein's attitude formation model as employed,
for example, by Otway, Maurer and Thomas (1978), which conceives of
attitudes (A) in terms of a function of beliefs (b) that an object (0)
is characterised by a particular attribute (i), and of evaluations (e)
about the desirability of the attribute. Therefore, for a set n of
relevant beliefs:
Ao b. e.~ ~
The work of Otway et al (ibid) has illustrated the importance, in the
controversy over nuclear power, of the cognitive dimension - of differences
in beliefs about the nature and magnitude of the costs and benefits
associated with its developmento Nevertheless, the emphasis is placed,
in explaining public attitudes, on the evaluative dimension indicating
the importance of concerns relating to the social and political institu-
tions implied by nuclear power and to the underlying 'social and moral
order' of different groups (ibid p 115-7; Cotgrove 1981 p 132-6)0 Hence
the argument that 'the nuclear debate is about values'o However, it
can be argued that such a perspective tends to neglect the significance
and implications of dispute in the cognitive dimension, perceiving this
aspect of the problem in terms of the acceptance or non-acceptance of
'factual information', thus implying the separateness of the cognitive
and evaluative realms (Otway et al 1978 p 116)0 It leads to the view,
implicit, for example, in the argument of Bickerstaffe and Pearce (1980),
that we can make progress towards consensus on the basis of information
about the impact of nuclear power in relation to social goals (ie about
social costs and benefits) considered separately from issues relating to
the definition and weighting of those goalso
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Underlying much of the discussion and debate about nuclear power, then,
is a particular conception of scientific knowledge and information. Two
major broad positions are discernible as indicated aboveo On the one
hand, there are those who argue that the issue is clear-cut and that the
facts speak for themselves indicating that the cost-benefit outcomes are
such as to generate no question of dispute over evaluative trade-offs
(cf 'unconditional' positions)o On the other hand, there are those
who argue that the facts concerning cost-benefit outcomes are such that
the question of acceptability is contingent upon evaluative trade-offs
and that the conduct of the debate must take on board the importance of
the latter dimension (cf 'conditional' positions)o Both these positions
are based upon the assumption that is is possible to identify through
scientific investigation a set of 'reliable facts' about the likely
implications of nuclear power programmes which all participants should
be able to agree upon if they behave in a reasonable and rational way
(eg critically evaluate all the available information)o The existence
of disagreement in the ccgnitive dimension is therefore explained in
terms of the adherence by certain groups to positions based upon factual
evidence which is wrong and therefore is capable of empirical refutationo
However, the implication of the analysis presented in Part One (Chapters
2-3) is that this perspective on the relationship between the cognitive
and evaluative dimensions of the nuclear power debate cannot be upheld and
that a proper understanding of the role of the cognitive dimension in
the debate requires a rather different conception of the nature of the
scientific knowledge which can be derived about the implications of
nuclear power programmes and the role of such knowledge in debates about
public policy issueso Such a conception has been outlined (cf Chapters
4-6) and the concern of the remainder of this Chapter will be to examine
certain aspects of the nuclear power debate as conducted in this country
in order to illustrate some of the analytical implications of this concep-
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Firstly, however, it is perhaps worth very briefly summarising the
major characteristics of this conception, It is argued that social
scientific knowledge must be seen as thoroughly contingent upon values
whose meaning is established in an interpretive way in relation to the
prevailing social, institutional and political context. Therefore,
social knowledge is necessarily morally tinted; any attempt to portray
such value-conditioned knowledge as 'objective' and 'value-free' must be
seen as ideological. The development of social knowledge is not an
isolated mental activity but is rooted in human social activity. Such
knowledge is seen as arising from the continuous need to confront and
solve problems concerning human relationships which are perceived from
particular social perspectives. In a structureJ social context different
values and interests define different 'locations' and perspectives and
different 'world views' can be seen as arising within such 'locations'.
It is argued that amongst these various perspectives particular interpre-
tations of the meaning of the social world and its problems condition
the process of knowledge develcpment. Thus, in a structured context
dominant 'universes of reality and value' arise which define relevant
and Significant problems and therefore condition what is accepted as
viable and relevant knowledge. Such knowledge is then in turn reinforced
by the problem-solving process. This process is seen as comprising both
'cognitive-rational' and 'normative-legitimatory' components and social
knowledge is seen as playing an important role in providing interpretations
of social meaning which serve to legitimise institutional structures and
therefore to aid in the maintenance and transmission of social order and
stability.
In relation to this wider problematic of the maintenance of social
stability and control the process of development of social knowledge is
seen as closely tied up with the institution of the state. The state is
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seen as primarily concerned to ensure social stability through the
promotion of the conditions for capital accumulation, through the
maintenance of institutions of social control, and through maintaining
mass loyalty by securing the conditions for hegemony of a particular
'universe of reality and value' which provides dominant interpretations
of the meaning of the social world and therefore serves to legitimise
its institutional structure, It is argued that the increasing involve-
ment of the state in the social and production systems has produced the
need for rational-formal procedures of planning and allocationu Moreover,
difficulties in achieving the conditions for social control and stability
have placed increasing strains onlegitimisingframeworks and created a
need for their reinforcement, Therefore, it is argued that the develop-
ment of social knowledge has become increasingly related to the require-
ments of the State in respect of problem-solving and legitimation and
that this has resulted in a dominant body of ideological knowledge which
both asserts the possibility of objective, value-free knowledge and
contains a conception of its application to the guidance of social action,
The main theme of this dominant ideology, then, is a technocratic form
of rationality wh~ch relates the nature and form of knowledge to its
utilization in the direction of social and political action, A positivistic
conception of knowledge development provides a model of valid neutral
scientific reason and various bodies of theoretical knowledge provide the
relevant 'facts' which are to guide action. Technocratic rationality
embodies a form of instrumental reasoning which confines the concept of
rationality to the process of considering alternative means to given ends
on the basis of objective, value-free knowledge; ends become relegated
to the realm of the subjective and 'irrational' and 'progress' becomes
equated with the replacement of the 'irrational' political process by
rational technocratic guidance on the basis of value-free science, It
is argued that further themes of this dominant ideology are a 'liberalist'
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conception of the free, individualistic, harmonious equilibrium society
and a 'materialist ethic' which equates social welfare with the quantita-
tive output of material goods and services"
It is now possible to analyse certain aspects of the debate about nuclear
power from the perspective of this conceptiono
902 Technocratic Rationality and the Nuclear Power Debate
The aim of this section is to indicate the extent to which the themes of
technocratic rationality are manifested in the arguments which are widely
propounded in support of the development of nuclear power. We are
concerned here with the perspective which sees nuclear power simply as a
means to the achievement of given ends and the debate about nuclear power
as a purely 'technical' construct in which only issues related to the
choice of means are susceptible to 'rational' consideration involving
the application of scientific reason. This functional or instrumental
concept of rationality results, then, in an elevation of such scientific
reason and expertise to a position of unchallenged authority in the debate
as the fundamental prerequisite for 'rational' decisions. Improved
decision-making and debate is therefore seen as contingent upon the
improvement of our objective, factual knowledge about the implications
of nuclear power, upon the establishment of a greater role for the
experts who have command over such knowledge, upon the dissemination of
such knowledge to eliminate ignorance, and upon U.e willingness of all
parties to abandon irrational, emotional responses and base their
positions on the 'facts'o These themes can be developed somewhat
with reference to exampleso
Firstly, then, there is a tendency to view the nuclear power issue in
purely technical termso For example, Sir John Hill (1981A p516) has
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referred to the outlook of the nuclear industry in the early years of
development and describes the nature of the problems that were considered
to be relevant:
"Of course we foresaw that there would be problems but we imagined
that they would be amenable to solution by Science and engineeringu
In particular we imagined plants getting bigger and more efficient
as our technology and engineering improved and we saw the real
struggle as an economic one - to generate electricity more cheaply
than by burning fossil fuelso" (ibid)
In other areas relevant problems were technical in nature concerning the
means to given ends and were susceptible to solution on the basis of
science, the process resulting in technological progress" The view of
the nuclear power debate as involving only technical issues is also
illustrated in the argument of Fainberg (1980 p44):
"But why is it that in the nuclear power debate, issues which appear
to be technical in nature, and thus amenable to rational scientific
analysis, are the source not only of confusion, but also of
invective and irrationality? In principle, reasoned debate is the
best way to deal productively with such matters, and I respectfully
suggest it is particularly necessary now to turn to this mode of
discussiono"
Therefore, the nuclear power debate is seen as simply about the applica-
tion of objective, factual scientific knowledge in the determination of
the acceptability of nuclear power as a means of producing electricityo
As far as many supporters are concerned the relevant facts provide an
irrefutable case for nuclear power so anyone who opposes nuclear power
is behaving 'irrationally' in ignoring scientific evidence and basing
decisions on 'emotional' factorso The problem, according to, for
example, Fells (1981, 1982), Fainberg (op cit) and Hill (1978, 1981A,
1981B), is ignorance compounded byemotionalityo Fainberg (ibid p44)
argues that the complexity of the issues means that even experts in
particular fields cannot command sufficient knowledge to understand all
the issues:
395
"The road from this situation to irrational and emotional argument
is thus quite well laid outo" (ibid)
Further, the linking of nuclear power with nuclear weapons is seen as
evoking a ooo"deep emotional response"ooo (Fells 1982 p81), and this is
seen as compounding problems deriving from ignorance of the facts about
the risk of accidents and the hazards of radiationo The situation is
exacerbated by the media who propQgate ooo"misleading and untrue
statements"ooo (Fells 1981 p223)o
This general perspective on the nature of oppositional positions with
respect to nuclear power is illustrated in the arguments put forward by
~derlin (1976) 0 He focusses on the .oo"mysticism, irrationalism and
emotionalism"Qao which he sees as providing an important basis for
attacks on nuclear power, a technology which, he argues, is on the
contrary ao."the antithesis of irrationalism". He suggests that the
dominant problem in the nuclear debate may be that of oo."fighting
emotionalism and irrationalism"oo, as an approach to the analysis of the
major problems of our •••"real, physical world", He identifies
'emotionalist' critics of nuclear power in terms of groups .o."playing
out their inner and emotional needs".oo and groups ooo"furthering their
own political goals"ooo the latter composed of professional and 'amateur'
politicians, notably leftist groups, anarchists, some populists and
some environmentalistso He criticises them in the following terms:
"They rarely support their assertions with reasoned arguments or with
facts, and they consistently invoke the opinions of some distinguished
scientists, some Nobel prize-winners or some professional societies,
ignoring others who disagree with their views. By confusing techni-
cal facts which can never be argued qualitatively, with value-judge-
ments which can always be argued, the critics have in some countries
succeeded in misleading sections of the public, causing them to
believe that everything is open to argument and that the experts are
confusedo The truth is that the experts are not confused in their
own field of expertise. Outside their own field they are not
experts"" (ibid p202),
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Underlying this position, then, is the view that 'rationality' resides
in the assessment of means in relation to objective, value-free scientific
knowledge and that by adhering to such a standard of rationality the case
for nuclear power can be made in an uncontestable manner. The converse
of this position is the view that questions relating to ends and values
cannot be discussed within the bounds of 'rationality' and therefore
necessarily involve recourse to the realms of 'irrationality' and
'emotionalism'. An example of this view is provided by Brookes (1976
p2) with reference to those groups who question the desirability of
continuation of the present trajectory of economic and technological
'progress':
"One can understand and to some extent sympathise with the prevalent,
near-puritanical reaction to the rapid technology-based economic
growth of the post-war world. But to see the reason for it and to
sympathise with the attitudes behind it, is not the same thing as
agreeing that it is a rational and sound reaction. It is on the
contrary a largely irrational reaction stemming from deep emotional
conviction rather than any dispassionate analysis of the problems
and the practical options for dealing with them. Even though the
movement has now attracted a great deal of organised thought and is
backed up by intellectual analysis that is often of very high quality
it still relies for its wider support on attitudes that are largely
emotional and irrational. Such attitudes - even though they may
do credit to the holders of them - are no basis for tackling the
problems that face the world in the last quarter of the twentieth
century."
In other words, since debates about ends and values can only be conducted
in terms and categories which are not susceptible to rational analysis,
they can play no part in the process of formulating policy in relation to
nuclear power, or any other technological developments; our problems can
only be solved if we leave such considerations aside and focus on factual
evidence concerning the relative merits of alternative means to given ends.
An important implication of this perspective is that it produces a tendency
to regard the motives of opponents of nuclear power with some degree of
suspicion. Thus, if it is believed that there exist unambiguous 'facts'
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about the implications of nuclear power, that the debate could be
resolved if all parties behaved rationally and recognised these facts
and listened to the experts, and that opponents are introducing irrelevant,
irrational and emotional considerations to cloud the issue, then questions
natuTal1y arise concerning motivation: why should people behave so
irrationally if it were not for some ulterior motive? Therefore, we
find charges against opponents of being obstructive and irresponsible,
using 'shock horror' tactics to cause public concern (cf Hill 1981B p3),
deliberately 'distorting' the evidence (ibid p3-4) and deliberately
employing emotion as an instrument to cloud the debate (Hill 1978 p17).
To refer to a rather extreme example, in her evidence to the Sizewell B
Public Inquiry (Transcript Day 51) Dr K Little frequently refers to
'propaganda' disseminated by anti-nuclear groups, accuses them of
deliberately obstructing the debate and alleges connections with, for
example, 'communists' and South African terrorist organisations. The
allegations of Hoyle (1977) concerning links between anti-nuclear groups
and the USSR are well-known. Such allegations as these are indicative
of the existence of the problem of fundamental incommensurability between
the perspectives of such supporters and opponents in respect of the very
definition of what is 'rational' behaviour.
It is widely argued, then, by supporters of nuclear power that these
problems of ignorance, emotionalism and obstructivism constitute a
serious obstacle to efficient decision-making. Fells (1981 p222-3)
argues that the decision-making process is •••"frustrated and unreasonably
protracted" ••• due to public apprehension and the influence of pressure
groups. Hill (1981A p519) argues as follows:
"The fact that public perceptions of the safety of many things in our
society, and nuclear power in particular, differ so widely from the
understanding of those who have spent their lives studying the
subject is a matter of concern. It makes for great inefficiency in
the way we conduct our affairs and this in turn damages the well-
being of the society the industry is attempting to serve."
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The implication is, of course, that the efficiency with which we conduct
our affairs will be increased to the extent that we reduce the influence
on the decision-making process of the forces of 'ignorance' and 'emotion'
and enhance the influence of the factual evidence as dispensed by the
experts.
Indeed, such recommendations, implicit and explicit, are to be found in
the arguments of supporters of nuclear power. In this context, something
of an 'ideal' is outlined by Sir John Hill (1981A pS17) as follows:
"Nuclear power started in the days before protesting had become an
established occupation. It started at a time when the public had
great respect for science and technology, which they saw as the
answer to shortages, cold and want. The public trusted scientists
and technologists, and there was much less public criticism of the
management of our societies. Many of the older industries had a
very poor safety record and the perceived hazards of nuclear plants
was minimal. The technologists had great freedom to build and
operate plants in the way they thought right without external con-
straints. Decisions could be taken quickly and progress was
extraordinarily rapid."
It is widely argued that the emphasis must now be on restoring 'objectivity
and realism' to the debate, on replacing 'uninformed emotional response'
with a 'balanced critical approach' and on ensuring that decisions are
based on 'facts and reason' rather than on 'oratory and emotion' (cf Fells
1981 p223-4, 1982 p82; Hill 1978 p18; Steward 1982 p29). More speci-
fically, it is argued that it is necessary to educate the public and
politicians to understand the facts about nuclear power to eliminate oppo-
sition based upon emotion and intransigence (Fells op cit; Weinberg 1978
p74) • It is seen as desirable that discussions and decisions about
nuclear power are based firmly upon reliable factual knowledge and that
this will involve the employment, as much as possible, of formal,
quantitative knowledge. For example, H8fele (1974 p321) argues the
need for •••"a high level of formalisation" ••• of the debate and
D8derlin (op cit p203) suggests that •••
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"•••an evaluation of rational and quantifiable factors tells us how
many lives, which environmental improvements and what economic
advantages we have to sacrifice in order to satisfy ••. emotional
demand ••• (As) many problems as possible should be decided on a
reasoned, factual and rational basis."
A final element in this argument concerns the role in the debate and the
decision-making process of experts with command of the relevant scientific
information. Again, Daderlin (ibid) provides an illustration of the
position:
"If one expects the public to have confidence in the role of profes-
sionals in decisions, the opi~ions of highly regarded experts within
their chosen profession must be accorded a certain authority."
Therefore, this conception of 'efficiency' in decision-making as pro-
pounded in the arguments of supporters of nuclear power provides an example
technocractic rationality in practice. A further specific illustration
can be briefly referred to and this relates to reactions by certain
supporters of nuclear power to the Windscale Inquiry. On the one hand
Tombs (1978 p6) supports the emphasis in the Inquiry on empirical factual
information:
"I especially welcome Mr Justice Parker's emphasis on numerical and
factual support for the arguments put forward. By such means
emotional arguments can be reduced to an objective and intelligent
level."
On the other hand, however, Greenhalgh (1980 p224) questions the
legitimacy of the participation of certain organisations which opposed
THORP with reference to its wider political and social implications:
"It was remarkable that Durham County Council, The Town and Country
Planning Association, the National Council for Civil Liberties and
the British Council of Churches ••• took an active part in opposing
the Windscale reprocessing plant ••• Yet these are bodies whose
responsibilities would normally appear to be quite remote from
Windscale, from matters of energy policy and from the wider issues
of public health and safety."
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These arguments illustrate two basic features of technocractic rationa-
lity: firstly, the emphasis on objective facts as a basis upon which to
derive efficient decisions about means to given ends; and, secondly,
the view that the debate should be limited to certain 'technical' consi-
derations and that the introduction of other considerations, especially
those related to wider social ends and values, merely clouds the issue
with reference to emotional and irrational tendencies.
On the basis of the above analysis of the manifestations of technocratic
rationality in arguments supporting the development of nuclear power it
is possible to identify certain implications for the conduct of the debate
which can be subjected to further critical analysis. Firstly, as
already indicated, the restriction of the concept of rationality to the
realm of 'technical' question concerning the merits of alternative means
in relation to given ends means that the 'practical' discussion of
alternative ends is relegated to the realm of the I irrational I and
therefore has no place in an 'efficient I decision-making process.
Consequently, efficiency in decision-making implies the hypostatization
of particular ends and values; in the name of efficiency and value-
freedom, then, the debate about nuclear power must be conducted within
a given framework of existing dominant values ~nd ends. Attempts to
question such values take one, by definition, outside the confines of
rational debate. It is therefore important to explicitly establish
the nature of such ends and values and to assess what implications they
have for the conduct of the debate.
One important such implication concerns the definition of the range of
relevant means for particular given ends and values. If certain ends
become hypostatised then the consideration of alternative means is
circumscribed to the extent that certain means can be expected to be
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more appropriate than others to the achievement of the ends and values
concerned. The position taken here is that the appropriateness of means
cannot be established purely by the 'rational' process defined by techno-
cratic rationality but rather must inevitably make reference to the
realm of values designated as 'irrational'. Any 'rationality' which can
be established within the framework of technocratic rationality can only
be defined within limits set by value considerations and therefore is
contingent upon such considerations. Moreover, the situation is further
complicated because, as I have already argued at some length, techno-
cratic rationality embodies a conception of objective social knowledge
which cannot be realised so it cannot provide a meaningful conception of
rational and efficient debate and decision-making.
A further implication concerns the approach to the question of evaluation
of perceived costs and benefits in relation to goals and objectives.
Within the framework of technocratic rationality such a question is
irrational to the extent that it involves discussions about values and
the implication is that 'evaluative trade-off disputes' are to be avoided
if the decision-making process is to be rational and efficient. The
question is, then, how are such questions to be handled if this
imperative is to be adhered to?
These implications will be examined in more detail in the following
sections. The next section analyses the nature of the dominant ends
which energy policies are concerned to achieve; and Section 9.4 takes
up the question of the rationality of the consideration of means
(nuclear power and alternatives) in terms of both the analysis of
implications and their evaluation.
402
9.3 The Energy Problem and the Nuclear Solution
9.3.1 Introduction
An examination of the way in which the 'energy problem' is perceived and
defined according to the conventional wisdom in our society is important
for three main reasons. Firstly, within the analytical framework which
I have developed, the process of knowledge formation is heavily condi-
tioned by the requirement to solve perceived social problems; therefore,
we would expect an analysis of the perceived energy problem to provide
insights into the nature of knowledge about the energy system. Secondly,
through such an analysis it is possible to move towards a better appre-
ciation of the nature of the ends and values which condition the wider
problem-solving process; thus, the definition of the energy problem
must be based upon certain value-premises, and ends can be seen to be
equated with the solution of the problem-as-defined and, consequently,
the achievement of the values which are implied in its definition.
Thirdly, since the perception of the problem conditions the form of
action which is seen as appropriate in the attempt to achieve a solution,
an understanding of the nature of the perception will promote a better
appreciation of the process of the consideration of alternative means to
the solution of the problem.
Fundamental to the analysis of social problems, from our perspective,
is the recognition that they mean different things to different people.
The problem of different perceptions and interpretations of the energy
problem is identified, for example, by Lovins (1977 p12):
"Underlying much of the energy debate is a tacit, implicit divergence
about what the energy problem 'really' is. Public discourse suffers
because our society has mechanisms only for resolving conflicting
interests, not conflicting views of reality, so we seldom notice
that those perceptions differ markedly."
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More specifically, Caldwell (1976 p32) argues that different interpreta-
tions of the nature of the energy problem can be related to different
social interests:
"Interpretations of the problem ••• are influenced by the societal
arrangements through which energy is employed and administered •••
(and)••• the personal interests of the people administering the
institutions primarily concerned with energy policies may not be
consistent with an accurate interpretation of the problem or with
its fundamental solution." (ibid)
This argument, however, raises the important issue of the extent to
which it is possible to talk about 'accurate' interpretations and
'fundamental' solutions. If it is accepted that the definition of the
problem is in some way contingent upon social interests and values then
to posit an 'accurate' definition is to posit the possibility of deriving
objectively true statements about the social world as distinct from
ideological statements. If, as I have argued, this is not a tenable
position then we must accept the implication that such alternative value-
contingent interpretations of the energy problem must be analysed not in
terms of their accuracy or inaccuracy but rather in terms of the social
values and ends whose achievement is implied by attempts to solve the
problem-as-defined.
The perception of the energy problem, then, can be seen as tied into
a wider framework within which an approach is made to the broader question
of the planning of the future course of social development. In this
context it is appropriate to refer to the work of Lindberg (1975, 1976)
concerned with the analysis of the way in which dominant elites in
capitalist societies perceive and solve social problems. Lindberg compares
'routine' policy formulation to Kuhn's concept of 'normal Science'
(cf above Chapter 2) in that both are seen to rest upon a prevailing
'paradigm', •••ftadistinctive set of appreciations, rules, standards and
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models of reality." (op cit 1976 p266). His analysis is concerned to
establish the extent to which a dominant policy paradigm underlies
policy formulation in capitalist societies providing 'fundamental criteria'
for developing, debating and selecting options for policy action
(ibid p266-7). More specifically, he defines policy paradigms as ••.
"•••"schema' or 'pre-existing assumptions about the way the world
is organized', that structure information, help make sense of
complex environments, define what will be paid attention to,
considered problematic, and what actions or responses are both
available and appropriate." (ibid p273).
Moreover, Lindberg sees such policy paradigms as closely related to
interests and values as defined in a particular social context:
"'l'hereis reason to suppose that such policy paradigms derive not
only from the historical experience of particular polities, but
more importantly, from the general terms of economic and political
organisation and of ideological hegemony in a society. Policy
paradigms, then, not only guide and rationalise the decision
process; they may also reflect and seek to justify and perpetuate
the power resources and relationships of the dominant groups in
society." (op cit 1975 pXIV).
Lindberg's approach emphasises that the process of problem perception
and definition takes place within a wider framework of world views,
normative standards and operational rules and must therefore be related
to dominant structures of ideological knowledge and to the normative
basis of those structures. The present analysis, then, will attempt
to identify the normative commitment implied in the interpretation of
the energy problem to be found in the 'dominant energy policy paradigm'
in our society. I shall firstly briefly review the 'official' perspec-
tive on the energy problem as manifested in various government statements
and then analyse the nature of the problem as it is presented in the
arguments of various supporters of the development of nuclear power.
Finally, I shall draw some conclusions on the implications of the analysis.
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9.3.2 The 'Official' View of the Energy Problem
Several observers in recent years have directed attention to the extent
to which the conventional, official perspective on the energy problem
is preoccupied with considerations of energy supply (cf Lovins 1977,
1979B; Lindberg 1977; Patterson 1977; Avebury 1978). An early
illustration of this perspective is provided by the 1967 Fuel Policy
White Paper (Ministry of Power 1967) which was concerned to •••
"•••re-assess the balance between the available primary fuels (coal,
oil, nuclear power and natural gas), and to set the framework for
the more beneficial development of our energy supplies." (ibid p1).
The Government's concern was, therefore, •••"to see that our growing
energy requirements are supplied in the way which yields the greatest
benefit to the country" ••• (ibid p2). The primary resulting objectives
of fuel policy were adequacy and security of supp,lies, and the provision
of 'cheap energy' subject to consideration of the implications for the
balance of payments and for the efficient use of resources (ibid p35-9).
This rather narrow preoccupation with questions of energy supply was
subjected to the test of the 1973/74 oil crisis. The result was a tendency
for the perspective to be galvanised somewhat with the emphasis changing
from the problematic of coordinating supplies of relatively cheap energy
to fuel economic growth (as in the 1967 White Paper) to that of ensuring
supplies of energy at reasonable cost to guarantee growth prospects.
On the other hand, the massive increases in oil prices and temporary
shortages during 1973/74 did cause the perspective to be tempered somewhat
by considerations of efficiency of use and waste. A summary of the general
perspective and priorities of the newly-formed Department of Energy after
the events of 1973/74 is provided by its first Secretary of State:
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"Consumption of energy on a large scale is part of the fabric of
our society ••• we have to plan far ahead to continue to meet these
needs as securely, flexibly and cheaply as possible in a way which
allows continuing economic growth. But whereas our consumption
patterns reflect past access to cheap and plentiful supplies of
energy, we must now accept that energy is an expensive commodity;
that more active policies are needed nationally and internationally
to achieve security and availability; and that much more attention
needs to be paid to the way we use our energy, cutting out waste
and improving efficiency." (Varley 1974 p697) •
This basic perspective was carried forward into the Green Paper on Energy
Policy published in 1978 (Department of Energy 1978 p1) :
"Our standard of living and well-being depend on adequate supplies of
energy. So, too, do the hopes of the developed world. We have
become accustomed to oil and natural gas being available in plenty
to power the world's economic growth. The future is very uncertain,
but there is now wide agreement that world oil supplies cannot
continue to increase for much more than a decade or so and will,
thereafter, become increasingly scarce and expensive. This poses
a serious and complex problem. The world as a whole will need to
turn to other sources of energy, and so, despite our present rela-
tive affluence in energy, will the UK."
The objectives for energy policy discussed in the Green Paper relate
primarily to the supply and cost of energy although, again, reference
is made to the need to use energy more efficiently within the existing
economic framework. Underlying this perspective on the energy problem,
then, is a basically materialistic value orientation: the overriding
concern is to ensure that energy is supplied in sufficient quantity and
at such a price that the growth of output of material goods and services
(the central measure of welfare) can continue without constraint. In the
1978 Green Paper the then Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, did
make an attempt to introduce other values by referring to 'perceived
problems' relating, for example, to fuel poverty and the freedom of
consumer choice between fuels. However, such values have not made any
impact on the process of energy policy formulation as more recent
government statements indicate.
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Shortly after the election of the Conservative Government in 1979 the
'traditional' perspective was reaffirmed through a statement of the
objectives of energy policy as follows:
"The objective of energy policy has, traditionally, been to ensure
the adequacy, security and efficient use of energy supplies, at
the lowest practical cost to the nation in terms of real resources
after paying due regard to safety and environmental considerations;
adequacy has meant that energy supplies should not be a constraint
on economic growth." (Secretary of State for Energy 1981 pt).
Values related to the protection of people's safety and environmental
amenity are given an implied subsidiary role here while the major emphasis
remains on material economic growth. Again, in the 1981 White Paper on
Nuclear Power it was argued that:
"The Government has a duty to ensure as far as possible that both
now and in the future Britain has available at a competitive and
economic price secure supplies of energy sufficient to sustain
economic activity, to accommodate growth, and to provide for our
people's personal welfare." (Department of Energy 1981 para 1.02).
Here, the 'provision of personal welfare' appears to be something of a
'safety net' for non-material considerations but stated in such a vague
manner it is questionable the extent to which such values can have an
influence on energy policy formulation. Indeed, more recent statements
of the Government's perspective make no reference to any welfare considera-
tions outside the framework of 'economic efficiency'. For example, in
the statement of the Government's approach to energy policy provided by
the Department of Energy's Proof of Evidence to the Sizewell B Public
Inquiry (Department of Energy 1982) social value is implicitly equated
directly with the competitive and efficient operation of the economy under
the influence of free market forces:
"A major aim of the Government's overall economic policy is to set
the right conditions to enable the supply side of the economy to
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operate more competitively and efficiently. A crucial element of
that policy is to remove, where practicable, obstacles to the
free operation of market forces throughout the economy •••• The
thrust of Government policy in ••• (the energy) ••• sector therefore
is to remove market distortions where possible or otherwise seek
to ensure that the energy market operates as nearly as possible as
a free market. Such an energy market will regulate energy supply
and demand with greater success and efficiency than relying on
central planning as the means of ensuring that UK supply meets
demand." (ibid para 2).
From this perspective, then, the energy problem is basically seen to
consist in the existence of impediments to the operation of the free market
forces which will ensure the efficient function of energy markets and
consequently ensure that supplies are available to meet the demand which
arises. The two central elements of energy policy are therefore seen to
be the removal of such impediments and measures to ensure that energy
prices reflect 'market pressures'. Energy demand is seen to arise from
the free and rational decisions of millions of consumers in relation to
such 'realistic' prices and the thrust of policy must be concerned to
ensure that secure supplies are available at the lowest possible cost
(ibid paras 2-15).
Two normative themes can therefore be seen to underlie this perspective.
Firstly, a 'materialist' theme implicitly equates social welfare with
the expansion of output of goods and services (for example, as tradi-
tionally measured by Gross National Product) and relegates other values
to subsidiary status. For example, considerations relating to the
environment have gained mention but are not given much weight, especially
in recent statements. Further, it is interesting to note what has
happened to the value considerations which Tony Benn tried to introduce
into the process of energy policy formulation in the 1978 Green Paper.
At the Sizewell B Public Inquiry the Department of Energy's chief
witness was asked, under cross-examination, about considerations of
'fuel poverty' and 'domestic comfort'. Mr Priddle's reply is illuminating:
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"Work on the social implications of fuel poverty is primarily a
matter for the Social Departments in Government. The Department
of Energy's responsibility is to ensure, so far as it can, that
energy is produced and supplied economically and efficiently. If
there are social problems arising from the hard economics of supply
of energy, then the lead responsibility for that lies with other
departments." (Sizewell B Public Inquiry, Transcripts Day 40 p23).
On domestic comfort again his reply was:
"I think you are again
than energy policy.
two things separate."
touching on an area of social policy rather
It is very important to try and keep these
(ibid p24).
Consequently, certain values are being 'written out' of the energy
policy-making process qiving the process its heavily materialistic
normative underpinning and also reflecting the theme of 'rationalism'
to the extent that such fragmentation of values reduces the scope for
the political activity of integrating and trading off value achievements,
thus enhancing the 'technical' nature of the policy-making process.
Moreover, this official perspective on the energy problem and policy
objectives can also be seen as underpinned by the value judgements inherent
in the 'liberalist' view of society which posits the existence of a social
optimum defined in terms of a social, economic and political equilibrium
which is achieved through the social mechanisms of market exchange and
democracy which in turn are 'driven' by the autonomous preferences of
free, rationally-behaving individuals maximising their self-interest in
a process of equal exchange in the market. Based on this model of
society arises the fundamental value judgement that the individual's
preferences as revealed in the market should count and that decisions
which reflect such preferences are good decisions. Such a normative
theme has been implied to a greater or lesser extent in official statements
over time, perhaps becoming rather less influential during the 1970s with
the attempts by the Labour Administration to modify the normative basis
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of energy policy formulation. However, more recent government state-
ments certainly indicate a resurgence on this theme as an important
normative basis for energy policy formulation.
Having briefly examined 'official' perspectives on the energy problem
we can now proceed to an analysis of the forms in which the problem is
perceived and interpreted in the arguments of supporters of the develop-
ment of nuclear power.
9.3.3 Pro-Nuclear Perspectives on the Energy Problem
Some observers have referred to the underlying value orientation of
advanced industrial societies towards the continued expansion of material
economic outputs as a 'growth imperative' (cf Habermas 1976B p370;
Caldwell and Woolley 1976 pl16). Lindberg (1977 p347) argues that such
an imperative is manifested in •••"a common commitment to national power
and resource and capital-intensive economic growth measured in GNP terms."
This theme is very much in evidence in the interpretation of the energy
problem presented by supporters of nuclear power. The following quotation
from R.J. Weeks, the Director-General of the N.E. Region of the CEGB,
perhaps epitomises the viewpoint:
"The world's population is increasing and so, quite properly, are
people's expectations. Third World countries need a greater share
of the energy cake, and that means fossil fuels for the most part.
Resources of oil and gas are limited, and there will be pressure on
coal, not only as a fuel but as an oil and gas substitute and as
a raw material. contrary to what is sometimes claimed, this
picture will not be greatly altered if conservation measures are,
as they need to be, successful - on a world scale you cannot conserve
what you haven't already got. The clock cannot be stopped or put
back and some kind of dirigiste low-energy scenario will not be
accepted by the developing countries in order to satisfy the continuing
appetites of the advanced economics. At best, a scramble for world
energy will make for economic instabilities, and at worst, for
widespread social disturbance and conflict. It is naive to pretend
that we in the UK, with our open economy, will somehow be untouched
by these events." (Weeks 1982 p13).
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The various elements of this broad perspective can be examined in rather
more detail. Firstly, there is, once again, a definition of the
concepts of 'social welfare and progress' in terms of material economic
growth and technological progress (cf Greenhalgh 1980 p3; Hill 1981B p3) •
This pattern of growth is seen as desirable not only in advanced indus-
trial societies but also for Third World developing countries; it is
assumed that what is good for the former must also be good for the latter
and that developing countries will, as a matter of course, model their
development on western industrial societies (cf Greenhalgh op cit p3-1B;
Brookes 1976 pS). However, there is a tendency to translate such nor-
mative themes from values which are to be desired into imperatives which
must be achieved. This is done, firstly, by arguing that an orienta-
tion towards the achievement of such values will inevitably continue;
as Sir John Hill has argued:
"•••does anybody really believe that England, still a comparatively
wealthy country, is not going to try and raise its standards of
living? •• Does anybody believe that the poor countries are not
going to try and raise their standard of living? Of course not
and the result will be that world demand for energy will continue
to rise at least for the next 30 years." (Hill 1976 p3).
The second part of the translation is achieved by arguing that failure
to continue in the pursuit of material economic growth would produce
necessary consequences that cannot be contemplated, since they would
involve no less than the breakdown of the fabric of our society.
Greenhalgh (op cit p3) quotes Wilfred Beckerman as follows:
"Only an altogether unparalleled optimism can lead one to believe
that the vast mass of the population will voluntarily accept an
abandonment of the goal of economic growth, at least for the
foreseeable future. This means that if growth were to be abandoned
as an objective of policy, democracy too would have to be abandoned •••
(T)he costs of deliberate non-growth in terms of political and social
transformation that would be required are astronomical."
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This combination of, on the one hand, the portrayal of continued
economic growth as inevitable with, on the other, the argument that
the alternatives are beyond contemplation effectively results, then,
is such a value being established as an 'ethical imperative' which is
beyond question. This tendency is strengthened by the general belief,
inherent in technocratic rationality, that to question established
values is to display tendencies towards 'irrationality' and 'emoti,nalism'
or questionable motivation (see Section 9.2 above). For example,
Greenhalgh (op cit p224-5) argues that the public are being ••.
"•••deliberately, perhaps even cynically, manipulated by a much
smaller group of people who, dissatisfied with the present
industrial society are seeking to change what they regard as its
materialistic acquisitive values and to impose an 'alternative
society'. "
A general concept of 'technological progress' goes hand in hand with
economic growth to define the materialist orientation of this perspective
on the energy problem. It, too, tends to be portrayed as an inevitable
process which proceeds as we find out more about the "•••fundamental laws
of nature and society" (Ddderlin 1976 p202) • In his evidence to the
Sizewell B Public Inquiry (Transcript Day 52) Len Brookes refers in several
places to the •••"onward march of technical progress" (eg ibid plO, 38).
And it is also argued that to question such progress is a mark of
'irrationality'; for example, Weinberg (1979) argues that it represents
a •••"cynical denial of human ingenuity" •••, while Spinrad (1975)
suggests that it proclaims a 'fascist viewpoint' to the extent that it
postulates alternative lifestyles. Its unquestionable desirability is
therefore combined with that of the value of economic growth to form a
'materialist ethical imperative' underlying this pro-nuclear perspective
on the energy problem. Within the programme of technocratic rationality,
to accept this imperative without question is to adopt the 'rational'
approach to the planning of the future, seen as a value-free process;
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to question it is to be guilty of making irrational value-judgements,
of attempting to impose ideas on society and of unacceptably negating
the rational essence of human existence.
Having established such material values as ethical imperatives the next
element in the framework concerns the implications of the achievement
of such values for society's energy requirements. This element basically
rests upon arguments concerning the relationship between the growth in
GDP on the one hand and the growth of energy consumption on the other
(a relationship expressed in the 'energy coefficient'). While recognising
tendencies for the energy coefficient to decline over time due to the
impact of rising prices and saturation effects, supporters of nuclear
power nevertheless tend to place considerable emphasis upon the continua~on
into the future of past trends with relatively little modification. Great
weight is given to those factors which are seen as militating against the
'decoupling' of energy consumption from economic growth and it is argued
that continued growth must mean more energy consumption (cf Greenhalgh
1980 p4-7; Starr 1982; Bethe 1978). To quote Sir John Hill again:
"(T)here is an almost direct relationship between gross national
product and energy consumption. We can certainly save energy by
conservation but the linear relationship covers such a vast span,
the general philosophy that material growth requires more energy
cannot be denied." (Hill 1977 p3).
A central component of the viewpoint adopted on this question of the
relationship of energy consumption to future economic growth is, then,
a stance on the question of the potential role of energy conservation in
reducing the energy coefficient. This issue will be analysed in greater
depth in the next section (cf p426) but it is relevant to refer here to
the tendency of supporters of nuclear power to adopt a rather pessimistic
attitude concerning this potential. This can be seen to be due partly to
an adherence to certain cognitive beliefs about economic processes
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(beliefs which are value-conditioned) but also partly to certain normative
dispositions in relation to the question of taking steps to 'interfere'
with energy demand. Thus, it is possible to see here, once more, a
commitment to 'liberalist' principles which regard the consumer's auto-
nomous preferences as sacrosanct and any attempt to interfere with their
free expression in the market as representing a move towards •••"a dirigistic
economy with an associated police state." (Greenhalgh 1980 p3; cf Weeks
op cit) •
The 'bottom line', then, of this perspective on the energy problem is
a concern to ensure that energy supplies are available to provide for the
continued march of economic growth and technological progress. Attempts
to 'solve' the problem as thus formulated, although presented simply as
involving the 'technical' assessment of alternative means on the basis of
the relevant factual information, must rather be seen as a value-contigent
process. As interpreted by supporters of nuclear power the energy problem
can be seen to imply a normative orientation comprising a combination of
the themes of 'materialism' and 'liberalism' and to involve tendencies
towards the elevation of values into 'ethical imperatives'. Such tenden-
cies reinforce those of the programme of technocratic rationality which
imposes such values on the debate about nuclear power in the name of value-
freedom. Since it is argued that values cannot be rationally questioned,
alternative normative positions to the dominant themes are dismissed as
the basis for irrationality in the debate while these dominant themes
become hypostatised.
9.3.4 Conclusion
Having analysed interpretations of the energy problem which tend to be
associated with the pro-nuclear 'policy paradigm' and attempted to identify
its primary normative underpinnings, it remains in this section to indicate
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the major implications of the latter for the concept, embodied in
technocratic rationality, of rational and efficient debate and decision-
making about alternative means on the basis of value-free scientific
knowledge. Two such major implications can be identified. The first
concerns the nature of the knowledge which is brought to bear on the
debate concerning the implications of alternative energy policies. I
have argued that such knowledge is necessarily value-contingent but it
is now possible to be rather more specific in the context of the implica-
tions of the development of nuclear power. Therefore, in the next
section I shall briefly attempt to indicate the way in which the dominant
values identified might influence the knowledge employed in debate and
decisions about nuclear power.
The second important implication relates to the range of means which is
included within the ambit of rational consideration. Rationality in
the consideration of means implies that all possible alternative means
are included in the analysis. However, the implication of the above
analysis of interpretations of the energy problem is that such interpre-
tation circumscribes the consideration of means thus restricting the bounds
of 'rationality' with reference to particular values. This implication
will also be examined in greater detail in the next section.
9.4 Nuclear Power and Alternative Energy Policies
9.4.1 Introduction
The central value judgement of technocratic rationality relates to the
claim that the process of debating and making decisions about nuclear power
and alternative energy policies should be confined as much as possible to
technical considerations which can be defined in terms of objective facts;
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normative considerations should only enter the process at the final
stage, when all the implications are known, in establishing appropriate
trade-offs between achievement of different defined ends. There are,
therefore, 'rational' and 'irrational' components of the decision-
making process and decisions will be 'better' if the influence of the
former component is maximised. As a value-judgement, this claim can
be assessed in relation to its wider implications and can be questioned
on normative grounds, as can any value judgement. However, the force
of the value judgement must also be related to the question of the logical
feasibility of the programme that it implies. Therefore, in this section
the critique will illustrate the problems which arise for the claims of
technocratic rationality in respect of the feasibility of the programme
of the consideration of alternative means. Firstly, I shall provide
some illustrations of the extent to which the scientific knowledge which
can be employed in the nuclear power debate departs from the ideal
required by technocratic rationality: secondly, I shall illustrate the
way in which the consideration of alternative means can be circumscribed
by the perception of the energy problem and the way in which normative
considerations playa role in this proc ess; and, finally, I shall
briefly consider the problems which arise for technocratic rationality
from the requirement to establish trade-offs between costs and benefits
at the 'evaluation' stage and the ways in which such problems are accom-
modated.
9.4.2 The Problem of Knowledge Revisited: Some Illustrations
In the first part of this thesis, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4, I
attempted to analyse in some detail the problems which prejudice the
development of knowledge about the social world which can be considered
to be 'reliable' or 'cognitively well-founded'. As regards the
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development of knowledge which can be employed to inform debate and
decison about future energy policy there are significant components of
scientific and engineering knowledge the 'reliability' of which is not
fundamentally in dispute, but the major body of relevant knowledge
relates, in general terms, to the impact of technology on human social
and economic development about which there is a substantial degree of
controversy. I have indicated in some depth the serious problems which
arise for the production of such knowledge from the complex 'open systems'
nature of social and economic systems and from the severe difficulties
in establishing controlled experimental situations. These general
problems can be elaborated upon with reference to certain characteristics
of the debate about the implications of the development of nuclear power.
Firstly, there is the problem referred to earlier (cf p279) and noted by
HMfele (1974), Lovins (1975) and Otway and Von Winterfeldt (1982) that,
in Weinberg's words, •••"the advent of nuclear energy poses issues of
unprecedented magnitude and weight for mankind" ••• (quoted in Lovins
op cit p11). Lovins himself (ibid) elaborates:
"The very large inventories of fission and activation products in
the nuclear fuel cycle create hazards unlike those of any other
single technology. These hazards combine the geographic range of
certain military pathogens, the permanence of irreversible changes
in climate or in soil fertility, and the medical and moral signi-
ficance of the most persistent synthetic mutagens, all potentially
at a substantial level. Because this unique combination of inherent
hazards departs so much from our experience, we must define with
special care, before we choose to incur these hazards, the limits
of our ability to cope with them."
A fundamental problem therefore arises for the development of knowledge
about such potential consequences, because, in addition to the problem
of experimental control, there arise situations in which it is not
possible to experiment at all. Boldly stated, the central difficulty
is that because the consequences are unconscionable we cannot afford to
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be proven wrong and therefore we cannot experiment. The scale of the
potential collective 'social costs' of nuclear technology, in relation
to safety and environment (and, indeed social and political) implica-
tions, is such as to present a threat to the 'basic parameters of our
normal existence' (HMfele op cit) should 'errors' occur. Of course,
this situation presents severe difficulties for the programme of empirical
falsificationism: if the worst case scenarios in respect of, for example,
major reactor accidents and implications for civil liberties are considered
to be unacceptable then it must be inappropriate to judge the 'scientific'
quality of arguments that reactors are safe and that there is no threat
to civil liberties in relation to their potential falsifiability.
In the absence of the possibility of experimentation to derive direct
empirical information other forms of knowledge become necessary like,
for example, analogies with other systems where experiments can be
conducted, formal models designed to simulate system performance or sets
of hypotheses and assumptions based upon some background theoretical
framework. In all such cases considerable reliance must be placed upon
judgement and assumptions which may be rather remote from empirical
scrutiny. Moreover, the corollary of the potential scale of the social
costs of nuclear power is a strong ethical and moral dimension to the
debate and therefore considerable scope exists for the judgements and
assumptions which become such important elements in knowledge formation
to be influenced by this normative dimension.
The situation is compounded to the extent that much of the knowledge
employed in the nuclear power debate relates to the future. The most
important aspect of the debate is concerned with the implications of
proceding with a programme of investment in nuclear power, compared with
alternative energy policies, over a period into the future. Such knowledge
could potentially only be refuted on the basis of outcomes at some future
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point in time but this provides no effective 'quality control' on the
knowledge at the time that it is required - that is, at the present time
when it is needed to inform decisions. If, for example, it is currently
believed by policy-makers that a particular programme of investment in
nuclear power is necessary to maintain a particular level of economic
growth and will produce a net benefit of £X by a particular date, and
the programme is pursued on that basis, then failure of such benefits
and the expected growth rate to materialise at that date cannot provide
a meaningful criterion of 'scientificity' of the initial belief. The
first problem is that it is too late - the 'damage' is done and it is
irretrievable; the second is that the original belief could still be
defended on the grounds that changes in other factors were responsible
for the failure (ie 'ceteris' were not 'paribus') or, for example, that
the timing of the benefits is not central to the belief and that they
could still materialise at a later date. Such 'ex post' reasoning is
of little use when 'ex ante' criteria are needed to indicate the validity
of beliefs. Moreover, since past experience can provide no warrant for
future expectations assumptions about the future become fundamentally
important in the development of the required knowledge and, again, choice
of assumptions is very much a matter of 'informed judgement' which is open
to value-conditioning.
Therefore, something of a 'planning dilemma' can be seen as arising which
creates problems for the energy policy-making process. Because of the
large investment sums that are required for nuclear power programmes and
the magnitude of the possible implications of such programmes for the
economy, environment and society, there is an important requirement for
'reliable' knowledge about such implications in an ex ante context - in
advance of, and as an input to, decision-making. Yet these very same
characteristics exacerbate the problems which stand in the way of the
development of such knowledge due to, for example, long planning and
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investment lead times, the denial of opportunities for experimentation,
and the introduction of strong moral and ethical considerations. This
type of dilemma is common (to a greater or lesser degree) to policy
making in respect of all social and technological systems (cf Hutchison
1981 p284), especially those requiring large-scale investments, but
is arguably made particularly acute in the case of nuclear technology
by the potential impact of radiation releases.
There exist, then, several serious problems with the conception of
knowledge which is required for the achievement of the ideal of 'rational'
debate as propounded by technocratic rationality. A common response to
the recognition of some of these problems is to suggest that the branches
of science involved are 'immature' and that the answer is for them to
adhere more strictly to the results of falsificationism. For example,
Hutchison (1981 p27S-6) refers to a 'vicious circle of immaturity' in his
examination of economics:
n(T)here may well be a danger of a kind of vicious circle of
'immaturity' in a subject like economics, which is urgently
concerned with policy problems - and hence political power -
in that difficulties of testing, and the extent of ignorance, leave
a vacuum filled by bias and ideology, which in turn makes critical
testing more difficult." (ibid p276).
He goes on to suggest that such problems might be alleviated by greater
adherence amongst economists to the 'methodological prescriptions of
critical testing and testability' (ibid p298), a position echoed in
Blaug (1980). However, this position can be seen as side-stepping
the central problem by referring to an untenable ideal. From the
perspective adopted here, the concept of 'immaturity' seems inappropriate
since it is in the nature of the social sciences that their knowledge
develops in relation to the solution of policy problems and that such
knowledge is necessarily thoroughly conditioned by values. It is argued,
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therefore, that, although a critical approach to knowledge development
is indeed of crucial importance, it is nevertheless inappropriate to
judge questions of 'reliability' by the standards of the natural sciences
and that the kind of 'planning dilemma' discussed above is an inherent
characteristic of public policy-making systems and not something that can
be eliminated by an attempt to 'improve' social knowledge with reference
to 'naturalistic' standards.
However, such an attempt has indeed constituted the predominant response
to the perception of the types of problem embodied in this dilemma. The
result has been a tendency to formulate the required knowledge, wherever
possible, in the guise of formal quantitative schemes which are perceived
as enabling the more objective and reliable simulation and forecasting of
the relevant system properties (Lovins 1975 p11-12, 25; Otway and
Von Winterfeldt 1982 p248-9) • Indeed, HMfele (1974) recommends this
trend towards increased 'formalisation' of the debate in order to overcome
the problems manifested in the 'planning dilemma'. The general point is
made by Otway and Von Winterfeldt (op cit) in relation to the attempts to
establish criteria for 'acceptable risks' of technological developments in
response to the perceived problems of the lack of experimental knowledge
and the strong normative basis of the opposition to such developments:
"Puzzled by these confusingly different values and beliefs, and their
perseverance in the face of 'rational technical argument', demands
were put forward by industry and others for predetermined criteria
by which the acceptability of risks could be judged. Since technical
experts tend to have a mathematical orientation and possess analytical
skills, it is perhaps not surprising that they began to search for
quantitative risk acceptance criteria. An implicit assumption here
is that social preferences can be expressed in engineering terms and
used in the regulatory process to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity and
delay - in essence an attempt to model social and political behaviours
with the technical tools and the philosophy of the natural sciences."
(ibid p249).
As argued in Chapter 3 such approaches to knowledge development commonly
proceed under the justificatory banner of falsificationism but bear little
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actual relation to its imperatives: the predictions cannot be falsified
with reference to empirical evidence. As Kuhn (1977 p283) implies, it
would seem that here we have an example of falsificationism serving more
as an 'ideology' than as a workable logic of knowledge. However, the
problem goes deeper than this and relates to the role of assumptions in
the development of knowledge. The untenability of the falsificationist
position implies that the role of assumptions must be subject to close
scrutiny since they are of crucial importance in the formation of knowledge.
The problem is compounded by moves towards the increasing development of
formal systems of knowledge because while, on the one hand, such systems
are constituted so as to give the appearance of not having a strong assump-
tive basis, they nevertheless, on the other hand, can be seen as incor-
porating assumptions in an increasingly complex manner. The problem is
perhaps implied in Kendall's criticism of the use of mathematical models
in safety analysis quoted by Lovins (1975 p25):
"Mathematical models cannot be used reliably to span large gaps in
engineering knowledge, owing to the very great uncertainties that
accumulate in long and unverified chains of inference."
In such chains of inference assumptions must playa central role.
Assumptions can be seen as playing a variety of roles in the process of
knowledge development (cf Blaug 1980 p105-10; Hutchison 1981 p289-93).
Three main types of assumptions can be identified. Firstly, 'negligi-
bility assumptions' playa role in the process of abstraction from
'reality-as-perceived' of those factors which are considered to be important,
with the corresponding neglect of those whose influence is considered to
be 'negligible'. Secondly, 'domain assumptions' specify the circumstances
under which a model, hypothesis or theory is considered to be applicable
ie its 'domain of applicability'. Thirdly, 'heuristic assumptions' are
used to simplify complex processes by, for example, taking one factor
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at a time and arguing 'as if' other factors were not present. Moreover,
assumptions may be 'generative' in that they are used to derive a model
or hypothesis, or they may be 'auxiliary', used in conjunction with a
hypothesis in order to deduce its consequences (eg 'ceteris paribus').
NOw, Hutchison (op cit p291-3) argues that considerable confusion surrounds
the role of assumptions because it is often unclear precisely what kind of
assumption is being invoked. Both he and Blaug (op cit) dismiss the
'instrumentalist', Friedmanite version of falsificationism, which argues
that assumptions need not be tested, and argue instead for a more 'sophis-
ticated' version which involves the testing of neglibility and domain
assumptions. However, in view of the general problem of empirical
testing outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 it is difficult to see how the question
of the validity of assumptions can be reduced to the empiricist formulation.
For example, take the case of the development of an economic model of
consumers' demand for energy which is to be based on the neo-classical
assumption that consumers behave rationally with a motivation to maximise
utility. As a negligibility assumption this would involve assuming that
'non-rational' consumer behaviour is negligible as an influence on energy
demand; as a domain assumption it would involve the argument that the
model is applicable only in cases where consumers' behaviour is rational;
and as a heuristic assumption it would involve using the model to analyse
the process of consumers' demand for energy 'as if' the behaviour of such
consumers were rational.
If this assumption is employed in the 'heuristic' sense then there exists
no empirical problem to the extent that the model is used to analyse what
consumers' energy demand would be if they all behaved rationally without
making any statement about the actual relevance of the model to the 'real
world'. If any such statement becomes implied then, of course, problems
arise because the nature of the assumption is undergoing change to a
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negligibility or domain assumption. If it is argued that the model is
relevant because consumers do behave rationally then the assumption cannot
be tested because the only test of 'rationality' is the extent to which
the model 'fails' to predict the relevant observations. But failure is
a matter of judgement in statistical inference and can, in any case be
blamed on violated 'ceteris paribus' assumptions. Therefore, the
domain assumption cannot be tested either; if it cannot be established
when behaviour is not rational then neither can it be established that the
model is inapplicable to those circumstances.
Consequently, it can be seen that the assumptions upon which the process
of knowledge development is based are not readily amenable to empirical
testing and that there is a tendency within the falsificationist position
to neglect their importance; and it can be argued that the degree of
this neglect is proportional to the extent of formalisation and quantifi-
cation involved. However, assumptions do indeed playa very important
role in knowledge formation: they provide statements about the motivation
and behaviour of people engaged in various economic, social and political
activities; they provide criteria for what are to be taken as relevant
and important factors and variables and for the appropriate form of
representation of such variables in a particular knowledge formation; and
they provide statements on the existence and stability of certain functional
relationships in the system of interest (cf Blaug op cit pl07) • In the
absence of strict 'empirical accountability' the nature of such assumptions
must be largely a matter of judgement in relation to a particular conceptual
framework or paradigm and, as argued in Ghapter 4, such judgement is
open to conditioning by values.
For example, in the case looked at above the commitment to the assumption
of rationally-behaving, utility-maximising individuals can be related not
to its empirical veracity but rather to value judgements which argue that
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individual preferences should be sacrosanct which in turn can be related
to a favourable disposition towards the type of society implied by the
'liberalist' theme outlined in Chapter 6. However, such influences can
operate in a less direct manner to the extent that there are value
implications in an apparently value-free approach. For example, adherence
to the rationality assumption might be justified on the grounds of a
commitment to purely 'scientific values' of a paradigm; it could be argued
that the assumption is an integral part of the framework of neo-classical
economic theory and that such a framework represents the epitome of value-
free scientific knowledge. However, this approach merely asserts the
value-commitments of the neo-classical framework in the guise of a spurious
'value-freedom' •
Against this background it is now possible to refer to some specific
examples of the type of knowledge which is brought to bear upon the
debate about nuclear power, with particular emphasis on the pro-nuclear
perspective within which so much weight is placed upon the employment of
objective factual knowledge in a rational debate. In Chapter 3 I paid
a considerable amount of attention to the nature of economic knowledge
firstly due to the importance of this knowledge in the nuclear power
debate and, secondly, because such knowledge is conventionally seen as
the most cognitively reliable of all social scientific knowledge. We
can point once again to the reference, by the Department of Energy's
witness at the Sizewell B Inquiry, to the "hard economics" of energy
planning (cf above p409); and also in relation to the Sizewell proposal
Brookes (1982) argues for the virtual 'self-evidence' of the case on the
basis of what he considers to be an uncontestably firm and simple economic
analysis. Notwithstanding such a view, there exists, as indicated in
Chapter 7 and in section 9.1 above, a considerable degree of dispute in
the cognitive dimension about the economic implications of nuclear power.
The two main interrelated areas of dispute concern, firstly, the relation-
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ship between nuclear power and economic growth and, secondly, the cost
of nuclear-generated electricity.
As regards the first of these areas we can briefly restate the essence
of the disagreement. On the one hand, supporters tend to believe that
if continued economic growth is to be ensured then the scope for energy
savings is relatively limited. In a 'business-as-usual' future failure
to provide nuclear power is seen as a recipe for energy shortages and
high energy prices which would promote economic recession and stagnation.
In such a situation further required investment in energy supply would
be restricted creating the prospect of an 'energy-economic trap'. In
order to avoid this, additional nuclear capacity is required as soon as
possible to stabilise energy prices and help to secure the growth in GDP
which would otherwise be foregone. The supply of capital is seen as
creating no insuperable problems being generated by the growth which
nuclear power helps to promote.
On the other hand, opponents of nuclear power tend to argue that there is
considerable scope for energy savings with no threat to economic growth.
Indeed, it is argued that a greater emphasis on conservation and efficient
energy use may well be the best means of ensuring such growth due to its
lower capital intensity. Opponents tend to be critical of the belief
that capital-intensive, supply-oriented futures provide the best
guarantee of economic benefits and emphasize problems of the supply of
capital and its unproductive use over long construction periods and
advantages of more labour-intensive investments as promoters of economic
growth and welfare. Consequently, there exists divergencies of beliefs
concerning the macro-economic implications of alternative energy policies;
supporters and opponents tend to argue from within rather different
theoretical and conceptual frameworks. To what extent, then, is this
dispute to be resolved with reference to 'the facts'? To illustrate the
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problems in this view we can refer to a macro-economic model of the
relationship between energy and the economy which was elaborated by
Len Brookes at the Sizewell B Public Inquiry to elucidate the economic
case for nuclear power with allegedly close reference to the empirical
'facts' and to the economics of the 'real world' (cf Brookes 1983 p9-47).
I shall also refer to the macro-economic model implied by the analysis
provided by the Department of Energy as a basis for its projection of
future energy demand (Department of Energy 1982).
The stated aim of Brookes' interesting analysis, then, is to provide
a 'simple model' which will provide insights into the way in which high
energy prices can constrain economic activity in the context of a closed
economy when all the variables (except an assumed initial shift in the
supply curve) are endogenously determined by •••"the equilibrium seeking
forces in the system itself ••• as they are in the real world." (Brookes
1983 p30). More specifically, he is concerned to show how nuclear
energy can relieve current and future 'energy supply constraints' upon
economic activity and that it is 'unsound' to look for high levels of
energy conservation or other 'high cost' alternatives to nuclear (ibid
plO) . Firstly, he outlines a set of theoretical propositions supported
by various assumptions. The agent of human economic activity is charac-
terised as 'entropy-accelerating economic man' whose goal is asserted as
being not to minimise energy consumption but rather to maximise welfare
by seizing the available economic opportunities, the most important of
which is seen as the continual substitution of low-cost energy (complemen-
tary to capital) for scarcer inputs (eg labour) so as to increase factor
productivities, improve the efficiency of the whole productive process,
increase per capita incomes and therefore continually move to higher
states of economic welfare (ibid pl3-16). In this process energy
efficiency increases simply due to the 'onward march of technical progress'
stimulated by the search for economic efficiency which in turn is facilita-
ner su lies.
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On the basis of this theoretical scheme, Brookes arques that high
fossil fuel prices do not promote increased energy efficiency, as
conventionally argued, but rather have an adverse effect via constraints
on the process of factor substitution and therefore on economic growth
and technical progress (ibid p17-22). The hypothesis underlying his
model is, therefore, that the availability of energy is a 'driving
force' in the economy as much as the level of economic activity is an
important factor in the demand for energy. Consequently, a change in
the 'availability' of energy to the world economy (defined in terms of
both price and quantity supplied) will affect the level of economic
activity; in particular, a reduction in 'availability' (eg increase
in price) will constitute an important economic constraint, cause a
shift to a lower demand curve for energy and promote a new equilibrium
situation which will involve a lower employment of other factors of
production. The economy will suffer because capital which would otherwise
have been used complementarily to labour and energy to increase economic
output will, instead, be used in investment to increase energy efficiency
(ibid p22, 25-7).
Brookes argues, then, that this 'simple model' based on both economic
theory and empirical evidence, is •••"a surprisingly good one in the
real world." (ibid p27). However, it is evident that it is based
primarily on deduction from theoretical propositions and assumptions the
empirical veracity of which is not established by the empirical evidence
that he brings to bear upon the analysis. Indeed, most of evidence is
referred to in the context of an attempt to refute the hypothesis that
high energy prices result in a reduction in the energy coefficient and
such evidence lends only indirect support for the model proposed
(cf ibid p17-22). His model and its underlying hypothesis is not open
to refutation on the basis of its predictions; as he argues (ibid p30)
the model is based on considerable simplification involving neglibility
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and heuristic assumptions, and the required 'ceteris paribus' assumptions
could never hold. Consequently, the value of the exercise becomes a
matter of informed judgement about the 'reasonableness' of the assumptions
and theoretical propositions involved taking into account interpretation
of the rather patchy and inconclusive empirical evidence that is available.
This, I would argue, is indeed the nature of the social scientific
enterprise. It implies that we must reject both Brookes' claim of
'cognitive reliability' for the model on the grounds that it fits the
facts of the 'real world', and any claims for the 'cognitive unreliability'
of the model on the grounds that it cannot be refuted in relation to such
facts.
The problem of this type of knowledge is further illustrated by the macro-
economic model implied by the Department of Energy's analysis for the
Sizewell Inquiry. This model involves the very hypothesis about the
relationship between energy price and economic growth which Brookes seeks
to refute using his own model. Essentially, the hypothesis employed by
the Department of Energy has the main direction of causality going from
economic growth to energy prices, precisely the opposite of the Brookes
hypothesis; from the point of view of the analysis of energy problems,
economic growth can be taken as an exogenous variable:
"It is sometimes suggested that high world energy prices would prevent
the achievement of high rates of economic growth. Although high
energy prices are likely to place some constraints on economic
activity, the fundamental forces generating economic growth arise,
in the main, outside the energy sector." (Department of Energy 1982
pA4, para 16).
Consequently, the Department of Energy derives scenerios which involve the
combination of assumptions of high fossil fuel prices and high rates of
growth, reasoning that high economic growth will create high energy demand
growth which will bear on energy supplies to cause high rates of increase
in energy prices (cf Transcript Day 42 p34-6). Brookes rejects such
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scenarios as inconsistent arguing that high energy prices will prejudice
economic growth which must be treated as an endogenous variable.
It is difficult to see how this dispute can be resolved in relation
strictly to empirical evidence. From both positions it is accepted that
some degree of interdependence is present in the system and in the
context of such interdepency empirical evidence on the degree of
directionality could easily be taken on board by both sides. However,
given the complex, open-systems nature of macro-economic systems empirical
evidence which can be interpreted in a clear-cut manner is virtually
impossible to obtain.
A more pronounced disagreement arises between Brooke's position and that
of opponents of nuclear power who argue for measures to increase the
efficiency of energy use and, therefore, to reduce energy requirements
for any given level of economic activity. The arguments will be referred
to again in the next section (cf p447) but have interesting implications
for the present discussion. The position referred to is basically that
propounded by Leach et al (1979) and Brookes attempts to refute the
argument with reference to the 'evidence':
"All the evidence is against them. Since the dawn of the industrial
revolution no country has been able to produce sustained significant
economic growth without a corresponding growth in energy consumption."
(Brookes 1983 p12)
This 'evidence' is backed up by, for example, the following assertion:
"The diversion of resources to energy saving may amount to a misalloca-
tion of total resources at the macroeconomic level - ••• it takes the
form of diverting resources from investment that is complementary to
energy use to investment that is in substitution for energy use -
and where costs can be shown to be reduced by greater efficiency of
energy use.analyses may overlook that the income that is thus
released may fall upon energy intensive goods and services."
(ibid p13). (emphases added).
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Such 'evidence', therefore, amounts to no more than rather imprecise
hypotheses, not expressed in falsifiable form, and as such departs
significantly from the conception of 'facts' which underlies the position
from which the criticism is made.
Moreover, in this critique of the advocates of energy efficiency we
obtain an indication of the nature of the normative basis of the argument.
Brookes argues that the greater the conservation response to increased
energy prices, in the form of measures to increase the efficiency of
energy use and therefore offset the reduction in economic output, the
greater the adjustment towards accommodating higher price levels (as
resources are substituted for energy) and hence towards promoting a
higher level of equilibrium production and consumption of energy (ibid
p29). In this situation, he argues, there is a welfare loss associated
with a shift of resources into measures to save energy at the expense of
other goods and services which •••"given the choice, no doubt most consumers
would prefer to spend their incomes on •••" (ibid). In other words,
Brookes suggest that the apparent welfare gain from increased spending on
conservation measures is illusory because the 'goods' involved are
'regrettables' (ie means to avoiding disbenefits) and therefore do not
constitute proper benefits. His conclusion is that •••"it would be
much nicer if we could have cheaper energy and ••• (produce) ••• the
things we would much rather have." (ibid p30).
Now, this critique can be seen as involving a complex set of value judge-
ments. Essentially, Brookes is comparing two possible equilibrium
states which involve different levels of energy prices, consumption and
production, industrial structures and different compositions of final
outputs of goods and services. In both these states consumers are seen
as maximising their welfare, exercising their free choice in the market
in relation to the prevailing prices. Therefore, the normative stance
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embodied in the 'liberalist' theme is in evidence arguing that individual
preferences should count and welfare is thereby maximised. However,
an additional value judgement is being invoked to argue for one of these
states in preference to the other and this involves using the value-laden
term from welfare economics - 'regrettables' viz 'goods' which consumers
will prefer in particular circumstances but which, it is judged,
society would be better off without (if the reason for them could be
eliminated) and the resources involved reallocated. Here we can see
the 'materialist' theme at work producing a value judgement in favour of
the state in which the output of particular types of goods and services
is maximised because they are judged to be 'worth' more to the consumer.
This rather lengthy consideration of the nature of the macroeconomic
knowledge which is brought to bear upon the nuclear power issue has
illustrated the extent to which such knowledge departs from the
conventional positivistic notion of 'objective facts', is rather founded
upon theoretical propositions and assumptions which are not strictly
falsifiable in relation to empirical evidence, and, moreover, is value-
conditioned. Such findings do not in any way invalidate such knowledge
as an important basis for the debate; rather, it illustrates the invali-
dity of the conception of 'reliable' and objective knowledge which
underlies the imperatives of technocratic rationality.
illustrations can be briefly referred to.
Some further
The second major element in the debate about the economic implications of
nuclear power development concerns the cost of nuclear-generated electri-
city compared to that generated by alternative means (in particular, by
coal-fired power stations). As indicated in Chapter 7 above, the
degree of dispute is considerable and basically concerns the extent to
which investment in a nuclear power station (or series thereof) will
result in savings in costs over the whole generating system compared to
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what they would otherwise have been (ie with no investment or with an
alternative investment). In this context, the dispute about historic,
allocated total generating costs is essentially irrelevant (Department
of Energy 1981 para 4.01)~ rather it is the marginal cost implications
of pursuing alternative future courses of action which are important and
allocated historic costs do not provide a reliable guide to such future
implications (cf Turvey and Anderson 1977 p7-9) • Consequently, to
employ information relating to the 'ex post' allocated costs of nuclear-
generated electricity as a basis for arguing, 'ex ante', for future
investment in nuclear power (as is sometimes implicitly done, eg Hill
1981B) is to refer to 'facts' which are inappropriate to the decision
at hand~ moreover, even such 'facts' are open to dispute due to the
degree of arbitrariness in cost allocation conventions (cf the problem
of allocating overhead costs - Turvey and Anderson op cit) •
When it comes to the 'facts' about future marginal cost implications the
uncertainties proliferate to a point at which such knowledge bears little
relation to the model of 'cognitive reliability' embodied in technocratic
rationality. The estimation of the net effect which the construction
and operation of a new power station is expected to have on the total
generating system costs over its lifetime involves two primary stages
(see also Chapter 7). Firstly, for any proposed new generating plant
the initial capital cost, lifetime operating costs and decommissioning
cost are compared with the marginal savings accruing from the reduced
load factor and hence fuel requirement of lower merit stations; this
gives an estimate of 'net effective cost'. Secondly, for stations which
might be decommissioned as a result of the introduction of the new
capacity, estimates are made of the avoidable costs of retaining them
in service as opposed to retiring them - the 'net avoidable cost'. On
the basis of this information an assessment can be made of the economic
benefit of investment in new capacity arising from reductions in total
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system generating cost due to both the introduction of the new capacity
and the displacement of older plant with the highest avoidable costs
(CEGB 1982A Chapter 9; Baker 1982 para 52-3; Jenkin 1982 para 20-4).
Since such estimates have to be made for time periods extending well into
the future they necessarily rely heavily upon judgements and assumptions
about what is likely to happen. As Baker (op cit para 53) states:
"The process is complex because the various inputs and assumptions
underlying the calculations - plant costs, construction times,
performance and fuel prices over the life of the project - are
themselves subject to considerable uncertainty, so that a range
of outcomes must be possible."
Indeed, in the CEGBs Statement of Case for the Sizewell Inquiry, the
discussion behind the derivation of assumptions underlying the cost
estimates refers in several places to the 'reasoned judgement' which is
so important in generating assumptions in view of the considerable uncer-
tainties involved (CEGB 1982A Chapter 7; Wilson 1982). In view of
the crucial importance of assumptions relating to future levels of fossil
fuel prices it is not surprising that there arose a considerable degree
of controversy on this question at the Sizewell Inquiry. For example,
the issue was addressed in most of the cross-examinations of the Department
of Energy's evidence during which it was made clear that such assumptions
were based very much on judgement about likely outcomes on the basis of
theoretical preconceptions relating to the operation of world energy
markets (eg Transcripts Day 42 p40-5; Day 46 p88-9). Specifically,
reference is made to the basis for the Department of Energy's coal price
assumptions:
"The coal price assumptions have been derived on a judgemental basis
after consideration of possible growth paths in the marginal produc-
tion costs of Appalachian coal." (ibid Day 46 p88) •
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The problem of the derivation of assumptions about future fossil fuel
prices can be related back to the discussion above of macroeconomic models
(cf p426) • As the CEGB's sensitivity analyses indicate (CEGB 1982A
p60-1), the calculations of net effective costs of nuclear plant are
highly sensitive to fossil fuel price assumptions and the case for invest-
ment in such plant is improved if high rates of increases, particularly
of coal prices, are assumed. Within the Department of Energy's macro-
economic framework (a similar one is adopted by the CEGB in their analysis;
cf CEGB 1982A Appendix C) assumptions of high rates of economic growth
work through to assumptions of high fossil fuel prices, required to
balance energy demand and supply; therefore, the case for nuclear power
is reinforced both in terms of requirement for new capacity and in terms
of the replacement of (high cost) fossil-fired plant. On the other hand,
in his alternative framework, Brookes starts with the argument that
the introduction of new nuclear plant will reduce total generating system
costs and therefore provide a favourable shift in the supply curve for
energy, and argues that this will generate the required economic growth
by keeping down energy prices (Transcripts Day 52 p41-6; Brookes 1982).
A potential difficulty is produced here to the extent that the lower
fossil fuel prices which would result from the development of nuclear
capacity might result in less favourable net effective costs; however,
Brookes sees no problem here arguing that the case for nuclear power is
robust against lower coal prices (ibid). It can be seen here that the
basis for the arguments is provided by an intricate web of judgements
and interpretations about the nature of the complex inter-relationships
between energy and economic systems for which there is little direct
empirical support.
It is, perhaps, finally worth referring briefly to a further set of
assumptions required in the assessment of the net marginal cost implications
of new generation options which have a bearing on the cognitive basis of
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the economic evidence for nuclear power. The problem is that the
evaluation of the benefits of a particular power station must take the
relevant costs and savings over its whole lifetime; however, during
this period a large proportion of the total generating capacity in the
system will have to be renewed and the savings which will accrue to
anyone station will depend on the way that the mix of other generating
plant develops (CEGB 1982A p54; Jenkin 1982 p25-37) • Therefore,
estimates of the economic benefit of a nuclear station, required for
decisions now, are contingent upon the nature of future decisions about
investment in nuclear power. This can be seen as representing an
additional complicating factor in the 'planning dilemma' referred to above
(cf p.4IQ) concerning the development of knowledge to inform decisions
about investments which have impacts over long periods into the future.
The general problem is recognised by the CEGB in terms outlined by Jenkin
(1982 para 38):
"The forecasting problem is a formidable one partly because of the
complications resulting from ••• (macroeconomic) ••• interrelationships
•••but also because of the significant uncertainties in formulating
any forecast of all the variables for the more distant future. Many
alternative outcomes are possible and each outcome has its implica-
tions for the preferred development of the electricity system. The
CEGB therefore has to plan to meet its statutory obligations although
the future is unknown, and must make estimates of the future knowing
they are unlikely to be right."
Of course, recogntion of this problem is difficult to reconcile with the
requirement to make decisions which involve the commitment of large
amounts of resources, with a significant opportunity cost, and which
must therefore be presented as 'reliable' and 'well-founded'. Moreover,
since stances in debates about public policy issues like nuclear power
are conditioned (to a greater or lesser degree) by values, and this
influences the development and selection of 'relevant' knowledge, it can
be argued that to take on board the implications of the 'planning dilemma'
would be to jeopardise the wider 'legitimacy' of ones position in the
437
context of the dominant ideological themes of 'technocratic rationality'.
To round off this examination of the nature of the knowledge which is
employed in the debate about nuclear power, we can refer very briefly
to some of the implications which were discussed in Chapter 8 under the
classification of the 'social costs of nuclear power'. The primary issue
in this area of the debate concerns the safety of nuclear power and the
two main areas of controversy relate to the health implications of 'routine'
low-level radiation releases on the one hand, and to the risk of a major
accident on the other. Therefore, we are concerned here with the
'factual' basis for the confident assertions which are often made about
the safety of nuclear power. As regards the issue of the implications
of 'routine' releases of low-level radiation in normal operation, the
protection procedure recommended by the International Commission for
Radiological Protection (ICRP) upon which UK radiological safety criteria
are based, is founded upon the 'linear dose-response hypothesis'
(cf above p323) • However, there is considerable controversy about the
scientific evidence for the effects of radiation at low dose levels
(Pearce et al 1979 p144) •
On the one hand supporters of nuclear power tend to place weight on
evidence which indicates that low radiation doses have no lasting harmful
effects and that there exists a threshold below which a safe dose can be
defined. Consequently, they argue that the linear hypothesis over-
estimates the risks (cf Wade 1981 p292-3; Little 1983A); Weinberg
(1978 p75) implies that the problem lies in the scientific evidence and
that •••"as more scientific information is obtained, our beliefs as to the
hazards of radiation may change, and •••these hazards may be judged to
be less rather than more." Little (op cit), in her evidence to the
Sizewell Public Inquiry, argued that support for the linear hypothesis
reflected an increasing tendency by scientists to abandon the 'scientific
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approach', which involves the refutation of hypothesis in relation to
the facts, and to increasingly confuse 'facts' with 'opinions'.
On the other hand, opponents of nuclear power tend to concentrate on
evidence which suggests that the linear hypothesis under-estimates the
harmful effects of low-dose radiation. For example, Lindop (1980)
points to evidence of increased effectiveness of irradiation at low
doses in studies of lung and breast cancer but emphasizes the limitations
of the available scientific results as a basis for drawing firm conclusions
about the nature of the risks involved. At the Windscale Public Inquiry
Professor Radford and Dr Alice Stewart presented evidence to suggest that
the linear hypothesis significantly underestimates the harmful effects of
low radiation doses (cf Pearce et al 1979 p144-6) • In contrast to
Weinberg's view, Prior (l9BOA plO) presents a picture of increasing
knowledge indicating larger risks and causing standards to be tightened
up.
Therefore, here again we have a situation in which the available 'facts'
do not match up to the positivistic conception of them which underlies
technocratic rationality. This is also the picture which emerges from
a look at the evidence concerning the risk of a major reactor accident.
I referred earlier to the problem, in this area, of the impossibility
of deriving knowledge about such risks from experience or experimentation
and the resultant move towards the employment of mathematical simulation
of the behaviour of reactor systems employing probability analysis
(cf p417). The resulting evidence about reactor safety expressed in
probabilistic form (as presented, for example, in the Rasmussen Study)
is widely employed as a firm cognitive foundation for arguments about the
safety of nuclear power (eg Hill 19B1B; Wade 19B1; Greenhalgh 19BO, 19B1).
However, there are certain problems with probabilistic risk analysis
which prejudice this interpretation of its results and these can be very
briefly referred to.
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Firstly, the following criticism is quoted in Lovins (1975 p27):
"(a) There is little or no concrete evidence that the (rare) events
under consideration obey the laws of probability that underlie the
theory. There is no assurance that accident events are random in
time or independent of each other. The intellectually satisfying
idea of reliability analysis is no more than a hypothesis for these
events; (b) Even if the framework of the theory were correct, the
values of the parameters are largely unknown.
The method now generally used to predict these probabilities -
cascading of probabilities of the individual 'failures' that make
up the event - is known to be inadequate. The serious or
potentially serious events that have occurred have been characterized
by concurrent failures, usually interdependent or causally related.
Thus the theory's assumption of independence of failures has not been
borne out by experience."
Secondly, Taylor (1980 p77-8) argues that the probabilities which emerge
from such analysis are target probabilities to be achieved in future
operation and not 'facts' of reactor operation; whether they are indeed
achievable is an open question depending on equipment and organisational
performance. Thirdly, in the absence of experiential or experimental
data, the assignment of probability can be very much a matter of 'expert
judgement' which is not susceptible to falsification. Therefore, as
Otway and Von Winterfeldt (1982 p251) argue, •••"many engineering 'facts'
about technological risks ••• (are)••• strong held beliefs shared by expert
groups."
In view of such problems, then, the apparent objectivity of quantitative
probabilistic measures of risk must be seen as illusory; rather such
knowledge is necessarily founded upon judgements and assumptions which
are themselves open to conditioning by values (ibid p252-3). Certain
limitations on the 'scientific' nature (as conventionally defined) of
reliability analysis are indeed recognised in the CEGB's safety case for
the Sizewell B PWR:
"Where information is not available, for instance for novel or modified
components, estimates are made based on engineering judgement which
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draws on comparisons with other similar types of equipment. There
are, inevitably, matters of interpretation and uncertainties
associated with failure rate data particularly for infrequent faults
where statistical evidence is limited. For this reason reliability
analysis is seen as an aid to judgement rather than a precise science."
(CEGB 1982A para 17.33).
However, such qualifications would appear to be all too readily neglected
when the debate is projected into the public and political realm (cf Hill
1978, 1981B).
Finally, it is possible to refer very briefly to the realm of the nuclear
power debate concerned with 'political' implications ie those related to
civil liverties and weapons proliferation. Clearly, as we saw in
Chapter 8, argument on these issues rests primarily upon assumptions and
hypotheses about what could happen in the future if programmes of invest-
ment in nuclear power are pursued, with very little scope for empirical
evidence. Even disputes over the 'facts' about what has happened up to
the present time, for example, in respect of the interdependence between
civil and military programmes must rely heavily on interpretation and
judgement. As regards the cognitive basis of these areas of dispute,
then, it is possible to make three brief observations. Firstly, the
debate can be seen as heavily conditioned by underlying theoretical
conceptions relating to the role and purpose of the state. For example,
on the one hand the pro-nuclear view that civil nuclear programmes have
no adverse implications for civil liberties or weapons proliferation
(cf Jones 1980B; Greenhalgh 1980) can perhaps be related to assumptions
of a 'benign' state at national level operating in the interests of all
groups, safeguarding their rights and liberties, and, at the inter-
national level, of the general goodwill of states to work towards a
common cause through agreed treaties. On the other hand, the view that
the development of nuclear power will have adverse impacts on civil
liberties and weapons proliferation (cf Prior 1980B; Flood and Grove-
White 1976) may reflect an underlying view of the state as established
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in the interests of particular groups and therefore prepared to take
measures which would infringe the liberties and rights of some and,
internationally, as prepared to place national self-interest above
any considerations of a 'common good'. If such basic divergencies
of conceptual framework are an important factor then clearly there will
remain a degree of 'incommensurability' in'the dispute which will be
largely immune to empirical considerations.
Secondly, the perspective adopted for the consideration of such implica-
tions tends to differ between supporters and opponents of nuclear power
in another important respect. On the one hand, supporters tend to adopt
an 'incrementalist' view, focussing on the marginal implications of the
addition of nuclear capacity and this (combined with an emphasis on the
more quantifiable implications) results in a neglect of the problem of
the 'indivisibility' of certain implications (cf Jones 1980B). On the
other hand, many opponents appear to adopt a more 'holistic' perspective
which emphasizes cumulative implications of the projected 'end-state'
nuclear economy which might be neglected by the incrementalist approach.
This perspective is more in evidence in, for example, Flood and
Grove-White (op cit). The incrementalist approach is particularly
apparent in the government's present position which involves approaching
the assessment of nuclear power on a station-by-station basis (cf Sizewell
Transcripts Day 46 p67-8). Again, the existence of such a basic diver-
gence in paradigms prejudices the achievement of agreement in the cognitive
realm.
Thirdly, to the extent that the view prevails, within the institutions
of the state, that such political implications of nuclear power develop-
ment are negligible, there will be feed-back effects on the process of
development of knowledge about such implications which will effectively
tend to reinforce the prevailing view. If such implications are not
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perceived as problematical then research in this area will not be
promoted or funded as part of the 'mainstream paradigm' and without
'official' blessing research is hampered firstly by problems of obtaining
information from various institutions and, secondly, by the consequent
'anti-establishment' label.
This review of some of the areas of cognitive dispute in the nuclear
power debate has illustrated, then, the extent to which the type of
knowledge which is employed in the debate departs from the ideal
required by technocratic rationality. It has provided examples of the
way in which the scientific knowledge (particularly of social phenomena)
required as a basis for the planning of future social and technological
developments derives from theoretical and conceptual frameworks which
are not empirically falsifiable, and necessarily involves the employment
of interpretation, judgement and assumptions which are open to heavy
conditioning by normative stances in relation to the perceived character-
istics of such developments. Therefore, the process of consideration
of alternative means to the solution of the energy problem as perceived
cannot be made to conform to the model of technocratic rationality.
However, there is another part to this aspect of the critique and this
concerns the way in which evaluative themes actually condition the consi-
deration of alternative means; it is to this problem that we can now
turn.
9.4.3 On the Potential for Demand-Side Solutions
It was argued, in section 9.3 above, that the dominant conception of
the energy problem reflects the normative commitments of 'materialism'
and 'liberalism' and that such commitments are effectively placed beyond
'rational' discussion by the imperatives of technocratic rationality.
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It was suggested that the definition of the energy problem in a particular
form affects the process of the consideration of means to its solution;
in particular, the supply-oriented conception of the problem can be
seen as circumscribing the extent to which 'demand-side' solutions can
be seriously considered. This value-conditioned circumscription at the
stage of problem definition implies that the process of consideration of
means to the solution of the energy problem will tend to be dominated by
assessments of alternative supply options. In this section, then, I
shall attempt to provide a rather more detailed consideration of the way
in which dominant ideological themes· circumscribe demand-side approaches.
In many arguments in support of nuclear power there is a rather consistent
line of reasoning from 'problem definition' through to 'solution'. As
an example, it is possible to quote Greenhalgh's summary of his argument
in his book 'The Necessity for Nuclear Power':
"(T)he inevitable growth of world population, together with the
desire of the major part of that population which lives in developing
countries to have a higher standard of living, approaching more
closely that of developed countries, will push world energy demand
to between two to three times the present level by the year 2000 -
a short twenty years away. Tb meet this demand by that time the
only substantial energy sources are oil, coal and nuclear power.
Oil and gas output is unlikely to rise much, if at all, above
present levels and could even fall. There must then be a greater
reliance on coal. Coal production could be expanded, but it will
take time to establish new mines and in particular the new interna-
tional coal trade that will be required for coal to make a much
larger contribution to world energy needs. Coal will be increasingly
used as a source of hydrocarbon fuel to substitute for oil leaving
uranium to take over as the main primary fuel for electricity genera-
tion, and in the longer term for the production of hydrogen. Nuclear
power will also be used as a source of heat. Those countries in a
position to utilise nuclear energy should then increase their pro-
grammes to the greatest extent possible to reduce the present
dependence on oil and relieve the pressures on oil supply. And
experience shows that nuclear power is cheaper, safer, and less
environmentally polluting than most other sources of energy."
(Greenhalgh 1980 p237).
This general argument can be seen as broadly characterising the dominant
energy 'policy paradigm' and a general 'model' of the position can be
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represented schematically as in Figure 9.2. The structure of this
argument is such that the question of demand-side approaches to the
formulation of energy policy is basically settled in the definition of
the energy problem. Therefore, the problem is perceived and formulated
in such a way that the stage of consideration of alternative means to
its solution is concerned almost exclusively with questions relating to
alternative options for energy supply. As regards the Government's
approach to energy policy, this supply-side emphasis is explained in
terms of the sheer practical difficulties of involvement in decisions
about energy use:
"In considering who makes decisions on the use of resources in the
€nergy sector, one must recognise the inevitable asymmetry which
derives from the fact that there are a relatively small number of
fuel producers, and very few types of fuel, while there are an
enormous number of fuel users, whose patterns of fuel consumption
vary widely, and whose uses for fuel differ. This basic
asymmetry must influence how government sees its proper role in
regard to supply and use investment. It is both because of the
uncertainties, and the range of decisions to be taken on the
use side, that it is difficult to find an economic justification
for direct government involvement in the fuel use choices made
by consumers."
(Department of Energy 1983 para 82).
The central question for us, then, is to what extent is this 'asymmetry'
indeed due to practical and cognitive problems or, alternatively, what
role is played by evaluative factors?
It is possible to identify two main perspectives on the approach to
establishing policies in relation to the demand side of the energy
equation. The first approach basically involves the assessment of how
social goals and needs might be met with the minimum of energy (and other
resources) supplied in the most effective way for each defined task. In
other words the focus is on ensuring that end-use needs are provided for
with maximum efficiency in energy termsi therefore, this perspective
can be called the 'energy efficiency approach' (cf Lovins 1977, 1979B;
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FIGURE 9.2 A Schematlc Illustration of A 'Model' Argument for Nuclear Power.
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Leach et al 1979). On the other hand the second approach is primarily
concerned with measures to facilitate response by energy users to trends
in energy markets and thereby to promote the process of factor substitu-
tion in line with changes in relative costs and to ensure the optimal
employment of all factors of production. The focus here, therefore,
is on ensuring that energy~~Sed with maximum efficiency in economic
terms and this perspective can be referred to as the 'economic efficiency
approach' (cf Department of Energy 1983; Eden et al 1981; Brookes 1983).
These perspectives, then, produce rather different perceptions of what
is involved in 'energy conservation' and of the appropriate policies
which might be implemented to be consistent with the wider definition of
the problem. The 'energy efficiency' perspective implies a relatively
important role for government in ensuring that end-use efficiency is
increased. Essentially, this is seen as involving the establishment of
an institutional framework more appropriate to the achievement of energy-
efficiency goals by, for example, correcting institutional barriers
which presently impede conservation and 'rational' supply technologies,
removing any subsidies to energy supply industries, enforcing energy
consumption targets and standards for building, vehicles and appliances,
and making energy prices consistent with long-run replacement costs
(Lovins 1977 p18-20; Leach et al 1979 p16-17). On the other hand,
the 'economic efficiency' perspective implies a minimal role for government
in relation to energy use decisions and an emphasis on ensuring the
'realistic' pricing of energy based on market pressures on costs of
supply, backed up by certain measures to alleviate the problem of imper-
fect information, so that consumers' decisions made with reference to
such prices will result in an optimum allocation of resources (Department
of Energy 1982, 1983).
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The dominant energy 'policy paradigm', as was argued in section 9.3
above, incorporates the 'economic efficiency' perspective. On the
basis of this position the 'energy efficiency' perspective is rejected
on various grounds. Firstly, to the extent that it results in reflec-
tion back on the nature of existing social goals and values and in
questioning of the nature and composition of 'social welfare' then,
within the programme of technocratic rationality, it is associated
with 'irrational' and 'emotional' considerations which can be allowed
no part in the process of 'rational' and 'efficient' debate and decision
making (cf section 9.2 above). Secondly, from the 'economic efficiency'
perspective the search for energy efficiency is seen as essentially
irrelevant and as leading to patterns of resource use which are economi-
cally sub-optimal and therefore inefficient and wasteful. For example,
investment in energy efficiency (substituting capital for energy) is seen
as occurring at the expense of investment which would promote the comple-
mentary employment of energy and capital in a process of increasing overall
factor productivities,and investment of capital where it will obtain the
highest rate of return (and therefore promote economic efficiency) may
adversely affect energy efficiency (cf Brookes 1983 p10-16; Department
of Energy 1983 paras 4-17). Behind this argument lie the assumption
of the rationality of consumer behaviour, and the value judgements that
individual preferences are to count and that social welfare is to be
defined in terms of goods and services which are exchangeable in the
market.
Thirdly, the 'energy efficiency' approach is to be rejected because the
measures required by government to ensure increases in end-use efficiency
and the availability of supplies of energy in the most effective forms
are seen by some as constituting an infringement of the 'freedom of choice'
of consumers and as representing an undesirable trend toward a 'dirigiste'
economy (cf Greenhalgh 1980 p3; Weeks 1982 p13; see also Bickerstaffe 1979
p13) •
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Therefore, the 'energy efficiency' approach is rejected on the grounds
of introducing 'irrational' considerations into the debate, resulting in
economic inefficiency and therefore reductions in social welfare, and
producing undesirable social and political implications. On the contrary,
the 'economic efficiency' approach is presented as providing a rational,
value-free decision matrix which results in maximisation of social welfare
and retains freedom of choice. However, within this approach demand-
side policies are not considered to be primary appropriate means to the
solution of the energy problem. Rationality and value-freedom are here
seen to be consistent with certain assumptions relating to the behaviour
of individual consumers and the composition of social welfare which lead
essentially to the treatment of the demand-side as a 'black box' and to
a primary concern with setting the price of energy in such a way that this
'black box' can be assumed to produce an optimal pattern of energy use.
The conception of optimal resource allocation contained within the
'economic efficiency' approach is based upon a set of value judgements
which are in evidence in the normative themes of liberalism and materialism
as we have identified them. This evaluative basis is traditionally
defined within welfare economics as comprising the 'Paretian' value
judgements. Basically, there are four such judgements involved in the
definition of 'Pareto optimality': firstly that we should be concerned
with the welfare of individuals rather than groups or classesi secondly,
Ithat the individuals utility should be defined in terms of goods and
services exchangeable in the market; thirdly, that the individual should
be considered to be the best judge of her/his own welfare (ie individual
preferences are to count)i and, fourthly, that a change in the alloca-
tion of resources which results in a 'ceteris paribus' increase in one
individual's welfare should be seen as increasing social welfare (Nath 1969
p8-9i Graaf 1967 p143).
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Now, this evaluative basis has tended to become taken for granted as
'self-evident' on the grounds that it is widely accepted as a foundation
for the definition of optimality; therefore, the establishment of
Pareto-optimum conditions is widely seen as a value-free process (Nath
op cit p126-30) • However, as Weber (1949 p13, 22-3, 44) argued, and
as has been pointed out by critics of welfare economics, the widespread
acceptance of value judgements and their resulting apparent self-evidence
can never constitute grounds for their elevation into moral imperatives
or for the assumption that analysis founded upon their acceptance can be
asserted as 'value-free' (cf Nath op cit; Pearce and Nash 1981 Chapter 2).
Consequently, such an assertion by the 'economic efficiency' approach
must be rejected and can indeed be seen as concealing the implicit
acceptance of the prevailing values of the status quo.
The implications of this position can be illustrated by referring again
to certain of the criticism which are made of the 'energy efficiency'
approach from the standpoint of the 'economic efficiency' perspective.
For example, in a discussion of the problems of determining the scope
for energy conservation, Lecomber (1979 p1S8-9) refers to the value
judgements which are made by proponents of the 'energy efficiency'
approach in rejecting •••"the evidence of consumer choice." Specifically,
he argues that in overriding the principle of reve~led consumer preference
such proponents are making value judgements which reject or devalue the
welfare losses arising from the consumption foregone due to energy
efficiency considerations (eg the switch from a larger to a smaller car).
Clearly, value judgements are being made in such cases but there is an
implication that to accept the 'evidence' of consumer preferences as indi-
cative of a desirable state of affairs, or as an input to decision-making,
does not involve value judgements; this is not tenable.
This implication is also in evidence in the argument presented by Brookes
(1983) which was considered above (cf p427). He argues that improved
4S0
efficiency of energy use occurs as part of the 'onward march of technical
progress' which involves the improved efficiency of the whole productive
process, and that such trends are promoted by the availability of cheap
energy. Any extra energy conservation over and above this trend must
be associated with higher prices; but high energy prices will cause
economic growth to be constrained which in turn will reduce the rate of
capital investment and technical change and therefore reduce the rate of
'normal' improvement in energy efficiency (ibid pl0-1S, 32-3). Moreover,
he argues that the conservation response to high prices will result in a
welfare loss to the extent that resources are directed into investment in
energy saving measures ('regrettables') at the expense of the production
of other goods and services which consumers 'would prefer'. The allegedly
value-free nature of this argument therefore asserts not only the basic
Paretian value judgements but also additional judgements concerning the
relative weights of different goods and services in the social welfare
function.
In the Department of Energy's analysis of the potential for government
action to promote energy conservation the emphasis tends to be placed upon
certain 'practical' and institutional problems which are seen as prejudicing
the ability of government to implement effective demand-side policies
(Department of Energy 1983). For example, in considering the question
as to whether the government should attempt to redirect investment to
energy conservation in order to achieve greater optimality in the allocation
of resources considerable emphasis is placed upon the lack of knowledge
about the circumstances and needs of an 'enormous number' of individual
consumers on the one hand, and about likely future trends in energy
prices and market responses, in rates of economic growth and technological
change, in industrial structure, in exchange rates and so on (ibid
para 77-81):
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"The reality is, of course, that we live in a highly uncertain
world and none of these factors is known. Decision makers have
to form their own judgement on these. Some will be right but most,
to some extent at least, will be wrong on one or more of these
factors." (ibid para 78).
It is argued, then, that the consequence of such uncertainty and risk
is that it is very difficult to form •••"judgement as to the 'appropriate'
balance" •.. between investment in conservation and supply and that it is
•••"not clear that the appropriate fuel mix and thermal efficiencies for
consumers in the private sector can either be determined, or effectively
imposed, by government." (ibid paras 77, 80). The conclusion from this
is firmly stated:
"Without such prior knowledge,
optimal investment allocation
between projects on each side
it would be impossible to devise an
both as between supply and use and
of the energy scene." (ibid para 77).
The policy implications of this argument are then drawn out:
"It is both because of the uncertainties, and the range of decisions
to be taken on the use side, that it is difficult to find an
economic justification for direct government involvement in the fuel
use choices made by consumers." (ibid para 82).
Moreover, such involvement is equated with certain characteristics of a
'centrally-planned economy' (eg licences, directives, grants, subsidies,
exhortations) and is seen as implying substantial administrative cost and
'interference' (eg form-filling ,monitoring) (ibid para 94). It is then
concluded that:
"Government is not organised to do this. It is not a national
entrepreneur making all investment decisions on grounds of minimising
costs or optimising resourse allocation. Rather it is organised on
the basis that decisions are best left, wherever possible, to be
made by those who obtain the benefits or suffer the consequences if
things go wrong. Underlying this approach is the presumption that
for the most part, individual decision makers appreciate their own
circumstances, are rational and know better than government what
their interest are; and also that decisions made independently of
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one another and at different times are a securer answer to uncertainty
than a small number of massive centralised decisions in concentrated
time periods." (ibid para 95).
Now, certain comments can be made about this argument. Firstly, the
problem of lack of knowledge and uncertainty is indeed serious, as
discussed in the previous section; and it can be agreed that the
problem is rather more severe in relation to the demand-side than in
relation to the supply-side. However, this problem is present in all
forms of decision-making about social and technological futures and the
approach that is adopted to such decision-making cannot be justified
with reference to the existence of a firm cognitive basis. Conversely
it is difficult to see how the lack of such a firm basis can be logically
invoked to justify non-involvement, in this case, in the demand-side
when it is recognised that decision-making on the supply-side is also
subject to many uncertainties. Moreover, the argument appears to
imply that since optimal resource allocation cannot be achieved by
'interference' in the demand-side then government should not be involved
at all in influencing energy use decisions; however, the same grounds
could be invoked for not making supply decisions. Therefore, this
aspect of the rationale for government non-involvement in energy use
decisions would appear to be logically suspect; it can be seen as
providing grounds for arguments about the appropriate form of involvement
in such decisions but not in itself as providing grounds for total non-
involvement.
A second important feature of the argument concerns its emphasis on the
problem of identifying the circumstances and needs of an 'enormous number'
of individual consumers in the private sector (cf 'millions of consumers':
Department of Energy 1982 para 6). Again, this is a problem which
prejudices the success of demand-side policies, but this perspective
neglects the extent to which the level and structure of energy use is
influenced by decisions which are not made by the individual as an
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'isolated free agent' but rather by, for example, public sector agencies.
This problem is emphasized by Goode et al (1980 p24-6) who argue that
'social decisions' in respect of, for example, settlement patterns and
transport systems, the pattern and standard of building design, the mix
of industry and energy pricing, have a significant impact on energy demand,
in some cases a dominant impact. Therefore, it is argued that many
important decisions which affect energy use are made within the sphere of
government influence and that this constitutes a basis for a strong
conservation policy. This criticism of the Department of Energy's
argument was also made at the Sizewell B Public Inquiry where it was
pointed out, for example, that half the country's building stock is in
the public sector (Transcripts Day 43 p23-6) • In view of the above
comments, then, it would appear that there is rather more behind the
Government's stance on energy conservation policy than the practicalities
upon which so much emphasis is placed. Indeed, the normative basis for
the stance becomes evident in the final quotation presented above (~4SI·1;
cf Department of Energy 1983 para 95). Here the standard Paretian value
judgement relating to the preferences of rational individual consumers
is supplemented by a judgement on the 'appropriate' role of government
which reflects the 'liberalist' theme of democratic political theory as
discussed in Chapter 6. Therefore, demand-side approaches tend to be
'written out' of the discussion about energy policy alternatives simply
by adherence to a particular value-position. Moreover, since such
values play a major role in the process of problem perception and defini-
tion it is at this stage where the 'writing out' begins. The problem
as defined and put forward for solution embodies a particular view about
the appropriateness of, and potential for, demand-side action which
circumscribes subsequent consideration of alternative means. In a sense,
then, a 'territory of rationality' is mapped out for the process of con-
sidering alternative means and demand-side action is virtually excluded
from this territory. The exclusion arises as the implication of the
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adherence to a particular value position but the dominant energy 'policy
paradigm' presents its approach to conservation as resulting from the
pursuit of value-free rationality and efficiency.
programme of technocratic rationality.
Such is the ideological
9.4.4 On the Evaluation of Costs and Benefits
Potential difficulties arise for the programme of technocratic rationality
from any requirement to explicitly trade off the perceived costs and
benefits of alternative energy policies. As indicated in section 9.1
above, this requirement takes the debate into the realm of 'evaluative
trade-off disputes' and, according to technocratic rationality, such
disputes can be conducted only with reference to 'irrational' considera-
tions. From this point of view, then, in the interests of 'efficiency'
and 'rationality', the role of such evaluative trade-off considerations
must be minimised. In relation to this evaluation problem two possible
strategies emerge for improving the 'rationality' of the decision-making
process. Firstly, it is possible to attempt to prevent the debate from
moving into this realm of irrationality by, for example, arguing for
positions in the cognitive dimension of the debate such that the level
of perceived costs is 'neglible' in relation to the benefits and therefore
such that it can be argued that no 'reasonable' person would invoke a
trade-off dispute. Secondly, it is possible to attempt to impose upon
the debate about such trade offs, once they arise, some form of
'method' or 'calculus' which can be presented as increasing the degree of
rationality in the debate.
It is possible to perceive the development of both these forms of strategy
in public policy-making processes. The second strategy is perhaps best
illustrated by the widespread employment of cost-benefit analysis as a set
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of decision-making rules with universal application which provided for
rational decision-making on the basis of precise, quantified implications
(Pearce and Nash 1981 Chapter 1). Of course, this type of cost-benefit
analysis has been severely criticised on the grounds, for example,
of inappropriate quantification, exclusion of 'intangible' items, and
imposing a set of value judgements (ie those of Paretian welfare economics)
in the attempt to apply a universally-applicable quantitative framework
of an allegedly value-free nature (ibid; cf Self 1975). Consequently,
the value-contingent nature of cost-benefit analysis is now more widely
recognised and there has been a considerable effort made to develop
alternative techniques in order to promote the rationality of decision-
making (eg goals-achievement matrices, multiple criteria optimisation
techniques etc). This effort can be seen as consistent with the
programme of technocratic rationality conceived, in this respect, by
Habermas (1976A p341-2) as involving the attempt to impose rationality
on the separated domain of values and norms through a 'positivistic'
decision theory which applies such criteria as 'economy' and 'efficiency'
to the form of decisions but neglects consideration of content (ie the
actual nature of the values involved).
However, in spite of efforts to develop such formal decision-making
techniques the realm of evaluation and trade-off remains subject to
considerable controversy. Consequently, the imperatives of technocratic
rationality are best served if explicit reference to this realm can be
avoided. There are two components to such an avoidance strategy as it
relates to the nuclear power debate. Firstly, as indicated above,
it involves arguing in the cognitive dimension that the implications of
nuclear power development are such that there are no significant costs to
be traded against benefits (cf the 'unconditional support' position
identified in section 9.1). However, there is an additional possible
component and this involves the invocation of 'normally accepted'
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conditions in other areas of social life to justify particular levels of
costs without explicit reference to evaluative considerations. This
latter component can therefore be seen as an important element in the
process whereby decisions are increasingly taken out of the explicitly
political realm and presented as the outcome of technical processes in
which a particular set of values is implied under the guise of value-
freedom.
As an illustration we can refer to the use of the concept of 'acceptable
risk' in relation to the potential hazards of reactor emissions and
accidental radiation releases. As Pearce (1980B p8) points out, there
are two possible approaches to the definition of 'acceptable risk', the
first involving reference to other risks which can be considered to be
'acceptable', and the second involving explicit reference to the benefits
against which the risk is to be traded. Taking the arguments in support
of nuclear power it is evident that the first approach predominates.
Otway and Von Winterfeldt (1982 p249-50) summarise the procedure:
"Having arrived at a quantitative estimate of risk, some analysts
then compare it with statistics reflecting society's experience of
more familiar risks of technological or natural origin, assuming
that physical risk, as accepted in the past, provides sufficient
information to judge the acceptability of a new technology today.
These comparisons are offered as a basis for judging the social
acceptability of the new risk by placing it 'in perspective' as
a preliminary to 'embedding the problem into the normal conditions
of life'."
The process of 'embedding' (as indicated in Chapter 8) has been advocated
by H~fele (1974 p308-12) arguing that we must have some standard or
yardstick against which to judge acceptability, and that the appropriate
yardstick is the 'normal conditions of life' into which, therefore, the
problem should be 'embedded'. Lord Rothschild has endorsed this procedure
and advocated that a general standard of acceptability be derived from the
risk of being killed in car accidents in the UK (Otway and Von winterfeldt
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op cit; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p319). The practice of portraying
the risks of nuclear reactor accidents as acceptable with reference to
other risks of life is widespread in arg~ments for nuclear power
(cf Greenhalgh 1980 p174-86; Hill 1981B p3; Wade 1981 p298; see above
Chapter 8).
A recent example of this practice is provided by the CEGB's case for the
Sizewell B PWR. The CEGB's 'design safety criteria' for reactor accidents
are targets which are set •••"with regard to the levels of risk perceived
in other fields of life." (CEGB 1982A p81-3; Matthews 1982 p34-7). It
is argued that:
"It has always been the endeavour of the nuclear industry to ensure
that risks from nuclear plant are lower than the everyday risks of
life that currently exist and can be compared favourably with other
risks for similar types of activity. There is no generally accep-
table level of risk but different authorities have put forward views
on the acceptability of various levels of risk." (ibid para 98).
A general standard of acceptable risk is then derived on the basis of
certain 'authoritative views' including the ICRP, Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, the Health and Safety Commission's Advisory
Committee on Major Hazards and Lord Ashby. The latter's argument goes
as follows:
"Some sort of scale of relative values attached to risks is emerging
as a rule of thumb for political decisions ••••As a very rough
generalisation it can be said that risks of one in a million are of
no concern to the average person." (quoted in Matthews ibid para 102).
Similarly, for the development of a system of radiological protection the
CEGB follows ICRP recommendations for judging the acceptability of risks
to radiation workers and members of the public. For the former the
standard is the risk for •••"other occupations recognised as having high
safety standards" •••; while for the public acceptability is judged ••."in
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the light of the public acceptance of other risks of everyday life."
(CEGB 1982A para 13.22-23).
The practice of 'risk embedding', then, results in a portrayal of the
risks of nuclear power, as expressed in design targets, as being
generally acceptable and of little concern in relation to 'normal'
conditions of life. By implication the risk is negligible and therefore,
no rational person would attempt to invoke a trade off against benefits
which would require a valuation of the risk (cf Little 1983 p56-9) •
'Embedding' therefore provides a means of avoiding this process of
explicit trade off which would involve the development of 'evaluative
trade-off disputes' and hence, within the terms of technocratic rationa-
lity, jeopardise the rationality of the debate.
However, this practice is open to criticism on various grounds. Firstly,
there is the question of the appropriateness of comparisons between
different risks given their different nature and the ambiguity in
the concept of 'risk' itself; risks may be voluntary or involuntary,
they may be low probability/high consequence or high probability/low
consequence, and different indicators might be available to measure
categories of risk (Pearce 1980B p8; Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980 p319).
Secondly, a problem arises because the risks calculated for nuclear
reactors are design targets to be achieved in practice whereas the 'risks
of everyday life' used for comparison are frequency outcomes based on
past experience. Consequently, like is not being compared with like
since there must be some additional probability of the targets for nuclear
reactor performance not being achieved in practice which is not being
taken into account.
More fundamentally, there is the question of the grounds upon which the
comparative risks of everyday life are judged to be 'acceptable'. This
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problem is perhaps indicated in the subtle shift which occurs between the
proposition that certain 'risks of everyday life' are accepted, to the
proposition that these risks are acceptable in a general sense. The
first problem concerns who is to be the judge of whether or not such
risks are widely accepted and what degree of public acceptance (given
at least some degree of dissent), assessed in what way, can provide
grounds for this conclusion. It could be asked, for example, how the
rather vague generalisations about risk acceptance by the 'general public'
which underlie the conclusions of the bodies referred to by the CEGB
for standards of acceptability, can constitute an 'authoritative'
basis for such standards (cf Matthews 1982 p37-40; CEGB 1982A para 14.43).
However, it is the translation from a risk which might be accepted in a
particular context to a risk which is generally acceptable which consti-
tutes the major problem. For a risk which is considered to be non-
negligible, acceptance of it is basically motivated either by the
benefits against which it can be traded or by an assessment of the social
costs which would be incurred in reducing it (cf Bonnell 1982 para 38).
Therefore, the acceptance of a particular risk in a particular situation
with reference to these considerations cannot be taken as evidence of
the acceptability of that level of risk in a general sense. For example,
if it could be argued that the general public in this country accept the
risk of being killed in a car accident (which is debatable because many
people do not accept it) then this acceptance must be related to the
benefits which accrue from car ownership and use on the one hand, and the
costs which would be incurred in reducing the risk on the other. In
other words the acceptance is context dependent and makes explicit reference
to the valuation of costs and benefits: it is a value-conditioned
jUdgement" It cannot then be asserted that this risk of death in a car
accident is in some way generally acceptable beyond the context in which
its acceptance is judged, ie without reference to benefits or costs of
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This assertion is, however, central to the practice of 'risk embedding'.
Risk targets for nuclear reactors are justified as acceptable with
reference to general statements of acceptability which are abstracted
from the context of value judgement which provides them with meaning.
In effect, such risk targets are being justified 'by the back door';
they should only be justified with reference to the perceived benefits
of nuclear power as assessed in an explicitly evaluative context. There
is no conceivable basis for justifying such risk targets with implicit
reference to the benefits of other technological developments, the
social costs of reducing other risks or the acceptance of the risks from
'natural disasters'. The attempt to establish acceptability in these
terms through 'embedding', allegedly in the interests of promoting
rational debate and decision-making processes, merely serves to
'de-politicise' such processes by side-stepping discusssions of social
ends and values in the context of a trade off between risks and benefits
and, more generally, by promoting a concept of universally-acceptable
levels of risk which can be used to justify social and technological
developments in a supposedly value-free claculus. As a result existing
dominant values are effectively shielded from challenges which would
arise if the focus was placed upon the normative implications of risk
acceptance and the process of justifying risks with explicit reference
to the benefits against which they could be traded.
Nevertheless, this latter approach to the determination of 'acceptable
risks' does have its problems. It has the advantage of potentially
making value choices and assumptions more explicit but in the form of
'risk-benefit analysis' becomes susceptible to the tendencies, discussed
at the beginning of this section, to mould such decision-making aids
into quantitative 'techniques' of universal applicability, as has been
the case with cost-benefit analysis. Thus, when it comes to the
problem of expressing benefits and risks in commensurable units, the
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ready expressibi1ity of economic benefits in money terms leads to the
search for a monetary valuation of risk and this involves calculating
a money value for human life. Some regard this as morally offensive
but Pearce (1980B p1l) justifies it in the following terms:
"(A)ny decision implies a value of human life and that alone is
sufficient for us to justify converting the disutility function
into a cost-of-risk function using whatever values are separately
determined to apply."
However, the danger is that the decision-making process can be reduced
to an apparently unambiguous and objective problem of calculating a simple
quantitative risk-benefit ratio which submerges and obscures the value
choices which are required. The process of estimating the 'value' of
human life is an essentially ethical one but the search for quantification
can hide this and lead to the implicit acceptance of certain ethical
'norms' • Moreover, if such money valuations are determined separately
from the decision-making process in which they are to be used, then the
ethical choices upon which the valuations rest are effectively 'written
out' of the decision in question - they are not open to scrutiny or
challenge. Finally, in a quantitative risk-benefit analysis problems
of values and ethics are essentially reduced to the problem of deriving
numerical 'weights' for quantified risks and benefits and it can be
argued that such quantification tends to 'anaesthetize' the ethical
dimension by requiring a 'gestalt shift' which results in a failure to
address the full complexity of the ethical problem.
Therefore, although in principle there are advantages in the definition
of acceptable risks in relation to the associated 'benefits', in practice,
in the form of risk-benefit analysis, several problems arise. In
effect, the crucial ethical and value choices become submerged and implied
in the drive for quantification and this tends to 'impose-by-default'
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prevailing values and ethical norms. The result is that risk-benefit
analysis is reduced to merely a more sophisticated form of 'risk
embedding' in which the value framework of the analysis is effectively
derived implicitly from a particular interpretation of the 'normal
conditions of life' in which risks are incurred in the pursuit of the
prevailing goal of material economic growth. The business of risk
evaluation can therefore be seen as serving to establish a framework
for the justification of incurring risks in the pursuit of existing
dominant social goals and values without requiring explicit discussion
of the ethical issues involved on the grounds that this latter activity
can be no part of a 'rational' decision-making process.
9.4.5 Conclusion
In this section, then, I have attempted to illustrate some of the
fundamental problems in the conception of 'rational' and 'efficient'
debate and decision making which is propounded in what I have identified
as a dominant ideology of technocratic rationality. Basically, the
central argument has been that this ideal of rationality is founded
upon an untenable conception of the nature of the knowledge which it
is possible to develop in the debate about nuclear power. Such knowledge
is often of a highly tentative and speculative nature, heavily influenced
by value-conditioned judgements and assumptions, and cannot support the
claims and imperatives which, we have seen, are frequently propounded
in the debate. If this argument about the nature of knowledge is
conceded then it becomes illegitimate to dismiss oppositional arguments
simply on the grounds that they dispute certain 'facts' because all
'facts' are open to debate in this context. This is not to argue against
the importance of high standards of scientific practice and discussion;
these are indeed crucial. Rather, it is to argue that even with the
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development and application of the best possible practice in this respect
there will still be dispute over the 'facts' of the nuclear power debate
and that such dispute will not be due to 'irrational' behaviour by some
but rather due to the irreducible 'ambiguity' of the phenomena with which
the debate is concerned compounded by the divergencies between values
and interests which are a central feature of our society. To invoke
the imperatives of technocratic rationality, then, is to promote a
particular set of values by imposing a value framework upon the debate
which must be taken as given if 'rationality' and 'efficiency' are to
be achievedo
I have also attempted to illustrate the extent to which this ideal of
rational and efficient decision making is jeopardised by the way in
which the consideration of alternative means is circumscribed by a
value-contingent definition of the ene.rgy problem. Specifically, the
virtual 'writing out' of demand-side approaches can be seen to be founded
upon the 'taking-for-granted' of a particular value framework. Again,
this value-conditioning of the process of debate and decision-making
indicates the infeasibility of the imperatives of technocratic rationality
and further illustrates its ideological naturp..
Finally, I have attempted to indicate some ways in which the problem of
evaluation is accommodated in this model of rational decision making
with reference to the evaluation of risk. Essentially, I argued that
since the process of trading off costs and benefits in relation to goals
is considered to be part of the realm of the 'irrational', then consi-
derable attempts are made either to avoid this process or to attempt to
subject it to 'rational' procedures. The first strategy involves
arguing that the costs of nuclear power are negligible and, additionally,
involves the attempt to present such costs as generally 'acceptable'
without explicit reference to the normative basis underlying the defini-
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tion of 'acceptability'. The second strategy involves moulding the
evaluation process into a formal, quantitative decision-making
'technique' which serves to defuse the dispute over values by imposing
implicit value choices in the guise of 'value-freedom' - the central
feature of this ideology of 'rationality'.
9.5 In Conclusion: Some Political Implications
In this Chapter, then, I have approached the analysis of the debate
about nuclear power from a perspective founded in the conceptual frame-
work developed in Part One of this thesis. My two major concerns have
been, firstly, to provide an indication of the extent to which this
debate is inserted into the themes and discourse of a dominant framework
of ideological knowledge and, secondly, to illustrate some of the
fundamental problems in the conception of 'rational' policy making (and
therefore in the implied imperatives) contained in this framework. This
has led to the discussion of certain implications for the energy policy-
making process.
In particular, I have argued that technocratic rationality serves to
produce an approach to debate and decision making in which particular
dominant ends and values are implicitly taken for granted and, effectively
removed from the possibility of questioning on rational grounds, become
elevated into ethical imperatives. Since such values condition the
perception and definition of the energy problem and thereby circumscribe
the policy-making process, technocratic rationality serves to conceal
such conditioning of the dominant energy 'policy paradigm' behind a
facade of 'efficiency' and 'rationality'~ the promotion of dominant
values proceeds in the name of value-freedom.
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More specifically, I have attempted to indicate the ways in which
dominant evaluative themes of 'materialism' and 'liberalism' influence
perceptions of the energy problem and appropriate means to its solution
so as to promote a pervading orientation towards resource-intensive
economic expansion in which increasing energy consumption becomes
synonymous with modernity, a consequent preoccupation with ensuring
supplies of energy to guarantee continued consumption and growth, and a
resulting neglect of issues and questions concerning the demand for
energy. Indeed, demand-side approaches are essentially 'written out'
at the level of problem definition and the conception of the problem in
terms of an imperative to provide secure supplies of energy into the long
term future ('driven' by a materialist ethical imperative) produces a
particular orientation towards the consideration of alternative means.
Thus, the present structure of demand tends to be seen as unproblematic
within the framework of neo-classical economic theory, representing the
outcome of market decisions of consumers behaving rationally in accordance
with their subjective preferences in relation to market prices. The
problem, then, is seen as one of getting prices 'right'; it is
assumed that the market will then bring about optimum allocations.
Questions about the extent to which current and projected demands are
related to assessments of 'needs'; about the suitability of different
forms of energy in relation to end-use characteristics; about possible
definitions of 'waste' in conversion; about the extent to which economic
growth could be maintained with reduced energy consumption; and, more
fundamentally, about possible alternative paths of future social
development - such questions are either neglected or outlawed as illegiti-
mate within the confines of rationality.
On the other hand, given declining reserves of fossil fuels and perceived
uncertainties and problems of energy-intensity in renewable sources, an
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overwhelming emphasis on nuclear power as a 'secure' means of providing
long-term, large-scale supplies of energy can be seen as almost a
concomitant of the normative basis of the dominant energy 'policy
paradigm'. The argument that such an emphasis is the necessary result
of an impartial consideration of the available 'facts' can therefore
be seen as embodying the ideological nature of technocratic rationality.
Within our conceptual framework, then, these dominant ideological
themes operate 'positively' to condition the policy-making process.
However, such themes can also be seen to operate in a 'negative' way.
In particular, technocratic rationality produces a conception of policy-
making which apparently can be 'above' the traditional realm of political
activity which is portrayed as irrational. The ideal of such activity
is the model of rational technocratic guidance in which means to given
ends are assessed in relation to objective scientific knowledge dispensed
by impartial experts. To the extent, then, that the operation of
political power remains an important influence on policy making, the
technocratic conception serves to conceal such influence behind its
facade of rationality and value-freedom, and therefore to legitimise
existing structures of political power.
This 'negative' aspect of ideological influences on public policy making
can be of considerable importance. Essentially, the form of 'rationalism'
embodied in technocratic rationality generates a 'technical' framework
for the discussion of policy issues which abstracts from power political
influences on the one hand, as well as promoting particular normative
themes on the other. Such positive and negative aspects interrelate
to constitute a complex set of ideological influences on policy making.
It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to assess the relative
importance of ideological and power political influences on policy-making;
my concern has been primarily to attempt to indicate the nature and role
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of the former. However, the question of this interrelationship is
clearly an important research issue particularly in view of the way
in which technocratic rationality tends to 'write out' power political
influences from analytical attention by excluding them from the realm
of rationality in its normative model of policy making.
The legitimatory nature of the knowledge applied in the dominant
energy 'policy paradigm' in relation to existing structures of political
power has, indeed, been referred to by Lindberg (1977) in the context
of an analysis of an apparent lack of responsiveness in energy policy-
making systems to the so-called energy crisis of the early 1970s. In
a comparative study of such responsiveness in several advanced industrial
societies, Lindberg found their policy-making systems to be dominated by
"•••a relatively small, stable and closed circle of organisational
elites •••" (ibid p333) mainly associated with the production of energy.
Such elites, he argued, supported by technical experts, tend to restrict
decision making to supply-oriented perspectives, evoking support from
such criteria as the 'national interest', 'progress', etc. Further,
as a consequence of such elite domination, decision making tends to be
fragmented and incoherent, with complex decisions divided into simpler
components thus circumventing the problem of integration and trade-off
of competing values and insulating decision-makers from democratic
control (ibid p333-7).
More generally, Lindberg sees the political structure of growth- and
consumption-oriented industrial societies as dominated by three closely-
interrelated social institutions. Firstly, with increasing state
intervention in economic and social management and planning in such
societies complex bure'lucracies have arisen which have developed 'dynami-
cally conservative' modes of decision making in response to rapidly-
changing, complex and interactive problems. Such modes of decision
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making are seen as tending to reinforce a disaggregated. incremental
and sectoral approach to policy that implicitly advantages established
groups and assumptions and militates against 'higher level value
integration' (ibid p340-3). Secondly, a cadre of technocrats and
experts operate within such bureaucracies whose skills and expertise,
underlain by 'technocratic values', are seen as vital to industrial
and economic 'progress', to the power and legitimation of organisational
elites, and to the reproduction of basic structures of control (ibid
p344-6). Thirdly, Lindberg argues that a set of class structured
social relations provides the foundation for the other levels of the
political system and that the power and influence of dominant classes
and elites is buttressed by •••"social rules and ideologies that, while
seldom if ever explicitly contested, structure and limit pluralist
competition and the decision range of organizational elites." (ibid p347).
Consequently, within Lindberg's framework ideology plays an important
role in conditioning the policy-making process and in legitimising the
political power of dominant elites and social forces. Within such a
framework, then, it is possible to gain some insight into the potential
importance of the 'negative' role of technocratic rationality in terms
of the nature of the power political influences on policy-making which
are legitimised in its conception of rational policy making. Thus,
Lindberg summarizes the implications of his framework as follows:
"Energy policies are supply oriented and dominated by producers'
interests; other groups and other criteria challenge them in
various ways but with little impact on actual outcomes; govern-
mental bureaucracies are dynamically conservative; and technocratic
values increasingly suffuse policy formulation. All of these are
consistent with a view of the larger picture in which dominant
industrialising elites or social forces in communist and capitalist,
developed and developing nations alike struggle to maintain the
existing pattern of production, social priorities, and economic
expansion, in spite of resource and energy supply constraints in
the form of depletion, price increases, or import dependency."
(ibid p348).
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The corollary of this political implication of technocratic rationality
is a tendency towards the restriction of popular, public participation
in policy-making. Again, Lindberg summarizes the argument:
"The technocratic 'ethos' assumes the desirability of separating
scientific questions from political and social value questions,
assumes further that the scientific and technical questions are
the more decisive and that they can be resolved on scientific
grounds apart from ethical considerations, and finally, by
perpetuating the notion that scientific expertise is the main
requirement for making reasoned choice among technological alterna-
tives, restricts participation in such decisions and frustrates
democratic control of technology." (ibid p344-S).
Finally, there is another important possible political implication of
technocratic rationality to which it is worth briefly referring. I
argued above (see section 9.3.3) that the notion of rational policy
making contained in the technocratic conception implies a tendency
towards the translation of existing dominant values from ends which are
to be desired into 'ethical imperatives' which must be achieved and
which are, as such, beyond discussion on rational grounds. Since
the consideration of means to the achievement of such imperatives is
seen as a purely 'technical' issue then the problems which might be
associated with the implementation of means tend to be conceived of in
technical terms and are therefore considered to be susceptible to
'solution' or limitation through the appropriate technical and institu-
are
However, such 'fixes~presented as 'neutral' measurestional 'fixes'.
to limit social costs, themselves devoid of evalua~v~ implications, thus
circumscribing the process of evaluation of alternative means. As such
the quality of imperative is readily transferred from ends to the
appropriate 'fixes' once a particular means emerges from this circumscribed
evaluation process. This raises the potential problem that in developing
the appropriate supposedly neutral 'fixes' to achieve particular values,
hypostatised as imperatives, political and institutional structures
become subject to change, but this change occurs under the guise of
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This implication is indeed identifiable in some arguments presented in
favour of nuclear power from a 'technocratic rational' standpoint. For
example, Weinberg (1978) argues from a position in which the need for
nuclear power is established almost as an imperative with reference to
the goal of material economic growth; it is seen as •••"a permanent
technological base for man's material well-being •••" (ibid p73), an
essential option in the 'real world'. Therefore, •••"what is needed
are ways to fix nuclear energy •••" (ibid p74); an 'acceptable' nuclear
future will require an underlying political consensus and this will in
turn require the identification and 'fixing' of 'deficiencies' (ibid
p76-7) • The fixes required are of a technical and institutional/political
nature. 'Technical fixes' are required to control proliferation and
diversion, to solve problems of waste disposal, and to prevent serious
accidents. 'Institutional fixes' will also be needed to solve safety
and proliferation problems; this will essentially involve devising
•.•"better institutional and political arrangements." (ibid p77-8).
Weinberg elaborates on the nature of such arrangements. He argues that
•••"we must guarantee some degree of political stability" (ibid p79) and
suggests the development of a policy of 'center siting'. The aim of
this policy would be to •.•
" reduce to a minimum the land committed to nuclear energy and •••
place the enterprise in the hands of highly expert, professional
people invested with institutional longevity. These two fundamental
desiderata seemed to us to come together, almost automatically, if
nuclear energy were confined to large energy centers. These centers
would automatically draw to them powerful groups of people •••who
could provide the strength in depth that is a prerequisite for
successful management of the nuclear enterprise." (ibid p79).
It is apparent that Weinberg presents his proposal in an essentially
'neutral' guise - a technical solution to potential social costs of
nuclear power; moreover, it is presented in the form of a virtual
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imperative as the reference to 'fundamental desiderata' indicates.
The implications of such measures for social and political values are
not considered; material well-being is effectively established as
an unquestionable goal and the means to its achievement must be
implemented as 'efficiently' as possible.
A similar form of argument is presented by Starr (1982). The need for
nuclear power is established with reference to an economic growth impera-
tive and it is argued that the main potential problems associated with
nuclear energy are amenable to technical solutions. However, while
••• "expanded use of uranium power is essential to provide a substantial
portion of the electricity necessary for world economic growth" ••• ,
obstacles to this expansion derive from •••"the inadequacies of our
industrial, political and economic institutions to manage this new
energy system effectively •••" (ibid p250) • Therefore, we must, Starr
argues, change our organisations and institutions so as to permit
effective and efficient management of nuclear energy programmes by,
for example, providing such programmes with their 'own management
structure' and promoting multi-national or international management of
fuel-cycle plant (ibid p 254-5). In other words •••"industrial nations
should thoughtfully plan and establish the unique institutions and
management that this special technology demands." (ibid p255). Once
again the implication is that wider political and institutional changes
are being established as imperatives with reference to a specific domain
of technological development and are being placed 'above' the requirement
of evaluation in relation to broader political and social values. There-
fore, in the name of 'efficiency' and 'rationality', a particular
technology, established as 'essential' in relation to particular values,
begins to dictate our social and political structures further eroding
the potential for democratic control of social and technological develop-
ment.
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In conclusion, then, it can be argued that the themes of the 'techno-
cratic ideology' have an important impact on the processes of debate and
decision-making about the future development of nuclear energy. An
important manifestation of this impact is in the imposition of a
particular set of restrictions and constraints on such processes and
in the effective denial of opportunities for meaningful discussion of,
or challenge to, such constraints. Strongly conservative influences
derive from various factors: analytical neglect within theoretical
frameworks of such variables as class, social conflict and institutional
change; the promotion of a culture of political passivity, apathy and
alienation through scientific and technological elitism and through the
'post political myth' which insists on the desirability and inevitability
of the replacement of politics by rational, value-free technocratic
guidance; the abstraction of technological development from its social
and political context and the banishment of normative questions concerned
with values to the realm of irrationality while experts in command of
'hard facts' are given preeminence in the realm of 'rational' discussion.
The policy-making process is restricted to issues, problem interpretations
and policy prescriptions which present no fundamental threat to established
interests; challenges to dominant groups and elites are deflected since
the legitimacy of the bases upon which fundamental challenges could be
made is denied. Issues such as nuclear power development become insulated
from truly democratic political discussion, social development is taken
out of the realm of public choice, and any attempt to question the
resulting paths of development brings down the charges of 'emotionalism',
'irrationality', questionable or unpatriotic motivation, and even
'fascism'.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
The aim of the analyses presented in this thesis has been essentially
two-fold. In the first place, I have been concerned to undertake
an examination of the issue of the 'rationality' of social scientific
knowledge and of the role of such knowledge in informing action
designed to influence the course of social and technological develop-
ment. More specifically, I have attempted to formulate a conception
of the nature of ideological knowledge in our society and of the
form of the normative underpinnings or commitments of a dominant
framework of ideological knowledge as it relates to the process of
'societal guidance'. Secondly, I have been concerned to apply
this conception in an examination of certain aspects of the debate
about nuclear power - specifically, the 'mainstream' arguments in
favour of its development - in order to make some assessment of the
contribution of such a conception to developing our understanding
of this debate.
It is appropriate now to assess the extent to which the analysis
has achieved these aims, to indicate its limitations and to discuss
various possible directions for further research which become apparent
from the analysis to date. As regards the first aim, then, I have,
in the first part of this thesis (chapters 2-6) I developed in some
detail a conception of the rationality of scientific knowledge of
social phenomena, of the nature of ideological knowledge, and of a
'dominant ideology' in terms of its major characteristics and norm-
ative commitments in relation to the social problem-solving activities
of the state. This conception is developed in the form of a
'theoretical-descriptive schema', a set of hypotheses and descrip-
tions derived primarily on the basis of a review of literature from
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many schools of thought. An essentially integrative approach was
adopted, attempting to identify useful elements in various alter-
native theoretical perspectives, rather than restricting the analysis
within the confines of a particular pre-conceived theoretical frame-
work. From the viewpoint of such frameworks, then, the resulting
conception may appear 'eclectic'. However, my view is that such
a criticism of eclecticism is usually made from an epistemological
standpoint which claims access to the objective truth about the
social world; from the alternative standpoint of the present analysis
such a claim is seen as ideological.
Nevertheless, serious problems do arise in the assessment of the
'scientific validity' of the conception which I have developed.
These problems essentially arise from the rejection of the notion of
methodological guarantees of objective knowledge, a rejection which
raises problems of relativism and, at the limit, produces Feyerabend's
position of 'anything goes'. However, the epistemological position
one
embodied in the conception is notiof extreme relativism; indeed, it
rejects the view that 'helpless relativism' is the necessary con-
comitant of a denial of the possibility of methodological guarantees
of rationality. Instead, it places the focus on decisions, judge-
ment and integrity of scientists in particular social positions,
defined in terms of the nature bf the scientific community and its
relationship to the wider social and political context. From this
perspective, therefore, social knowledge can be assessed in terms of
its 'scientific quality', notwithstanding the value-contingency
and moral colouring which are necessarily part of its make-up, and
the dimension of 'cognitive reliability' is essentially contingent
upon the critical judgement and integrity of scientists within the
context of their scientific community.
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In other words we are going part way along the Weberian and Popperian
paths, as discussed in chapter 4, accepting the role of values, de-
fined in a particular socia-cultural context, in the 'psychology
of knowledge' but rejecting the notion of methodological guarantees
in the 'logic of knowledge'. This distinction is seen as false
and the process of social knowledge formation is seen as an essentially
'social-psychological' process. Such a view places considerable
emphasis on the role of critical judgement and decision-making by
the scientific community: it therefore accepts Ravetz's view of the
primacy of 'scientific ethics'. Moreover, it sees such ethics as
being intimately related to the socia-cultural and political charac-
teristics of the society in question and therefore posits a relation-
ship between the 'scientific quality' of social knowledge and. its
social ilndpolitical context.
I shall return to these issues later in discussion of further research
needs but it is perhaps worth summarising briefly my conclusions on
the nature of social science. I would conclude, then, that the
development of hypothetical statements is thoroughly contingent upon
the values of scientists and their community and upon the normative
commitments embodied in particular paradigms or world views. The
process of testing hypotheses must rely very much on the critical
judgement and integrity of the investigator and 'good' social
science can be seen as having certain prerequisities: firstly to
critically examine as many implications of the hypothesis in
relation to as much 'appropriate' empirical evidence as possible
(taking into account its limitations as theory-dependent); secondly,
to be as explicit as possible about the necessary judgements in-
volved and the values and assumptions underlying them; and, thirdly,
to seek the maximum degree of criticism of any conclusions drawn.
The process therefore depends heavily on 'craft judgement', guided
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by a set of ethics; it cannot produce 'objective truth' but 'scientific
quality' ('cognitive validity') can be seen as contingent upon the
above criteria.
From this perspective, then, the 'truth' about the social world will
always elude us and those who purport to peddle 'truth'must be seen
as guilty of deception. Since social knowledge must always have
a certain 'moral colouring', disagreements about political and social
ends in a society will be reflected in competing versions of 'social
reality'. Moreover, in a society with dominant-submissive social
relations the requirement of the exercise of power through ideology
will produce a tendency for the dominance of a particular set of
ideas which can perform a legitimising role in the guise of 'truth'.
This implies that in such a social context, the social influences
on science and the system of scientific ethics will depart from the
ideals outlined above. Furthermore, it implies that the attain-
ment of such ideals must be contingent upon changes in the social
context. In this sense, then, we are led to the view that, in
essence, a society mdY get the science that it deserves.
Returning to the question of the 'scientific validity' of the con-
ception developed in this thesis, the implication is that the assess-
ment of such validity basically must involve the elaboration of the
implications of the conception in relation to a particular issue
(in this case the debate about nuclear power) and making critical
judgement and decisions about the extent to which the evidence suggests
rejection, modification or acceptance of the conception. This,
then, was the second aim of this thesis and the analysis was
reported in the second part of the thesis (chapters 7-9). The analy-
sis was, however, necessarily restricted and was confined to an
examination of the 'mainstream' arguments in favour of nuclear power
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development in terms of the extent to which they embody the normative
commitments of what we have conceived of as a 'dominant ideology',
and the extent to which they gain credence in the debate from such
commitments. In relation to this more limited interpretation of our
aim, it was concluded that there is indeed evidence to support
the conception in relation to the conduct of the 'nuclear debate'.
However, it must be emphasised that the analyses in this thesis can-
not be seen as providing support for the whole of the conceptual
scheme as developed in the first part. In particular, evidence to
support ~he influence of the identified normative themes of an
hegemonic framework of ideological knowledge does not necessarily
lend support to the various other components of the theoretical
framework concerning, for example, the role, in the process of
social knowledge production, of the 'problem-solving' activities of
the state and the specific role of social knowledge, relative to
political power, in the process of public policy formulation. These
might be seen as receiving some 'indirect' support by virtue of
their interrelationship with the more 'directly supported' hypotheses
within the wider conceptual framework, to the extent that this frame-
work is internally consistent. Nevertheless, there is a need for
further more detailed analysis of the various aspects of the theore-
tical position elaborated in the first part of the thesis.
As regards possible lines of further research there is indeed a
multitude of questions which has been raised by the analyses in this
thesis. I shall attempt to cover the more important ones in discus-
sion of three main research areas of increasing 'generality': aspects
of the debate about nuclear power; the question of the role of social
knowledge in public policy formulation; and the issue of the relation-
ship between the process of knowledge development and its social context.
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First, then, there are many aspects of the debate about nuclear
power which require further research. In substantive terms, we reqUire
an improved understanding of the economic, environmental, social and
political implications of nuclear power development. As I have
argued, this cannot be a case of producing 'objective truths' about
such implications but rather of constantly attempting to improve
the 'scientific validity' of our knowledge and produce a context in
which alternative and competing perspectives are openly and critically
discussed and recognised as scientifically valid to a greater or
lesser degree. The problem of bringing about such changes will be
discussed below under our third area of research. At this stage it
can be suggested that there is a need for more research into those
aspects of nuclear energy which are of great concern to its opponents
but which do not attract funding from official sources, in order to
increase the potential for conflict resolution on the basis of
increased knowledge, while recognising that this potential may be
rather limited.
Particular areas where further research is needed include the
relationship of nuclear power development to economic growth and
its wider macro-economic implications, the environmental consequences
of large-scale development of nuclear energy, the low-level radiation
implications of the nuclear fuel cycle and the effects of this on human
and other biological systems, and a fuller and more open assessment
and discussion of the implications of nuclear power development for
social structures, individual freedoms and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Another important area concerns the role of the 'nuclear
industry' (defined in the widest sense) in our political system and
the way in which decisions about nuclear policy are made; this relates
to our second area of research below. Finally, the analysis in this
thesis has been restricted to the arguments of the sUpporters of
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nuclear nowerand it is necessary to extend the same approach to the
analysis of the arguments of its opponents in order to identify their
normative underpinnings and the specific way in which such evaluative
factors constitute the basis for conflict.
The question of the role of social scientific knowledge in the pubic
policy-making process and, in particular, in the resolution of conflict
over public policy issues has essentially provided the broader
context for the analyses presented in this thesis. However, further
research is required on various aspects of this question. A useful
approach might be to broaden the analysis to look at the wider
debate over low energy futures to isolate the sources of the conflicts
and identify the potential for conflict resolution on the basis of
'improved' knowledge. A possible approach to extending my analysis
into such a research area can be briefly outlined.
The basic research hypothesis would derive from the conclusion of
the present analysis to the effect that the perceived 'rationality'
and 'acceptablility' of arguments concerning the nuclear power
issue depends, to a significant extent, on the nature of their under-
lying normative basis in relation to dominant 'conventional' values
and interests. It would be hypothesised, then, that conflict over
energy policy issues primarily derives not from problems of shortage
of information or the use of wrong information, but rather from the
existence of conflicting basic 'evaluatazy perceptions' of the social
world which are manifested in conflicting paradigms and world-views,
and in conflicting social and political value judgements and assumptions
embodied in the analyses and proposals of different interest groups.
In other words, conflict derives not simply from ignorance but from
the material interests of different social groups and classes within
a specfic institutional context, interests which become embodied in
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the aims, motivations and arguments of the various groups entering
the energy policy arena.
The process of assessing the validity of this hypothesis would involve
the following stages. Firstly, the energy scenarios which have been
propounded by interest and pressure groups and official govern-
ment bodies could be examined to determine the major areas of con-
flict. The various critiques and reviews would also be examined
at this stage. Secondly, the assumptions, postulates, premises,
information bases etc upon which conflicting positions are developed
could be identified. Examples might be assumptions about economic
growth, definitions of economic variables, assumptions about the
performance of supply options (efficiencies, accident risks, economic,
social and environmental implications etc.). Particular attention
would be given to identifying the basis of selectivity and judgement,
and relating choices to the theoretical commitments which underlie
the development of the scenarios and provide the analytical dimen-
sions of the paradigms within which the scenario
situated.
proponents are
The third stage might involve an examination of the social, political
and iTl~;t-itllUOllcll 'positions' of scenario advocates, their aims
and objectives in relation to the promotion of energy scenarios,
and the sets of social values and interests which underlie their
approach to the energy policy arena. This would involve analysis
of their constitutions and statutory obligations (if any), of any
contributions to other areas of public policy and, further, could
involve an approach to the qrouos involved with a structured enquiry
into these issues. A basis would therefore be provided in these
stages for tracing the source of energy policy conflicts via inter-
paradigm disputes to conflicts in social values and interests
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as they are manifested in the particular social context of the
conflicts.
Finally, the analysis would provide a basis for an assessment of the
potential for 'conflict resolution'. On the one hand, the frameworks
employed for the analysis and evaluation of energy policy altern-
atives could be assessed in terms of their existing implications for
conflict resolution and their potential for incorporating an explicit
consideration of those factors which are at the base of controversies
and therefore for contributing to their resolution. On the other hand,
it would be necessary to investigate the possible nature of institutional
changes which would be required to promote conflict resolution on
the basis of full and open discussion and debate of all viewpoints
in the absence of domination, whether of an overtly 'political' or
implicity 'ideological' nature.
Such an analysis, then, would hopefully provide valuable further
insights into the source of conflicts over public policy issues and
the nature of the pre-conditions for a meaningful, open, and fully
democratic debate about such issues. It would build on the conclusion
of the f'rf'~;(,Tlt analysis that an important pre-condition for such a
debate is a reform of both scientific practice and prevailing ration-
alisations of that practice. This brings us to our third area of
further research - that of the relationship between the process of
social knowledge development and its social context.
The present analysis has indicated the extent to which we can
perceive the influence of an hegemonic framework of ideological know-
ledge upon the conduct of the debate about nuclear power. such a
framework was conceived in terms of an interrelated set of epistemelo-
gical and theoretical structures with both descriptive and evaluative
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components. Thus, the framework on the one hand purports to describe
the way in which social knowledge is developed, the nature of the
social world and the way in which knowledge is utilized in informing
social action, and, on the other hand, provides certain imperatives,
based on these descriptions, on the way in which knowledge should
be developed and utilized and implies evaluations about the nature
of the social world. In chapter 9 I attempted to indicate the way
in which the evaluative themes structure the conduct of the debate
in terms of forms of 'rational' argument, perceptions of the
nature of the 'energy problem' and approaches to the solution of the
'problem-as-perceived'. The implication is that far-reaching
changes in the dominant modes of thinking about social and techno-
logical development would be required as a pre-condition for changes
in the conduct. of the debate about issues related to such development.
However, this then raises the question of the kinds of changes
to the social and institutional context which might be necessary
to support reforms in our social science and philosophy.
This is essentially a research problem in the field of the sociology
of knowledge. Tile primary issue concerns the degree and form of
influence of social, economic and political structures on the process
of production of social knowledge. We need to gain a better under-
standing of the extent to which it would be possible to institute
'reforms' in this process without fundamental changes to social and
institutional structures. Alternatively, we need to know what kinds
of changes in the latter would be required to permit desired reforms.
As regards the present analysis the conclusions lead to arguments
for reforms in two respects. Firstly, I have argued that the actual
nature of social knowledge in our society is rather different from
the dominant conception of it and that the latter performs an important
legitimatory function; consequently, we need to reform our dominant
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conception of the natureof social knowledge. Secondly, having done
this, and having recognised the crucial role of scientific ethics
in determining the 'scientific quality' of social knowledge, we need
to institute a system of ethics which will ensure 'good' social
science.
Therefore, we need a better understanding of the kind of social
and institutional changes which would be required to permit such
reforms. I have hypothesised for this study that the present structure
of ideological social knowledge is related to certain aspects of the
social and political context, specifically through the role of the
state in defining and attempting to solve major problems related to
capital accumulation and the maintenance of stability. I have indi-
cated that this hypothesis requires further analysis and this would
provide a basis for assessing the prospects for and approach to reform,
the crucial question being, perhaps, the degree of 'determinism' in
the above hypothesised relationship. To what extent, then, are a
particular system of social relations and its legitimising ideological
structure mutually reinforcing and interdependent? To what extent
have we got the science that we deserve?
It may be, therefore, that systems of sceintific ethics are basically
a function of the characteristics of the social and political con-
text and that if we lived in a society which promoted the full and
open debate between competing value-contingent viewpoints then the
establishment of an effective scientific ethics would be a 'trivial'
problem. This is undoubtedly a very difficult research area and it
is also one which has been rather neglected by many philosophers of
science in their concern to outline the way in which they feel science
should be undertaken. For example, Paul Feyerabend (1970, 1975)
presents a conception of the 'desirable' form of scientific activity
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from the point of view of promoting wider social goals. Specifically
he argues that the overriding goals of scientific activity should
be the maximum development of the liberty and freedom of individual
humans and of their capacity to enjoy life and that this goal is
best served by methodological, theoretical and ideological pluralism.
Rejecting the motion of methodological guarantees of objectivity, he
argues that any methodology should be permitted and encouraged thus
leading to a proliferation of theories; that confrontation of rival
theories will force implicit assumptions out into the open and promote
debate and criticism of them; and that the individual should be
presented with a choice of 'ideologies' amongst which science is only
one. In short, 'anything goes': ..• "it is up to us to choose
either a dragon or a pussy cat for our company." (op. cit. 1970
p. 229).
However, Feyerabend would appear to underestimate the constraints
on our freedom to choose our science deriving from the social and
institutional context. It is very easy to posit ideals, to suggest
that, for example, the arguments in the debate about nuclear power
should be developed within a plurality of approaches set in a con-
text which permitted, and indeed encouraged, mutual open criticism
and debate, in such a way that progress could be made both towards
a better knowledge of the world and towards the goals of greater
democracy and freedom. The problem is: to what extent could such
radical changes in our approach to science be achieved only as part
of a programme of fundamental social and political. change? To
extend Feyerabend's analogy, it could be argued that if we are cur-
rently lumbered with a dragon and we want a pussy cat then we must do
ewo thinq~;:firstly, we need to dispose of the dragon.; and secondly,
we mUQt create an environment in which our pussy cat can survive and
prosper.
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Ravetz (1971) also considers the issue of scientific reform though
placing more emphasis on its social context and the central role of
ethics. He argues that the conditions for an 'effective' scientific
ethics have been eroded in modern industrial society but, while
emphasising the dependence of ethics on the social and cultural
context of scientific activity, he discusses the issue of 'ethical
reform' without fully tackling the problem of the nature of the social
and political changes which might be necessary to support such reform.
Thus, he argues that the ethical basis for ..."the future excellence
of science" .... perhaps lies in a ..•"humanitarian conunitment, nec-
essarily interpreted in a much more sophisticated fashion than ever
before" (op, cit. p , 313). However, he does not indicate the nature
of the social and political changes which would be necessary to sup-
port the development of such a commitment into a primary motivating
ethic for the scientific community, notwithstanding the present moti-
vation of some scientists by humanitarian concerns. In spite of
recognised serious impediments in the present social context, however,
he sees hope in a 'critical science' motivated by such concerns:
"(I)f the style of critical science, imposed by.the very nature
of its problems, becomes incorporated into a coherent
philosophy of science, it will provide the basis for a trans-
formation of scientific inquiry as deep as that which occured
in early modern Europe. The problems, the methods, and the
objects of inquiry of a matured and coherent critical science
will be very different from those of academic science or
technology as they have developed up to now; and together
they can provide a practical foundation for a new conception
of humanity in its relations with itself and the rest of
nature." (op, cit. p. 428-9)
It is evident, then, that the studies undertaken for this thesis
represent a very small achievement in the context of a broader concern
with the role of knowledge in informing social action. Nevertheless,
I would personally hope that the analysis makes some contribution to
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improving the basis for an understanding of how we might move towards
a freer, more equal and more democratic society. Given my perspective
on the nature of social knowledge, there is always likely to be dis-
agreement about the role of such knowledge in achieving a 'better
world'. Some, following Bertrand Russell, for example, will see
intelligence as paramount; others will emphasise the role of political
power. However, whatever the relative role of 'rationality' and
'power' may be (and it is likely to vary considerably in different
circumstances) it is evident that the scientific community has a very
important role to play. From a context in which humankind lives
under the threat of annihilation from the technological 'fruits' of
its own ingenuity, in the development of which the scientific
community has played a crucial part, one might reasonably question
the grounds for optimism. However, a moment's reflection on the
improbability of our very existence, and on the amount of human
effort and inspiration invested by our ancestors to get us where we
are today, should be sufficient to re-establish an optimism based upon
a conviction that what we have is far too precious to place in
jeopardy and, moreover, that we can make the world a better place
for those who will follow. As Noam Chomsky (1972 p. 83) argues,
quoting Russell's vision of the world we must seek:
"(I)t would be tragic if those who are fortunate enough
to live in the advanced societies of the West were to
forget or abandon the hope that our world can be transformed
to 'a world in which the creative spirit is alive, in which
life is an adventure full of hope and joy, based rather upon
the impulse to construct than upon the desire to retain what
we possess or to seize what is possessed by others' ••••.
'Meantime, the world in which we exist has other aims. But
it will pass away, burned up in the fire of its own hot
passions; and from its ashes will spring a new and younger
world, full of fresh hope, with the light of morning in its
eyes'. II
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Annex 1 References for Review of UK Energy Policy
Cheshire et al. (1977)
Department of Energy (1977)
Department of Energy (1978A)
Department of Energy (1979)
Department of Energy (1981)
Department of Energy (1982A)
Department of Energy (1982B)
Flowers (1976)
Goode et al. (1980)
International Energy Agency (1978)
International Energy Agency (1979)
Ministry of Power (1967)
Pearce et al. (1979)
Pearson (1981)
Select Committee on Energy (1981)
Times (1981)
Webb and Ricketts (1980)
Williams (1980)
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Figure 1.1 UK Primary Energy Consumption 1960-82
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Figure 1.3 Fuel Used In ELectricity Generation in the UK 1966-83
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Figure 1.1. Electricity Consumption by FinaL User Sector in the UK 1965-82
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Annex 2: Comparative Generation Costs of Nuclear and Fossi1- Fuelled
Power Stations
Table Al: Comparative Generation Costs for Major Power Stations
Commissioned Between 1965 and 1977 (p/KWh)
Costing System
I II III IV
A. Nuclear (Magnox)
Capital charges (incl. provision
for decommissioning) 0.43 1.57 1.45 1.41
Inclusive Fuel Cost 1.21 1.38 0.82 0.88
Other Costs of Operation
(incl. research & training) 0.42 0.42 0.33 0.34
Total Cost 2.06 3.37 2.60 2.63
B. Coal-Fired
Capital charges (incl. provision
for decommissioning) 0.10 0.33 0.48 0.40
Inclusive Fuel Cost 1.72 1.72 1.51 1.84
Other Costs of Operation
(incl. research & training) 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.22
Total Cost 2.05 2.28 2.19 2.46
C. Oil-Fired
Capital charges (incl. provision
for decommissioning) 0.27 0.92 0.57 0.79
Inclusive Fuel Cost 2.68 2.68 1.76 2.10
Other Costs of Operation
(Lnc l . research & training) 0.27 0.27 0.16 0.18
Total Cost 3.22 3.87 2.49 3.07
Notes on Table Al
1. Power stations covered are:
Nuclear (Magnox): Dungeness A, Sizewe1l A, Hinkley Point A,
Oldbury, Trawsfynydd, Wylfa:
Coal: Tilbury B, Ferrybridge C, Aberthaw B, Fiddlers Ferry,
Drakelow C, Ironbridge B, Rugeley B, Cottam, Ratcliffe,
West Burton, Eggborough DidcotiOil: Fawley, PembroKe
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2. Alternative costing systems are as follows:
I Generation costs for 1981-82 on monetary interest cost
basis: costs allocated to one year's generation reflect
money values and interst rates in years in which they
are incurred.
II Generation costs for 1981-82 on opportunity cost basis
with 5% discount rate: Costs allocated to one year's
generation converted to prices in that year and
annuitised assuming 5% opportunity cost of capital;
III: Generation costs of lifetime to 1982 on opportunity cost
basis with 5% discount rate: Costs allocated on time-
related basis from commissioning date to 1981/82
converted to 1982 values and discounted to commissioning
date assuming 5% opportunity cost of capital.
IV Generation costs over whole lifetime on 5% opportunity
cost basis: Past and forecast future costs up to and
including decommissioning expressed in 1982 values and
discounted or compounded to commissioning date at 5%
opportunity cost rate.
3. 'Capital Charges' include the original capital cost of each station
in each year of construction and extra miscellaneeus capital
expenditure (eg improved or post-commissioning site facilities);
for nuclear stations an annual sum is included to cover the
net costs of decommissioning and the cost of decommissioning
BNFL's reprocessing plant at Sellafield.
4. 'Inclusive Fuel Cost': costs of fuel consumed, of reprocessing
spent fuel and of disposing of waste material.
5. 'Other Operating Costs' include salaries and other operating,
repair and maintenance costs and an estimate of expenditure
on research and training allocable to each station type.
6. Where future costs are involved expected real increases in
prices of fuel, nuclear fuel reprocessing and construction costs
have been built in; for fuel assumed real increases are coal 2% p.a.
from1984-85, oil 3% p.a. and uranium ore 3% p.a.
7. Assumed operating lives are coal 40 yrs, oil 30 yrs and nuclear
(Magnox and AGR) 25 yrs (20 years for Wylfa).
8. Source CEGB (1983).
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Table A2: Comparative Generation Costs for Hinkley Point Band
Drax First Half (p)KWh)
Costing System
I II III IV
A. Hinkley Point B
Capital charges (incl. provision 0.51 1.03 1.63 1.14
for decommissioning)
Inclusive Fuel Cost 0.77 0.85 0.92 0.93
Other Costs of Operation
(incl. research & training) 0.29 0.29 0.37 0.32
Total Cost 1.57 2.17 2.92 2.39
B. Drax First Half
Capital charges (incl. provision
for decommissioning) 0.21 0.47 0.50 0.43
Inclusive Fuel Cost 1.59 1.59 1.61 1.02
Other Costs of Operation
(incl. research & training) 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.22
Total Cost 2.04 2.30 2.30 2.67
Notes on Table A2
1. See notes on Table Al.
2. Source CEGB (1983)
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Table A4: Comparative Net Effective Costs for Sizewell B, AGR, and
Coal-Fired Stations under Different Scenarios and Nuclear
Backgrounds (£/KW p.a. March 1982 prices)
No new
Nuclear
Nuclear Background
Medium
Nuclear
High
Nuclear
Scenario A
Sizewell B
AGR station
Coal-fired station
Scenario B
Sizewell B
AGR station
Coal-fired station
Scenario C
Sizewell B
AGR station
Coal-fired station
Scenario E
Sizewell B
AGR station
Coal-fired station
Notes on Table A4
-138
-92
-3
-143
-111
-24
-83
-46
21
-25
-14
46
-121 -92
-4 -2
-128 -108
-25 -24
-63
-24
17
-32
-9
26
-25 -3
46 49
1. 'Nuclear Backgrounds' comprise alternative assumptions concerning the
development of generating plant mix after the construction of Sizewell B
a) No new nuclear = no new nuclear construction after Heysham II
b) Medium nuclear = nuclear capacity builds up to 40% of total
c) Hiqh nuclear = nuclear capacity builds up to 70% of total
2. Scenarios represent alter~o~ive sets of assumptions about growth in
electricity demand between, 1979/80 and 2030:
Scenario A + 27%
Scenario B + 56%
Scenario C + 15%
Scenario E - 16%
3. AGR station is assumed to be of the type under construction at
Heysham II and coal-fired station of the type constructed at Drax;
for other assumptions see Table AS.
4. Source: Jenkin(1982).
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Annex 3: The Safety of Nuclear Power
A. Routine Radiation Emission
Table AI: ICRP Recommended Annual Dose Limits
occupational Exposure
Whole Body 5 rem p. a.
Maximum to any tissue 50 rem p.a.
Eye Lens 15 rem p.a.
Public Exposure
Whole Body 0.5 rem p.a.
Maximum to any tissue 5 rem p.a.
Source: Bonnell (1982 p. 12-13); Wade (1981) p. 294)
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Table A2: Maximum Exposures Resulting from the Nuclear Industry
Compared with ICRP Dose Limits
Critical Individual Dose (Max) •
Source Pathway as % of ICRP Limit
UKAEi'.
Winfr i th Shellfish <0.2
Hawell Drinking Water <1.0
Dounreay External dose <1.0
BNFL
Windscale Fish/shellfish 30.0
Springfields External dose <1.0
Chapelcross External dose/shell-
fish <1.0
CEGB
Berkeley/Oldbury External dose/fish <0.1
Bradwell Fish <0.3
Dungeness A External dose/fish <0.1
Hinkley Point A External dose/fish <0.2
Sizewell A External dose/fish <0.2
Trawsfynydd Lake fish 3.0
Wylfa External dose/fish <0.1
Notes
1. Data relates to 1977
2. Windscale figure was expected to reduce as new plant was
commissioned.
3. Source: Wade (1981 p. 295).
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Table A3: Average Annual Per Capita Radiation Doses in the UK
Source Effective Whole-Body Dose Equivalent
(rem)
Natural Background 0.186
Minimum (London) 0.160
Maximum (Aberdeen) 0.250
Medical Applications 0.050
Fallout from Weapons Tests
1963-64 0.006 - 0.008
1977 0.001
Miscellaneous Sources 0.0008
Nuclear Power Generation 0.0003
Notes
1. Data show exposure of public based on NRPB publications in 1974
and 1978.
2. Source: CEGB (1982A p. 70); Wade (1981 p. 295).
B. The Risk of Major Accident
See FLqure Bl (over)
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